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Abstract 
Social science is in crisis. The task of social science is to study “man in situation”: to understand the 
world as it is for “man”. This thesis charges that this crisis consists in a failure to properly address the 
philosophical anthropological question “What is man?”. The various social scientific methodologies who 
have as their object “man” suffer rampant disagreements because they presuppose, rather than consider, 
what is meant by “man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that social science can 
provide no formal definition of “man”. In order to understand this we propose a phenomenological 
analysis into the essence of social science.  
 This phenomenological approach will give us reason to abandon the (sexist) word “man” and 
instead we will speak of wer: the beings which we are. That we have not used the more usual “human 
being” (or some equivalent) is due to the human prejudice which is one of the major constituents of this 
crisis we seek to analyse.  
 This thesis is divided into two Parts: normative and evaluative. In the normative Part we will 
seek a clarification of both “phenomenology” and “social science”. Due to the various ways in which 
“phenomenology” has been invented we must secure a simipliciter definition of phenomenology as an 
approach to philosophical anthropology (Chapter 2). Importantly, we will show how the key instigators 
of the branches of phenomenology, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre, were all engaged in this task. 
To clarify our phenomenology we will define the Phenomenological Movement according to various 
strictures by drawing on the work of Schutz and his notion of provinces of meaning (Chapter 3). This will 
then be carried forward to show how Schutz’s postulates of social science (with certain clarifications) 
constitute the eidetic structure of social science (Chapter 4).  
 The eidetic structures of social science identified will prompt several challenges that will be 
addressed in the evaluative Part. Here we engage in an imperial argument to sort proper science from 
pseudo-science. The first challenge is the mistaken assumption that universities and democratic states 
make science possible (Chapter 5). Contra this, we argue that science is predicated on “spare time” and 
that much institutional “science” is not in fact science. The second challenge is the “humanist challenge”: 
there is no such thing as nonpractical knowledge (Chapter 6). Dealing with this will require a 
reconsideration of the epistemic status that science has and lead to the claim of epistemic inferiority.  
 Having cut away pseudo-science we will be able to focus on the “social” of social science 
through a consideration of intersubjectivity (Chapter 7). Drawing on the above phenomenologists we will 
focus on how an Other is recognised as Other.  Emphasising Sartre’s radical re-conception of “subject” 
and “object” we will argue that there can be no formal criteria for how this recognition occurs. By 
consequence we must begin to move away from the assumption of one life-world to various life-worlds, 
each constituted by different conceptions of wer. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social science is in crisis. As understood by Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) a crisis involves ‘an event or 
situation that cannot be met by applying the traditional and habitual pattern of behaviour and 
interpretation’ (Schutz, 1964i:231). To speak of a crisis of social science is to declare as Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938) did in the opening of The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Philosophy 
(Crisis) (1936[1970c]) that ‘the crisis of science indicates nothing less than that its genuine scientific 
character, the whole manner in which it has set its task and developed a methodology for it, has become 
questionable’ (1970c:3). Despite many claiming to do social science, these claimants struggle to cohere 
with one another as to what is meant by “social science”. The task of social science as we understand it 
(co-opting Sartre) is the study of “man in situation”: to understand the world as it is for “man”. It is the 
charge of this thesis that this crisis stems from a failure to properly address the philosophical 
anthropological question “What is man?”. As we understand it, “philosophical anthropology” is the 
determination of “man” over and against all that is “not-man”. It is our intention to show that the root of 
the crisis is that social science as the study of “man in situation” can provide no formal definition of 
“man” (see below).  
 To this end we will pursue a phenomenological analysis into the essence of social science as the 
most precise means of understanding this crisis. That is, phenomenology, among other things, is a 
reflection into the nature of science (Moran and Embree, 2004c:1). Following Schutz we understand that 
it is ‘the ideal of phenomenology to establish a complete realm of fully clarified ideas, that is, a complete 
system of all intuitively knowable essences’ (Schutz, 1970a:49). “Essences” are discerned when a thing is 
‘brought by the process of clarification to perfect self-givenness, to perfect lucidity and vividness’ 
(1970a:50). We propose the essence of social science to be:  
The pursuit of nonpractical knowledge into “man” as a being who not 
only exists as a part of the organisation of the life-world but acts as one 
among many organisers of a life-world. 
 
Our task is to bring this essence to the fullest possible clarity necessary to address the crisis. We 
emphasise that this pursuit of essences is an ideal of phenomenology and no one study will fully discern 
the essence of social science. Rather, our intention is to affect the necessary shift in our understanding 
that will enable future constructive solutions to this crisis.  
 In the course of bringing this essence to the fullest possible clarity we will have cause to critique 
much that has gone by the name “social science”. Indeed, to achieve clarity we must recognise that much 
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of the “science” that occurs in universities is pseudo-science, though we do not mean to engage in an 
institutional defence of Social Science. To be clear, by “social science” we refer to a particular practice, 
an activity, and by “Social Science” we mean the institution or discipline. This does not necessarily 
exclude the “Humanities” as such. Rather, the institutional division within universities of Social Science 
and Humanities are taxonomic divisions done for practical reasons: ‘dividing the field of scholarship and 
science into various departments or faculties or schools is largely a matter of convenience in organisation 
rather than a reflection of intrinsic differences in subject matter’ (Gordon, 1991:1). As we see it, social 
science is to be found in both Social Science and Humanities.
1
  
 As part of its process it must be noted that ‘clarification also has the function of giving old 
words a newly constituted sense’ (Husserl, 1980:88). Words and terms have been given 
phenomenological meanings, or new terms developed. But through translation or the historical gap 
between the writings of “then” and “now” unintended connotations or interpretations have accrued to 
these words that must again be clarified. One such word is “man” which in the wake of feminist critiques 
now carries with it a certain degree of sexism. In the treatment of ambiguous words we have adopted the 
strategy of translating them into their Old English equivalents
2
 when we wish them to carry a specific 
phenomenological sense. We have chosen Old English for three reasons: first, it is closer to Modern 
German - which many key phenomenologists wrote in - than Modern English is; second, there is a level 
of specificity lacking in Modern English; third, as a dead language the terms used are unlikely to be read 
with meanings other than those defined. “Man”, as one such word, will now be rendered as “wer”.3 As 
we will use it in this thesis we define wer in the minimal sense of the beings which we are. Thus to say of 
someone that they are wer is to say “they are a being like me” and as such has no gender indication. The 
reader may well ask why we have not used “human being” or some equivalent in this particular case. The 
reason for this is what we call the human prejudice which constitutes one of our major steps in analysing 
the crisis of social science.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 For ease of exposition we have referred almost exclusively to the former. 
2
 For translations we have relied primarily on Jember (1975), Englisc Onstigende Wordbōc 
 (2014) and Old English Translator (2014). Where possible we have also kept to the Old English 
grammatical forms (see Glossary).  
3
 “Wer” is predominantly found in the concept of wergild: the price someone would have to pay for 
killing another person. 
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i. Seeing the crisis 
 
In the lecture “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man” (1935[1965b])4, which Lauer describes as an 
introduction to the Crisis
5
 (Lauer, 1965:7), Husserl claims that science began with the Greeks. Greece, 
Husserl suggests, is the spiritual birthplace of Europe not as a geographically defined area but the ‘unity 
of a spiritual life and a creative activity – with all its aims, interests, cares, and troubles, with its plans, its 
establishments, it institutions’ that includes Europe as a land mass and other English speaking domains 
such as the United States (Husserl, 1965b:155).  
 Here we strike upon our second term in need of clarification – “Geist”. Both Lauer and Carr 
translate “Geist” as “spirit” as it is the lesser evil in comparison to the alternative “mind” or “mentality” 
(in Husserl, 1965b:152; 1980:6). The issue is that both “spirit” and “Geist” can carry certain metaphysical 
connotations and be synonymous with “soul”. However, in the case of Husserl this would be erroneous as 
“soul” is always referred to as “Seelen”. According to Dermot Moran, “Geist” translated as “spirit” (over 
“mind”) indicates cultural activity (Moran, 2012:47). As such it is also erroneous to translate the 
associated Geisteswissenschaft, which Husserl uses to refer to what we now call “social science”, as 
“human science” as Lauer and Carr, and Rojcewicz and Schuwer in their translation of Ideas II 
(1952[1989]), all do. For the latter this leads to the odd construction: ‘if I am in the attitude of the human 
science, the sciences devoted to the spirit’ (Husserl, 1989:214).6 How “Geist” can be translated as both 
“human” and “spirit” in the same sentence is not explained by the translators. We agree with Seebohm 
that a proper translation would be “spiritual science” (Seebohm, 2013:126). Further complications, 
however, arise when we turn to a consideration of “Geist” as it is translated in Max Scheler’s (1874-
1928) works. In the case of Scheler, “Geist” is more consistently translated as “mind” as well as “spirit”. 
As explained by Frings, a principle translator of Scheler, the use of both to translate “Geist” is to 
differentiate between a sociological use (“mind”) and a metaphysical use (“spirit”) (in Scheler, 
1980b:vii). Not only does this cause difficulties for Frings’ translation; it also means that in English 
Scheler’s “mind” corresponds to Husserl’s “spirit”. To avoid confusion we will adopt the Old English 
                                                 
4
 An alternate translation also appears as appendix A in Crisis.  
5
 Only Parts I and II of Crisis were published in Philosophia. Husserl died in 1938 before finishing Part 
III which was then completed by his research assistant Eugen Fink. Moran has suggested the published 
text is a “Fink-Husserl cooperative effort” (Moran, 2012:13-14). 
6
 A similarly issue may occur in Weinsheimer and Marshall’s translation of Gadamer’s Truth and Method 
(Gadamer, 2013:3). More detailed study is required beyond the scope of this thesis to be sure of how 
Gadamer properly meant the phrase to be used.  
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word “ferhđ” to mean the cultural activity indicated by Husserl. Should we need to refer to “Geist” or 
“spirit” in a metaphysical sense we will use the cognate “gāst”. While “ferhđ” shares the ambiguity of 
“Geist” in that it can be translated as “mind” or “spirit”, unlike “gāst” it cannot be translated as “soul” or 
“ghost”. We will further clarify this choice later in our discussion of Scheler’s phenomenology.  
 In Greece this ferhđ took shape in the seventh and sixth century BCE as a new Einstellung 
(attitude), or, ‘a habitually determined manner of vital willing, wherein the will’s directions or interests, 
its aims and cultural accomplishments, are preindicated and thus the overall orientation determined’ 
(Husserl, 1965b:165). This arose into the “cultural form” which the Greeks called philosophy. According 
to Husserl, “philosophy”, ‘in its original sense, bespeaks nothing but universal science, science of the 
world as a whole, of the universal unity of all being’ (1965b:159). The interest in this totality began to 
particularise itself into various specialisations out of which were produced the various sciences. Thus, in 
the earlier Logical Investigations (1901, 1913, 1921[1970a, 1970b])
7
, Husserl characterises philosophy 
(and logic) as the “theory of science”. Husserl goes on to call the attitude of philosophy (and the sciences) 
the “theoretical attitude” by which is meant an attitude that pursues ‘knowledge for its own sake’ 
(1965b:164).  
 It is not our purpose to assess how historically accurate Husserl is in crediting the Greeks with 
the beginning of science. Scott Gordon (1991), for example, suggests that science did not emerge until 
the Renaissance (14
th
-17
th
 Century). This is not to suggest that science did not occur before the works of 
Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) whom 
Gordon singles out as exemplars in this period. Gordon also points to work of the Roman Period, Middle 
Ages, and the 11
th
-13
th
 Centuries as containing science. Rather, it is his suggestion that it is only with the 
Renaissance that “modern science” can said to have begun as a continuous development (1991:23).  
 The Renaissance, and particularly Galileo, hold an important place in Husserl’s argument of the 
Crisis also. Husserl credits Galileo with the mathematisation of nature: ‘nature itself is idealised under 
the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes – to express it in a modern way – a 
mathematical manifold’ (Husserl, 1970c:23). Koyré details the impact of the Galilean revolution, which 
overturned Aristotlean physics, as the ‘discovery of the fact that mathematics is the grammar of science. 
It is this discovery of the rational structure of Nature which gave the a priori foundations to the modern 
                                                 
7
 The book would go through various editions and alterations.  
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experimental science and made its constitution possible’ (Koyré, 1943:347). In short everything in the 
universe becomes amenable to quantification. As Husserl describes it: 
The indirect mathematisation of the world, which proceeds as a 
methodical objectification of the intuitively given world, gives rise to 
general numerical formulae which, once they are formed, can serve by 
way of application to accomplish the factual objectification of the 
particular cases to be subsumed under them. The formulae obviously 
express general causal interrelations, “laws of nature,” laws of real 
dependencies in the form of the “functional” dependencies of numbers. 
(1970c:41) 
 
Galileo himself was unable to shake off all his Aristotlean heritage and in Husserl’s analysis Galileo is a 
figure used to exemplify the emergence of modern science. Moran notes that the Crisis is more concerned 
with uncovering ‘the concealed thought-formations and intentions that led to the “construction” of the 
idea of nature as understood by modern science that has now become so thoroughly implanted in our 
culture that we somehow think of this scientific nature as if it were the “natural” or common-sense view 
of modern humanity’ (Moran, 2012:74).  
 Out of the mathematisation of nature comes a decisive split wherein the thing of experience is 
treated as a sign of certain other properties. Beginning with Galileo there is a ‘surreptitious substitution of 
idealised nature for prescientifically intuited nature’ (Husserl, 1970c:49-50). In this new science 
emerging from Galileo as physics, ‘things “seen” are always more than what we “really and actually” see 
of them’ (1970c:51). And it is through the “garb of ideas” this mathematisation creates that ‘we take for 
true being what is actually a method – a method which is designed for the purpose of progressively 
improving, in infinitum, through “scientific” predictions, those rough predictions which are the only ones 
originally possible within the sphere of what is actually experienced and experienceable’ (1970c:51-52). 
However, in order to engage in this infinite progress of ever detailed predictions we must entertain an 
abstraction whereby all “cultural properties” are removed from objects to create a self-enclosed world of 
bodies. In effect, Galileo invented “nature” as we know it now: ‘a self-enclosed natural causality in which 
every occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance’ (1970c:60). And as “nature” was 
discovered, so too was the idea of “gāst” as its opposite. As such this led to a new European ferhđ. Or 
rather, a revolution whereby what the European considered “natural” became replaced with a new 
conception.  
 Most significant in this revolution is the ambiguous place ferhđ held in this new nature/gāst 
division. Culminating in Descartes’ mind-body dualism, ferhđ effectively became equated with gāst. 
However, also stemming from Galileo came what de Caro and MacArthur have recently called the “Great 
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Success of Modern Science Argument”: the technical achievements of natural science to encompass more 
and more data engendered scientism, the view that the only true picture of reality is provided by natural 
science (de Caro & MacArthur, 2004:4). Thus, Hobbes formulated the doctrine of subjectivity in which 
the intuited world of our lives is taken to be subjective and insofar as it relies on pre-scientific thinking is 
necessarily false. And even Descartes declared in the case of the sun that only the sun constructed by 
astronomers using geometry and mathematical physics was the true sun (Moran, 2012:77). As these 
various successes mounted they began to be taken for granted by scientists and in such a way that any 
attempt to get the scientist to reflect upon the ‘original meaning of all his meaning-structures and 
methods’ was rejected as “metaphysical” (Husserl, 1970c:56-57). In “Crisis of European Man” Husserl 
refers to the naïveté of scientism wherein bolstered by the success of the natural sciences those who claim 
to study ferhđ “naturalised” it (Husserl, 1965b:181). As such ferhđ became equated with nature and its 
method of study. 
  This naturalised study of ferhđ is pegged on psychology for much of the Crisis as the exemplary 
case. Husserl brands this as naiveté because the idea of “nature” as a ferhđcund construction was never 
raised. By consequence the crisis of Husserl’s time was that European wer had become dominated by a 
“rationalism” based upon the natural sciences. In particular a dissonance emerged between the world as 
these “naturalistic” sciences proclaimed it to be and the world as it was experienced. Husserl saw this 
happening most clearly in the case of the “ferhđcund sciences”, or, what we now call the social sciences, 
which consistently fail to understand the “ferhđcund world” according to the principles of the “natural 
world”. This thesis may be considered an extension of Husserl’s project in the Crisis. Yet in writing of 
the “crisis of social science” are we suggesting that a new crisis has arisen? 
 There is a significant historical gap between this thesis and Husserl’s arguments of 1936-1938. 
Nor can we ignore that it came into being in a particular historical context with the rise of anti-
rationalism both within philosophy and in politics. Husserl was not the first to attack the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment period but, as he saw it, the mistake of contemporary philosophers was to abandon 
rationality altogether. At the same time the “staleness” of naturalistic rationalism was finding a political 
reaction in the form of National Socialism which was also embracing anti-rationalism. Yet Husserl’s aim 
was not ‘a political polemic but a sober philosophical diagnosis of the roots of the problem’ (in Husserl, 
1970c:xxvii). It was these problems of the day that gave the impetus for Husserl to reflect upon the crisis 
of European Science. And if we look at our current context then there can be no denying that the current 
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financial climate has not in some way provided the impetus to this current study. But it would be a 
mistake to suggest that we are dealing with two separate crises of a similar nature. It is the presupposition 
of this thesis that social science has never not been in crisis. It is only such events as the rise of Nazism 
or the economic crash that make the crisis apparent.  
 Looking at the history of Social Science in the wake of Husserl’s Crisis we find scholars 
tackling the same crisis that he identified: the question of the character of social science. Ernest Nagel, 
writing in 1952, comments that: 
There is little general agreement as to what social theory ought to be, and 
as to what social theory ought to accomplish; and in any case, whatever 
sense is attached to the word “theory,” there is no theoretical treatise in 
these disciplines comparable in scope and authority with those current in 
physics, chemistry or biology. (Nagel, 1963:19) 
 
Nine years later he expanded on this earlier comment making the situation of social science sound even 
worse: 
In no area of social inquiry has a body of general laws been established, 
comparable with the outstanding theories in the natural sciences in scope 
of explanatory power or in capacity to yield precise and reliable 
predictions… It is also generally acknowledged that in the social sciences 
there is nothing quite like the almost complete unanimity commonly 
found among competent workers in the natural sciences as to what are 
matters of established fact, what are the reasonably satisfactory 
explanations (if any) for the assured facts, and what are some of the valid 
procedures in sound inquiry. (Nagel, 2003:39-40) 
 
Fritz Machlup (1963) referred to this situation as Social Science’s “inferiority complex” – whether 
justified or not – in which Natural Science is perceived to be better.  
 Stephen Toulmin later drew a distinction between Physics as a “compact discipline” and 
Behavioural/Human Sciences (i.e. Social Science) as a “would-be discipline” (Toulmin, 1972:382-386). 
In short, we seek the methodological unity of Natural Science, whether there is indeed such, and yet 
somehow have failed to live up to this desire. In fact, Toulmin’s own views echo that of Husserl’s above: 
‘in science and philosophy alike, an exclusive preoccupation with logical systematicity has been 
destructive of both historical understanding and rational criticism’ (Toulmin, 1972:vii). More than this 
though, the following diagnosis of a “would-be” discipline applies to social science: 
The different men attempting to co-operate in launching a new science 
(say) may not merely disagree about their particular observations and 
interpretations, concepts and hypotheses: they may even lack common 
standards for deciding what constitutes a genuine problem, a valid 
explanation, or a sound theory. (1972:380) 
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As of 2011 the situation has hardly improved according to Steel and Guala: ‘there is little consensus 
across the social sciences as to basic methods, aims, and fundamental assumptions about human beings’ 
(Steel and Guala, 2011:1).  
 The resolution, as Toulmin recognised, of such a problem is not to be found in empirical 
investigation but in methodological and philosophical discussion. As such while much of what we will 
discuss has practical benefits for many empirical studies the exploration of these goes beyond the scope 
of our main argument. Indeed, these “practical” problems can only be properly addressed once we have 
affected the fundamental shift this thesis aims to achieve. Where possible, we have included some 
indication of these in footnotes. 
 However, no such philosophical discussion can proceed without reference to these empirical 
investigations if it is not to be trapped in its own musings. To this end we shall use Religious Studies
8
 as 
a way of exemplifying the issues which we wish to discuss. We have chosen Religious Studies over other 
disciplines (e.g. Sport Studies) due to comments like that of Luther Martin and Donald Wiebe that ‘no 
undergraduate departments of Religious Studies have fully implemented a scientific program of study and 
research since such an approach was first advocated in the late nineteenth century’ (Martin and Wiebe, 
2012a:9). There is a particular lack of identity that lends itself to our current considerations in part 
because Religious Studies straddles the institutional Social Science/Humanities divide. Samuel Preus 
(1987) and Eric Sharpe (1988) have detailed some of the chaos that has ensued as a result of this. But in 
1996 Charlotte Allen suggested that it was a good thing ‘for religious studies to be a shapeless beast, half 
social science, half humanistic discipline, lumbering through the academy with no clear methodology or 
raison d’etre’ (Allen, 1996). In 2008 Paul-Francois Tremlett echoed Allen’s comments in slightly more 
negative tones: ‘The study is a field of enquiry that lacks any clear or singular definition of its object or a 
specific procedure, method or set of assumptions by which the study of religions might claim for itself 
the (dubious) status of a “discipline”’ (Tremlett, 2008:viii). But it must be emphasised that this crisis we 
are seeking to analyse is not just the concern of Religious Studies. Jonathan Turner, describing the 
situation of Sociology, states the following: ‘A discipline that speaks with so many voices is not vibrant; 
rather it is in chaos’ (Turner, 2005:38). We are simply using Religious Studies to illustrate this very 
point.  
                                                 
8
 We will use “Religious Studies” and “religious studies” in the same fashion we have used “Social 
Science” and “social science”.  
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 The comments of Martin and Wiebe, in particular, are useful for highlighting some of the 
charges we wish to make. As they see it, religious studies as it is done in universities now originated in 
the works of Max Müller (1823-1900) and Cornelius Tiele (1830-1902) who advocated a 
Religionswissenschaft – a “science of religion” (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a:11-12). The project of 
Religionswissenschaft, they explain, can be seen as a “specialisation” within the wider project of 
Wissenschaft (science) understood as “knowledge for the sake of knowledge”. Their account, however, is 
unacceptably naïve. Wissenschaft has its roots in the University of Berlin in 1810 as the first “modern 
research university” but was crucially oriented toward assisting Bildung – education as self-cultivation 
(Gregory, 2012:348-349). In this early stage the “modern university” was bound to a Romantic vision of 
education as self-realisation, a view in part stemming from the influence of Schleiermacher. Contra 
Martin and Wiebe’s abbreviated account, the Wissenschaft of 1810 did not yet resemble the Wissenschaft 
of a century later.
9
 According to Gregory, on practical terms, these “romantic universities” had only 
traded out one source of control, The Church, for another, The State, dependent as they were on funding 
(2012:350-351). It is not until the nineteenth century, and a certain transposition to America, that we see 
universities endorsing the sort of program advocated by Martin and Wiebe. Indeed, Gregory indicates 
that it is as late as Max Weber (1864-1920) – specifically “Science as a Vocation” (1919[1946]) – that 
Wissenschaft in Martin and Wiebe’s sense of “knowledge for the sake of knowledge” really established 
itself in universities (Gregory, 2012:358). 
 This Weberian Wissenschaft has since been taken up in phenomenology; according to Aron 
Gurwitsch there are two important aspects of Wissenschaft: even though much technology is based on the 
findings of science, technological development is not itself a part of science; and, the term not only 
indicates natural science, but also the human sciences and formal sciences (in Gurwitsch, 1974:ix). 
Though it originated separately, “Wissenschaft” has effectively become another way of expressing 
Husserl’s “theoretical attitude” as “knowledge for its own sake”. Or, as commented by Scheler 
responding to “Science as a Vocation”: ‘The very central point on which I fully agree with Max Weber is 
the assertion that science, by its nature, has no application to the development and formulation of a 
Weltanschauung (world-view)’ (Scheler, 1989a:87). A point echoed by Husserl’s conclusion to Cartesian 
Meditations (CM) (1931[1988]): ‘phenomenological explanation does nothing but explicate the sense of 
this world has for us, prior to any philosophising … a sense which philosophy can uncover but never 
                                                 
9
 A similar argument is found in Gadamer (2013:3-16). 
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alter’ (1988:151).  But the problem this presents for both Scheler and Husserl is the shared conviction 
that “science” has stemmed back as far as the Ancient Greeks; a view potentially just as idealised, if not 
more so, as Martin and Wiebe’s.  
 The distinction between the two is that Martin and Wiebe’s comments rely too much on science 
as it is done in ‘modern research universities’ (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a:12). That is, they take the 
practice of science, or lack thereof, in universities as the principle factor for discerning what they call a 
“failure of nerve” in Religious Studies to meet the scientific aims of pioneers like Müller and Tiele. More 
specifically, Wiebe (2012) comments elsewhere, these departments have failed to achieve the necessary 
“secularisation” demanded for a (Weberian) Wissenschaft and remove themselves from religious 
concerns. However, it must be recognised that not all Religious Studies departments descend from this 
original Religionswissenschaft and there are other origin stories too. Or, as they blithely ignore, that 
Religionswissenschaft fell into the hands of what we will call phenomenology-of-religion – the 
“phenomenology” most familiar to Religious Studies – immediately after Tiele. Our charge against 
Wiebe’s account is that the crisis of social science is not brought about by a failure of universities to 
promote science. Husserl’s account of the “theoretical attitude” not only argues for its presence long 
before “modern” universities existed but makes hardly any reference to them. To argue for Wiebe’s 
position is to misunderstand the conditions under which science is possible. It will be one of our tasks to 
clarify the possibility of science to combat the mistaken assumption that universities are necessary for 
science.   
 Furthermore, both Martin and Wiebe have already proposed a solution to this crisis/failure on 
“scientific” grounds (2012a:13-17). They suggest that on the basis of cognitive and evolutionary sciences 
it is possible to explain why “religiousness” will continue to constrain religious studies. Drawing on 
Robert McCauley (2011) it is suggested from the evolutionary and cognitive perspective that religion is 
natural and science is not (2012a:15). Humans, they argue, are very adept at detecting agency pre-
reflectively and on the basis of minimal stimulation. This ability to detect agency is an evolutionary trait 
that instilled a wariness that protected us from predators identified by Justin Barrett (2004) as 
Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD). Martin and Wiebe conclude that: ‘Our evolutionary 
history has, in other words, endowed our species with a developmentally early proclivity for explaining 
our world in terms of agent causality’ (2012a:15). Scientific knowledge, they contend, replaces this agent 
causality with natural causality. But, as agent causality is part of our evolutionary make-up we have a 
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tendency to cognitively default to thinking in terms of agent causality. We have, as it were, a natural 
‘anti-science proclivity’ (2012a:16). Framed in terms of the crisis of social science this would be to 
suggest that the crisis emerges from a human propensity to default into agent causality.  
 As a solution to the crisis, however, this does not reach far enough. Even if we were to accept 
their premises, their argument is aimed exclusively at religious studies. They openly admit that this 
problem is not suffered elsewhere: ‘In no other department of the modern university do researchers 
systematically avoid critical studies and theoretically based explanations of their subject of study’ (Martin 
and Wiebe, 2012a:17). But as von Stuckrad has recognised, it is question begging as to why, if we have a 
natural propensity to be un-scientific, this propensity only manifests in religious studies (von Stuckrad, 
2012:59). As they present their argument, Martin and Wiebe are responding to a “crisis of religious 
studies” and their comments cannot be extended to include all of social science. It is also on the grounds 
that our analysis must be applicable to all social science that we will later reject phenomenology-of-
religion. 
 Related to this point is that the division between agent causality and natural causality is heavily 
reliant upon the philosophy of naturalism. Their claim that agent causality can effectively be reduced to 
natural causality is one that naturalism has historically struggled to justify. Not only does this repeat the 
naïveté of which Husserl spoke above,
10
 but it has led more recently to a divide within naturalism 
between “scientific” and “liberal” naturalisms. But even liberal naturalism which would allow for some 
form of agent causality is nevertheless flawed because the way in which it determines which causes are 
“natural” or “agential” requires an orthodoxy of rationality which is fundamentally pseudo-scientific. Our 
charge against naturalism is that it has essentialised
11
 the epistemic status of science and it will be another 
of our tasks to clarify this.  
  The crisis, quite simply, is ongoing. Yet the obvious question is why? Husserl proposed the way 
out of the crisis was through transcendental phenomenology. Yet the less than universal acceptance of 
this program even among his own followers suggests that his solution to the crisis was inadequate in 
some regard. We do not intend to suggest that phenomenology is deficient in the task however. But as 
Husserl himself demanded: ‘It lies in the nature of phenomenology and of the unique functions which 
devolve upon it for the whole of our knowledge, that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that 
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 Von Struckrad (2012) and Seiwert’s (2012) responses to Martin and Wiebe’s paper repeat some of 
Husserl’s more general contentions against naturalism.  
11
 The full meaning of this term word will be unpacked in Ch.4.i.  
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out of phenomenological sources it must bring to fullest clarity the method itself which it practices’ 
(Husserl, 1980:80). As such if we are to engage in a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social 
science we must first clarify what it means to be phenomenological. Only then will we have adequate 
grounds upon which to proceed.  
 
 
ii. Philosophy of social science  
 
Based on the above comments we know there is a crisis of social science because there are a number of 
methodologies in contestation with one another. More accurately each methodology is an attempt to say 
what “social science” is. That this constitutes a crisis is precisely because there is disagreement and not 
agreement. As Delanty and Strydom define it, “methodology” roughly translates from the Greek as 
“theory of the way in which knowledge is acquired” and thus refers to the rationales and processes that 
guide scientific enquiry (Delanty and Strydom, 2003:4). In English “methodology” is often associated 
with “theory of science” or “philosophy of science” (2003:4). Broadly understood the philosophy of 
social science is a reflexive activity and is not the doing of social science per se. Delanty and Strydom 
note that this reflexive attitude can be conceived in one of three broad ways: 
1. The philosophy of social science can be construed as a second order activity with the purpose of 
providing a normative vision for social science. The philosophy of social science is a sub-branch 
of the philosophy of science and plays a legislative role over how science should be done. As 
Gordon forcefully puts it: ‘some philosophers of science take the stance that the object of their 
discipline is to delineate a methodology of investigation that guarantees the discovery of truth, 
and to prescribe that methodology as canonical imperatives which practising scientists are 
obliged to follow’ (1991:ix).  
2. As a reaction to this first kind of activity, a second emerged through a “hermeneutical tradition” 
started by social scientists rather than philosophers. In this understanding ‘leading social 
scientists advocated a specifically social science epistemology, seeing the philosophy of social 
science as something that goes on within social science and for which philosophers are not 
responsible’ (Delanty & Strydom, 2003:2). Like the previous understanding it is a second order 
activity as an epistemological consideration of the nature and status of scientific knowledge. In 
this respect we may think less of “philosophers” and more of “social theorists”.  
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3. Another understanding, similar to the previous, regards the practice of social science and 
philosophical reflection to not be separate activities on different levels.  This stance differs from 
the above in that ‘the philosophy of social science is a reflexive discourse on the practice of 
social science, but one that is neither prescriptive-legislative nor proclaims a specific philosophy 
of social science’ (Delanty & Strydom, 2003:3). Another way of understanding this is to 
describe it as the social scientific study of social science.  
 As we understand it, there is little difference in Delanty and Strydom’s differentiation between 
philosophy of social science in the first and second senses. The only substantive difference that can be 
discerned is that the former are “philosophers” and the latter are “social scientists”. If we follow 
Husserl’s understanding of the relation of philosophy to science we can say that philosophers attempt to 
make normative claims about the whole of science (Husserl, 1970a:70-71). As Lauer suggests, 
philosophy ‘provides the norms whereby any science can be worthy of the name’ (in Husserl, 
1965b:178).  Scientific theorists differ in that their normative claims focus on the specific branch of 
science in which they operate. Both, however, are making normative claims that are operating at the same 
level. While scientific theorists may add certain claims there is, nevertheless, a core which applies to all 
science in their thinking or else they cannot speak of other disciplines outside their own as sciences. It is 
for this reason that we will speak of “normative philosophy of social science” to refer to both first and 
second senses and “evaluative philosophy of social science” to refer to the third sense.   
 Thus within Social Science these contesting methodologies are all normative philosophies of 
social science – i.e. they make normative claims about what social science should do and how it should 
be done. We do not, however, intend to argue that these methodologies are mutually exclusive per se. 
Rather, our focus is the source of this contestation which we have suggested can be found through a 
consideration of philosophical anthropology. However, to understand this contestation we must engage in 
a social scientific analysis of it. That is, this thesis can be regarded as evaluative philosophy of social 
science.  
 In saying this though, we enter into a hermeneutical circle. Evaluative philosophy of social 
science as a social scientific study of social science necessarily presupposes the validity of at least one of 
these methodologies in order to know what it is we are doing and how we are to do it. The presupposing 
of this methodology has a consequence for this argument: any attempt to study the crisis of social science 
from a social scientific perspective is also an attempt to resolve it. More exactly, it is the enforcement of 
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certain normative claims about social science to ascertain why they have not been kept by other parties. 
This can be seen in Husserl’s Crisis: not only did he recognise that his study involved ‘a sort of circle’, 
but the very phenomenology he used to perform the study became the very solution to the crisis 
(1970c:58). In presupposing a methodology we are drawing a line in the sand within which are 
encompassed social scientific methodologies, including the methodology used to draw the line itself. As 
Martin Heidegger, who made the circle famous, queried: ‘in working out the question do we not 
“presuppose” something that only the answer can provide?’ (Heidegger, 2010:7). This then implies those 
methodologies encompassed within this line are valid and should be defended as proper science against 
pseudo-science.
12
 As Heidegger goes on to say: ‘“Presupposing” being has the character of taking a 
preliminary look at being in such a way that on the basis of this look beings that are already given are 
tentatively articulated in their being’ (2010:7). Nor, though, should we be lulled into thinking this 
resolves the crisis. True, this may delimit proper social science, but this does not negate that there is still 
contestation among those methodologies contained therein. As such our concern is to first expel threats to 
science (pseudo-science) and from there delve deeper into this contestation, unconfused by outside 
influences, to get at the core of the crisis.   
 The presupposing of a methodology and the hermeneutic circle entailed is not a reason to 
discount this argument. Indeed, Kiesel has suggested that the hermeneutic circle is closer to thinking than 
presumed by (positivistic) science (Kiesel, 2004:50-51). If we tried to proceed without a methodology 
this analysis would be curtailed at the observation that there are many competing methodologies within 
Social Science and could say no more. Anything further said on the matter presupposes a methodology 
by which to proceed even if this methodology is only tacitly presupposed. The key is not so much 
breaking the circle but generating enough momentum with it that we are propelled forward: ‘the practical 
possibility of a new philosophy will prove itself: through its execution’ (Husserl, 1970c:18). The further 
we propel ourselves, the more successful we have been. From this, though, it may be legitimately claimed 
that the methodology presupposed has been presupposed either arbitrarily or ideologically. However, as a 
criticism this point is empty. As hinted at by von Stuckrad, any methodology presupposed will be subject 
to this point: ‘There is no way out of the dilemma that advocating science or a particular understanding of 
it cannot be grounded on scientific arguments but necessarily refers to normative positions and subjective 
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 “Proper” and “pseudo” replace “good” and “bad” in Husserl’s discussion of a “normative science” (i.e. 
“theory of science”) (Husserl, 1970a:81-86).  
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preferences’ (von Stuckrad, 2012:36). Certainly we may be able to push the circle back a step. This is the 
naturalist move of making social science continuous with natural science. While this might appear to get 
us out of the circle for social science it only does this by the presupposing of a natural scientific 
methodology – i.e. the line in the sand of social science is drawn within the line in the sand of natural 
science which is also drawn by a presupposed methodology. The circle remains, only now it is in the 
frame of natural science.  
 Because of the arbitrary/ideological nature of this presupposing of phenomenology, we are 
making an imperial argument. The line we are drawing between proper science and pseudo-science will 
invariably displace certain people who claim to be doing “science” to the latter side. We will not shy 
away from this, any attempt to resolve the crisis of social science carries with it the claim “Get in line or 
get down”. But we would add in defence of this vulgar phrasing that we are not the first to say as such, 
Wiebe states similarly that: ‘What is required in that debate – not only in the field of the study of religion 
but there especially so – is an either-or choice, for it is not scientifically acceptable to mix our science 
with modes of thought that contradict its fundamental intentionality’ (Wiebe, 1999:135). Speaking more 
recently, he has suggested that this division and defence of science requires both an intellectual and 
political effort (Wiebe, 2012:184-186). What Wiebe has referred to as the political effort we have cast as 
the arbitrary/ideological. More important for now is that the intellectual effort requires a normative 
philosophy of social science not only to defend, but also to defend with. To reiterate, this does not make 
phenomenology the only normative philosophy of social science to be defended, only that the precision of 
phenomenology will bring the greatest possible clarity to the crisis.
13
 
 This thesis is, then, divided into two parts. Part I is a normative philosophy of social science: it 
will elucidate the phenomenological methodology presupposed and the essence of social science to be 
defended. Part II is an evaluative philosophy of social science; having established the essence of science 
it will be our task to scrutinise this further to sort proper from pseudo- science. Once achieved we will 
finally be in a position to understand the crisis of social science.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 While we suspect there to be a number of similarities between Foucault and the position argued here 
(particularly in The Order of Things (1966[2002a]) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969[2002b])), 
his criticism of philosophical anthropology (see Schacht, 1990) turns him away from the very issue we 
wish to discuss.  
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iii. Proper phenomenology 
 
The task of Part I of this thesis can be summarised as follows: we must bring to the fullest possible clarity 
our understanding of what is meant by “phenomenology” as the methodology which we shall presuppose 
in our analysis of this crisis. And so securing this meaning we must also demonstrate that 
phenomenology is social scientific and therefore in a position to analyse the crisis of social science.  
 However, in privileging phenomenology as the methodology for this thesis and taking Religious 
Studies as our main example we now need to make certain clarifications. Herbert Spiegelberg has bluntly 
pointed out that ‘the difficulty of stating point-black what phenomenology is are almost notorious’ 
(Spiegelberg, 1982:1). The word “phenomenology” has existed a long time and according to Spiegelberg 
it has been invented at least eighteen times independently. He points out this is hardly surprising that 
once “phenomena” became worth studying and “-ologies” became fashionable, the conjunction 
“phenomenology” was somewhat inevitable. We raise this point because within Religious Studies 
historically the most predominant methodology has been what we call “phenomenology-of-religion”. 
Although the phenomenology-of-religion has all but died in recent years under stringent criticism it has 
left behind a curious mark by which any form of “phenomenology” is treated with suspicion. It is the first 
task of this thesis, therefore, to separate the phenomenology-of-religion from the Phenomenological 
Movement. In order to achieve this we need to make various distinctions between “phenomenology 
simpliciter” and “pseudo-phenomenology”, “phenomenology simpiciter” and “phenomenology proper”, 
and “phenomenology proper” and “unrelated phenomenology”.  
 Beginning with phenomenology simpliciter it is necessary to determine how it is that so many 
disparate scholars working in relative isolation can claim the title of “phenomenology”. We propose in 
Chapter 2 that in the simpliciter sense what holds together otherwise disparate “phenomenologies” is that 
they are all engaged in the task of philosophical anthropology. That is, “phenomenology” is by definition 
an approach to the question “What is wer?”. We intend to demonstrate this by looking into the various 
branches of the Phenomenological Movement. 2.i will pursue why it is the approach to this definition has 
not proceeded along the lines of phenomenology-of-religion. There are two grounds for this: first, there is 
a large degree of ambiguity over when and where phenomenology-of-religion began and by consequence 
who should or should not be contained within the rubric; second, phenomenology-of-religion’s position 
on the relation of religious studies and social science indicate that its concerns do not extend to the latter. 
2.ii will, however, show that though the Phenomenological Movement has more certain beginnings it 
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would be erroneous to equate the entire Movement solely with the thinking of Husserl. There are at least 
four “branches” of phenomenology for which Husserl can be accredited with the instigation of only two. 
2.iii will resolve this problem by showing how the thinking of several key phenomenologists, Husserl, 
Scheler and Heidegger, all approached philosophical anthropology even if they did not always accept the 
title themselves. The lack of “philosophical anthropology” in both Husserl and Heidegger has more to do 
with a polemic attempt to outshine Scheler. 2.iv will argue that Sartre, despite comments to the contrary, 
carried forward the specifically phenomenological approach to philosophical anthropology. This will then 
lay the foundations for later arguments.  
 From this understanding of phenomenology simpliciter we need to move forward in Chapter 3 to 
an understanding of phenomenology proper as the specifics of how this approach to philosophical 
anthropology is carried out. That is, while both the Phenomenological Movement and phenomenology-
of-religion are phenomenologies in the simpliciter sense, as phenomenologies proper they shared marked 
differences. To this end we will introduce the work of Schutz as the successor of Husserl. By this we 
mean that Schutz is the instigator of a fifth branch of phenomenology that applied itself specifically to the 
problems of social science. In 3.i we will introduce how Schutz synthesises and responds to the thinking 
of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre.
14
 In particular we will focus on his notion of provinces of 
meaning, a key aspect of his sociology of knowledge, as being the framework from which we can 
delineate the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement. 3.ii will therefore detail the 
necessary components that must go into a province of meaning in order for it to function as such. Using 
these requirements we will then demonstrate how the Phenomenological Movement constitutes a 
province of meaning in 3.iii. We will thus identify the strictures of phenomenology and bring clarity to 
the definition of the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement as: 
Proper phenomenology is the faithful study of things themselves to clarify 
their essences as they are given to wer. 
  
Carried with this identification of phenomenology proper is the “ideological” claim that it is proper 
phenomenology. By this we mean that the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement is 
suitable for getting at the core of the crisis of social science whereas the phenomenology proper of 
phenomenology-of-religion is not.  
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 That we have focused on these five phenomenologists to the exclusion of others (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 
Gadamer, Ricoeur and Levinas) is based primarily on their explicit discussions of philosophical 
anthropology as well as their key positions in instigating the various branches of phenomenology. 
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 Continuing with Schutz it will then be necessary in Chapter 4 to demonstrate the 
phenomenology of the Phenomenological Movement is also social scientific. In order to do this we must 
begin to formulate the essence of social science. For this 4.i will make the argument that “social science” 
is also a province of meaning, or more accurately, a means of characterising a type of province of 
meaning. In various essays Schutz delineated various postulates that can be used to determine whether a 
province of meaning is social scientific or not. However, as these postulates are spread across several 
essays which differ as to titles and content it is the task of 4.ii to bring to full clarity the proper list of 
postulates. In so doing we will argue that it is the purpose of science to pursue “knowledge for its own 
sake” and that social science is a qualification of this purpose to focus on knowledge about “wer in 
situation”. As part of this task we will also address the rationality of science. Having established the 
various postulates as the eidetic structures of the essence of social science we will finally show in 4.iii 
how these cohere with the strictures of phenomenology. By doing so we will confirm that the 
phenomenology of the Phenomenological Movement as proper phenomenology can engage in an analysis 
of the crisis of social science.  
 
 
iv. The phenomenological analysis of social science 
 
The essence of social science and its relation to phenomenology shall present us with a number of 
challenges which will be addressed in Part II. We will turn from a normative philosophy of social science 
to an evaluative social science in which the full extent of our imperial argument will take shape in the 
delineation of proper science from pseudo-science. It is only by making these demarcations around 
proper science that we will be able to get at the core of the crisis of social science.  
 The first challenge is already contained in our agreement with Toulmin above over social 
science as a “would-be discipline”. His diagnosis of what this means is quite apposite for summarising 
the current state of affairs of Social Science (and Religious Studies). But in admitting this we may 
question what we can add to Toulmin’s already detailed analysis? Our difference stems from the fact 
Toulmin recognised that the phrase “scientific discipline” is not tautological (Toulmin, 1972:359). While 
we agree with this, it does reveal that Toulmin focuses primarily on the problem of “disciplinarity” – a 
focus shared by numerous other scholars who take the issues of social science to be an institutional 
problem. But out of this has stemmed the erroneous assumption that science is dependent upon 
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institutions, specifically universities, in order to proceed.
15
 It is the purpose of Chapter 5 to address under 
what conditions is it possible for science to proceed? This requires differentiating between the practical 
and essential possibilities of science. Those who regard science as institutional have conflated these two 
kinds of possibilities. Such a view is exemplified by Robert Merton who made the further argument that 
democracy is essential to science. Contrary to this, in 5.i we will show that democratic States can hinder 
science according to Merton’s own understanding of it. In particular we will demonstrate that the recently 
implemented Research Excellence Framework violates Merton’s scientific norm of disinterestedness. In 
further investigating this challenge we will then explore the relation of science to institutions in order to 
show that science can be non-institutional. 5.ii will argue that institutions are “protected groups” and their 
ascription as such is subjective to the individual/group. Whether Science is an institution or not is a 
contingent matter which can easily be demonstrated by cases of illegal science. As we see it, the essential 
possibility for doing science lies not in its relation to democracies or institutions but in there being spare 
time. “Spare time” as we will define it in 5.iii is any time the individual/group has which does not need to 
be spent surviving or thriving – i.e. time available for the pursuit of nonpractical interests. Here we will 
draw on Sartre’s notions of fear and anguish to demonstrate how easy it is to lose spare time and by 
consequence that much that goes by the name “science” is in fact pseudo-science. 
 In arguing that the essential possibility of science lies in spare time we then encounter the 
“humanist challenge”: As we have eminently practical interests (surviving and thriving) that cannot be 
escaped, all “nonpractical interests” in fact contain implicit practical interests. Such a claim would 
reduce all proper science to pseudo-science. Chapter 6 will therefore deal with the argument that science 
understood as knowledge for its own sake has never, nor can ever, be achieved by considering the 
epistemic status of science. 6.i will give clarity to the divide between “scientist” and “humanist”, noting 
of the latter that it can in fact be divided into imperativist and cohortativist varieties. In order to clarify 
the epistemic status of science we need to demonstrate that science is “nihilist” and avoids 
“commitment”. To do this, we will demonstrate how the humanist challenge correctly applies to 
naturalism. In 6.ii we will explicate the constitutive claim of naturalism and the related positivism to 
reveal that they give science epistemic superiority by claiming to know the world “as it is”. Such a 
postion, however, involves an orthodoxy of rationality which, in 6.iii, we will argue necessarily leads to 
ought claims. In order to avoid this and protect the claim that science involves “knowledge for the sake of 
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 This does not mean this view originates with Toulmin. 
23 
 
knowledge” we need to stand in complete opposition to the naturalists who would proclaim science to be 
a ‘different, and epistemically superior, method for understanding and explaining the world’ (Martin and 
Wiebe, 2012b:69). We thus suggest in 6.iv. that science is an epistemically inferior pursuit. In order to do 
this we will clarify “objectivity” in the sense of objective knowledge in relation to neutrality. That is, 
objective knowledge has to do with meeting the rational standard of a particular province of meaning. 
More precisely in the case of science this has to do with determining whether a scientist is being 
scientific. Naturalism, we charge, has essentialised the rational standard of science through its orthodoxy 
of rationality so that it applies to all provinces.  
 All rational standards are intersubjectively constituted and this will lead us into a consideration 
of intersubjectivity as the crux of social science. Here we will get at the core of the crisis of social science 
in Chapter 7: why, if various methodologies are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one 
another? In 7.i we will begin to move away from an understanding of intersubjectivity as “mutual 
understanding”. Our analysis will focus less on how objective knowledge is achieved and more on who is 
involved in its constitution. In understanding intersubjectivity so we will return to the philosophical 
anthropological question: “What is wer?”. More specifically we are concerned with how the Other is 
recognised as Other. To do this we will explore Scheler’s consideration of intersubjectivity as involving a 
distinction between “knowledge about” Others in general and “knowledge of” the Other. We mean to 
show that Schutz has misread Scheler on the basis of the human prejudice. In 7.ii we will show that the 
human prejudice provides “knowledge that” is an Other in order to gain “knowledge of” the Other. We 
argue, however, that in order to understand how the Other is recognised as Other we require instead 
“knowledge how”. Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity provides this through a radical reconception of 
“subject” and “object”.  
 As a consequence of this appeal to “knowledge how” we will turn Derrida on his head in 7.iii 
and argue that rather than an end of wer, wer is without end. Based on the processes of intersubjectivity 
no formal definition can be given to the characteristics of wer – i.e. “knowledge that”. This is the crisis of 
social science: as the study of wer in situation, social science can provide no formal definition of wer. 
The human prejudice entails a limited concept of wer which presumes a world as it is and is thereby 
unsocial scientific. We charge that much “social science” operates under the human prejudice and this 
has led to distortions which mean we consistently fail to understand the world as it is for X. The full 
ramifications of this argument will be explored in 7.iv. Here we argue that in order for a proper social 
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science to proceed we need to abandon the idea of the world and accept the notion of worlds. More 
importantly, as revealed by Schutz himself, the very name “social science” counterpoises itself to 
“natural science” and thereby contributes to perpetuating the very problems we have identified. We will 
therefore take steps towards clarifying our science as the science of ferhđ.
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Part I 
 
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science. But 
before we can begin our analysis we are beset with the question of what is meant by 
“phenomenological”? As suggested in the Introduction, the possibility of a “phenomenological analysis” 
presupposes that it is itself social scientific. Thus we must ask the question “what is phenomenology?” 
This is, however, not an easy question to answer; as recognised by Spiegelberg ‘the difficulties of stating 
point-blank what phenomenology is are almost notorious’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:1). Indeed, that we have 
chosen Religious Studies to highlight the crisis of social science makes an answer to this question all the 
more demanding. Within the history of Religious Studies the phenomenology-of-religion, through such 
figures as Gerardus van der Leeuw, Juoco Bleeker, Mircea Eliade, and Ninian Smart, has represented one 
of the dominant methodologies of the discipline. However, this is only one invention of 
“phenomenology” and whether it is appropriate to our study is debateable.  
 According to Spiegelberg there have been at least eighteen independent inventions (1982:7-19). 
In the Phenomenological Movement he designates the phenomenology of the Phenomenological 
Movement instigated by Husserl as “phenomenology proper” and the remaining seventeen inventions as 
“pseudo-phenomenologies” in the second edition (1971) and as “unrelated phenomenologies” in the third 
edition (1982). Spiegelberg explains in the preface to the third edition that the reason for the shift is to 
move away from the derogatory tone of the former designation (1982:xxxvii). It is the purpose of this 
Part to take up Spiegelberg’s terminology to understand what phenomenology is. However, we will use 
them in a slightly different fashion. Though he dropped the designation of “pseudo-phenomenology” it 
can in fact be retained by pursuing a simpliciter definition of phenomenology. Chapter 2 will show that 
phenomenology by its very definition is a philosophical anthropology – an approach to the question 
“What is wer?”. Any “phenomenology” which does not meet this simpliciter definition will be designated 
as “pseudo-phenomenology”. However, this simpliciter definition applies to a number of 
phenomenologies which need differentiation. As such Chapter 3 will pursue a definition of 
phenomenology proper (designating a particular). That is, a definition of phenomenology as a 
methodology. The phenomenology proper which we shall seek to define is that of the Phenomenological 
Movement which we shall call “proper phenomenology” (of one’s own) in opposition to the 
phenomenology proper of the phenomenology-of-religion as an “unrelated phenomenology”. From here 
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Chapter 4 will argue that this proper phenomenology is social scientific by elucidating the essence of 
social science as it was discerned in the phenomenological analyses of Schutz. 
27 
 
2. Phenomenology Simpliciter 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to begin to clarify the precise sense of what we mean by 
“phenomenology”. As we have proposed to use Religious Studies as our example this consideration takes 
on double importance. Just as we have suggested there is a failure of claimants to cohere as to the 
meaning of social science, so too we find within Religious Studies a failure to cohere as to the meaning 
of “phenomenology”. This is in part to due to the existence of a diffuse tradition of scholars which we 
will bring under the title phenomenology-of-religion. While the various disagreements as to who belongs 
to this tradition indicate its inadequacy to serve our purpose of analysing the crisis of social science, if we 
are to gain a precise understanding of the phenomenology we intend to use we must clarify how it is that 
“phenomenology” can be used by both the phenomenology-of-religion and the Phenomenological 
Movement to which we will subscribe ourselves. To this end we must first establish a simpliciter 
definition of phenomenology which we suggest can be achieved through a survey of the key instigators of 
the major branches of the Phenomenological Movement. By doing so we will define phenomenology 
simpliciter as an approach to philosophical anthropology. 
 
 
i. Phenomenology and phenomenology-of-religion 
 
According to Spiegelberg the “phenomenology” of Religious Studies is an invention which stands 
‘halfway between the philosophy of religion and the history of religion, yet without coinciding with the 
psychology of religion’ (Spiegelberg, 1971a:10). In order to avoid confusion with the phenomenology of 
religion that occurs within the Phenomenological Movement we will refer to this invention as the 
“phenomenology-of-religion”. For the aims of this thesis the phenomenology-of-religion is unsuitable for 
the task of performing a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science. In order to see this we 
will compound Spiegelberg’s analysis of it. 
 In Spiegelberg’s brief account, the phenomenology-of-religion began with Chantepie de la 
Saussaye. However, while the first edition of de la Saussaye’s Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte (1887) 
contained a section on “phenomenology of religion”, this was subsequently removed for a dedicated work 
on the topic that never appeared. Thus Arie Molendijk has suggested phenomenology-of-religion really 
began with Gerardus van der Leeuw whom Spiegelberg also erroneously identifies as de la Saussaye’s 
28 
 
student (Molendijk, 2000:27; Spiegelberg, 1971a:605-606). But this is to then ignore the intermediary 
figures of Tiele and William Brede Kristensen (1867-1953), the latter of whom is suggested as the 
founder by James Cox (2006). Indeed, based on the work of Cox we have reason to suggest that 
phenomenology-of-religion is not a single Dutch invention and that there are two others occurring 
independently in Britain and America.   
 The British school begins with Edwin Smith (1876-1957), a contemporary of Kristensen. 
According to Cox, Smith’s phenomenology begins with African Ideas of God (1950) a full ten years 
before Kristensen’s principle work in English, Meaning of Religion (1960), was made available. As 
Kristensen was not widely known beyond his immediate locale and Meaning of Religion is a translation 
of lectures it is unlikely that Smith was aware of his work (Sharpe, 1975:227). Even Cox admits that 
Kristensen’s ‘substantial contribution to methodological issues did not occur until after 1950’ (Cox, 
2006:108). There is nothing to indicate that Smith’s phenomenology-of-religion is drawn from the Dutch 
school. Similarly, Cox regards Geoffrey Parrinder’s (1910-2005) West African Religion (1949) and 
African Traditional Religion (1954) as being phenomenology-of-religion, but it is not until Comparative 
Religion (1962) that we see influences from the Dutch school’s C.J. Bleeker and Hendrik Kraemer (1888-
1965) (2006:146-150). The same story occurs in the case of the American school along with the 
following comment: ‘Wach, Eliade, J.Z. Smith and W.C. Smith, aligned themselves with disciplinary 
approaches in the study of religion that can be distinguished from the phenomenology of religion’ 
(2006:171). In the case of Eliade, he referred to himself as a historian of religions and explicitly rejected 
the title of “phenomenologist of religion” (Eliade, 2006a:259).  
 Based on other comments it is likely that the British and American schools could be further 
divided into other inventions. But this mulitiplicity of phenomenology-of-religions creates a broader 
issue of general disagreement among commentators as to who does or does not belong under the rubric. If 
we compare those “phenomenologists” listed by Cox with those compiled by Eva Hirschmann (1940), 
Eric Sharpe (1975), Joseph Bettis (1969), and Jacques Waardenburg (1973) we gain conflicting results: 
  Hirschmann Sharpe Bettis Waardenburg Cox 
Chantepie de le 
Saussaye 
Yes Yes  Yes  
Nathan 
Soderblom 
Yes Yes  Yes  
Edvard 
Lehmann 
Yes Yes    
Brede 
Kristensen 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Gerardus van der 
Leeuw 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
C.J. Bleeker  Yes   Yes 
Joachim Wach  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joseph Kitagawa  Yes    
Mircea Eliade  Yes Yes  Yes 
E.O. James  Yes    
A.C. Bouquet  Yes    
Cornelius Tiele Yes   Yes  
Friedrich Pfister Yes     
Max Scheler Yes   Yes  
Georg 
Wobbermin 
Yes     
Robert Winkler Yes     
Rudolf Otto Yes     
Heinrich Frick Yes   Yes  
Gustav 
Menshing 
Yes   Yes  
Friedrich Heiler  Yes  Yes  
Joseph Bettis  Yes    
Hendrik 
Kraemer 
   Yes  
Edwin Smith     Yes 
Geoffrey 
Parrinder 
    Yes 
Andrew Walls     Yes 
Ninian Smart     Yes 
J.Z. Smith     Yes 
W.C. Smith     Yes 
 
This list is far from comprehensive and only takes into account those names mentioned in the respective 
works of the compilers. Certain names such as Ninian Smart, whose first publication was in 1958, cannot 
be expected to appear on the older lists. Furthermore, personal correspondence with Cox has revealed that 
he considers certain of those names above not mentioned in Guide to the Phenomenology of Religion as 
phenomenologists.
1
 Nevertheless there are clear points of divergence between compilers over certain 
figures. Kraemer, counted by Waardenburg, is explicitly rejected by Sharpe for being a theologian 
(Sharpe, 1975:227-288). Ironically, Sharpe refers to Soderblom (1866-1931), who was Archbishop of 
Uppsala, as ‘a phenomenologist of religion before the label had even been invented’ (1990:167). Nor is 
Sharpe the only one inconsistent with his criteria; Cox includes Eliade who expressly claimed he was not 
a phenomenologist despite “self-identification” being one of his criteria for selection (2006:3). Indeed, 
                                                 
1
 However, this led to the contradictory exclusion of Edwin Smith and Walls as “theologian” and “church 
historian” respectively. 
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though we cannot deny the influence of Eliade and Otto on phenomenology-of-religion they are among 
the most contentious and most often named “members” by critics.2  
 A distinct lack of agreement or understanding as to who should or should not be counted raises a 
subsequent lack of understanding of what “phenomenology” means. Bettis, for example, proposes that 
the “phenomenology of religion” can in fact mean one of three things. First, it can refer to the 
philosophical school that began with Husserl and carried on through the works of Heidegger, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. In this understanding ‘phenomenology of religion would be that part of 
phenomenological philosophy devoted to the study of religion’ (Bettis, 1969:1). Second, it can refer to a 
group of scholars who employed ‘broad phenomenological methods’ within the history of religions 
(1969:1). Such men, who included Eliade, van der Leeuw, and Kristensen, were primarily scholars of 
religion rather than philosophers. As such they used phenomenological tools in the study of religion. 
Third, it can mean ‘the application of general phenomenological methods to the whole spectrum of 
religious ideas, activities, institutions, customs, and symbols’ (1969:1). Bettis’ volume, by his own 
indication, works with this third understanding and has taken it from Merleau-Ponty. The advantage, he 
claims, of this third conception is that it takes a disparate range of studies from different disciplines and 
unites them on the assumption that ‘each has tried to describe the essence of religion’ (1969:2).  
 Yet if we scrutinise these three forms of “phenomenology” it becomes clear the latter two are 
derivatives of the first. The second form involves “broad phenomenological methods” and the third 
“general phenomenological methods”. But where have these “broad” and “general” methods come from 
if not the first? This is most clear in the distinction between the first and second groups. The first are 
philosophers who founded a philosophical tradition called “phenomenology” while the second are 
historians of religion who use those phenomenological methods. The imposition is that “phenomenology” 
comes from a philosophical tradition that has been taken up by certain scholars who are not philosophers 
and have found its application in other areas to be of use to them. This point is emphasised by the fact 
that these are scholars who have ‘utilised phenomenological methods’ (1969:1). But then for all the 
references to “phenomenology of religion”, “phenomenological philosophy”, “phenomenological 
method”, and “phenomenological analysis” it is not really clear what phenomenology/phenomenological 
                                                 
2
 E.g. McCutcheon (1997); Tremlett (2008:100-102), Taves (2009:5), Stausberg and Engler (2011:27-
28), Spickard (2011:336) and Martin and Wiebe (2012b).  
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means in Bettis’ account. At best all we can say is that phenomenology-of-religion is a divergence from 
Husserl’s phenomenology but Bettis is less than clear in what this philosophical tradition entails.  
 However, this account can only be maintained because Bettis begins with van der Leeuw. 
According to Spiegelberg, van der Leeuw ‘shows an attempt to link up an impressive array of the main 
types of religious phenomena with philosophical phenomenology’ (i.e. the Phenomenological Movement) 
(1982:10). Spiegelberg’s comments imply a synthesis of two separate traditions rather than some form of 
divergence or appropriation. He goes on to warn that we cannot ignore the independent origins of 
phenomenology-of-religion and the Phenomenological Movement. And we can also question the extent 
of the merger, regardless of how successful van der Leeuw was; Bleeker as his effective successor 
quickly distanced phenomenology-of-religion from the Movement.
3
 According to Cox: ‘With respect to 
its philosophical heritage, Bleeker argued that the epoché and the eidetic vision are employed figuratively 
in the phenomenology of religion and thus should be distinguished from a specialised philosophical 
analysis of knowledge as found particularly in the writings of Edmund Husserl’ (2006:136). Walter 
Capps makes a similar comment in his historical survey of Religious Studies where he notes there are 
two genealogies of “phenomenology” which correspond to the phenomenology-of-religion and the 
Phenomenological Movement. He points out that the application of the latter has been rather tangential in 
Religious Studies (Capps, 1995:109). Indeed, Capps suggests that “phenomenology of religion” is 
synonymous with “History of Religion” implying that, contra Bettis, these historians of religion didn’t 
just appropriate a range of “phenomenological tools” – they changed them into something else.  
 The multiple ways in which “phenomenology” has been applied within the phenomenology-of-
religion renders it difficult to give a concise statement of what “phenomenology” is.4 We are inclined to 
agree with Oxtoby’s critique of phenomenology-of-religion in which he charges that there are as many 
phenomenologies as phenomenologists (1968:598). This is mainly because the phenomenology-of-
religion does not have a definitive origin. Rather, it is a history of converging inventions through the 
syncretistic work of, for example, Smart and Cox. From the latter, and therefore comparatively recently, 
we get the clearest statement on what phenomenology-of-religion is:   
the phenomenology of religion defines the methodology that is uniquely 
associated with religious studies as a distinct discipline studying 
                                                 
3
 Bleeker succeeded van der Leeuw as the president of the International Association for the History of 
Religions after the latter’s death in 1950 (Sharpe, 1975:236). 
4
 We have largely focused on proponents and commentators; a full survey of the critiques of 
phenomenology-of-religion would likely compound the issue further.  
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“religion” itself, as opposed, for example, to studying sociology as it is 
applied to religion or psychology as it is applied to religion… Only 
phenomenology provides for the academic study of religions a distinct 
methodology, justifying its claim to a be field of study in its own right, sui 
generis. (Cox, 2006:3-4). 
 
The inherent problem with such a position for our argument is made clear by the final sentence. If 
religion is a sui generis topic then by definition the methodology that studies that topic is specific and 
unique to it. By consequence this “phenomenology” cannot study non-religious phenomena. Any such 
attempt would mean we are either proceeding along mistaken lines whose results would be of no use to 
us or, if successful, we undermine the sui generis status of religion. A sui generis topic requires a sui 
generis method. Insofar as the phenomenology-of-religion sees itself as uniquely suited to the study of 
religion, it thereby becomes unsuitable for social scientific study in general. We simply cannot do a 
“phenomenological(-of-religion) analysis” of the  crisis of social science. As Cox makes clear in 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion: ‘[phenomenology-of-religion is] a method for the study 
of religion that can be distinguished from other methods in the social and natural sciences and one that 
also remains distinct from theological interpretations’ (2010:22-23). And later he provides a definition of 
phenomenology-of-religion: 
The phenomenology of religion is a method adapting the procedures of 
epoche and eidetic intuition to the study of identifiable communities 
which base their acts of believing and resulting communal experience of 
postulated non-falsifiable alternate realities on a tradition that they 
legitimate by appealing to its authoritative transmission from generation 
to generation. (emphasis added, 2010:48) 
 
What is most telling here is that this says more as a definition of “religion” than it does as a definition of 
“phenomenology”, and the use of “adapting” indicates that this phenomenology-of-religion falls under 
Capps’ comment about the appropriation of “phenomenological tools”.  Somehow in this adaptation these 
“tools” are rendered unique to the study of religion and lose validity outside this domain.  
 The problem with then taking up this methodology is similar to that faced by Martin and Wiebe 
in the Introduction. Any analysis would only be applicable on the level of religious studies and could not 
be expanded to social science more generally. In fact, because of its understanding of religious studies, 
the phenomenology-of-religion becomes part of the problem to be analysed by a “phenomenological 
analysis”. Cox’s comments regarding the relation of religious studies to social science reveal that the 
former is not a subset of the latter but sits at the same level.  
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ii. The Phenomenological Movement 
 
Due to the lack of clarity within the phenomenology-of-religion as to what it is and who belongs, it seems 
unsuitable for the task defining “phenomenology” itself. To this end we turn instead to the 
Phenomenological Movement, for unlike the former there is a clear origin with Husserl. Capps, drawing 
on a comment made by Maurice Natanson, notes that within this philosophical genealogy we could treat 
phenomenology and Husserl as synonymous (Capps, 1995:109). If the Phenomenological Movement has 
this clear founder then it would stand to reason that its understanding of “phenomenology” derives from 
his.  
 
a. Husserl I 
 
 Husserl studied under Franz Brentano whose philosophy had convinced Husserl to abandon his 
study in mathematics. In 1887 Husserl took a teaching position at Halle where he was disappointed by the 
role’s low prestige and income (Woodruff Smith, 2007:17). The former of these concerns seems to have 
predominated throughout his career in a consistent desire to develop a “following”. It was not until 
Logical Investigations (LI) that Husserl began to receive the recognition he desired and was offered a 
professorship at Gottingen. It was here that Husserl would begin to develop phenomenology as both 
philosophical method and as a movement. Though LI is considered phenomenological, only later editions 
make the connection apparent and it was not until 1907 that Husserl formerly began phenomenology in 
“The Idea of Phenomenology” (1907[1999]).  
 Husserl envisaged his philosophy in truly radical terms, according to Natanson he was looking 
for the same kind of certitude that he had found in mathematics (Natanson, 1973:5). In this respect he is 
rather Cartesian in thought but held that Descartes had fallen just short of his goal of absolute certainty. 
The English word “radical” may, however, cause some confusion and so we can also describe Husserl’s 
philosophical aim as that of a “rigorous science” (Husserl, 1981a:166). In “Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science” (1910[1981a])5 Husserl sets his position against Dilthey and what he calls naturalism which is 
                                                 
5
 Essays taken from edited volumes such as Husserl: Shorter Works (1981) have been broken down into 
individual references to make clear which essay is being drawn from. Lettering has been done according 
to the chronological order in which they were originally published.    
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linked to positivism and psychologism. The naturalist trend had driven science to look only for “positive 
facts” and Husserl saw it that ‘science itself was crying out for a philosophy that would restore its contact 
with the deeper concerns of man,’ namely meaning and value (Spiegelberg, 1971a:80). In particular 
Husserl wanted to highlight the contradiction in naturalist thinking that reduced everything to functions 
of physical nature using principles of thought that could not be explained in naturalistic terms. The 
critique of naturalism has since become one of the universal themes of phenomenology and will be 
addressed later.
6
 
 Husserl expressed his radical attitude towards science as a desire to be free from presuppositions 
of any kind, prompting the famous slogan “zu den Sachen selbst”: “back to the things themselves” 
(Husserl, 1970a:252). In Ideas I (1913[1982/2012])
7
 this slogan was formalised as the principle of 
principles:  
that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimising source of 
cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its “personal” 
actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is 
presented as being, but also only within the limits that in which it is 
presented there. We see indeed that each <theory> can only again draw its 
truth itself from originary data. Every statement which does no more than 
confer expression on such data by simple explication and by means of 
significations precisely conforming to them is … actually an absolute 
beginning called upon to serve as a foundation. (Husserl, 1982:44) 
  
According to the principle, a propositional statement is valid or scientific only if it is drawn from relevant 
evidence. In Ideas III (1952[1980])
8
 Husserl then speaks of “description”: ‘the conceptual expression of 
the perceived itself, i.e., of that which is in the proper sense experienced’ (Husserl, 1980:58). Russell 
explains this “descriptive” and “demonstrative” task prevents science from becoming bound up in its own 
musings (Russell, 2006:109). This understanding of “description”, according to Russell, presents a 
                                                 
6
 See Ch.6. 
7
 There are two competing translations of Ideas I by Kersten (1982) and Gibson (1931[2012]). We have 
relied upon both because each has their own merits. Gibson’s translation was done under Husserl’s 
auspices and includes a preface from Husserl not found in Kersten’s translation. Kersten’s translation 
however claims to have included material that was prepared for Gibson’s translation but not included in 
the final publishing (in Husserl, 1982:xiv). Spiegelberg comments of Gibson’s that it is ‘fair, not always 
accurate’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:163). Perhaps one prime example of this is the slogan itself. Kersten’s 
translation follows that of Findley’s translation of LI and renders the phrase “back to the things 
themselves” (Husserl, 1982:35). Gibson, however, translates it as ‘guided by the facts themselves’ 
(Husserl, 2012:35). Based on Moran’s commentary we may suggest that Kersten’s translation is more 
accurate. Commenting on the slogan he notes that ‘Husserl does not mean that we must bring philosophy 
back to a concern with factual, empirical things, such as physical objects in space and time’ (Moran, 
2000:107). By speaking of “facts” Gibson’s translation suggest exactly this. However, it is also worth 
noting that Moran does not bring this up in his preface to the 2012 reprint of Gibson’s translation.  
8
 The book was published posthumously but the completed draft existed as early as 1912 when Husserl 
was writing Ideas I.  
35 
 
definition of “evidence” in science as ‘“originary” or “bodily” givenness. However, this requires 
clarification as “given” can be meant in the sense of “gifting” or “true without question”. “Givenness” as 
it is used by Husserl refers to the former sense as is made clear in his claims that phenomenology focuses 
on the ‘perceived as perceived’ (Husserl, 1982:214)9. For this understanding we will now use the Old 
English word “giefannis” to avoid confusion. Thus, a thing is only a thing if it is giefan to someone. If a 
thing is not giefan to someone then it is not a thing. As noted by Lewis and Staehler, to understand things 
as gifts it is necessary to understand how such things are received (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:1). To speak 
of the things themselves is to say that the thing which is giefan to someone is also the giver. The thing 
giefen itself. If Varhern giefe his life for Leaphin the thing giefan is “Varhern’s life”. As “Varhern’s life” 
is the thing itself, how Leaphin receives it can differ from how Varhern expects her to receive it. It is thus 
necessary to emphasise that the giefannis of things therefore depends on the person receiving them.
10
  
 In addition to this positive formulation there is also a negative formulation in LI as the principle 
of freedom from presuppositions (1970a:263). This is not to say we become tabula rasa, something which 
is impossible, rather that ‘no metaphysical, scientific and, above all, no psychological assertions can 
therefore occur among its premises’ (1970a:265). The principle is also found in the earlier “Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science” as the “radical lack of prejudice”: ‘What is needed is not the insistence that one sees 
with his own eyes; rather, it is that he not explain away under the pressure of prejudice what has been 
seen’ (Husserl, 1981a:196). No concept, no matter how seemingly obvious, was above scrutiny in 
Husserl’s mind. As such Natanson notes that Husserl pushed language to its philosophical and mundane 
limits by the introduction of completely new terms and using older terms in completely novel ways 
(Natanson, 1973:8).
11
 In this he was breaking new territory and in Ideas I Husserl referred to his 
philosophy as a wandering across a new continent (2012:xliv).  
 The most famous of the presuppositions that Husserl wished to get past was the natural attitude 
which takes for granted the possibility of knowledge: ‘Constantly engaged in the productive activity, 
advancing from discovery to discovery in the newly developed sciences, natural thinking finds no 
                                                 
9
 Kersten’s translation makes more sense in this context than Gibson’s which reads ‘the perceived as 
such’ (Husserl, 2012:185).  
10
 Lewis and Staehler go beyond this in their understanding: ‘”Givennness” describes the way in which 
an entity appears insofar as it is certain beyond doubt that the appearance has not in any way been 
distorted by our experience of it’ (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:2). Such a position, however, moves back 
toward an understanding of “givenness” as “true without question” and stands at odds with their own 
recognition that gifts are always received.  
11
 A habit we have taken up by the introduction of Old English.  
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occasion to raise the question of the possibility of knowledge as such’ (Husserl, 1999:16). For Husserl 
there are many attitudes within a particular culture – philosophy being one12 – all of which are derived 
from this primitive natural attitude.
13
 According to Lewis and Staehler, this natural attitude has two basic 
features: ‘First, it is directed in a straightforward manner towards its objects, and second, it is convinced 
that these objects are not only there when we turn to them, but exist independently of our attention’ 
(Lewis and Staehler, 2010:12). What this amounts to is that the natural attitude incorporates all that is 
given in the sense of “true without question”. But unlike a Kantian approach the given is understood as 
subjective and hence open to revision. As Lewis and Staehler note, individual objects may be questioned 
in their givenness but the natural attitude always composes what we take to be given (2010:13).  
 In order to break from this attitude Husserl looked at consciousness itself. But unlike standard 
psychology, in his desire to break from all presuppositions Husserl conceived of consciousness 
differently; he was not interested in physical processes but the structure of consciousness. Unlike 
Descartes who was concerned with what could be doubted, Husserl was more interested in the process of 
doubting itself. He argued that consciousness is always conscious-of and Natanson describes this as acts 
of perception having ‘directional force’ (Natanson, 1973:13). Drawing on Brentano’s studies of 
intentionality, Husserl states that consciousness is intentional (Husserl, 1970b:95-97). Intention in 
Husserl’s sense gives meaning to consciousness and is not synonymous with volition. Both Moran and 
Spiegelberg comment that Husserl’s development of intentionality breaks from Brentano significantly 
and has more in common with William James’ Principles of Psychology. The difference from Brentano is 
evidenced by the fact that Brentano never used “intention” in its noun form. Spiegelberg summarises an 
intention to be, 
that component of any act which is responsible not only for its pointing at 
an object but also for (α) interpreting pre-given materials in such a way 
that a full object is presented to our consciousness, (β) establishing the 
identity between the referents of several intentional acts, (γ) connecting 
the various stages of intuitive fulfilment, and (δ) “constituting” the object 
meant. (Spiegelberg, 1971a:110) 
 
While in the natural attitude, little of these aspects of intention are called to attention. Phenomenology as 
such puts these into question. To do this Husserl “bracketed” (the epoché) the question of the object’s 
existence in order to focus on the act of consciousness: 
                                                 
12
 See Ch.1.i. 
13
 Phenomenology as a radical attitude is also subject to this point; it involves a habitual activity that is 
only possible as a deviation from the natural attitude (see Ch.5.iii).   
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In the phenomenology of the consciousness of physical thing the question 
is not how physical things in general are, or what in truth belongs to them 
as such; but rather how the consciousness of physical things is qualitied, 
what sorts of consciousness of physical thing are to be distinguished, in 
what manner and with what correlates a physical thing as such presents 
and manifests itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness. (sic) 
(Husserl, 1980:72) 
 
Natanson describes this relation by stating that ‘phenomena are meant, not simply acknowledged in 
perception’ (Natanson, 1973:13). The intended object, the phenomenon, possesses meaning and 
according to (δ) and (β) consciousness constitutes this meaning and relates this meaning to the meanings 
of other intended objects.
14
 In effect we may define “phenomenon” as any object that has meaning for the 
subject. “Phenomenology” as the study of phenomena becomes the study of meaning.  
 These introductory comments do not cover the full extent of Husserl’s phenomenology. We 
have, for example, glossed over certain important notions like the epoché and the various reductions on 
the grounds that they constitute Husserl’s method.15 At present, however, it is the X to which this method 
is to be applied that concerns us.  
 Before we continue, however, several issues highlighted by Natanson must first be noted: first, 
Husserl was not a writer of books and while a number of volumes were completed in his lifetime, much 
of his thought was contained in a Nachlass of 45,000 pages of shorthand notes which would not just 
comprise books but whole sets of books (Natanson, 1973:5);
16
 second, Husserl was constantly writing 
“introductions” to phenomenology including: The Idea of Phenomenology (1907); “Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science” (1910); Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology: General Introduction to a Pure 
Phenomenology (1913); Logical Investigations (1913);
17
 “Phenomenology” in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (1927); Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1931); and, The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy (1936). According to Natanson: ‘Beginning, for Husserl, is the permanent state of the genuine 
philosopher’ (1973:10). The constant writing of “introductions” was Husserl’s way of assessing how well 
the philosopher had proceeded in that task. As Husserl himself claimed: ‘anyone who seriously intends to 
become a philosopher must “once in his life” withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to 
                                                 
14
 Though Husserl did develop the notion of unconscious intentionality in later works (see Mohanty, 
1971), engaging these discussions would be tangential to our primary arguments.  
15
 More detail will be given to these in Ch.3.iii. 
16
 Much of this has now been published under the Husserliana series. We have largely avoided arguments 
relying on those texts which do not yet have English translations.  
17
 Specifically the Prolegomena which was published as volume I in the German Edition.  
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overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been accepting’ (Husserl, 1988:2). For 
Husserl the task of the philosopher was to seek out radical certitude which meant that there could be no 
reliance upon all that had gone before and phenomenology was meant to find that certitude.  
 
b. The “turns” of the Movement 
 
 Paul Ricoeur has observed of this obsession with writing introductions to phenomenology that 
Husserl’s published works ‘do not constitute one homogenous body of work with a single direction of 
orientation’ (Ricoeur, 1967:4). Husserl was constantly developing his phenomenology and this invariably 
had a consequence for those around him. As Pierre Thevenaz describes it: ‘Even before Husserl himself 
knew exactly where he was going and what he was really searching for, his resolute step and the sterling 
quality of his method had already caught up and carried along a number of thinkers and philosophers’ 
(Thevenaz, 1962:39). This had its consequences upon his “followers” and “students”, as Spiegelberg 
comments:  
Husserl’s own course within the movement may well be compared with a 
spiral converging upon an inner centre, in this case the phenomena of the 
subjective sphere. Yet at several turns of this spiral some of his followers 
were flung off at a tangent, as it were, following up lines suggested by 
Husserl himself during an earlier phase, while he himself had already 
changed his course. (Spiegelberg, 1971a:2) 
 
However, such comments suggest that to each “turn” belongs a different conception of phenomenology. 
But this would mean that the Movement, rather than homogenous, is divided according to which 
“Husserl” is appealed to. In particular, the most famous “turn”, the “transcendental turn” which occurs 
between LI and Ideas I, led to political disputes within the Movement over which is the more genuine 
“Husserl”. 
 However, unlike phenomenology-of-religion, Spiegelberg comments that ‘it would go too far to 
say that there are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists’ (1971a:xxvii). Yet Ricoeur, 
contra Spiegelberg’s image of tangents, suggests that phenomenology ‘is both the sum of Husserl’s work 
and the heresies issuing from it’ (Ricoeur, 1967:4). While there is some recognition of this point by 
Spiegelberg when he refers to the followers of Husserl in quotation marks, the problem arises that if 
Husserl’s so-called followers are heretics what is this “phenomenology” which holds them all together as 
the Phenomenological Movement? In the introduction to the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (EP) 
(1997), Embree notes that, beginning with Husserl, phenomenology is often characterised negatively as 
39 
 
being opposed to naturalism. Yet the easy error to then make is to assume that everything that opposes 
naturalism is phenomenology (Embree, 1997:1). As noted by Stikkers and Kerry and Armour, 
“phenomenology” has become a byword for any sort of descriptive work, and often used as a means to 
disguise subjective biases and prejudices (in Scheler, 1980b:3; Kerry and Armour, 2000:10). To clarify 
“phenomenology” we need a positive understanding of what it does for which we will now turn to the 
four branches of phenomenology discussed by Embree. 
 According to Embree there are four main branches within the Phenomenological Movement. For 
Embree these branches represent the dominant phases in the shifting focus of what he calls the 
phenomenological agenda (1997:2). Husserl as the instigator of phenomenology first laid out this agenda 
in LI in which he placed maths, logic, and language as the first items as part of his attack on naturalism. 
Further to these he also added the items of perception, re-presentation, and the eidetic method. By 
“items” Embree means those topics which phenomenology is about, i.e. the “of” that often follows 
“phenomenology”. As he suggests later, phenomenology is a distinctive approach that, focusing on a 
particular domain, becomes the “phenomenology of X”’ (1997:10).  It is for this reason we have made a 
distinction between phenomenology of religion not being phenomenology-of-religion. “Religion” is an 
item (1997:10), an X, like any other to be placed on the phenomenological agenda. In this respect, unlike 
the phenomenology-of-religion, the “phenomenology” contained within phenomenology of religion is 
defined without reference to religion. In the same way that the “phenomenology” in the phenomenology 
of geography and the phenomenology of nursing can be understood without reference to either geography 
or nursing. Only phenomenology alone may be called a distinctive approach, but this has nothing to do 
with some inherent connection to any one particular item of the agenda. 
 As Husserl’s phenomenology was taken up by others more items were added to the agenda. 
How the items of the agenda were subsequently arranged led to the development of various branches of 
phenomenology, each with their own focuses.  Realistic Phenomenology, as the first branch, placed 
emphasis on the eidetic method in the search for universal essences (Embree, 2001:4). For example, 
Scheler added the items of ethics, value theory, and religion, while others also added law, human sciences 
(i.e. psychology), aesthetics, architecture, music, literature and film (Embree, 1997:2-3, 2001:4). 
Constitutive Phenomenology was further instigated by Husserl as a result of Ideas I during which natural 
sciences (for Husserl this mainly meant physics) and cultural sciences were placed on the agenda 
(Embree, 2001:4-5). This also led to an increased focus on the epoché and reductions such that much 
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Constitutive Phenomenology belongs to the transcendental turn with its focus on the (solitary) 
Transcendental Ego. Yet in its way this prompted the development of the other two branches which are 
not accredited to Husserl by Embree.  
 Among those to react negatively to Husserl’s transcendental turn were Scheler and Martin 
Heidegger. Unlike Scheler who maintained Realistic Phenomenology, Heidegger wanted to alter the 
agenda by placing fundamental ontology at the top, over and above Husserl’s regional ontologies as they 
were first discussed at the end of Ideas I (Husserl, 2012:305-324). However, Being and Time (BT) (1927) 
was an incomplete work
18
 and through a ‘misunderstanding of intentions’ many focused instead on 
Heidegger’s analysis of ‘human life or existence’ which prompted Existential Phenomenology (Embree, 
2001:5). Hannah Arendt might be called the first true existential phenomenologist but this branch is more 
widely associated with France under Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir. This branch added 
the items of intersubjectivity, human freedom, action, desire, conflict, and reason to the agenda. Finally, 
not only did Existential Phenomenology stem from Heidegger but so too did Hermeneutical 
Phenomenology.
19
 Instigated as part of the proper intentions of BT, this branch builds on Heidegger’s 
methodology as interpretation. Not only did this add technology to the agenda, it changed how the items 
of the agenda were studied through hermeneutics.   
 Each of these branches had its heyday: Realistic and Constitutive Phenomenology were at their 
strongest just before and after World War I; Existential Phenomenology had its zenith between the 30’s 
and 60’s; and Hermeneutical Phenomenology monopolised America from the decline of Existential 
Phenomenology to around the 80’s (Moran and Embree, 2004a:5). We should not however think that 
phenomenology lives and dies with these branches. In EP Embree points to a potential fifth planetary 
period as phenomenology becomes better known in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia (Embree, 
1997:5). Although there is nothing to presuppose that there could not be a sixth or seventh branch either, 
the question would be how do such branches even emerge? Quite simply this would be through the 
reordering of the agenda with the significance of certain items changing. On the individual level this 
means that the phenomenologist prioritises their items into a hierarchy, and the structures this takes can 
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 Originally planned in two parts comprising six divisions the published work only consists of the first 
two divisions. Supposedly the third division was drafted but Heidegger expressly denied that it be 
published even posthumously. 
19
 Moran has suggested that Husserl’s work in Crisis could also be described as a hermeneutical 
approach, particularly in its consideration of Galileo (2012:74-76). However, as this work came after BT 
it is still proper to suggest that Heidegger instigated Hermeneutical Phenomenology. 
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place that phenomenologist under one of the available branches. Or, if they strikes us as being singular in 
their agenda and accrues a subsequent following they may instigate a new branch. By 2001 Embree was 
more certain of the emergence of this fifth period, something he tentatively calls “Cultural 
Phenomenology”: ‘the general theme would then be collective as well as individual human life in the 
socio-historical world, a theme that is suitable for a reflective-descriptive philosophy of culture’ (Embree, 
2001:8). As of 2004 the dominant themes of this new fifth branch appear to be religion, technology, 
ecology, ethnicity, gender, and interculturality; all topics of significance within social science (Moran and 
Embree, 2004d:1-2). We will suggest in the next chapter that this fifth branch of phenomenology was 
already instigated by Schutz in the 1930s.
20
  
 
 That Embree suggests these branches were instigated by Husserl and Heidegger would alter 
Spiegelberg’s metaphor to make two spirals for each thinker. However, this would present the image that 
Realistic Phenomenology ended and became either Constitutive, Existential, or Hermeneutical after the 
“transcendental turn”. To the contrary, Scheler, as one of the first to reject the “turn” stuck dogmatically 
to Realistic Phenomenology throughout his work, giving rise to three spirals. Further, as Existential 
Phenomenology came out of a “misreading”, it is more accurate to place its instigation with Sartre 
creating a fourth spiral.  
 
 
iii. The early branches of the Movement 
  
It is our task now to show that despite the divergences implied by the metaphor of spirals/branches there 
is a common core that connects the Phenomenological Movement that will also provide our 
understanding of phenomenology simpliciter. We propose this unifying factor to be philosophical 
anthropology and how it emerges in the thinking of the four branches’ instigators: Husserl, Scheler, 
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 There is reason to suppose that a sixth branch already exists in the form of “Theological 
Phenomenology”. With roots in the work of Ricoeur and Levinas, the “turn” seems to have emerged in 
France during the 1980s-1990s and has become more visible since Dominique Janicaud’s essay “The 
Theological Turn of French Phenomenology” (1991[2000]). However, it is worth noting that Janicaud’s 
essay is aimed at accusing Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien and Michel Henry (prominent figures 
within Theological Phenomenology) of perverting phenomenology by introducing a (biblical) God which 
does not belong. Certainly Theological Phenomenology has understood itself to be closer to the 
Phenomenological Movement than phenomenology-of-religion (Kosky, 2000:110-112). However, the 
discussion of whether it meets the phenomenological strictures to be established in Chapter  3 goes 
beyond the scope of our main argument.  
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Heidegger, and Sartre. As the first three write concurrently, they shall be dealt with in this section and 
Sartre in the next.  
 Speaking of the connection between Husserl and Heidegger, Simon Glendinning claims that: 
‘Husserl and Heidegger are both concerned (pace Husserl) to effect a fundamental shift of level in their 
reflections on worldly existence’ (Glendinning, 2007:75). There is, he suggests, a functional equivalence 
between Husserl’s Transcendental Ego and Heidegger’s Dasein. As Derrida intimates in “The Ends of 
Man” (1969) the Ego of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is none other than “man” understood as 
the rational animal (1969:43-44).
21
 And in the case of Heidegger, Dasein ‘if it is not man, is not, 
however, other than man’ (1969:48). As both Derrida and Glendinning see it, through the transcendental 
reduction of Husserl and the existential analytic of Heidegger, both were engaged in the task of 
philosophical anthropology. As Gurwitsch points out, the project of philosophical anthropology should 
not be confused as some kind of “ethnography” but rather indicates ‘the broader meaning of a general 
preoccupation with man and his existence’ (Gurwitsch, 1974:9). Its central question is “What is wer?”. 
What we suggest here is that phenomenology in the simpliciter sense is an approach to philosophical 
anthropology.  
 Though we cannot speak for Derrida’s use we must reiterate that the use of “man” in this sense 
is supposed to carry no gender connotations. Following our comments in the Introduction, we will 
continue to translate “man” as “wer”: the beings which we are. Thus to say of someone that they are wer 
is to say that they have the same being as myself. Why we have not used “human being”, “humanity” or 
“human nature” will become clear in our consideration of phenomenology simpliciter as philosophical 
anthropology. 
 Derrida and Glendinning’s suggestion that Husserl and Heidegger were engaged in 
philosophical anthropology is, however, beset with the problem that they both repudiated the title. This 
can only be explained by considering the work of Scheler who is conspicuously, though not surprisingly, 
absent from their analyses. Scheler is a lesser known figure of the Phenomenological Movement but 
nevertheless one of great significance who both influenced Husserl and Heidegger and was in turn 
influenced by them. As Frings and Funk describe their main difference: ‘[Scheler’s] primary concern was 
never the phenomenological investigation of the Transcendental Ego or the ontological question of 
Being; it was rather the Being of Man, here and now, in his biological, social, ethical, metaphysical, and 
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 Husserl admits as such in CM (1988:74).  
43 
 
religious dimensions’ (in Scheler, 1973b:xiv). Indeed, because of their close proximity to one another it is 
almost impossible to cover the full thought of one before the influence of another gets in the way.  
 
c. Scheler I 
 
 By his own admission, Scheler, along with Heidegger, was Husserl’s greatest rival (Spiegelberg, 
1971a:229-230). Scheler, a student of Rudolph Euckon and Max Weber, was initially brought to 
phenomenology through Husserl’s LI. The first of Scheler’s major works, Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Value (Formalism) was published in two parts in the Jahrbuch in 1913 (alongside 
Husserl’s Ideas I) and 1916. In those early years Husserl rarely referred to Scheler’s work, while 
conversely Scheler was openly critical of the transcendental turn. However, between 1921-1928 Scheler’s 
immense popularity as a public speaker threatened to eclipse Husserl as the doyen of phenomenology 
(Moran, 2000:200). Threatened with the loss of his “following”, it is possible to see elements of Scheler’s 
thinking in Husserl’s later work without credit.22 Scheler’s influence was cut short by his untimely death 
in 1928 and his work became obscured under Nazi repression due to a Jewish heritage.
23
 
 While both men subscribed to “phenomenology”, the two seemingly differed as to its purpose. 
Husserl was seeking a rigorous science to ground all others but to Scheler this was only a means to an 
end, and according to Frings ‘there is one subject in which ultimately all of Scheler’s thoughts focus: 
Man’ (Frings, 1996:2). Alongside Kant, Scheler shared the view that all philosophical questions 
ultimately reduce to the question “What is wer?” (1996:7). But as the title of “The Idea of Man” 
(1915[1972]) makes clear, Scheler had the same sort of radical approach that Husserl expected of 
philosophy in general: he took a prolific interest in biology, atomic physics, sociology, animal 
psychology, theology, medical science, history, and more. All these topics would have served as the basis 
for his Philosophische Anthropologie which was never completed before his death (1996:2). Scheler’s 
philosophical anthropology is, however, divided into two phases roughly delineated by his break with the 
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 Elements of which can be seen in the Crisis, according to David Carr the work represents Husserl’s 
growing awareness that his own presentation of phenomenology had not generated the desired following 
and the existence of such “revisionists” (i.e. Scheler and Heidegger) prompted a need to alter his 
approach (in Husserl, 1970c:xxv-xxvii).  We suggest Husserl’s terminological adoption is far more 
extensive than Carr suggests.  
23
 Moran and Spiegelberg differ over how important he was to the work of Merleau-Ponty (Spiegelberg, 
1982:537-538; Moran, 2000:292-393).  
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Catholic Church in 1922.
24
 For this first phase we will look primarily at Formalism, though a 
phenomenology of ethics, his discussions of the various concepts of value are underpinned by their 
relation to wer. A significant part of this involves the critique of “anthropologisim”: the view that human 
beings are of the highest value and that all other living beings are derivations thereon. 
 Herbert Spencer is one of Scheler’s main targets for an anthropologism based on biological and 
psychological findings. Due to a “one-sided” reading, Spencer endorsed “egoism”: the individual 
naturally places self-preservation over self-sacrifice (Scheler, 1973b:278). Not only does Scheler 
demonstrate the falsity of egoism in nature, he points out that even if it were correct this would contradict 
the anthropologism Spencer espouses. Egoism, Scheler notes,  means that independence is a positive 
value: ‘The more dependent on others such forms are, the more they must be exposed to perils and 
injuries, and the earlier they will meet their destiny in earthly life in the sequences of death, which, in the 
end, is the destiny of earthly life itself’ (1973b:284). But civilisations as systems of interdependency, 
which only humans supposedly create, ‘represent a kind of faux pas which life has taken in its evolution 
on earth’ (1973b:285). Even the ability to create artificial tools represents the biological inferiority of 
humans because they lack the appropriate organ for the task. Indeed, even the highly complicated 
structure of humans stands against them compared to animals who can achieve the same level of survival 
(i.e. life-duration) with simpler systems. Scheler concludes of Spencer’s position that it is 
“anthropomorphism”: ‘from the beginning he relates all vital organisations to man and his milieu, and, 
without saying so, subordinations all organisations to man’s mileu’ (1973b:291). Due to the technical 
way in which “anthropomorphism” has been taken up by naturalists,25 we prefer instead to say that 
Spencer’s position is an anthropologism based upon what we call the human prejudice: to speak of “wer” 
is to speak of the human (biological) species alone. Spencer’s anthropologism privileges the human 
species and understands all other organisms as derivations thereof.  
 It is this definition of “wer” in terms of a particular species that Scheler finds problematic. Wer, 
Scheler argues, is not defined by biological characteristics: 
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 Prior to this Scheler was known as a major Catholic apologist in Protestant dominated Germany which 
netted him a position at Cologne. However, On the Eternal in Man (1921[2010]) showed signs of a 
divergence with Catholic fundamentals and a break with Thomism. Scheler supposedly lost his faith as a 
result of further research (Kelly, 1977:15), but another factor may have been his desire to divorce his 
second wife, Märit, which the Church had denied.  
25
 E.g. Guthrie defines “anthropomorphism” to mean ‘the attribution of human characteristics to 
nonhuman things or events’ (Guthrie, 1993:3). 
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whenever we value “man,” we in fact presuppose values that are 
independent of vital values – the values of the holy and spiritual values. 
That is, man is the “highest being” insofar as he is the bearer of acts that 
are independent of his biological organisation, and insofar as he sees and 
realises the values corresponding to these acts. (1973b:288) 
 
This reference to “holy” and “spiritual” values bears comment, however. In the Introduction we noted 
that Frings adopted the strategy of translating “Geist” in Scheler as either “mind”, for sociological uses, 
and “spirit”, for metaphysical uses. However, this does not work as Scheler speaks of both “spiritual 
values” (“geistigen werte”) which are clearly sociological and “holy values” which are metaphysical 
(“wertes des Heiligen”) (Scheler, 1966:124-126, 1973b:107-109). In this case “spiritual” has more in 
common with Husserl’s use than Fring’s comments would allow. We are therefore inclined to read 
“spiritual values” as “ferhđcund values” and “holy values” as “gāstcund values”. 
 With this emphasis on ferhđcund and gāstcund values, Scheler goes on to suggest that:  
If I say that man is the bearer of a tendency which transcends all possible 
vital values and which is directed toward the “divine,” or if I say, in short, 
that he is a being that seeks God, I imply no predication having as its 
subject an already definable unity of man, be it of a biological or a 
psychological nature. It is precisely such a unity that I expressly deny. 
According to his essence man is, rather, only the living X of this seeking, 
an X that must be conceived as still completely variable with regard to all 
possible psychophysical organisations so that the organisation of factual 
earthly man represents only one actualised possibility among all the 
possibilities for which this X affords an infinite field of play. (1973b:291-
292) 
 
He thus stipulates that if a parrot were to manifest this tendency then it too would be wer. In this respect 
Scheler is trying to escape Spencer’s “naturalistic anthropologism” in which humans are placed at the top 
of a hierarchy. In saying wer as wer is independent of “psychophysical organisations”, Scheler evades the 
human prejudice and his further considerations of wer are not restricted to biological humans. Such a 
distinction then brings to light the difficulty of both defining and differentiating between “man”, 
“human”, and “human being”.26 It is perhaps because of the ambiguity of all these phrases that Scheler 
then speaks of “Person” in the final chapter of Formalism. However, even then it is not always clear 
where “Person” sits in relation to “wer”, either as a synonym for or separate from or specification of.  
 Scheler’s discussion of the Person27 is lengthy and complicated, taking up nearly a third of 
Formalism. One of his most significant claims comes earlier in the chapter:  
                                                 
26
 A problem made no easier by translation.  
27
 When speaking of the general concept we will use “Person” and when speaking of a particular we will 
use “person”. This also holds for our uses of “ego”, “transcendental ego” and “self” later.  
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The person must never be considered a thing or a substance with faculties 
and powers, among which the “faculty” or “power” of reason etc., is one. 
The person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced unity of 
experiencing; the person is not a merely thought thing behind and outside 
what is immediately experienced. (1973b:371) 
 
With this Scheler accuses Kant of “rationalistic anthropologism” for conceiving the Person as nothing 
other than a rational will or rational activity; only what is capable of rationality can be considered a 
person. However, Scheler points out that such a notion renders the idea of “individual persons” a 
contradiction. Rational acts in Kant’s work correspond to a lawful state of affairs that is extra-individual, 
making them a system of rules and mechanisms which determines a person’s “personhood” by their 
conformity. Rather than recognising the autonomy of persons as Kant claimed, such an understanding 
emphasises the heteronomy of persons in which one could not be told apart from another (1973b:372).  
 On these grounds he goes on to deny the Ego also. In Kant the Ego is the correlate of the object 
– that through which the object is identified as “object”. But this requires that the Ego itself cannot be an 
object which Scheler shows to be clearly false as it can become the object of inner perception. Scheler 
notes that in the phrase “I go for a walk” the “I” (ego) does not speak, it is the person who speaks 
(1973b:390). The use of “I” in this case is a form of address, it differentiates one person from another. 
When I say that “I perceive my ego” this “ego” does not have the same sense as the “I”. As a 
consequence of the object-ness of the ego, this also entails a denial of any “supra-individual ego”, 
“consciousness in general” or “Transcendental Ego” as ‘special lawful types of procedural activities in all 
men’ (1973b:378). Though not mentioned by name, Scheler accuses Husserl’s Transcendental Ego of 
engaging the same sort of “rationalistic anthropologism”. For Husserl, the Transcendental Ego left behind 
by “bracketing” is the same for all individual egos. As Moran describes it: ‘the Transcendental Ego is a 
set of anonymous eidetic structures within which individual consciousnesses come to have their 
experience of meaning, but what is inhabited and lived is a single individual life’ (Moran, 2001:174). 
Rather than emphasising the autonomy of egos, Husserl emphases their heteronomy by providing a 
variation on the rational animal.  
 However, as noted by Eugene Kelly, the relation between Ego and Person is not all that clear 
(Kelly, 2011:194). Thus, for example, Dunlop suggests that there is a dualism in “human being” between 
Person and Ego, though Scheler himself claims that an ego is the opposite of the “outer world” and the 
Person is indifferent to both (Dunlop, 1991:22; Scheler, 1973b:390). Kelly himself suggests that the 
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dichotomy is between that of the Ego and the lived body to which the Person is a separate phenomenon. 
However, as a phenomenon the Person is not an object:  
It belongs to the essence of the person to exist and to live solely in the 
execution of intentional acts. The person is therefore essentially never an 
“object”. On the contrary, any objectifying attitude (be it perception, 
representation, thinking, remembering or expectation) makes the person 
immediately transcendent. (Scheler, 1973b:390) 
 
Unlike Kant these acts are of many different kinds, not just rational activities. Acts contain ferhđ in that 
they are intentional and fulfil meaning. Thus, according to Dunlop: ‘The person, then, is a “unity of 
being” of spiritual acts, and gives spiritual meaning and value to the vital function of an individual human 
animal’ (Dunlop, 1991:23).28 A ferhđcund act is by its nature intentional (in Scheler, 1962:xxxi).  
 However, there is a general issue with Scheler’s understanding of wer that impacts how 
accurately we can translate “Geist” as “ferhđ”. In Formalism, Scheler’s understanding of wer 
indicates a being directed toward God which may force us to translate it to “gāst”. The problem with this 
phase of Scheler’s phenomenology, neatly summarised by Kelly, is that he was a political man with an 
axe to grind:  
He might have been either an evangelist, basing his pronouncements upon 
the free speculation of his imagination – such as he believes to be of the 
essence of metaphysical creativity – or he might have been a 
phenomenological researcher into the essences given to the metaphysical, 
ethical, and social standpoints. The point is that he often tries to do both 
of these at the same time, and this attempt leads him to grief. (Kelly, 
1977:22) 
 
We cannot deny that a strong Christian apologetic seeps through into his considerations of the Person in 
Formalism. In 1926, after his break with the Church, he intended however to edit subsequent editions 
(Scheler, 1973b:xxvi), but this was never done before his death. In order to understand Scheler’s later 
position, and how it determines the translation of “Geist”, we must first account for Heidegger’s 
criticisms in BT. 
 
d. Heidegger 
 
It is important that Heidegger, like Scheler, was never a student of Husserl’s in the formal sense. By the 
time the two came to collaborate, Heidegger had already been a privatdozent at Freiburg for a year when 
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 In this use of “human animal”, however, Dunlop deviates significantly from Scheler in that he 
threatens to reinstitute the human prejudice Scheler was avoiding. This will become clearer when we look 
at Scheler’s later work (Ch.3.iii.e).  
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they first met in 1916. Nor did Husserl hold much ambition for Heidegger to succeed him until after the 
First World War.
29
 Heidegger’s philosophical development was already underway by the time the two 
worked together and it would be wrong to think of him as the student who “broke away” from the master. 
As characterised by Spiegelberg, the two’s temporary coalition could only ever be temporary: 
‘Heidegger’s fundamental wonder is objective Being, Husserl’s, subjective consciousness’ (Spiegelberg, 
1971a:284).  
 In fact, there is much to suggest Scheler and his phenomenology was a far more significant 
influence on Heidegger’s work. This, in part, can be seen by the reaction of both Husserl and Scheler to 
BT. Though Heidegger originally dedicated BT to Husserl, the latter considered it a betrayal of 
phenomenology. Scheler on the other hand was the only scholar, Heidegger claimed, to recognise the 
importance of his work (Frings, 1996:3). Scheler even invited Heidegger to Cologne in 1927 to discuss 
the work and Heidegger later dedicated Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) to Scheler after his 
death. He was even involved in a project that would unsuccessfully attempt to see Philosophische 
Anthropologie finished. Schacht has suggested that Heidegger, out of deference or a desire for originality, 
eschewed the title of philosophical anthropology on the basis of this close connection to Scheler 
(Schacht, 1990:163).The problem with this interpretation is that it ignores Heidegger’s own claims that 
the existential analytic proposed in BT is meant to precede a philosophical anthropology. 
 Indeed, Heidegger takes a negative stance towards “anthropology” in the opening chapter of BT. 
Here he criticises both Husserl and Scheler of engaging in “traditional anthropology” by which he means 
“anthropologism” (Heidegger, 2010:47). Heidegger states that in the study of Dasein (“being there”)30 
‘the manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show 
itself to itself on its own terms’ (2010:16). This statement rings very true of Husserl’s own maxim “to the 
things themselves”; and yet in the next sentence Heidegger also says that ‘this manner should show that 
being is as it is initially and for the most part – in its average everydayness’ (2010:16). Glendinning 
characterises the divergence between Husserl and Heidegger as follows: ‘In Heidegger’s work there 
would be no going back to the solitude of an ego, transcendental or otherwise, but … a turn around for 
phenomenology that would re-launch it as an interpretative engagement with our existence as, essentially 
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 Another factor was the death of Husserl’s intended successor, Adolf Reinach, during the war. 
30
 It has occasionally been translated as “existence” or “human being”. Following Stambaugh’s advice we 
have not used either translation due to various connotations, and have maintained the original German (in 
Heidegger, 2010:xxiv).   
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and irreducibly, in the world’ (Glendinning, 2007:58).31 It is part of the existential (the basic structure) of 
Dasein that it is being-in-the-world. This being-in-the-world, then, is Heidegger’s attempt to rewrite 
Husserl’s notion of intentionality (Moran, 2004b:159-161; Lewis and Staehler, 2010:74-76). 
 Heidegger was critical of Husserl’s concept of epoché on the grounds that it turns ‘the objects of 
consciousness exclusively into objects in consciousness’ (Frede, 1999:53). In spite of this apparent 
contrary view to Husserl, Heidegger did not abandon the concept of reduction altogether. Certainly, if we 
understand it in terms of moving away from prejudices and “theory”, Heidegger advocated what he called 
“destruction”, in his own words. Heidegger argues that if the question of being is to achieve any clarity 
there must be a loosening of the ‘sclerotic tradition and a dissolution of the concealments produced by it’ 
through the ‘destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology’ (Hiedegger, 2010:21). As noted by 
Glendinning this “destruction” should not be construed negatively, but as “destructuring” that allows us 
to get at the primordial elements that make up tradition (Glendinning, 1998:77); and by “tradition” is 
meant those very prejudices that are meant to be bracketed in Husserl’s reductions.  
 Along with Husserl, Heidegger shared the conviction that phenomenology gets at the things as 
they present themselves without any form of presuppositions. However, it would be wrong to think that 
as Husserl and Heidegger share this trait that Heidegger also advocated “philosophy as rigorous science” 
as Hall does (Hall, 1999:125); on the contrary Heidegger was very critical of the idea. This critical 
attitude gives rise to the accusation of anthropologism. Here he shares Scheler’s critique that Husserl’s 
Transcendental Ego is no different from Kant’s rational animal (Scheler, 1973b:378). But he turns on 
Scheler too by adding a third form of anthropologism (different from both the rationalistic and 
naturalistic kinds) when he speaks of the “anthropology of Christianity”. This anthropologism arrives at 
its definition of wer through Genesis 1:26: And God said, “Let us make man in our own image, after our 
likeness”. This is one example, and modern variations have lost their theological character. The focus of 
this kind of anthropologism is on “transcendence”: ‘that man is something that reaches beyond himself’ 
(Heidegger, 1962:74). Scheler commits this anthropologism by suggesting that ‘vital values “ought” to be 
sacrificed for’ “ferhđcund values” which are in turn subordinated to “gāstcund values” (Scheler, 
1973b:107-109). As such his “transcendence anthropologism” is marked by the claim that beings strive 
toward “gāstcundian” (in Scheler, 1980b:14). This creates a hierarchy in which some beings are more 
gāstcunded than others.  
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 It is this focus on lived experience that led to Existential Phenomenology.  
50 
 
 Heidegger’s core criticism of Husserl’s Transcendental Ego and Scheler’s Person is that they are 
entities (Heidegger, 1962:74). As such they try and determine the extra constituent(s) these entities 
possess in contradistinction to other entities without questioning the being of these entities. As Heidegger 
states clearly at the very beginning of BT: 
We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity 
is in each case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves 
toward their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to 
their own Being. Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. 
(1962:67)
32
 
 
This emphasis is to avoid both anthropologism and the human prejudice. As Gorner observes: ‘There is, 
it must be confessed, something slightly artificial about Heidegger’s choice of the entity to be questioned. 
We must avoid any suggestion that the being of the human beings is to serve as the model for the being 
of all other entities’ (Gorner, 2007:22).33 A point that echoes Scheler’s own consideration of “factual 
man” above. Heidegger frames it thusly: ‘Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other 
entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it’ 
(Heidegger, 1962:32). Lachterman draws a useful distinction to understand this: “Dasein” does not 
designate a particular kind of entity, rather it picks out a style of being that certain entities possesses 
(Lachterman, (1973:xxv). Heidegger’s existential analysis undercuts Scheler’s philosophical 
anthropology because it recognises that the determination of wer as an entity (kind) is secondary to the 
                                                 
32
 We have utilised Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation here because there is some difficulty with 
Stambaugh’s translation. In her version the passage reads as follows: 
The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The being 
of this being is always mine. In the being of this being it is related to its 
being. As the being of this being, it is entrusted to its own being. It is 
being about which this being is concerned. (Heidegger, 2010:41) 
In certain respects this translation is closer to the original German:  
Das Seiende, deßßen Analyße zur Aufgabe ßteht, ßind wir je ßelbßt. Das 
Sein dißes Seienden ißt je meines. Im Sein dißes Seienden verhält ßich 
dißes ßelbßt zu ßeinem Sein. Als Seiendes dißes Seins ißt es ßeinem 
eigenen Zu-ßein überantwortet. Das Sein ißt es, darum es dießem 
Seienden je ßelbßt geht. (Heidegger, 1949:41-42).  
The main difference is in the translation of “Seiende” as “being” by Stambaugh and “entity” by 
Macquarrie and Robinson. Stambaugh’s confusing translation of two separate German words into one 
English word is brought about by the attempt to avoid a different confusion. Unlike Macquarrie and 
Robinson who always translated Sein as “Being”, Stambaugh avoids this capitalisation: ‘Capitalising 
“being,” although it has the dubious merit of treating “being” as something unique, risks implying that it 
is some king of Super Thing or transcendent being. But Heidegger’s use of the word “being” in no sense 
refers to something like a being, especially not a transcendent Being’ (in Heidegger, 2010:xxiv). Without 
the original German to compare however, it then becomes unclear when Heidegger is speaking of being 
(Sein) or a being (Seiende). 
33
 It is worth noting that Gorner is aware of both translations by Macquarrie and Robinson, and 
Stambaugh. Initially he translates “ein Seiendes” as “an entity” and “a being” but then goes on to 
translate “Seiendes” as just “entities” (2007:15). No explanation for the preference is supplied, but all his 
translations of BT are consistent with Macquarrie and Robinson.  
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determination of weres (man’s)34 being (style).35 The full meaning of the claim that ‘The essence of 
Dasein lies in its existence’ is that ‘Dasein is concerned with its being in the sense that it must choose the 
way it is. Its being is such that it must choose the way it is, not that it is but how it is’ (Gorner, 2007:23).  
 Such a claim though does not necessarily mean Heidegger is divorced from the question of wer. 
As noted by Derrida even though Dasein is not wer, it is not other than wer. Similarly, Gorner observes 
‘that Heidegger is talking about human beings when he uses the term “Dasein”’ (2007:23). But 
Heidegger qualifies this by suggesting that “human being” and “man” are not ontological terms whereas 
Dasein is (Glendinning, 1998:47).
36
 The novelty of Heidegger’s position lies less in the shift away from 
the philosophical anthropological question “What is wer?” to a different consideration of how to 
approach the question. Rather than defining wer by what a human is, which commits the human 
prejudice, Heidegger defines wer in terms of what weras do. But is this really that different from 
Scheler’s concept of the Person? Indeed, it has been suggested by Frings that much of Scheler’s Person 
anticipates Heidegger’s Dasein.37 For example, we noted above Scheler’s claim that Person cannot be 
objectified. Similarly in Heidegger we find the following claim: ‘Dasein is never to be understood 
ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of beings objectively present’ (Hiedegger, 2010:42). 
 
e. Scheler II 
 
 The convergence between Scheler and Heidegger can also be seen in the post-BT publications of 
Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge (PSK) (1926[1980b]) and The Human Place in the Cosmos (HPC) 
(1928[2009]). The latter was to serve as Scheler’s introduction to Philosophische Anthropologie and is 
now the only indication of his later philosophical anthropology after his complete break with the 
                                                 
34
 In Old English apostrophes are not used to indicate possession, rather this achieved by changing the 
word ending (-es). 
35
 A further ambiguity of phrasing and titles that pervades this discussion is the possibility that Heidegger 
saw his work as “existential anthropology”. According to Moran, Sartre considered BT to be existential 
anthropology – though it is not clear if this is Sartre’s phrase or Moran’s (2000:362). It is possibly the 
latter as the term “existential anthropology” seems to have been coined by Michael Jackson, a 
phenomenological anthropologist (e.g. 1996, 2005, 2012). Nevertheless there are two instances in which 
Heidegger does mention an “existential anthropology” in BT. However, in the first reference he claims 
we must ‘go beyond the special task of an existential, a priori anthropology’ and says similarly in the 
second (Heidegger, 2012:177, 288).  
36
 Even so, Glendinning persists in speaking of “human being” and “human existence” which undermines 
this point.  
37
 See Person und Dasein (1969). No English translation available. Comments are primarily taken from 
Lachterman’s discussion of the relation between Scheler and Heidegger (Lachterman, 1973:xxii-xxvi) 
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Church.
38
 Importantly, in HPC Scheler seems to be attempting to get out of the “transcendence 
anthropologism” when he lists it among those kinds of “anthropology” he rejects (Scheler, 2009:3).  
 Before continuing with Scheler’s main argument, however, it is necessary to highlight certain 
issues with Frings’ translations. The first is an inconsistency in the translation of “Mensch”. In PSK it is 
translated as “man” and we find the significant claim that Scheler proposes to study what he calls the 
“idea of man” as opposed to the “man-animal” (“factual man”); a distinction he proposed to justify in his 
Philosophische Anthropologie (Scheler, 1980b:195). In this respect he is quite overtly avoiding the 
human prejudice. Yet this highly significant distinction is not maintained by Frings in HPC where 
“Mensch” is translated as “human being”. Indeed, the title alone (Dies Stellung des Menschen im 
Kosmos) is given different translations by Meyerhoff (Man’s Place in Nature (MPN) (1962)) and Farber 
(“The Place of Man in the Cosmos” (1954:393)39). The book itself is based on a lecture Scheler gave in 
1927 under the title “Die Sonderstellung des Menschen” which in a further oddity of Frings’ translation is 
rendered as both “The Special Place of Humankind” and “The Special place of the Human Being” 
(Scheler, 2009:xix, 3). While we regard Frings to be terminologically incorrect on the translation of 
“Mensch” we cannot unfortunately rely solely on MPN – which does use “man” – as it is a translation of 
an abridged version of the argument which was published in Der Leuchter (1927) and lacks certain 
salient details. As such in this one case we have altered quotations with our own term “wer”. 
 Turning to “Geist”, we mentioned previously the difficulty Frings had in its translation as 
(sociological) “mind” and (metaphysical) “spirit”. In PSK “mind” is his preferred translation but admits 
that there are certain situations in which he could not avoid translating it as “spirit” (in Scheler, 
1980b:vii). These “situations” occur in the opening pages where “mind” and “spiritual” occur side-by-
side almost immediately. Indeed, Frings’ own formal distinction breaks down when “objektiven Geist” is 
translated as “objective spirit” and then “objective mind” in a corresponding footnote (Scheler, 1980a:24, 
1980b:39, 194).  
 In order to clarify Scheler’s use of “Geist” it must be contextualised within his sociology of 
knowledge. As Becker and Dahlke explain, “sociology of knowledge” means ‘the analysis of the 
functional interrelations of social processes and structures on the one hand and patterns of intellectual 
life, including modes of knowing, on the other’ (Becker and Dahlke, 1942:310). This Schelerian 
                                                 
38
 Though it should be warned that this did not entirely remove Scheler’s “theological axe” (see Kelly, 
1977:182-184). 
39
 This is also the title favoured by Schutz when he responds to Scheler’s work (Schutz, 1970e:151).  
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sociology of knowledge differs from the version forwarded by Karl Mannheim which is the more 
commonly accepted understanding within English speaking sociology (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:20-
21). Broadening Marx’s understanding of “ideology”, Mannheim claimed that no human thought was 
immune from ideologising factors and these could only be mitigated by a sociology of knowledge. 
Mannheim’s position influenced, among others, the work of Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton. By 
contrast, Schelerian sociology of knowledge deals ‘with the processes by which any body of 
“knowledge” comes to be socially established as “reality”’ and is as such ‘concerned with the analysis of 
the social construction of reality’ (1966:15). This understanding then informs Scheler’s definition of 
“Geist”: 
[Geist], in the subjective and objective sense as well as in the individual 
or collective sense, determines only and exclusively the particular quality 
of a certain cultural content that may come to exist. [Geist] as such has in 
itself no original trace of “power” or “efficacy” to bring this content into 
existence. [It] may be called a “determining factor” but not a “realising 
factor” of possible cultural developments. (Scheler, 1980b:36-37) 
  
What is clear is that in PSK “Geist” carries the same meaning as Husserl’s (later) use in Crisis. 
Significantly any gāstcund connotations seem to have been exorcised such that it can only really be 
translated with “ferhđ”. This understanding, we argue, is then carried forward into HPC. 
 In HPC Scheler argues that what distinguishes wer from other beings is ferhđ. Drawing on 
contemporary work in biology, zoography, and other related areas Scheler makes a four-fold division of 
life beginning with impulse or drives, and moving through instinct, habit, and practical intelligence. It is 
at the stage of practical intelligence that many try and make the division between weras and other beings. 
Scheler denounces this and points out that many, if not all, of the behaviours associated with such 
intelligence that are meant to make humans unique are also found within other animals too. Instead what 
distinguishes weras from other beings is the possession of ferhđ which is ‘opposite anything we call life, 
including life in [wer]’ (Scheler, 2009:26). In a significant move this ferhđ/life dualism should not be 
confused with a restatement of Descartes’ mind/body dualism: ‘the ultimate determination of a being 
with [ferhđ] – no matter what its psycho-physical makeup – is its existential detachment from organic 
being, its freedom and detachability – and the detachment of its centre of existence from the bondage to, 
the pressure of, and the organic dependence on “life” and everything which belongs to life’ (2009:27). 
This argument is also part of the reason why we have chosen the word “ferhđ”. Bearing in mind that 
Scheler wanted to get out of the mind/body dualism it is worth noting that in Old English “body” is 
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translated as “ferhđloca”: “location/house of spirit”.40 The virtue of this rendering, therefore, is that the 
two, ferhđ and ferhđloca, though separable ideas are not presented as being diametric opposites.41 
  Thus, what separates ferhđ from life is precisely the ability of the possessor to separate itself 
from life. That is, ferhđ is “world open” in that it can turn the sources of resistance and reaction in its 
environment into objects (2009:27). Resistance is a major concept in Scheler’s later phenomenology – 
grounding it in the Realistic branch – only briefly mentioned in Formalism as “with-standing” (Scheler, 
1973b:135). It was further developed in “Theory of Three Facts” (1973c) which was written concurrently 
with Formalism but never published. In this essay he explains that: ‘In every experienced resistance, we 
are aware of the operation and the forcefulness of something which does not and cannot stem from 
ourselves… The phenomenon of resistance comes to light only as directed against an activity we perform 
and, indeed, only in the exercise of the activity itself’ (Scheler, 1973c:263). Scheler’s main published 
statements are then found in PSK (Scheler, 1980b:141-143). According to Stikkers, one of Scheler’s main 
criticisms of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein was the lack of a concept of resistance in relation to Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world (in Scheler, 1980b:10). Indeed, it is this ability – to turn sources of resistance into 
objects – that allows such a being to be aware of a world as “world”. Not only this, but the ferhđ-bearing 
being becomes self-conscious in the sense that it ‘is able to objectify its very own physiological and 
psychological nature’ (Scheler, 2009:29). The animal in contrast to wer (as bearer of ferhđ) is not aware 
of its instincts as instincts or a world as “world”. It does not reflect upon a particular action as the result 
of an instinctive behaviour; rather it is too caught up in the dynamic of draw and repel (the dynamics of 
resistance) giefan by things in its environment.
42
  
                                                 
40
 We believe Scheler was approaching a similar point when he speaks of the “Hause” of “Geist” 
(Scheler, 1980a:21). Significantly in his translation of this passage (above), Frings removes any reference 
to “house”. 
41
 The full advantage of this manoeuvre cannot be worked out here. However, it nevertheless has 
implications for recent phenomenological investigations that have focused on the experience of the body 
in: video games by Murray (2000) and Crick’s (2010); sport by Meier (1988), Rail (1990, 1992), Allen-
Collinson and Hockey (2007, 2011) and Samudra (2008); and martial arts by Masciotra et al. (2001), 
Morley (2001), McDonald (2007) and Spencer (2009).  
42
 There is potential to relate Scheler’s notion of resistance and this idea of “draw” and “repel” to 
Heidegger’s analysis of fundamental moods in BT. Staehler (2007b) has pointed out that Heidegger’s 
analysis of anxiety as a fundamental mood needs to be counter balanced with the fundamental mood of 
awe especially if we are to make sense of his distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. We 
have not pursued the matter here because the understanding of authenticity/inauthenticity goes beyond 
the limits of our main argument. All we will stipulate is that we are not suggesting an equivalence 
between draw/repel and awe/anxiety. In the main we have reservations about the notion of “awe” due to 
its application in the study of religion (e.g Otto, 1926; van der Leeuw, 1963:43-51; Tiele (quoted in 
Capps, 1995:119); Cox, 2010:38-41). 
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 In fact Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein allows us to better understand Scheler’s earlier comments 
regarding the Person. Scheler points out that it is a quality of ferhđ that it  
is the only being which cannot be objectified – [ferhđ] is pure actuality; it 
exists only in freely carrying out its acts. Hence,  
[ferhđas] centre, the “person”, is not objectifiable, nor is the person a 
thinglike being. The person is a constantly self-executing order structure 
of acts (and essentially a specific structure). (emphasis added, 2009:34)  
 
Just as Dasein is not a kind of entity but a style of being, so too is ferhđ a style of being. That is, while 
humans may be delineated as one kind of entity among animals as a broader kind, insofar as they are the 
bearers of ferhđ, i.e. are persons, they have a particular style of being. Thus in Heideggerian terms Person 
or ferhđ is understood not in terms of categories but in terms of existentials. One of the most significant 
existentials of ferhđ is its ability to separate essence from existence, the act of ideation, whereby the 
person ‘uses, consciously or unconsciously, a technique which can (tentatively) be called a suspension of 
the reality of things and the world’ (2009:37). Unlike other beings which always say “yes” to reality in 
that they always follow their drives, the person is able to say “no”. This act of sublimation allows the 
person to deny drives (2009:40). By such an act the person opposes themselves to life. Such a conception 
is no different from Dasein; in its ability to raise the question of being, Dasein performs this exact same 
sort of sublimation. Though Heidegger may have denied the title of philosophical anthropology, the 
equivalency of Dasein and Person indicate that he and Scheler were operating in the same manner. 
 
f. Husserl II 
 
 In the wake of Heidegger’s publication of BT Husserl became more openly critical of his 
phenomenology. According to Spiegelberg he drew the following conclusions:  
Apparently his main impression was that Heidegger, by substituting 
human existence (Dasein) for the pure ego, had transformed 
phenomenology into anthropology, the very same anthropology which 
Husserl had once fought in the first volume of his Logische 
Untersuchungen as a species of psychologism. (emphasis added, 
Spiegelberg, 1971a:282)
43
 
 
Husserl’s criticisms reached their most vocal in a lecture delivered in 1931 entitled “Phenomenology and 
Anthropology” (1981d). At the outset of the lecture Husserl declares: ‘It is a well-known fact that the 
                                                 
43
 There is an ambiguity with Spiegelberg’s phrasing here. We have already noted above that Dasein is to 
be translated as “there-being” and not “human being”, and by extension “human existence”. It is not clear 
here whether it was Husserl who considered Dasein to be another name for human existence or if this is 
Spiegelberg’s interpolation.  
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younger German philosophers have during the last decade become increasingly interested in 
philosophical anthropology’ (1981d:315). Though these “younger German philosophers” are not named 
at all throughout the lecture, a letter to Ingarden reveals that his comments are directed toward Heidegger 
and Scheler (Scanlon, 1981:313). Husserl mentions that this new kind of “anthropology” stems from 
Dilthey and holds that philosophy is founded in wer and its concrete existence. Yet contrary to this both 
Heidegger and Scheler distance themselves from Dilthey: in Formalism Scheler had explicitly stated his 
agreement with Husserl’s analysis of Dilthey (Scheler, 1973b:302), and Heidegger criticises Dilthey’s 
philosophy of life alongside both Husserl and Scheler (Heidegger, 1962:72-73).
44
  
 What is significant about this new sort of philosophical anthropology is that, guided by 
phenomenology, it does not fall into the old pitfalls of psychologism and anthropologism. But once this 
point is recognised Husserl’s argument takes on an interesting tone. Take the two contrasting statements: 
The fundamental, that is to say, definite decision of the question under 
discussion, how far philosophy and, specifically phenomenological 
philosophy can derive its method from “philosophical” anthropology will 
accrue to us automatically on the basis of the acquired insight. (Husserl, 
1981d:316) 
 
And then: 
My task is now to make this true meaning of transcendental 
phenomenology evident to you. This will lead us to those fundamental 
insights which will help us decide whether philosophical anthropology is 
possible. (1981d:317)  
 
The issue that Husserl appears to be tackling is which is given precedence: phenomenology based on 
philosophical anthropology or philosophical anthropology based on phenomenology?
45
  
 Yet Husserl, in his defence of transcendental phenomenology, makes a very similar claim to that 
of Scheler and Heidegger. While Husserl maintains the activity of the (Transcendental) Ego, which 
Scheler denied, he nonetheless speaks of the Ego in terms that parallel Scheler’s idea of the Person. In the 
first case the Ego becomes the correlate of the world. Following a process similar to Descartes’ 
meditations, Husserl points out that if we perform an epoché whereby we put into question the existence 
of the world:  
                                                 
44
 We may also note that this criticism, to a degree, plays into a misreading of Heidegger that Derrida 
points to in the “Ends of Man”, specifically one in which BT is read as a philosophy of “human reality” 
(Derrida, 1969:34). 
45
 This point seems to be recognised by Spiegelberg who discusses Husserl’s critique of Heidegger’s 
“Existenzphilosophie” but gives no explicit references to indicate that he is speaking specifically of 
“Phenomenology and Anthropology” (Spiegelberg, 1981:53-54). 
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I experience myself as the being who practices the epoche,
46
 an 
experience which I can justify immediately and actively. This is not 
experience of the world, because the validity of the experience of the 
world has been suspended – yet it is experience. As this apodictic ego, 
therefore, I am prior to the existence of the world because I exist as this 
ego whether or not the world’s existence can be accepted and accounted 
for. (Husserl, 1981d:318) 
 
Later on, Husserl describes this Transcendental Ego as being above all worldly existence, directly 
paralleling Scheler’s concept of the Person. As Mohanty describes it: ‘the ego is constituted by habitus, 
through a sort of auto-genesis, though it never quite becomes an object but at best somewhat like an 
object’ (Mohanty, 1971:113). The mode of constitution of the Transcendental Ego differs from that of the 
constitution of objects. In CM Husserl states that this constitution is given through the habitualities of the 
Transcendental Ego (1988:66-67). In this respect the Transcendental Ego – like Person and Dasein – is 
unobjectifiable and these habitualities parallel Scheler’s acts and Heidegger’s existentials.  
 In a further fundamentally important insight, Husserl recognises that in the epoché of the world, 
‘since this world of experience must now remain in question, my being as man among men and among 
other realities of the world has become questionable too and is also subject to the epoché’ (Husserl, 
1981d:318). Without saying as such, Husserl’s Ego draws closer to Heidegger’s Dasein as the “being 
which I am”. As he goes on to add: ‘The epoche, however, makes it clear that the apperception, “human 
being”, receives its existential meaning within the universal apperception, “world”, only in the life of the 
ego’ (1981d:319). This transcendental reduction, then, echoes Heidegger’s own claims that his existential 
analytic precedes any “anthropology”. Heidegger too rejects discussion of “human beings” (Heidegger, 
1962:72), suggesting an equivalence between Dasein and the Transcendental Ego. Echoing Heidegger’s 
comments at the opening of BT, Husserl goes on to add: ‘My own self, the essential structures of my 
entire sphere of consciousness together with the structures of actual and potential meanings, and the 
conferring of validity, must all be made the themes of an eidetic science’ (Husserl, 1981d:321). To a 
certain extent it can be argued that Husserl was engaged in his usual practice of twisting words into new 
meanings in order to suit his own arguments. Thus the “Ego” Husserl actually presents is not necessarily 
the Ego Scheler and Heidegger have in mind when they level their criticisms. 
 As noted by Moran, by Crisis Husserl understood transcendental phenomenology to be ‘the 
science that grasps in a fundamental way the meaning of the accomplishment of spiritual life in all its 
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 Note there is an inconsistency within the article whereby “epoché” is referred to as either “epoche” or 
“epoché”. If there is meant to be a difference between the two uses no explanation is provided.  
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forms’ (Moran, 2004a:91). Here it would seem “spirit” has a certain equivalence to the Transcendental 
Ego when he claims of the former: ‘The spirit and in fact only the spirit is a being in itself and for itself; 
it is autonomous and is capable of being handled in a genuinely rational and thoroughly scientific way 
only in this autonomy’ (Husserl, 1965b:188). And as we have commented previously, “Geist” (Husserl, 
1954:345) should be translated as ferhđ. This ferhđ, Husserl argues, can only be studied through 
transcendental phenomenology and the Transcendental Ego that reveals its activities (Moran, 2004a:92). 
 We suggest that there is a certain equivalence between Husserl’s Transcendental Ego, Scheler’s 
Person and Heidegger’s Dasein. The accusation of “anthropologism” made in “Phenomenology and 
Anthropology” is more of a polemic against his two greatest rivals of the time. The major difference 
between Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger stems from Husserl’s insistence on this study being a “rigorous 
science” or “eidetic science”. But this does not make their respective projects incompatible. In fact, 
Husserl’s entire project can be seen to argue that no social science can proceed without a proper 
foundation in phenomenology (as philosophical anthropology). And that this “rigorous science” of 
phenomenology is philosophical anthropology is made clear in closing statements to CM: ‘The path 
leading to a knowledge absolutely grounded in the highest sense, or (this being the same thing) a 
philosophical knowledge, is necessarily the path of universal self-knowledge’ (Husserl, 1988:156). 
However, less so than Scheler and Heidegger, it is perhaps not all that clear what the details of this 
philosophical anthropology are.  
 At the end of “Phenomenology and Anthropology” he claims that: 
We must never lose sight of the fact that this transcendental 
phenomenology does nothing but interrogate just that world which is, at 
all times, the real world for us; the only one which is valid for us, which 
demonstrates its validity for us; the only one which has any meaning for 
us. (Husserl, 1981d:322)
 
  
What this amounts to is hinted at by Spiegelberg who speaks of a final (and most radical) turn in which 
Husserl produced (but rarely published) much work on two central issues of concern, intersubjectivity 
and the life-world (Lebenswelt) which emerged in CM and become central themes in Crisis (Spiegelberg, 
1971a:156-157).
47
 According to Gurwitsch the life-world is: ‘the world as it is encountered in everyday 
life and given in direct and immediate experience – especially perceptual experience and its derivatives, 
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 An early suggestion of this direction can be found in Ideas I under “world of experience” 
(Erfahrungswelt) (Moran, 2000:181). See also Moran (2013) for a more detailed account of the 
emergence of the phrase “Lebenswelt” in Husserl’s phenomenology. Spiegelberg indicates this final turn 
began prior to CM with Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929).  
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memory, expectation, and the like – independent of and prior to scientific interpretation’ (Gurwitsch, 
1974:3).
48
 For Spiegelberg, Husserl found in this notion a revealing clue for the study of intentionality. 
Indeed, its study is given fundamental importance: 
the study of the life-world is already a type of phenomenology, though 
this may still be a “mundane phenomenology.” The importance of such a 
new phenomenology, destined to explore the fields of logic and formal 
ontology, ethics, psychology etc., is indicated, among other things, by the 
fact that the final arrangement of Husserl’s papers in 1935 put the 
manuscripts on mundane phenomenology first (under A) and those on 
reduction and the various types of constitutions only under subsequent 
letters (from B to E). (Spiegelberg, 1971a:160-161)
49
 
 
This “mundane phenomenology” seems to involve the study of the life-world as various cultural-worlds: 
‘it is a world interpreted, apperceived, and apprehended in a specific way. In a word, it is a cultural 
world, more precisely, the cultural world of a certain sociohistorical group’ (Gurwitsch, 1974:20).50 As 
Gurwitsch goes on to point out, we never encounter the “perceptual world”, but rather our life-world, 
building on an earlier comment: ‘that man exists in the world means that he is involved in it’ (1974:7). 
This would then seem to implicate Husserl in the very historical relativism that he accused Dilthey of in 
“Philosophy as Rigorous Science”. And while this might pertain on the level of “mundane 
phenomenology”, Gurwitsch points out that the step to transcendental phenomenology (i.e. through the 
transcendental reduction) entails the task of ‘setting forth and elucidating the universal structures of 
consciousness which make possible any cultural world as the life-world of a sociohistorical group’ 
(1974:25). Or, as Moran notes, ‘Husserl shifted the emphasis from phenomenology as an a priori 
exploration of pure consciousness to phenomenology as the a priori exploration of the life-world’ 
(Moran, 2013:124). We may alternatively refer to these universal structures of consciousness as 
existentials.  
 
                                                 
48
 Based on this description it is possible to suggest (tentatively) that Husserl’s notion of the life-world is 
in part derived from Scheler’s discussion of “milieu” which he alternatively calls the “value-world” 
(Scheler, 1973b142). 
49
 Spiegelberg over-emphasises the importance of mundane phenomenology in this regard. He adds later 
that it is only after the seemingly historical relative studies of the cultural worlds ‘have been carried out 
will Husserl’s phenomenological or transcendental reduction have a sound basis and a proper guide’ 
(Spiegelberg, 1971a:161).  Mundane phenomenology as a potential synonym for “philosophical 
anthropology” would, as he characterises it, precede and serve as the basis of transcendental 
phenomenology. If true this would be a complete reversal of Husserl’s argument in “Phenomenology and 
Anthropology”.  
50
 “Cultural world” and “life-world” are often used interchangeably such that it is not always clear if there 
was a difference between the two. This point extends to Husserl’s own original presentation as noted by 
Carr (in Husserl, 1970c:xl-xli).  
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 What is significant about Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger is that despite certain polemical 
elements, all of them were using their respective phenomenologies to approach the question “What is 
wer?”. What holds them together is a peculiar approach to the question: in the consideration of what 
makes wer “wer” the answer lies not in the consideration of wer as entity. Treating wer as entity leads to 
naturalistic, rationalistic or transcendence anthropologisms. Rather, the question of “wer” can only be 
answered if we treat wer as a style of being. The Transcendental Ego, Person and Dasein all signify the 
being which I have (not am) and to call other entities weras marks them as having this same being. 
Being, though, (any being, be it wer or some other being) can only be giefan by the way in which the 
entity that possesses it interacts with its world. Thus the question of wer is a fundamentally social 
question. It is a question of meaning.  
 
 
iv. The fourth branch of the Movement 
 
In the “Ends of Man”, Derrida predominantly comes down in favour of Heidegger’s existential analytic 
and claims that its greatest misreadings have been brought about by Sartre. Contra Derrida, we argue that 
Sartre’s phenomenology is not some “existential misreading” but follows on from Husserl’s final “turn” 
when he abandoned the “Cartesian way” to phenomenology. This “Cartesian way” belongs to Ideas I and 
its almost Herculean leap into the realm of pure consciousness. According to Moran in the later works we 
see a shift to an “ontological way” through the life-world (2013:108-109). This “ontological” shift is 
significant for our consideration of philosophical anthropology. Eshleman has suggested that Husserl 
paved the way for a revolution in ontology by attempting to collapse the distinction between being 
(reality) and appearance (Eshleman, 2013:332). This he suggests indicates a more complex relation with 
Sartre and his own “ontology” in Being and Nothingness (BN) (1943[2003]) than has been recognised by 
secondary literature. Our concern here is to show that Sartre’s instigation of Existential Phenomenology 
continued this distinctively phenomenological approach to philosophical anthropology in a way that 
synthesises Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger.  
 
g. Sartre 
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 According to Spiegelberg, Sartre was heavily influenced by Scheler’s work and suggests that 
Sartre’s phenomenology ‘sounds like the program of a philosophical anthropology’ whereby ‘Sartre 
would presumably claim that his enterprise is even more basic than the philosophical anthropology of 
Max Scheler, its best known rival in this field’ (Spiegelberg, 1971b:482). However, Sartre’s position in 
The Phenomenological Movement is like that of a “black sheep”51 with a “phenomenological period” that 
can be dated roughly between 1934 with Transcendence of the Ego (TE) (1934[2004a]) to 1943 and the 
publication of BN.
52
 Commonly conceived, Sartre’s phenomenology involves a radical shift from the 
dogmatically Husserlian stance of TE which he began to take “liberties” with after the influence of 
Heidegger’s BT (in Sartre, 2004a:ix). Sartre comments that: ‘It is the war and Heidegger who have put 
me on the right path; Heidegger by showing me that there was nothing beyond the project which human 
reality realised itself’ (quoted in Fretz, 1992:78). This “réalité humaine”53, often equated with 
Heidegger’s Dasein, is the core of Sartre’s philosophical anthropology as “wer in situation”. In order to 
avoid “existentialist misreadings” we need now to clarify these ideas. 
 Two significant factors in this portrayal concern us here: first, a comparison is usually only 
made between TE and BN, largely ignoring the works in between of which Sketch for a Theory of the 
Emotions (STE) actually provides certain insights into the “shift” in Sartre’s phenomenology; second, 
discussions usually focus on how Sartre is related to Husserl and Heidegger, ignoring the influence of 
Scheler. These are important for our considerations because STE contains Sartre’s clearest statement 
regarding philosophical anthropology, but the lack of consideration of Scheler’s influence in particular 
stems partly from a tendency of Sartre only to really mention scholars when he disagrees with them.
54
 
There is not the space to give a systematic treatment of how Sartre has been read and misread and so we 
will restrict ourselves to a few statements about the major points of Sartre’s phenomenology.55 
                                                 
51
 E.g. Schutz (1962e:180), Derrida (1969), Spiegelberg (1982:529-530), and Richmond (in Sartre, 
2004a:xxiii). 
52
 Contained within this rough ten year period are also the works The Imagination (1936[1962]), the 
novel Nausea (1938[2000]), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1939[2002]), and The Imaginary 
(1940[2004b]). Despite the importance given to Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960[1976]) by Fretz 
(1992) and Cannon (2013) we have followed Moran in not going beyond BN as Sartre strays into 
humanist philosophy (2000:255-256) (see Ch.6.i). 
53
 Like “Dasein” we have elected to leave the phrase untranslated.  
54
 Richmond has observed a similar point in regard to Henri Bergson (in Sartre, 2004:xxv). 
55
 A consideration of Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis at the end of BN has largely been ignored despite 
the numerous benefits it might have for social science. Such considerations are beyond the scope of our 
current considerations and also require us to deal with a strong methodological individualism emphasis in 
his work.  
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 In order to make sense of Sartre’s phenomenology as philosophical anthropology we need to 
begin with STE. Here Sartre proposes an “experiment in phenomenological psychology” into the study of 
emotions. This stems from a criticism of psychology and its failure to understand wer. “Anthropology”, 
he claims, has as its task ‘to define the essence of man [l’homme] and the human [humaine] condition’ 
(Sartre, 2002:2). For Sartre psychology can never achieve this. Wer, as it is understood by psychology, is 
brought about by the observation that all over the world there are certain creatures that share common 
constituents, and from studies in sociology and physiology, certain “objective” relations obtain between 
them. The psychologist limits himself to the study of these creatures without asking if this limitation is 
arbitrary. Why, Sartre asks, are the “Australian primitive” and “American workman” included, but higher 
apes excluded (2002:2-3)? These remarks bear some similarity to Scheler’s (above) and indicate an 
awareness of a human prejudice involved in psychology.  
 More substantively, Sartre notes that the psychologist excludes as a possibility of his analysis 
that he consider the weras around him as weras like himself. The psychologist’s own “werisc character” 
is supplied after the fact, as it were. As such the notion of wer is no more than a unifying hypothesis 
aimed at bringing together otherwise disparate data and can only derive its probability from successful 
use. But this makes the psychologist a mere collector of facts and little more. In the case of emotions the 
psychologist thus knows that wer has emotions because they can see them and so catalogues them as 
historical accidents. Nowhere, though, do they study 
the conditions under which an emotion is possible – enquiring, that is, 
whether the very structure of the [“réalité-humaine”] renders the 
emotions possible and how it does so – to the psychologist this would 
seem needless and absurd. What is the use of enquiring whether emotion 
is possible, seeing that manifestly it exists? (2002:5) 
 
The psychologist may counter that this “synthetic” approach is exactly the same sort as applied in the 
natural sciences. However, Sartre points out that the world as the synthetic totality of natural science is 
rarely appealed to.
56
 It is a presumption, then, that psychology thinks that it can synthetically reach wer. 
                                                 
56
 This point is not overtly clear in Mairet’s translation of STE. In the original the key sentence reads as 
follows: ‘Il y a beau temps que cette notion de monde s’est évanouie sous la critique des méthodologistes 
et cela précisément parce qu’on ne saurait à la fois appliquer les méthodes des sciences positives et 
espérer qu’elles conduiront un jour à découvrir le sens de cette totalité synthétique qu’on appelle monde’ 
(Sartre, 1948:5-6). Mairet translates this as: ‘It is a good while since the notion of the world has 
succumbed under the criticisms of the methodologists, just because we cannot apply the methods of the 
positive sciences and at the same time expect them to lead us one day to a discovery of the meaning of 
the synthetic totality that we call the world’ (Sartre, 2002:4-5). We think this oblique sentence is better 
translated as: ‘It has been a long time since the notion of the world has succumbed to criticism by 
methodologists and this is precisely because we do not have the time to apply the methods of the positive 
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Indeed, “wer” and “the world” are beings of the same type, such that, ‘as Heidegger believes, the notions 
of the world and of [“réalité-humaine”] (Dasein) are inseparable’ (2002:5). This parallels an earlier 
comment in TE where Sartre claims that the Ego and the world are both synthetic totalities unifying 
psychical objects or things together (Sartre, 2004a:30); or, as Hazel Barnes usefully refers to them, “ideal 
unities” (in Sartre, 1956:xiii).  
 Turning to Husserl, Sartre argues that phenomenology accepted that not only can we have 
experiences of facts, but we also have experiences of essences and values.  Accordingly, “emotions” 
cannot be picked out from the multitude of psychic facts unless implicit recourse is made to the essence 
of emotion as what holds these facts together as emotions (2002:7). In this respect “essence” is 
understood as that which holds the disparate emotions in a particular unity, and Husserl’s study into 
transcendental and constitutive consciousness through the “phenomenological reduction”, was a means 
by which these implicit essences are made explicit. Heidegger is appealed to in this sense because the 
phenomenological reduction is applied to me: ‘What must differentiate all research into man from other 
types of strict investigation is precisely this privileged circumstance, that the [réalité-humaine] is 
ourselves’ (2002:8). As such, I am a being who, to varying degrees of clarity, apprehends myself as wer. 
It is on this basis, Sartre maintains, that any philosophical anthropology should proceed (2002:9). 
Therefore: 
In a general way, what interests psychology is man in situation. In itself it 
is, as we have seen, subordinate to phenomenology, since a truly positive 
study of man in situation would have first to have elucidated the notions 
man, of the world, of being-in-the-world, and of situation. (2002:12-13) 
 
The remainder of STE is a piece of phenomenological psychology: the study of the essence of the 
emotions as one particular activity of réalité humaine – i.e. “wer in situation”. That is, the study of 
emotion, though only an aspect of réalité humaine, nonetheless indicates its totality. Though Sartre never 
speaks in terms of social science, it is not unreasonable to draw from this understanding the view that 
social science is the study of “wer in situation”, which elucidates the essence of wer through weres 
particular activities.
57
  
                                                                                                                                               
sciences and hope that one day they lead us to discover the meaning of this synthetic totality known as 
the world’.  
57
 Lewis and Staehler have commented that Sartre still recognised the importance of “empirical science” 
for showing how possible consciousness discerned by philosophy is actualised (Lewis and Staehler, 
2010:124-125). 
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 In TE Sartre is dogmatically Husserlian in his understanding of consciousness as intentional: 
consciousness is always conscious-of something other than itself. He even uses this core of Husserlian 
phenomenology to demonstrate that not only is the concept of the Transcendental Ego superfluous to our 
considerations of consciousness, but it actually hinders them (2004a:4-9). The supposed shift of BN is 
meant to revolve around a change in the understanding of consciousness, but as Barnes’ extensive 
footnotes in TE reveal, much of it is presupposed in the later text. She indicates that the only difference in 
BN is the recognition that the refutation of solipsism in TE failed (in Sartre, 1956:xi-xii). More 
significant, we suggest, is how Sartre’s phenomenology is given a focus in BN pre-determined in STE as 
the need to define “wer”, “the world”, “being-in-the-world”, and “situation” in order to study “wer in 
situation”.  
 In order to understand this we must see that STE reconciles an apparent contradiction between 
TE and BN. In TE Sartre claims that ‘for consciousness, to be and know oneself are one and the same 
thing,’ or, ‘consciousness is a being whose essence implies existence’ (2004a:36). In BN this is seemingly 
rejected: ‘Since consciousness is not possible before being, but since its being is the source and condition 
of all possibility, its existence implies its essence’ (emphasis added, Sartre, 2003:11). This, Sartre has 
garnered from both Heidegger’s study of Dasein in terms of its essentia and existentia and Husserl’s 
“necessity of fact”.58 By the phrase Sartre means that: ‘In order for there to be an essence of pleasure, 
there must be first the fact of a consciousness (of) this pleasure’ (2003:11). But understood in this way 
Sartre is hardly deviating from his claims in STE that phenomenology makes explicit otherwise implicit 
essences. If I am conscious-of a particular pleasure then contained within this is a consciousness of 
Pleasure in general.
59
 Each such essence then points back to wer in her totality. As he goes on to explain, 
as consciousness is always conscious-of something, consciousness emerges as a revelation revealed by a 
being which it is not and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals that being 
(2003:18). As such: ‘Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is 
consciousness of a being, whose essence implies its existence’ (2003:18). Unlike Fretz who has 
suggested that the crucial difference lies in two possible senses of “implies” (Fretz, 1992:82), we suggest 
the key is the use of “is” and “of”. Consciousness as a transcendent (going beyond) being reveals its 
                                                 
58
 There is not the space to comment fully on the ease with which Sartre synthesises both Husserl and 
Heidegger in a number of places. Spiegelberg has suggest one reason is that Sartre was unlikely aware of 
the friction between the two (Spiegelberg, 1981:54). 
59
 Indeed, to speak of a “pleasure” at all requires recourse to some essence in this sense.  
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essence by its very existence; each object consciousness is conscious-of has the capacity to reveal 
consciousness to itself (existence implies essence). Conversely, the being which consciousness becomes 
conscious-of (i.e. itself) is a being which has as a part of its essence the necessity of existing (essence 
implies existence).  
 Further to this we must understand how Sartre uses “existence” in distinction to Heidegger. It 
must be noted that he dropped Heidegger’s Dasein in favour of consciousness. As such Spiegelberg has 
pointed out that Sartre’s concern with existence is not as a particular mode of being for Dasein but as ‘the 
concrete behaviour of human being in his conscious situation with an experienced world and responding 
to it’ (Spiegelberg, 1971b:482). This point allows us to give some sense to what Sartre means by réalité 
humaine. Existence is for Sartre consciousness in situation. Though the formal definition does not occur 
until much later, “situation” is understood by Sartre as the objective structure which surrounds me 
determining what possibilities I have available at the given moment (Sartre, 2003:283). The crucial 
question is how this structure of the situation is available to consciousness. The flaw of Heidegger’s 
definition of Dasein as ‘a being such that in its being, its being is in question’ is that it is not a full 
definition and Sartre proposes instead that: ‘consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in 
question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself’ (2003:18). Réalité humaine therefore 
indicates the dealings of consciousness with a being which is not itself. That is, “wer in situation”.  
 It is the investigation of this point that leads Sartre to his study of nothingness and negation. 
This negation is not a thing among things, but the means by which the totality of being is ordered into 
differentiated complexes of instruments. Through this negation we invest ourselves in the world and 
more importantly it is through this that the “world” arises as such. Sartre goes on to claim: ‘Thus we 
reach the first term of our study: man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world 
(2003:48). This “first term” – the first item listed in STE – is wer and its definition: Wer brings 
nothingness into the world. By this Sartre means that insofar as wer is able to ask questions of being she 
must be able to put herself outside of being. To do this wer alters her relation with being: ‘For man to put 
a particular existent out of circuit is to put himself out of circuit in relation to that existent. In this case he 
is not subject to it; he is out of reach; it can not act on him, for he has retired beyond a nothingness’ 
(2003:48). Wer can never deny existence as such but only change her relation to it. Negation, then, is no 
more than Scheler’s concept of sublimation. These negations produce négatités – a term coined by Sartre 
– which indicate the subsequent relation of wer to the world. Sartre calls this ability freedom, the 
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requisite for negations to take place, and understood in parallel to Scheler it is no more than another way 
of speaking of ferhđ.  
 However, unlike Scheler’s ferhđ, freedom is not the essence of wer but the condition of weres 
essence: ‘Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being 
is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of 
“[réalité humaine].” Man does not exist in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between 
the being of man and his being-free’ (Sartre, 2003:49). We take Sartre to mean the following: the being 
of wer is wer existing – that is, consciousness in its full intentionality caught in situation. Thus the being 
of wer is found in being conscious-of something that is not itself. At the same time consciousness is also 
consciousness (of) consciousness. This reflected consciousness brought about by reflective consciousness 
is the essence of wer. As he goes on to explain later: ‘essence is what has been’ (2003:59). Existence 
precedes essence in the significant sense that the way in which wer indicates an essence by the phrase 
“that is” causes all that is designated to have-been.  
  
 The true advantage of Sartre’s synthesis will not be played out until our consideration of 
intersubjectivity.
60
 For now we want to contextualise his approach to the being of wer in relation to 
Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger in two respects: 
 First, for Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre, phenomenology dealt with philosophical 
anthropology even if they did not all consistently use the title. Returning to our consideration of 
Spiegelberg’s divisions at the beginning of the chapter we can now say the following: phenomenology in 
the simpliciter sense means an approach to philosophical anthropology. Any “phenomenology” which 
does not engage in the question “What is wer?” is considered pseudo-phenomenology. In Spiegelberg’s 
list of excluded “phenomenologies”, we can point to Ernst Mach as one example of pseudo-
phenomenology. In Mach’s use, phenomenology was not the study of wer but the means by which 
physics would be purged of all metaphysical elements (Spiegelberg, 1982:8). The obvious question, then, 
is whether or not phenomenology-of-religion meets this simpliciter definition also? The answer to which 
must be affirmative. To take two promiment members: van der Leeuw attempted to define “wer” as the 
seeker of power (van der Leeuw, 1963:680-681) and in Eliade “wer” is defined as homo religiosus 
(Eliade, 1959:15, 2006b:58-60). Though it is possible to question whether the latter belongs under the 
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 See Ch.7.ii. 
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rubric “phenomenology-of-religion” it is nonetheless the case that this notion of homo religiosus is taken 
up by such members as Smart (1996:30) and Cox (2010:92). 
 Second, if we were to maintain Spiegelberg’s metaphor of a spiral, we should strictly speaking 
discuss the four separate spirals of Husserl (Constitutive Phenomenology), Scheler (Realistic 
Phenomenology), Heidegger (Hermeneutic Phenomenology) and Sartre (Existential Phenomenology). 
Such an image indicates wildly divergent traditions but as the case of Sartre shows, he was able to make 
his contributions by synthesising the thought of the previous three. The true advantage of the 
Phenomenological Movement (and that which holds these four together) is that in their approach to the 
question “What is wer?” Wer is understood not by a set of constituents but by a particular style of being. 
To define wer as “the beings which we are” is to say that wer carries a particular meaning. How Husserl, 
Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre differ in their accounts of this being – i.e. the structure or existentials of 
this being’s style – is brought about by their differing phenomenological agendas that led them to 
consider wer under different conditions. We propose to abandon Spiegelberg’s metaphor of a spiral in 
favour of the anology used by Moran and Embree to describe their edited series Phenomenology as a map 
by which the reader can get their bearing in the phenomenological tradition (Moran and Embree, 
2004a:2). What we suggest is that the items of the agenda are “mountains” or waypoints which orientate 
our navigation through the “phenomenological continent”. Each phenomenologist relies upon different 
waypoints to draw their map of this continent; a map which approaches the question “What is wer?” The 
various branches instigated by Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre represent various routes to 
exploring this continent. And it is this approach of the Phenomenological Movement that will allow us to 
get to the core of the crisis of social science.  
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3. Phenomenology Proper 
 
By investigating the phenomenologies of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre we have now 
formulated a definition of phenomenology simpliciter as an approach to philosophical anthropology. 
However, this definition is not yet precise enough for our main argument. First, we have yet to 
demonstrate that phenomenology is a normative philosophy of social science. Second, without this 
understanding of phenomenology as normative philosophy of social science we lack the tools by which to 
engage in an analysis of the crisis of social science – i.e an evaluative philosophy of social science. In 
order to be in a position to achieve this we must develop a definition of a phenomenology proper. Such a 
definition will give us an understanding of phenomenology as a normative philosophy of social science.  
 
  
i. Alfred Schutz as Husserl’s successor 
 
The previous chapter argued that Husserl’s phenomenology was an approach to philosophical 
anthropology in all but name. However, Husserl was only ever to sketch the beginnings of this before his 
death and much of his thought is now known through posthumous publications of his Nachlass. And 
while Husserl may have held out hopes that Heidegger would be his successor, once viewed in the light 
of his final turn it is another figure that may be the true heir to Husserlian phenomenology. Spiegelberg, 
speaking of Husserl’s considerations of the life-world in Crisis as sketchy, suggests that they have 
received a full and concrete development in the work of Schutz (Spiegelberg, 1982:163). One significant 
aspect of Crisis, as recognised by Moran, is its continued focus on rigorous science. But what becomes 
clear about Husserl’s concept of science is that, unlike the positivist conception that was emerging at the 
same time, he was not advocating ‘a conception of the world to correct – or even replace – the naïve, 
natural, pre-scientific approach to the world’ but rather to ‘re-situate the scientific conception of the 
world within the life-world and show how the idealising scientific attitude requires and cannot replace the 
natural attitude’ (Moran, 2013:106). It is precisely this task that we suggest Schutz carried out beginning 
with The Phenomenology of the Social World (PSW) (1932[1967]) in which he provides an analysis of 
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Max Weber’s methodological position using Husserlian phenomenology.1 Significantly, Husserl read 
PSW, delivering it the praise that Schutz was ‘one of the few who have penetrated to the core of the 
meaning of my life’s work’ (in Schutz, 1967:xviii). External constraints, however, prevented the two 
from collaborating. 
 According to Embree, Schutz ‘fundamentally created the phenomenological theory of the social 
sciences single handedly’ (Embree, n.d.). Delanty and Strydom list him under their second sense of 
“philosophy of social science” (now subsumed under normative philosophy of social science).2 As a 
follower of Husserl, Schutz argued extensively for his importance for social science. Although he admits 
in “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences” (1959[1962j]) that Husserl himself was not concerned 
with the problems of social science, social sciences will nonetheless ‘find their true foundation not in 
transcendental phenomenology, but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude’ 
(1962j:149).
3
 The qualification contained here points to the fact that Schutz was by no means an 
uncritical follower of Husserl. According to Seebohm, Schutz’s account of social science makes up for 
certain shortcomings in Husserl’s own discussions in Ideas II and III (Seebohm, 2013:138). Based on our 
discussion in the previous chapter it could even be suggested that Schutz focused on the work of 
“mundane phenomenology” which Husserl saw capable within the study of life-world (Spiegelberg, 
1982:256).  
 But most significant for our concerns is Natanson’s comments that Schutz saw that social 
science required a basis in philosophical anthropology in order to proceed properly (Natanson, 1962:xlvi-
xlvii). As Schutz himself wrote in “Symbol, Reality, and Society” (1955[1962i]) regarding the study of 
symbols:  
The analysis of these transcendences – from those going beyond the limits 
of the world within his actual reach to those transgressing the paramount 
of everyday life – is a major task of any philosophical anthropology. At 
                                                 
1
 Though in reality Scheler had already provided a phenomenological critique of Weber’s work (see 
Scheler, 1989b). 
2
 Embree, however, has noted the difficulty of associating Schutz with the phrase “philosophy of social 
science” since it had yet to be coined (Embree, 2011a:xi-xiii). Schutz himself speaks more often of 
“theory of science”, a phrase seemingly equivalent to “methodology”. Embree adds that his primary aim 
seems to have been to uncover and clarify certain foundational difficulties that may have been overlooked 
(2011a:xiii). E.g. Schutz suggests that “choice” and “decision” are fundamental categories for any theory 
of social science yet few social scientists have clarified these basic concepts (Schutz, 2011b:75). 
Embree’s comments regarding “philosophy of social science” seem to fit in with a general difficulty of 
capturing what is meant by the phrase. Nevertheless, his understanding of Schutz clearly indicates that he 
was working on a methodology by which social science was to proceed. In this respect Schutz may still 
be classified as a normative philosopher of social science as we have used the phrase.  
3
 See also 1962a, 1962c, and 1970b. 
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the same time, the clarification of the categories of common-sense 
thinking within everyday life is indispensable for the proper foundation of 
all the social sciences. (1962i:356) 
 
Further to this he claimed in “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences” that Husserl’s 
phenomenology was ‘designed to be developed into a philosophical anthropology’ (1962j:149).4 
According to Gurwitsch, Schutz was in search of the same invariant structures as Husserl which could 
only have their roots in the “werisc condition”. Therefore, the search and clarification of such structures 
requires a philosophical anthropology (Gurwitsch, 1974:28). Schutz worked on developing 
phenomenology as a philosophical anthropology and on placing that within Social Science. But also 
significant in this regard is that as a critical follower of Husserl, Schutz also drew on the work of Scheler, 
Heidegger, and Sartre.
5
 Though we commented that Sartre synthesised much of the previous three, it is 
also the case that his comments were not related to social science. In Schutz we find a similar project 
with the added benefit of being explicitly concerned with social science. We can also suggest that Schutz 
is the instigator of the fifth branch of phenomenology that Embree calls Cultural Phenomenology.  
 Most significant in Schutz’s synthesis is his appropriation of Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, 
which he makes use of in numerous places without qualification. The major difference between the two is 
that where Scheler focused on “philosophical or theological systems” (Schutz, 1964i:249), Schutz 
focused on common-sense life (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:27-28).
6
 This “sociological” emphasis is the 
main reason Schutz himself is often characterised as a sociologist rather than a phenomenologist and why 
this fifth branch of phenomenology has moved beyond Philosophy departments into the Social Sciences.
7
 
For our purposes our main focus will be on Schutz’s analysis into the essence of social science, but this 
can only be understood if placed into the wider framework of his work on provinces of meaning.
8
  
                                                 
4
 It is possible to see this in Husserl’s discussion of regional ontologies as formations of objectivities. 
These objectivities are: ‘all types of objects bearing a value, all practical objects, all concrete cultural 
organisations which as hard realities determine our actual life, the State, for instance, the Church, custom, 
the law, and so forth’ (Husserl, 2012:320).  
5
 See 1962b, 1962e, 1970c and 1970e.  
6
 Schutz’s relation to Mannheim is unclear; there is only one vague reference that might suggest an 
explicit disagreement with his form of sociology of knowledge (Schutz, 1967:11). 
7
 E.g. Greil (1977), Davies (1983), Neitz and Spickard (1990), Berger, and Luckmann (1991), Spickard 
(1991, 2005, 2008), Embree (1999), Luckmann (2003) and Bellah (2011). 
8
 We avoided using The Structures of the Life-World (1973) on that grounds it was completed 
posthumously by Thomas Luckmann using the available collected notes and chapter plans Schutz was 
able to draw up before he died. As Luckmann admits in the preface: ‘This book cannot be the book as 
Schutz would have written it. It is not even the book I think he would have written’ (in Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1973:xxi). As such the work is a collaborative effort and there is not the space to extract 
Luckmann’s interpolations.  
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 In PSW Schutz argues that Weber’s position fails to appreciate that there is a difference between 
meaning as it is intended by a person and meaning as it is received by another: ‘the subjective meaning of 
another person’s behaviour need not be identical with the meaning which his perceived external 
behaviour has for me as an observer’ (Schutz, 1967:20). Weber’s analysis of meaning takes it as a given 
that the meaning I observe of another is the meaning that they intend. Following Husserl, Schutz offers a 
different approach. At its simplest, 
we will say that meaning is a certain way of directing one’s gaze at an 
item of one’s own experience. This item is thus “selected out” and 
rendered discrete by a reflexive Act. Meaning indicates, therefore, a 
peculiar attitude on the part of the Ego toward the flow of its own 
duration. This holds true of all stages and levels of meaning. (1967:42) 
 
Each “attitude” is then ‘that frame of interpretation which sees them as behaviour’ (1967:57). In this 
respect Schutz extends Husserl’s discussion of “attitudes” to understand them as interpreting in a 
particular way.
9
  
 Drawing further on Husserl, Schutz focuses on the idea that polythetic experiences are 
synthesised into a monothetic unity. For example, when I observe an object I observe each constituent of 
that object individually while my consciousness synthesises all these observations into a single totality. 
The way in which these monothetic unities are brought together are called meaning-contexts by Schutz. 
He gives the following definition: 
We say that our lived experiences E1, E2, … , En stand in a meaning-
context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, 
they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming 
thereby unified objects of monothetic attention. (1967:75) 
 
The meaning-contexts or “configurations of meaning”,10 as they are alternatively called, build up within 
the person a “stock of knowledge at hand”: ‘the story of already constituted objectives of experience in 
the actual Here and Now’ (1967:78). By this “Here and Now” Schutz means the situation I find myself in 
as “null-point” around which that situation, as situation, is oriented (1962a:133; 1962i:306-307).11 Thus 
the stock of knowledge at hand contains all the configurations of meaning that a person has gathered up 
until this point. Many of these configurations also contain within them further configurations which may 
be regarded as subdivisions. A meaning-context is then a collection of these configurations based on 
                                                 
9
 See Ch.1.iii.e. 
10
 Though Schutz does not explicitly state as such within PSW there is a strong parallel between what he 
has called meaning-contexts and Husserl’s regional ontologies.  
11
 This understanding of the “Here” can be found as early as Husserl’s LI (1970a:315-316).  
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similarities they hold. This is not to say that they hold these similarities in a formal sense; it is the person 
who decides if configurations of meaning are similar and so creates a meaning-context.  
 Both the notions of meaning-context and stock of knowledge are developed further in the later 
essay “On Multiple Realities” (1945[1962d]). Schutz draws upon James’ idea that within our lives our 
reality is divided up into “sub-universes” (1962d:207). Each of these “sub-universes” is determined by a 
particular set of relevancies or what Schutz later prefers to call ‘finite provinces of meaning’ 
(1962d:230). “Province of meaning” replaces “meaning-context”.12 Each province of meaning is finite in 
that ‘there is no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a formula of 
transformation’ (1962d:232). For example, taking Husserl’s notion of a European ferhđ as a province of 
meaning we can contrast this with a (hypothetical) British province. As finite provinces this entails that I 
cannot be both European and British at the same time. They constitute exclusive monothetic unities. 
While it is not stated as such by Schutz, we would qualify that this point holds true only for those 
provinces of meaning on the same level of meaning-context. That is, we re-interpret “meaning-context” 
to mean how provinces are hierarchically organised depending on the situation. Thus, if we regard 
Europe as a higher meaning-context level to Britain the latter becomes one of its polythetic constituents.  
 Each province involves its own cognitive style by which is meant that each province determines 
how an object should be engaged with – i.e. the attitude taken towards object. Britain, then, as a 
polythetic constituent of Europe entails that its cognitive style is in some way derivative of this higher 
level.
13
 According to Schutz, the natural attitude is the primary province of meaning in that it is the one 
we occupy most regularly and is indeed fundamental to most of our ability to interact with others. While 
he does not give a full exposition to the matter, he suggests that some, if not all, of these provinces of 
meaning form “enclaves” within the world of working (the natural attitude) by which he means each 
province becomes a variation upon this fundamental province (1962d:233).
14
 This seems to follow in the 
line of Husserl’s comments of “Crisis of European Man” in which different attitudes derive from the 
natural attitude.
15
  
                                                 
12
 According to Sebald “province of meaning” is a more elaborate version of Weber’s “spheres of value” 
though we have found no textual reference from Schutz to confirm this (Sebald, 2011:342).  
13
 Again it must be emphasised that this is not a formal relation. Empirical observation would reveal 
examples of British people who would not regard Britain as a constituent of Europe. Britain would thus 
be a monothetic unity on the same level of meaning-context as Europe.  
14
 In “On Multiple Realities” only the provinces of work, phantasy, dreaming, and social science are 
mentioned.  
15
 See Ch.2.ii.a.  
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 This emphasis on “work” as the equivalent of the natural attitude can lead to a confusion, 
however, as Schutz does not mean “jobs” in the sense of “going to work”. Rather, work is anything 
dominated by the pragmatic motive (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:36): anything concerned with the 
surviving and thriving of the person. Berger and Luckmann note that a similar confusion has occurred in 
interpretations of Marx’s thinking. Marx’s discussion of “substructure” and “labour” led many to equate 
this substructure with the economic structure alone. However, this is to miss that by “labour” Marx meant 
any “human activity” that produces “superstructure” understood as “human thought” (1966:18).16 This 
sub/superstructure scheme can then be found in Scheler’s sociology of knowledge as the difference 
between “real factors” and “ideal factors”: ‘the “real factors” regulate the conditions under which certain 
“ideal factors” can appear in history, but cannot affect the content of the latter’ (1966:20).17 In order to 
avoid confusion later when we discuss science in relation to jobs
18
 we will replace Schutz’s “work” with 
the Old English “swincan”19 to indicate his particular meaning. Further, it is important to recognise that 
swincan as concerned with surviving and thriving avoids the criticism of entailing egoism that Scheler 
levelled against Spencer.
20
 “Thriving”, understood here as prospering, requires not only one’s own 
survival but also the securing of future generations.  
 “Stock of knowledge” therefore comes to be defined as the totality of these provinces of 
meaning. Because these provinces are finite, access into each requires a specific form of epoché in which 
the person brackets out the cognitive style of the natural attitude in order to enter the cognitive style of 
the appropriate province (Schutz, 1962d:231). Again, to draw a connection with Scheler, this is similar to 
the idea of sublimation.
21
 To avoid conflation with the technical use of epoché by Husserl, Schutz states 
that moving from one province to another requires a “leap” or a “shock”.22  
                                                 
16
 See also McMurty (1978) and Strenski (1998). 
17
 The sub/superstructure scheme can also be found played out in Scheler’s distinction between 
Gruppenseele and Gruppengeist (see Ch.7.iv). 
18
 See Ch.5.iii.  
19
 Translated as “strive”, “struggle”, “labour” or “toil”. 
20
 See Ch.2.iii.c. 
21
 See Ch.2.iii.e. 
22
 Schutz does not suggest if there is a difference between “leap” and “shock”, but we would infer there 
is. Specifically, “leaps” refer to those instances where the person enters a province by their own volition 
whereas “shocks” occur when they are forced into a province. This differs from Berger and Luckmann’s 
interpretation of provinces of meaning where they claim that: ‘While there are, of course, shifts in 
attention within everyday life, the shift to a finite province of meaning is of a much more radical kind’ 
(1966:39). In their conception “everyday life” is surrounded by provinces of meaning which implies these 
leaps are “unnatural” or disturbing. Sebald (2011) has suggested something similar in claiming that 
moving through provinces is never easy. We regard it as more accurate to say that everyday life is 
constituted by the totality of various provinces of meaning all arranged around the province of Swincan 
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 To each province of meaning belongs a “practical attitude” and a “contemplative/theoretical 
attitude”23 (1962d:245). This distinction has potentially come from Scheler who speaks in Formalism of 
the “practical man” who ‘is surrounded, as it were, by thinglike units representing a realm of graduated 
and qualitatively differentiated efficacies independent of their being perceived. They are already 
differentiated and structured as points of departure of possible acting. The practical man “learns” to 
“handle” these units without needing to have any theoretical knowledge of the laws that govern such 
units’ (Scheler, 1973b:141). This is in contrast to the “theoretician” who seems concerned with this 
theoretical knowledge of these units. Where Schutz seems to differ is in not making this differentiation of 
persons. Thus, the practical attitude and the contemplative attitude constitute the two possible modes of 
the cognitive style a person adopts when operating within a particular province of meaning. We may 
usefully think of this in Heidegger’s terms, likely also drawn from Scheler, of ready-to-hand and present-
at-hand (Heidegger, 2010:72-73). Each cognitive style determines the ready-to-handness (practical 
attitude) and the present-at-handness (contemplative attitude) of an object. The use of “ness” is meant to 
convey that how an object is ready-to-hand, say, is dependent upon on the cognitive style in use. Take 
Heidegger’s hammer as an example. The ready-to-handness of the hammer differs if my intended project 
is to put nails in a wall or to kill someone. 
 In order to proceed in a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science we must 
develop an understanding of both phenomenology and social science as cognitive styles. In the case of 
the former this will lead to a phenomenology proper. “Proper” means here both “accurate” and 
“designating a particular”. More specifically, we understand the Phenomenological Movement to be a 
province of meaning with a particular cognitive style that we call “phenomenology”. In so doing we 
make the ideological claim to “proper phenomenology”. That is, returning to Spiegelberg’s discussion of 
various inventions of “phenomenology”, we are so far capable of dividing these inventions into 
simpliciter phenomenologies and pseudo-phenomenologies. But as these simpliciter phenomenologies all 
share in the philosophical anthropological concern they may be regarded as having the same 
contemplative attitude. What differentiates them, therefore, is the differences in their practical attitudes, 
                                                                                                                                               
as the “lodestone”. Thus while the movement from province to province involves “leaps” and “shocks” 
these are by no means as disturbing as implied by Berger and Luckmann.  
23
 We will drop “theoretical” for the time being though it would be more in keeping with Husserl. The 
decision of whether we think of a province of meaning as having a contemplative or theoretical attitude 
depends, we suggest, on how we want to conceive that province. In this we take “contemplative” to be 
more fundamental.  
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i.e. how they go about approaching the question “what is wer?”. All these phenomenologies are cognitive 
styles and once we have grasped their practical attitudes we have their definition in the proper sense. It is 
for this reason we can carry forward Spiegelberg’s distinction of “unrelated phenomenologies” to 
designate those phenomenologies proper whose practical attitudes are not the same as that of the 
Phenomenological Movement. In this respect the “proper” of “proper phenomenology” can be understood 
in its Old French root propre meaning “one’s own”.24 The definition of the Phenomenological Movement 
as a phenomenology proper thus requires that phenomenology possess all the necessary constituents of a 
cognitive style.  
 
 
ii. Constituents of a province of meaning 
 
In order to define the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement we must be clearer on 
what we expect such a definition to contain. That is, we must be clear on what is entailed in both a 
province of meaning and its cognitive style. To achieve this we will further investigate some of Schutz’s 
thinking on provinces of meaning.  
 As was noted in the previous section, in “On Multiple Realities” Schutz develops the notion of 
provinces of meaning out of William James’ discussion of sub-universes of reality. Schutz focuses on the 
world of everyday life, i.e. Swincan, in this regard. He recognises that it is the province of meaning most 
fundamental for the person and as such occupies the highest level of meaning-context. Schutz discerns 
that there are six basic characteristics that constitute this cognitive style: 
1. A specific tension of consciousness, namely wide-awakeness, originating in full attention to 
life; 
2. A specific epoché, namely suspension of doubt; 
3. A prevalent form of spontaneity, namely [swincende] (a meaningful spontaneity based upon a 
project and characterised by the intention of bringing about the projected state of affairs by 
bodily movements gearing into the outer world); 
4. A specific form of experiencing one’s self (the [swincende] self as the total self); 
5. A specific form of sociality (the common intersubjective world of communication and social 
action); 
6. A specific time-perspective (the standard time originating in an intersection between durée and 
cosmic time as the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world). (Schutz, 
1962d:230) 
 
                                                 
24
 We have differed from Spiegelberg who used “phenomenology proper” in the sense that we have used 
“proper phenomenology” (Spiegelberg, 1971a:8).  
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Thus as he summarises on the following page: ‘To the cognitive style peculiar to each of these different 
provinces of meaning belongs, thus, a specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific 
epoché, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, 
and a specific time perspective’ (1962d:232). What this latter quote provides us with that is not present in 
the list above is the primacy of the “tension of consciousness” – all the others are “consequent”.  
 What then is meant by a “specific tension of consciousness”? We can note that as Schutz is 
speaking of swincan as the natural attitude our interests are fundamentally practical. It is, then, this 
pragmatic motive of the person that sets up a tension within consciousness. In the philosophy of Bergson, 
whom Schutz also draws from, our conscious life has a number of planes graded from the plane of action 
to the plane of dreams at its two extremes. To each plane belongs a degree of tension in consciousness. 
‘According to Bergson,’ Schutz informs us, ‘these different degrees of tension of our consciousness are 
functions of our varying interest in life’ (1962d:212). Schutz introduces the term wide-awakeness to 
denote the plane of consciousness in which that tension is at its highest. He goes on to say that: 
The state of full awakeness of the [swincende] self traces out that segment 
of the world which is pragmatically relevant, and these relevances 
determine the form and content of our stream of thought: the form, 
because they regulate the tensions of our memory and therewith the scope 
of our past experiences recollected and our future experiences anticipated; 
the content, because all these experiences undergo specific attitudinal 
modifications by the preconceived project and its carrying into effect. 
(emphasis added, 1962d:213-214) 
 
We will modify Bergson’s, and Schutz’s, understanding of “tensions” here. To both, consciousness is 
always “tense” and the question of which plane we are on depends on how tense we are. What we suggest 
instead is that rather than there being one tension of varying degrees there are multiple tensions of 
different styles. Used in this way, “tension” indicates the attentional focus or interest of the person in that 
particular province of meaning.  
 
a. Purpose 
 
 The notion of interest is found in Husserl but also taken up by Schutz (1970f:98-101).
25
 In 
“Choosing among Projects of Action” (1951[1962f]) and “Some Structures of the Life-world” (1970g) 
                                                 
25
 Husserl makes a distinction between two kinds of interest: ‘first, the object, which is passively 
pregiven to us, affects our receptivity and wakens in us the more or less intense tendency to follow the 
stimulus emanating from and imposed upon us by the object, and to advert to it’ and ‘the second and 
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Schutz explains that the prevailing interest determines what aspects of the world are picked out as 
relevant. This interest also determines which aspects of the stock of knowledge are relevant (1970g:123). 
To understand this he gives the case of “S is p” (1970g:102-104). If our interest is the p-being of S then 
what is not brought to mind is that S is also q, r, and other things as well as p and so really we should say 
“S is, among many other things such as q and r, also p”. He thus points out that if I assert “S is p” ‘I do so 
because for my purpose at hand at this particular moment I am interested only in the p-being of S and am 
disregarding as not relevant to such purpose the fact that S is also q and r’ (emphasis added, 1962f:76). 
Consciousness can thus be regarded as “tense” by the various ways in which it disregards certain aspects 
of the world in favour of others.
26
  
 That this interest also draws on the stock of knowledge entails that certain aspects of it are 
relevant to the current situation. From this we can determine that provinces of meaning, contained within 
the stock of knowledge, contain a “preconceived project”: an interest they can fulfil. Thus, the first 
requirement of a province of meaning is that it be relevant to fulfilling certain interests that I might 
have.
27
 This we shall call the purpose of a province of meaning following Scheler’s use of the term. A 
purpose according to Scheler is ‘a “content” of some sort (of possible thinking, representing, perceiving) 
which is given as to-be-realised, no matter by what, by whom, etc.’ (Scheler, 1973b:30-31). The purpose 
of the cognitive style is the interest which it can fulfil. In Schutz’s case the province of meaning that we 
call Swincan has the purpose of surviving and thriving. It is the purpose that is fundamental to a province 
of meaning because without this the province has nothing to be directed toward and could not exist as a 
province.
28
  
 (2) of Schutz’s list above also pertains to this point. By his use of this epoché the purpose of 
other provinces of meaning are bracketed so that they do not become obstructive. That is, at a given 
moment a person only operates with one province of meaning, if they tried to operate with more than one 
the purpose of each province would confound the purposes of the others. If Swincan is the fundamental 
province of meaning characterised by the purpose “surviving and thriving”, to say I suspend doubt is to 
                                                                                                                                               
broader notion of interest does not originate in the simple adversion toward the object, but in making it 
thematic’ (Schutz, 1970f:98). In general how interest is used here relates to this thematic sense.  
26
 A parallel can be drawn here with Sartre’s notion of negation (see Ch.4.iv.g). 
27
 This choice is based on a footnote regarding interest where Schutz comments that: ‘Because what is 
commonly called interest is one of the basic features of human nature, the term will necessarily mean 
different things to different philosophers in accordance with their basic conception of human existence in 
the world’ (1962f:77). 
28
 In the converse direction the problem of phenomenology in the simpliciter sense is that it only indicates 
the purpose of a cognitive style and lacks the remaining constituents.  
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say I do not let myself be swayed by other provinces that I could think of as swince instead. For example, 
let us take two provinces of meaning “huscarl” and “gesith” which have as their purposes “being a 
warrior” and “being a learned advisor” respectively. Insofar as Reinakh has as his interest “becoming a 
warrior” he must suspend the interest “becoming a learned advisor”. The two provinces of “huscarl” and 
“gesith” are mutually exclusive as finite provinces of meaning. It is precisely because of this that all 
shifting from one province to another requires either a “leap” or a “shock”. So long as Reinakh’s interest 
is to become a warrior he must suspend those provinces whose purpose does not fulfil this.  
 As before, this exclusiveness applies only on the same level of meaning-context. Thus, the 
province of meaning “loyal subject” which contains the purpose “to aid his queen” sits at a higher level 
of meaning-context in that both the previous provinces may be subsumed under it. Reinakh may aid his 
queen by either being a huscarl or a gesith. In this respect “loyal subject” is a monothetic unity to which 
“huscarl” and “gesith” are polythetic constituents. Nevertheless, in speaking of the compatibility or 
incompatibility of provinces of meaning, we begin to move beyond the purpose of the cognitive style. In 
order to “bracket” out other provinces of meaning I must know what is constituted by the province I 
intend to utilise and that I could constitute it in another fashion. This means I know how to carry out the 
purpose of this province of meaning.   
 
b. Outcome 
 
 Carrying out a purpose refers to the cognitive style of the province of meaning. That is, our 
concern is how the province of meaning is used in action.
29
 We must now look at (3) and (4) of Schutz’s 
basic characteristics. The cognitive style may be more explicitly described as the “form of spontaneity” 
and the “form of experiencing”. As the cognitive style is the use of a province of meaning through 
“action”, we need a better understanding of this latter term and the corresponding “act”. Schutz defines 
these as follows:  
The term “action” shall designate human conduct as an ongoing process 
which is devised by the actor in advance, that is, which is based upon a 
preconceived project. The term “act” shall designate the outcome of this 
ongoing process, that is, the accomplished action. (1962f:67) 
 
                                                 
29
 In this respect the contemplative attitude also involves acting.  
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The difference between the two actually provides us with two further components of a province of 
meaning. However, before continuing we would take a more Schelerian approach to “act” and “action” 
by reversing how Schutz has used them here. Take the following examples: 
Hebiro acted bravely 
Hebiro’s actions were brave 
Hebiro’s action was brave 
Hebiro acts bravely 
Hebiro is acting bravely 
Hebiro’s actions are brave 
Hebiro’s action is brave 
Hebiro will act bravely 
Hebiro’s actions will be brave 
Hebiro’s action will be brave 
 
Whereas each use of “act” functions as a verb, the possessive in the uses of “action” indicates that actions 
are not processes but objects. This is made further apparent in the fact that whereas “action” can clearly 
be distinguished into plural and singular uses, the same cannot be done of “act”. Acting is a homogenous 
whole which requires demarcation into distinct units of action. This is more consistent with Scheler’s 
own argument that “acts” like “persons” cannot be objectified.30 Therefore, by “act” we designate the 
ongoing process and by “action” we designate the accomplished act.  
 Acting, then, is the carrying out of a purpose but this can only make sense if we can divide the 
homogenous acting into actions which complete the act. Returning to the example of Reinakh we can say 
that the acts that fulfil the interest of “becoming a warrior” include conditioning the body through 
exercise, practice with a sword, and learning military tactics. However, such acts can only make sense to 
Reinakh if he has some measure of the end of these acts. That is, he must have some determinable notion 
of when his acts have been accomplished and thereby become actions. This we will call the outcome of 
the cognitive style and refers to (6) of Schutz’s characteristics. There is a logical sequence in which the 
person goes from a purpose which is revealed in the Here and Now to the outcome which is in the future. 
As Schutz notes: ‘I have to have some idea of the structure to be erected before I can draft the blueprints’ 
(1962f:68). Let us say in Reinakh’s case that the outcome is to “defeat another warrior in real combat”. 
Only once this is established can we then focus on acting, the turning of the “to do” into the “done”.31 
                                                 
30
 See Ch.2.iii.e. 
31
 It is for this reason that we have used “outcome” instead of Scheler’s “goal”. While goal does capture 
what we mean by outcome, how Scheler relates goal to purpose differs to how we have connected 
outcome to purpose. The following statement illustrates this difference:  
Anything that is called a purpose of the will therefore presupposes the 
representation of a goal! Nothing can become a purpose that was not first 
a goal! The purpose is grounded in the goal! Goals can be given without 
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The person’s thinking moving from purpose to outcome is what Schutz means by “projecting” and 
“projection” (1962f:84-85).  
 
c. Methodology 
 
 The acts referred to by which Reinakh can bring about the intended outcome are in fact 
generalisations. For example, the first act he takes is to condition his body, but no content was given to 
the actual process of “conditioning”. We may fill in this content by thinking of exercises such as push-
ups, sit-ups, and running. A generalisation is another name for what Schutz described as typifications. 
According to Schutz in “Concept and Theory Formation in Social Science”32 (1962h) our stock of 
knowledge, and by extension the provinces of meaning contained within, is filled with typifications. 
Drawing on the work of Husserl, he means that the world of the everyday is experienced in the mode of 
typicality. Any encountered object is experienced within a frame of familiarity constituted by other 
previously experienced objects. He gives the example of Rover to illustrate this: 
Now I may look at Rover either as this unique individual, my 
irreplaceable friend and comrade, or just as a typical example of “Irish 
setter,” “dog,” “mammal,” “animal,” “organism,” or “object of the outer 
world.” (1962h:59) 
 
Rover is a specific instance of all these typifications.
33
 In respect to Reinakh we can say that “push-ups” 
are the unique individual and at the same time a typical example of “conditioning”. In this respect they 
become polythetic actions within the monothetic act. But, “push-ups” is also an act to which “200 push-
                                                                                                                                               
purposes, but no purposes can be given without previous goals’ (Scheler, 
1973b:40) 
For Scheler goals are logically prior to purposes which we have denied. 
32
 Hereafter “Concept and Theory Formation”. 
33
 In an early draft of this paper Schutz refers to “types” instead of “typifications” (Schutz, 2004:132). It 
would seem the term “typification” is taken up to indicate that these are utilised in everyday activity 
rather than just theoretical thinking. This connection is strengthened in his discussion of Husserl’s notion 
of horizon: ‘in spite of their undetermined generality these anticipations are, according to Husserl, 
nevertheless typically determined by their typical prefamiliarity, as typically belonging, that is to the total 
horizon of the same and identifiable objectivity, the actually apperceived properties of which show the 
same general type’ (Schutz, 1970f:94). More exactly we may say that the experience of the typicality of a 
thing is predicated on the knowledge of a type. However, there is a difference between typification and 
type which is echoed in the work of Douglas. Speaking of the way animals are divided in Leviticus 11 
she points out that classifications ‘owe their divisions much more to their capacity to model the 
interactions of the members of society than to a disinterested curiosity about the works of nature’ 
(Douglas, 1987:59). A typification therefore not only classifies the thing but also determines how that 
thing is interacted with.  
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ups” is the action. To these we will now apply the terms methodology and method34 along similar lines to 
Christopher Lloyd in his survey of methodologies in social history. As he puts it: ‘Methodological 
questions … concern the actual explanatory practices and structures of a particular science or discipline. 
(These should not be confused with questions about research methods; they deal with the technical 
problems of conducting empirical research, the counterpart of experimental laboratory techniques in 
chemistry)’ (Lloyd, 1991:188) Methodology, as typification, is here defined as the correct procedure for 
pursuing purposes or negatively phrased as limitations placed upon possible procedures. Method, as 
specific example, is the individual practice that operates within the limitations set out by methodology. 
Thus, once Reinakh has his purpose and his projected outcome he then develops a methodology, the 
“doing”, to achieve just that.35 What Schutz calls the “project” is therefore the combination of purpose 
and outcome with a methodology.  
 
d. Identifier 
 
 However, these three requirements are not enough to fully constitute a province of meaning 
because we have yet to account for (5) of Schutz’ basic characteristics. How are we to understand “forms 
of sociality” as a constituent of a province of meaning? Within the fundamental everyday this refers to 
intersubjective encounters.
36
 Earlier in “On Multiple Realities”, Schutz states the following: ‘Social 
actions involve communication, and any communication is necessarily founded upon acts of working’ 
(1962d:218).
37
 Communication is predicated on overt actions, according to Schutz, actions which it is 
presumed that the other person will understand. In a number of places Schutz (1964e, 1964f) develops 
this idea as the notion of “tuning-in” which for our purposes means that in communicating to the other 
person I communicate on the basis that she will understand what I mean, but in order for this to be the 
                                                 
34
 We have not taken up Scheler’s term of “means” due to a slight inclarity in his usage. As he defines it: 
‘whatever is related to the realisation – or, better, the reality – of the content of the purpose in terms of 
the logical relationship of a condition or a reason is, in the formal sense, a “means” for the “purpose”’ 
(1973b:31). For Scheler “means” applies to both “realisation” and “reality”, but these two refer to what 
we have termed methodology and outcome respectively.  Further reason for this is because Scheler 
claims that ‘there is no temporal difference between means and purposes’ which conflicts with our 
agreement with Schutz on (6) (1973b:31).  
35
 There is not the space to engage in an extended discussion of methods; viewed here as logically 
entailed by methodology they constitute a subsidiary concern.  
36
 See Ch.7. 
37
 This earlier use of “action” and “act” is consistent with our amended use. 
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case I must assume that she is inhabiting the same province of meaning as I am.
38
 “Common-sense and 
Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”39 describes this as the general thesis of reciprocal 
perspectives (Schutz, 1962g:11-13).  
 In the case of Reinakh, practice with the sword requires another person to engage with; Reinakh 
cannot simulate a real fight with just himself. However, in order for Reinakh to engage in a successful 
simulation it is necessary for him that his partner, Kerwalh, is also engaging in the simulation in the same 
way. As Schutz puts it: ‘He and I, we share, while the process lasts, a common vivid present, our vivid 
present, which enables him and me to say: “We experienced this occurrence together”’ (1962d:219-220). 
Both Reinakh and Kerwalh need to be engaging in the same province of meaning and further recognise 
that they are both engaging in that province as opposed to another. We identify ourselves as part of a 
particular group engaged in a shared purpose. This is a positive identifier which is categorised by such 
words as “we are” and “our”. The identifier can also be negatively conceived if we contrast the mutual 
exclusiveness of provinces of meaning on the same level of meaning-context. Insofar as Reinakh does not 
pursue those actions pertinent to being a “gesith” he is declaring himself to not be one of “them”. Thus 
Reinakh identifies himself as “huscarl” by what he does not do. Such an identifier is then categorised by 
“us-them” and “we are not” phrases. 
 
 In summary, a province of meaning has the following requirements: a purpose, the interests 
which it can fulfil; an outcome, how it knows the purpose has been achieved; a methodology, the manner 
in which it achieves the outcome; and an identifier, that which distinguishes it from other provinces of 
meaning. This is, however, only a preliminary sketch of these requirements and to each belong 
consequences that have only been hinted at here. Many of these consequences have been discussed in 
                                                 
38
 Another way of putting this would be to say that two persons share the same cognitive style. Phrased 
this way we can draw strong similarities with the work of Fleck (1935), Goodman (1978) and Douglas 
(1987). This does, however, entail a slight disagreement with Schutz. According to Schutz 
communication can only occur within the province of Swincan. By contrast we argue that communication 
can occur in any province so long as that province is accessible within each communicator’s stock of 
knowledge. While this also points to a strong affinity with discourse analysis we have not pursued this 
connection as such primarily because we hold that phenomenology offers a deeper level of analysis. 
Specifically, discourse analysis tends to focus on language in intersubjectivity whereas phenomenology, 
Zahavi has pointed out, has ‘often endeavoured to unearth the pre- or extra-linguistic forms of 
intersubjectivity’ (2004:197). Indeed, based on Glendinning’s argument (1998) an emphasis on language 
can be seen as anthropologism.   
39
 Hereafter “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation”. 
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some detail by Schutz in other areas of his work.
40
 For the considerations of this thesis we require only 
this basic understanding in order to define the provinces of meaning of Social Science and the 
Phenomenological Movement with its cognitive style that we have referred to as phenomenology proper.  
 
 
iii. Proper phenomenology 
 
In seeking a definition of phenomenology proper as the cognitive style of the Phenomenological 
Movement we must make use of people associated with the Phenomenological Movement. However, this 
entails a degree of circularity, for having used Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre already it would 
seem they belong to the Phenomenological Movement before it is even defined. It would appear that we 
have already decided who are phenomenologists before we have even decided what phenomenology is. 
Nor will we attempt to deny this. These figures all belong to the Phenomenological Movement. It is not 
our intention to put into question whether these conventional phenomenologists are indeed 
phenomenologists – though by consequence it might – but to investigate the procedures and rationales by 
which they are given the title “Phenomenological Movement”; we are making explicit the cognitive style 
that these philosophers share in common by formalising the purpose, outcome, methodology and 
identifier of that province of meaning. In doing this we are doing no more than carrying out Husserl’s 
claim in Ideas III that ‘It lies in the nature of phenomenology and of the unique functions which devolve 
upon it for the whole of our knowledge, that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that out of 
phenomenological sources it must bring to fullest clarity the method itself which it practices’ (Husserl, 
1980:80).  
 We may compare this task to that of Merton in “The Normative Structure of Science”41 (1973b) 
in which he laid out the various norms that underpin science. As Kalleberg notes, Merton’s study was 
less a prescriptive claim but rather a reconstruction: ‘an identification and explication of presuppositions 
and norms taken for granted in well-functioning scholarly communities’ (Kalleberg, 2007:150). Merton 
                                                 
40
 E.g. his discussions of the difference between consociates and contemporaries are highly relevant to 
further our understanding of identifier. His discussions on in-order-to and because motives is relevant for 
explaining actions and acts in terms of purpose and outcome respectively.  
41
 This essay was originally published under the title “Science and Technology in a Democratic order” in 
the Journal of Political Sociology (1942), then under the title “Science and the Democratic Social 
Structure” in Social Theory and Social Structure. It was printed under the above title in The Sociology of 
Science. 
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was acting as an “outsider” looking at the norms that shape the “world” of scientists. In a similar fashion 
to Merton we are here adopting an “outsider” position to reconstruct the strictures of phenomenology. 
That is, defining the Phenomenological Movement involves identifying the strictures phenomenologists 
work with when they do phenomenology. In order to do this we will draw on a number of other 
“outsider” reconstructions to understand phenomenology in terms of its purpose, outcome, methodology, 
and identifier.  
 It should be emphasised that the definitions that we shall draw on in this regard can be said to be 
trying to discern the essence of phenomenology. This follows both Schutz and Sartre in the sense that we 
are clarifying the otherwise implicit unity across different concepts of phenomenology. We have drawn 
on the following sources primarily:  
a. The definition provided by Spiegelberg in PM (1971a, 1971b, 1982). Spiegelberg’s definition is 
unique in the fact, that unlike many other definitions having decided whose “phenomenology” does 
count within the Movement, he dedicates space to the description of a number of 
“phenomenologies” that do not qualify for admittance. It is in Spiegelberg’s sense that we have 
spoken of the Phenomenological Movement. 
b. The definiton Embree relies upon to organise EP and then supplemented by further essays (2001, 
2003). Whereas Spiegelberg’s definition covered some of the most significant members of the 
Movement’s history, Embree’s covers the contemporary context of work containing a global range 
of contributors from numerous disciplines.   
c. Glendinning’s five theses presented in “What is Phenomenology?” (2004)42 and In the Name of 
Phenomenology (2007). Glendinning offers the broadest definition in that he sees phenomenology 
extending beyond the names associated with the Phenomenological Movement.
43
   
d. Moran’s definitions in Introduction to Phenomenology (2000) (IP) and The Phenomenology Reader 
(2002) (PR). Moran differs from the above in that he does not present his definition by “bullet 
point” and as such explicates in detail some of the conceptions indicated by the others. 
                                                 
42
 Not to be confused with the 2008 article of the same name.  
43
 Interestingly included among these other “phenomenologists” is J.L. Austin who was Smart’s 
supervisor. Thus if we do grant that Austin is a phenomenologist we have another potential connection 
with the phenomenology-of-religion. Kelly also suggests that Smart’s The Science of Religion and the 
Sociology of Knowledge is influenced by Scheler’s work (Kelly, 1977:20). However, Spiegelberg warns 
against the assocation as Austin’s proposed “linguistic phenomenology” of 1957 was not taken up by his 
listeners and it seems Austin was unaware of the parallel this label had with the Phenomenological 
Movement (Spiegelberg, 1982:691-692).  
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a. Identifying proper phenomenology 
 
 By this choice, however, we are nevertheless faced with the problem that we must have some 
pre-understanding of what holds these names together into a single group. Clearly some sort of identifier 
is being presupposed to hold these names together. However, if we have learned anything from 
phenomenology-of-religion it is that use of the word “phenomenology” is not enough. Rather than one 
scholar say what “phenomenology” is, such an identifier could helpfully be established through a 
colloborative statement. Indeed, such a statement would potentially provide us with the purpose, 
methodology and outcome in the process of identification. 
 Based on our discussion of the agendas of phenomenology in the previous chapter it may be 
reasonable to look for some form of joint statement between Husserl and Heidegger. The rationale would 
be that as the four major branches of phenomenology (possibly five) can in one way or another be traced 
back to these two figures, a joint statement from the pair on what phenomenology is would help us in our 
task. Such a statement almost existed as an article on “phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(1927[1981c]). Unfortunately the collaboration was aborted. Already distant, Husserl seems to have used 
the article as a chance to re-ingratiate Heidegger into his phenomenology. As Spiegelberg describes the 
attempt:  
He seems to have considered this occasion important enough to invite 
Heidegger to collaborate with him on a joint statement, based of course on 
his own draft: this would also give him a chance to make Heidegger a 
more active participant in the latest phase of his transcendental 
phenomenology. (Spiegelberg, 1971a:279) 
 
But the attempt was to be a bitter disappointment for both scholars (Spiegelberg, 1981:18). None of 
Heidegger’s contributions were included in the final product and were only published separately much 
later.
44
 Based on what Heidegger would have included, Husserl went on to comment to Roman Ingarden 
a year later that ‘Heidegger has not grasped the whole meaning of the phenomenological reduction’ 
(quoted in Spiegelberg, 1971a:281). Instead of uniting the two phenomenologists the article further 
served to divide them.
45
  
                                                 
44
 See “Heidegger: The Idea of Phenomenology” (1970).  
45
 The trouble with the article did not end there; the original translation into English was a botch job and 
contributed to stifling interest in phenomenology in Britain (see Spiegelberg, 1981).  
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 A better source is the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung which was 
instigated by Husserl in 1913. On the editorial board along with Husserl were Moritz Geiger, Alexander 
Pfänder, Reinach and Scheler, and later joined by Heidegger and Oskar Becker. Here we find the closest 
to a joint statement on phenomenology produced by the publisher at the head of the Jahrbuch: 
It is not a system the editors share. What unites them is the common 
conviction that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct 
intuition to insights into essential structures derived from them (die 
originären Quellen der Anschauung und die aus ihr zu schöpfenden 
Wesenseinsichten) that we shall be able to put to use the great traditions of 
philosophy with their concept and problems; only thus shall we be in a 
position to clarify such concepts intuitively, to restate the problems on an 
intuitive basis, and thus, to solve them, at least in principle. (quoted in 
Spiegelberg, 1971a:5) 
 
Though it begins with a problematic claim, Spiegelberg nevertheless uses this statement as the basis for 
his own definition of the Phenomenological Movement. We are, however, a little too wary of that 
opening sentence to proceed solely from this statement and by consequence Spiegelberg’s definition 
alone. The lack of qualification on what is not shared makes it difficult to assess who placed importance 
upon which areas of the above statement. Further reason to be wary is that Spiegelberg, through personal 
correspondence with Pfänder, thinks the statement was drafted by Husserl alone (1971a:5). In which case 
the obvious question is to what extent the other editors actually had any input.  
 Instead we will focus on the identifier Spiegelberg draws from this statement in his own 
definition:  
Conscious adherence, however qualified, to the Movement as such in full 
awareness of these methodical principles. Short of such an expression, a 
thinker may well be considered as “really” belonging to the Movement, 
but it would be unfair to read him into it as an actual member. (1971a:6) 
 
What is almost unique about Spiegelberg’s definition is this criterion that in order to be a member of the 
Phenomenological Movement the scholar in question must recognise themselves as a phenomenologist. 
The only other definition that we have encountered that contains identifiers is in Embree who provides 
two: first in EP: ‘Phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl called the transcendental 
phenomenological epoche and reduction is useful or even possible’ (1997:2); and second in the follow-up 
article: ‘phenomenology tends to oppose naturalism’ (Embree, 2001:7). The second identifier is negative 
and we have already noted Embree’s own comments on the difficulty of suggesting that phenomenology 
is anything that opposes naturalism.
46
 As for the first identifier there is an ambiguity in this point. The 
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 See Ch. 1.ii. 
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identifier is predicated upon Husserl but we must question the allowance of both positive and negative 
responses. Specifically, none of Embree’s other characteristics of phenomenology state that the scholar in 
question must call themselves a “phenomenologist”. As such there is nothing to stop us counting as 
phenomenological – if not phenomenologists – a number of scholars within Religious Studies, many of 
whom would balk at the association,
47
 simply because they responded negatively to Husserl.  
 Nevertheless Embree’s point about Husserl can help us formulate the qualification of 
Spiegelberg’s criteria of conscious adherence which is lacking by his own admission. To do this we wish 
to draw on Kerry and Armour’s review of phenomenology in Sport Sciences where they complain that 
‘phenomenology, as a descriptor of research, is sometimes misused or simply used as another way to 
describe qualitative research’ (Kerry and Armour, 2000:10). For example, they criticise Whitson who 
argued for the benefit of phenomenology to sport sciences but fails, in their opinion, to engage with the 
roots of phenomenology as philosophically developed by Husserl, Heidegger, and more. As they see it, 
such lack of clarity over how a researcher is using “phenomenology” creates confusion and by extension 
marks it as improper phenomenology. Further, they note that Husserl and other proponents fail to be 
mentioned directly and the second-hand sources referenced may themselves not be proponents, resulting 
in “tiered” information. While the top tiers may be proper phenomenology, lower tiers cease to be so. 
According to Kerry and Armour, at best most researchers rely on “second generation” phenomenologists 
such as Giorgi, Schutz, and van Manen, who they deem more like ‘philosophically minded social 
scientists’ rather than proper phenomenologists (2000:11).48 But perhaps worst of this lower tier research 
is that it fails to take into account the philosophical underpinnings it relies upon.   
 We propose to qualify Spiegelberg’s criterion of conscious adherence with the following 
comments from Kerry and Armour who conclude that we need to make ‘explicit the philosophical 
background from which methodological approaches are drawn’ and that the ‘inclusion of such 
background detail in published phenomenological research’ is a necessity (2000:14). From this we can 
formalise the stricture of conscious adherence: explicit recognition of phenomenological approaches 
used with reference to other established phenomenologists as stemming from Husserl. Note, this does not 
contradict Embree’s positive identifier as such. It is not being suggested that phenomenologists follow 
tout court that which has gone before; they do put into question past methods/findings because in the 
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 E.g. Wiebe(1996), Flood (1999) and Fitzgerald (2000). 
48
 We do not agree with Kerry and Armour for their inclusion of Schutz on this point (see Ch.3.i).  
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very doing so they are establishing themselves within that tradition so long as they also maintain the self-
referential title of “phenomenologist”.49  
  
b. The purpose of proper phenomenology 
 
 As has been hinted in the above discussion, the purpose of any phenomenology proper has been 
covered in our definition of phenomenology simpliciter. Stated more formally we can say that the 
purpose of phenomenology is the stricture of philosophical anthropology: to study what weras are 
through their encounters.  
 “Encounter” is taken from Embree’s fifth characteristic of phenomenology: ‘Phenomenologists 
tend to practice reflective observation on what can be called encounterings as encounterings of objects 
and also on objects as they are encountered, although few use this terminology’ (Embree, 2001:7). An 
“encountered object” parallels what Scheler calls “milieu-things” which are things (Sachen) effectively 
experienced: ‘something whose variation in any form corresponds to a variation of some form in my 
experience’ (Scheler, 1973b:139). Phenomenology as such does not concern itself with the “real” 
properties of objects
50: ‘The sun of the milieu of [wer] is not the sun of astronomy. Neither stolen meat 
nor brought meat is a sum of cells and tissues and their chemicophysical processes. The sun of the milieu 
is different at the North Pole, in moderate zones, and at the equator, and its beams are felt as different 
beams’ (1973b:139). Milieu-things, as encountered, are meaningful in that they demand a response of 
some sort by the experiencing wer. In Husserl’s own writings this has taken the form of intentionality, 
what Moran referred to as the “aboutness” of consciousness in his own definition of phenomenology 
(Moran, 2000:16). As Husserl describes this in Ideas III:  
In the phenomenology of the consciousness of physical things the 
question is not how physical things in general are, or what in truth 
belongs to them as such; but rather how the consciousness of physical 
things is qualitied, what sorts of consciousness of physical thing are to be 
distinguished, in what manner and with what correlates a physical thing as 
such presents and manifests itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness. 
(Husserl, 1980:72) 
 
                                                 
49
 This therefore allows for Ricoeur’s comment on “heresies” (see Ch.2.b) and leaves room for a 
proclaimed phenomenologist to overhaul – allowing certain qualifications – the entirety of 
phenomenology.   
50
 Strictly speaking an object is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon treated in a specific manner (see 
Ch.6.iii).  
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We have refrained from using “intentionality” here because if we take up Schutz’s notion of “leaps” and 
“shocks”, consciousness as conscious-of a thing can involve either “leaping” at that thing or being 
“shocked” by that thing. Speaking in terms of “intentionality”, which implicitly gives directional force 
away from consciousness, can lead to odd grammatical constructs when we speak in terms of “shocks” 
when it is supposed to go the other way. Speaking in terms of “encounters” avoids this because we can 
say the encounter is either forced (“leap”) or enforced (“shock”).51 
 As was suggested in the previous chapter, this philosophical anthropological task has as its 
setting the life-world:  
The life-world, as Husserl characterises it, is the world of the pre-given, 
familiar, present, available, surrounding world, including both “nature” 
and “culture” (however they may be defined), that envelops us and is 
always there as taken for granted. The life-world also provides a set of 
horizons for all human activity. The life-world is, in Husserl’s terms, the 
“fundament” for all human meaning and purposive activity. (Moran, 
2012:7) 
 
Expressed in Spiegelberg’s terms, the purpose of phenomenology is described as the “phenomenological 
task”: ‘the descriptive investigation of the phenomena, both objective and subjective, in their fullest 
breadth and depth’ (1971a:2).52 Bearing in mind Husserl’s comments in Ideas III, to be “descriptive” in 
this sense entails that we focus on the perceived as perceived;
53
 a notion now in need of further 
clarification. 
 
c. The outcome of proper phenomenology 
 
 As hinted at in the Introduction, essences are the outcome of phenomenology. Following Schutz 
we have provisionally defined “essence” as a thing ‘brought by the process of clarification to perfect self-
givenness, to perfect lucidity and vividness’ (Schutz, 1970a:50). Husserl personally saw the goal of 
phenomenology as ‘the realm of pure consciousness and its phenomena’ (Husserl, 1981b:17). By this is 
meant the contents of consciousness. However, Husserl goes far beyond these individual contents to seek 
the ‘the ideal laws in the realm of pure consciousness’ (1981b:17), the very structures and essences 
required by consciousness in order to produce knowledge. Yet this use of “essence” requires further 
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 Framed in such terms it may also be possible to draw a parallel between leap/shock and the draw/repel 
of Scheler’s resistance (see Ch.2.iii.e). 
52
 This is not one of the criteria Spiegelberg uses for admission into the Phenomenological Movement but 
is brought up in the preceding discussion.  
53
 See Ch.2.ii.a. 
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clarification. “Essence” not only poses a problem in the English philosophical writing, but the German 
“Wesen” from which it is translated also presented a problem for Husserl (in Husserl, 1980:xi). 
According to Moran: ‘Husserl never developed a full critical understanding of the notion of essence’ 
(Moran, 2000:134). Indeed, it is because of his discussion of essences that Husserl was sometimes seen 
as a Platonist – a connection he denied.  
 As can be seen in Ideas III, “essence” is used to mean a typical way of being experienced or of 
experiencing (in Husserl, 1980:xi; Schutz, 1970f). That is, it is a unity of meaning intended by different 
individuals performing the same act or by the same individual in different acts. An understanding carried 
forward by Sartre. In Ideas I Husserl introduced the terms noesis for the act of thinking and noema for 
what is thought to explain this. The noema is not the object which is intended but the object as it is 
intended, a point going all the way back to LI (1970b:113). The noema of the conscious act is the 
‘perceived as perceived’ (Husserl, 1982:214). The phenomenological reduction drives a wedge into 
consciousness so that it separates out this noema from the noesis. However, we should not think that the 
noema is the essence (1980:73); rather the essence of a phenomenon is intuited across noemata as that 
which holds them together as a unity. Spiegelberg explains this process by suggesting that we intuit the 
essence when we see the noema as an example (Spiegelberg, 1982:697). In this regard Spiegelberg 
mentions redness as an example as an allusion to Husserl’s own discussion in IP: 
I have a particular intuition of red, or several particular intuitions of red; I 
intend to pure immanence alone; I perform the phenomenological 
reduction. I separate off anything that red might signify that might lead 
one to apperceive it as transcendent, as, say, the red of a piece of blotting 
paper on my desk, and the like. And now I actualise in pure seeing the 
sense of the thought red, red in specie, the identical universal that is seen 
in this or that; now the particularity as such is no longer meant, but rather 
red in general. (Husserl, 1999:42) 
 
There is a problem with this translation by Hardy in which “seeing” and “seen” are not placed in 
quotation marks, unlike in an earlier translation by Alston and Nakhnikian (see Moran, 2000:134). We 
should not think the person sees the colour red in the phenomenological reduction in the way they could 
picture a particular table. Only instances can be seen in the reduction. Rather, what is “seen” is the idea 
of “red” or “table”: what holds disparate phenomena under a single title and how future phenomena may 
also be brought under this title. We will refer to this as type.
54
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 An association can be made between essence as type and family resemblance style analyses. 
Spiegelberg himself refers to Wittgenstein but in reference to “phenomenological analysis” of 
investigating particular phenomena (Spiegelberg, 1982:691). Nonetheless, his discussion of investigating 
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 Type, however, is not the only way in which Husserl seems to use “essence”. After the 
phenomenological reduction which reveals types, Husserl speaks in various places of the eidetic 
reduction in which we perform the “imaginative free variation”, the possibility of which is predicated on 
the distinction between polythetical and monothetical acts. Consciousness, according to Husserl, is 
synthetical in the sense that when we look at the tree we see individual constituents. A “tree” is really 
made of many leaves and its bark among other things, each piece of which is regarded by consciousness 
as a single object. Thus, Husserl says: ‘No matter how many particular positings and syntheses may be 
fitted into it, each synthetically unitary consciousness possesses the total object belonging to it as a 
synthetically unitary consciousness’ (Husserl, 1982:285). The total object is a monothetic act which 
regards the tree constituted by the synthesis of polythetic acts which regard the various components. 
Relating to the above, the noesis involves these polythetic acts and it is in the noema that the monothetic 
act is produced. In imaginative free variation we focus on these polythetic acts, or constituents, and swap 
them in and out, thereby creating new monothetic acts turning a noema into noemata. By doing this 
Spiegelberg suggests we discover ‘essential relationships or connections (Wesenszusammenhänge) 
pertaining to such essences’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:699). The connections that he speaks of are those that are 
contained in the uses of such expressions as “it is the essence of…”, “is part of the essence of…” or 
“essentially…”.  
 These essential relationships are of two kinds: relationships within a single essence and relations 
across essences. In the first case we rely upon imaginative free variation (Husserl’s eidetic reduction) to 
vary the components of a phenomenon with one of three possible outcomes:  
Either the essence in the sense described, i.e., the fundamental structure 
designed by the general name, will remain unaffected by such an omission 
or substitution, which proves the omitted or replaced component to be 
unessential; or such an omission or substitution, while conceivable, will 
change the character or gestalt of the entity fundamentally; or it will not 
only affect the total configuration but “explode” the whole essence, since 
its components are completely incompatible among themselves. 
(1982:700) 
 
Based on these three outcomes we will discern that the component of the phenomenon is one of essential 
possibility, relative essential necessity, or absolute essential necessity respectively in order to belong to 
that essence. In case of relations across essences another form of imaginative free variation is performed. 
                                                                                                                                               
general essences involves the suggestion that another route to identifying general essences other than the 
phenomenological reduction would be ‘in lining up particular phenomena in a continuous series based on 
the order of their similarities’ (1982:698).  
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By keeping one essence constant we associate it with various other essences through omissions and 
substitutions. Again we will produce three similar sorts of result, either the relation between two (or 
more) essences is of essential necessity, essential possibility or essential impossibility (1982:701). For 
example, “extension” is of essential necessity to “colour”.55 The discernment of these essential relations 
provides us with an a priori insight: ‘A priori insight in this sense is therefore a type of experience, but an 
experience which gives us structural understanding of the linkage between the phenomena to such a 
degree that we can read off one phenomenon from the other without waiting for an indefinite number of 
repetitions’ (1982:702). That is, from the experience of a single phenomenon it is possible to gain a 
priori insight regarding all phenomena of the same type without ever encountering such phenomena. A 
priori in this sense means what Husserl referred to as invariant: ‘that without which an object of a 
particular kind cannot be thought’ (Husserl, 1980:341). Husserl would then go on to replace this use of “a 
priori” with “eidos” (Moran, 2004a:98). Understood as eidos the essence is the sine qua non of a thing.  
 The outcome, we may say, is the clarified essence which incorporates both type and eidos. 
Specifically, type refers to the unity of meaning held across various instances and eidos refers to what is 
necessary for those instances to belong to that type. Insofar as the discernment of essences in this sense is 
the outcome of phenomenology, Embree’s own definition includes this point among its characteristics: 
‘Phenomenologists tend to recognise the role of description in universal, a priori, or “eidetic” terms as 
prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds’ (Embree, 1997:2). This a priori insight 
can also be seen in Glendinning’s fifth thesis, back to the things themselves: ‘[phenomenological 
investigations] are works of words whose capacity to work as philosophy is inseparable from their 
capacity to involve their reader’s capacity to acknowledge the matter of thinking “itself” for themselves’ 
(Glendinning, 2004:40). What is meant by this is that a phenomenological investigation has reached 
clarity if the person reading it is so convinced by the investigation it is as if they had done it themsleves.  
 This understanding of essential relationships has a strong connection to Husserl’s notion of 
“evidence”.56 In another of Embree’s characteristics we also find this notion: ‘Phenomenologists tend to 
justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with reference to evidence, which is awareness of 
a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way possible for something of its 
kind’ (Embree, 1997:1). In this understanding the essence is that which is brought to full clarity such that 
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 However, it is important to note that the converse does not necessarily hold true.  
56
 See Ch.2.ii.a. 
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it is evident ‘when it displays or “gives” itself with all the requirements necessary for knowledge’ 
(Moran, 2000:95). I.e. giefannis. Focusing on what is giefan should also prevent us from determining this 
stricture purely in terms of eidos. To have full clarity regards a particular phenomenon, for example, 
requires more than just knowledge of its eidos. Indeed, knowledge of the phenomenon’s eidos must also 
necessarily entail that we have fully clarified knowledge of everything that belongs to that phenomenon 
which does not belong to its eidos. As such we can formulate the outcome of phenomenology as the 
stricture of insight into essences: the clarification of phenomena according to their type and eidos.   
 
d. The methodology of proper phenomenology 
 
 In formalising the outcome of phenomenology we are now set with the question of how this is 
achieved. We have just now mentioned the imaginative free variation as employed by Spiegelberg and 
also made reference to Husserl’s reductions. However, we must bear in mind that Embree’s identifier 
characteristic points out that the value and use of the reductions is something that is in dispute. 
Heidegger, also, famously rejected Husserl’s notion of the reduction despite the importance placed upon 
it by the latter. Schutz in PSW vocally disavowed any attempt to perform the transcendental reduction and 
yet Husserl gave high praise to the work. There is a seeming incongruity here as to the role of the 
reductions within phenomenology. Does this then mean that it is not a part of the methodology of 
phenomenology? We may note in the case of other definitions that the reductions or the epoché, though 
mentioned with regard to certain criteria, do not constitute criteria themselves, with the exception above 
of Embree. For example, in the case of Moran the reductions are mentioned in reference to suspension of 
the natural attitude. According to Moran:  
Husserl came to believe that the scrutiny of the structure and contents of 
our conscious experiences was inhibited and deeply distorted by the 
manner of our engagement with experience in ordinary life, where our 
practical concerns, folk assumptions, and smattering of scientific 
knowledge all got in the way of a pure consideration of experience as it is 
given to us. (Moran, 2000:11) 
  
In this regard the reductions are “steps” that allow us to isolate the essential constituents of phenomena 
without being swayed in our analysis by our own scientific, philosophical, cultural, and everyday 
assumptions. Understood like this, we can say they are not Husserl’s methodology, but his methods. A 
point also recognised by Russell: ‘All three reductions – transcendental, eidetic, and philosophical – 
contribute to Husserl’s phenomenological method’ (Russell, 2006:57-58). This allows us to see that 
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Heidegger’s (and others) rejection of the reductions does not entail a rejection of phenomenology per se. 
To achieve a rejection of phenomenology we would have to reject the methodological principle that 
underpins the reductions as methods.  
  Our task therefore is to identify the methodological principles that underpin the reductions. In 
point of fact, we have already suggested the methodological principle behind the reductions, as methods, 
to be Husserl’s principle of principles.57 The principle of principles is encapsulated in the maxim “back to 
the things themselves” and represents Husserl’s concern that only those propositions which are drawn 
from the relevant evidence (what is giefan) may be regarded as scientific. As Spiegelberg describes this:  
What the phrase does mean is the refusal to make philosophical theories 
and the critique of such theories the primary and at times, the all-
absorbing concern of philosophy, as does much linguistic analysis and 
criticism… what philosophy must begin with are the phenomena and the 
problems themselves; all study of theories, however significant, must take 
second place. (Spiegelberg, 1982:109) 
  
This point is further emphasised in his definition of Sachen (things): ‘the phenomena themselves, as 
opposed to concepts or other derivatives from immediate experience’ (1982:753). This is a part of 
Husserl’s rigorous science in which phenomenology eschews any grand theories but instead like a form 
of archaeology digs ever deeper. Significantly, even though Heidegger rejected the reductions he also 
subscribed to the principle of principles. In History of the Concept of Time Heidegger declared the 
following:  
The phenomenological maxim “to the matters themselves” is addressed 
against construction and free-floating questioning in traditional concepts 
which have become more and more groundless. That this maxim is self-
evident, that it nevertheless has become necessary to make it into an 
explicit battle cry against free-floating thought, characterises the very 
situation of philosophy. (Heidegger, 1985:76) 
 
The principle is also found in Glendinning’s fifth thesis of phenomenology (2004:37-41) and Moran’s 
definition of the principle of presuppositionlessness (2000:9).
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 The idea of “giefannis” in terms of the “perceived as perceived” is also important for relating 
back to phenomenology’s concern with philosophical anthropology in that ‘all experience is experience 
to someone, according to a particular manner of experiencing’ (Moran, 2000:11). Even though Embree 
does not explicitly reference the principle of principles it can be seen operating in his definition under the 
notion of encountering. Though he recognises that few phenomenologists use the word “encounter”, 
                                                 
57
 See Ch.2.ii.a.  
58
 This seems to be an alternate translation of the principle of freedom from presuppositions in LI. 
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contained within it is the idea common to phenomenologists of the distinction between the ‘loving and 
the beloved as loved, remembering and the remembered as remembered, willing and the willed as willed, 
and so on’ (Embree, 2001:7). Thus, “encounters” are another way of speaking of “giefannis”. Drawing on 
our discussion of Schutz, how things are then “encountered” depends upon the person’s stock of 
knowledge and the various provinces of meaning contained within.
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 Significantly, the focus on intuition also helps us understand Spiegelberg’s own definition of 
phenomenology. In particular, in the first part of his first criterion for entry into the Phenomenological 
Movement he speaks of: ‘direct intuition (in a sense still to be clarified) as the source and final test of all 
knowledge, to be formulated as faithfully as possible in verbal descriptions’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:5). This 
can be broken down into the two components of “direct intuition” and “faithful descriptions”. The former 
may be clarified as referring to Husserl’s use of “originary presentive intuition” in his definition of the 
principle in Ideas I (Husserl, 1982:44). It is therefore an expression of the principle of principles - so 
what then of “faithful descriptions”? To this we return to Moran’s mention of the principle of 
presuppositionlessness above which Russell suggests is the methodological principle upon which the 
method of epoché is founded. As Husserl declares: ‘Phenomenology is never content, on principle, with 
vague talk or obscure generalities, but systematically demands a definite clarification, analysis and 
description shedding light on the essential connexions and penetrating to the remotest specifications 
attainable: it demands thoroughgoing work’ (Husserl, 2012:316). As Spiegelberg describes this, it entails 
freedom from ‘phenomenologically unclarified, unverified, and unverifiable presuppositions’ as a part of 
Husserl’s philosophical radicalism (Spiegelberg, 1982:77). This point is usefully described in 
Glendinning’s third thesis: ‘what phenomenologists will criticise most continuously in philosophy as they 
find it are what they regard as inherited theoretical “prejudices”, descriptive “distortions” and 
“inadequacies”, everything that prevents us from “seeing” what (by the phenomenologist’s lights) is there 
to be “seen”’ (Glendinning, 2004:35). In short, the principle of presuppositionlessness entails that we do 
not let ourselves deviate from what the phenomenon has giefan in our analysis of that phenomenon. 
Embree encapsulates this point as the first of his characteristics of phenomenology: ‘Phenomenologists 
tend to oppose accepting unobservable matters – e.g., the so-called outer world beyond the reach of 
sensuous awareness and also the unconscious in some psychological conceptions, and it is thus 
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 E.g. see Tuckett and Robertson’s (2014) discussion of how certain religious groups have reacted to the 
content of video games.  
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convergent with empiricism but not positivism because conscious life (but not ideal objects) is considered 
observable in at least classical empiricism’ (Embree, 2001:7).  
 From this we may say that the methodology of phenomenology involves two strictures: the 
principle of principles: the only source of evidence for phenomenology is that which is giefan by the 
things themselves; and the principle of presuppositionlessness: no description of the phenomena can 
deviate from what is giefan.  
 
 Taken altogether we may say that the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological 
Movement contains the following strictures: the purpose of philosophical anthropology; the outcome of 
insight into essences; the methodology of principle of principles and principle of presuppositionlessness; 
and the identifier of conscious adherence. All of these may be summarised in the following statement:  
Proper phenomenology (conscious adherence) is the faithful (principle of 
presuppositionlessness) study of things themselves (principle of 
principles) to clarify their essences (insight into essences) as they are 
giefan to wer (philosophical anthropology). 
 
As such the Phenomenological Movement constitutes a province of meaning with its own cognitive style. 
Now that we have defined phenomenology proper we must turn to our main task of analysing the crisis of 
social science. In order to do this we must return to the work of Schutz.  
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4. The Essence of social science
1
 
 
Having now established what proper phenomenology is, we now need to establish what we mean by 
“social science”. In particular, following the stricture of insight into essences, this entails that we need to 
identify those requirements (eidos) that are necessary for a particular cognitive style to be properly 
considered social scientific (type). We are now looking for the constituents of what Gordon called the 
“scientific way of thinking” (1991:x). Those who utilise this cognitive style may be regarded as “social 
scientific wer”. In order to do this we will discuss Schutz’s various postulates of social science found 
across several essays in Collected Papers I-III.
2
 Based on our understanding of proper phenomenology 
and Schutz as a member of the Phenomenological Movement, his analysis constitutes an attempt to 
describe the essence of social science. That is, the postulates discussed constitute that which is essential 
for the social scientist to do social science. In this regard we are concerned with the eidetic structures of 
social science. However, in keeping with our methodological strictures, particularly the principle of 
presuppositionlessness, our explication of Schutz’s analysis will require that we both clarify and amend 
certain aspects.  
 
 
i. Social Science as an ideal type 
 
Just as the Phenomenological Movement constitutes a province of meaning it must be recognised that so 
too does Social Science. This is made apparent by Schutz in his discussion of “leaps” and “shocks”: 
Religious experiences in all their varieties – for instance, Kierkegaard’s 
experiences of the “instant” as the leap into the religious sphere – are 
examples of such a shock, as well as the decision of the scientist to 
replace all passionate participation in the affairs of “this world” by a 
disinterested contemplative attitude. (Schutz, 1962d:231) 
 
Two consequences can be drawn from this: 
 Firstly, for the purposes of this thesis the term “religion” designates a particular sort of province 
of meaning. Thus, it is important to emphasise that when Schutz speaks of “religious experience” above 
                                                 
1
 An early version of this argument appears as “Alfred Schutz: Clarifications and Ammendments” (sic) 
(Tuckett, 2014).  
2
 The intended final chapter of The Structures of the Life-World seems to have been intended to draw 
these essays together in a single whole but no work was ever done toward its completion before Schutz’s 
death and Luckmann’s completed text adandoned the chapter altogether (in Schutz and Luckmann, 
1973:xxi-xxiii).  
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he does not mean something akin to a special or sui generis experience as one might find discussed by 
the phenomenology-of-religion.
3
 For example, in “Interpretation and Mystical Experience” (1965[2009]) 
Ninian Smart’s understanding of religious experience is almost exclusively tied to prophetic or 
“mystical” experiences, i.e. an “event” of some significance. Rather, what Schutz means by “religious 
experience” is closer to Taves in that the focus is on ‘the processes whereby people sometimes ascribe the 
special characteristics to things that we (as scholars) associate with terms such as “religious,” “magical,” 
“mystical,” “spiritual,” et cetera’ (Taves, 2009:8). While this involvement of scholarly ideas might be 
beyond Schutz’s own understanding, it is nevertheless the case that both agree that to speak of “religious 
experience” means only to ‘focus on things deemed religious’ (2009:9).4 In this there is a strong affinity 
with Byrne’s cultural-symbolic approach to the study of religion. Taking issue with both naturalism and 
phenomenology-of-religion he argues that ‘the first task of any human science (be it history, sociology, 
anthropology, or whatever) is to describe, interpret, and explain human action by bringing out its 
relationship to the concepts that inform it’ (Byrne, 1999:253).5 As he then goes on to say, the study of 
religion is possible only to the extent to which there are distinctive religious concepts that make possible 
forms of religious action. This study does not aim to discover ‘esoteric mental contents but rather the 
tracing of connections between concepts embodied in symbolic structures’ (1999:253). What can be said 
of Byrne’s approach here is that these concepts can be seen to operate in configurations that we have 
called provinces of meaning.
6
 For present purposes we will not attempt to define “religion” as a province 
but use “religion” as shorthand for “insert religion here” – i.e. Christianity, Hinduism, etc. – unless 
otherwise stated.  
 However, this very use of “religion” lends itself to a problematisation of the phrase “religious 
experience”. In the Schutzian framework a religious experience is an experience interpreted religiously. 
                                                 
3
 The above use of Kierkegaard has been pointed out by Wagner to be largely metaphorical (Wagner, 
1984:113). Schutz borrowed the notion of “leap” in order to get a sense of how we move from province 
to province and did not mean by it some transcendental experience.  
4
 Though the two share this common concern they are diametric opposites methodologically in that Taves 
intends to pursue this goal through naturalism and Schutz through phenomenology.  
5
 On the basis of our comments regarding philosophical anthropology we would replace “human” with 
“social”.  
6
 We do not intend to suggest that Byrne’s cultural-symbolic approach is fully consistent with 
phenomenology however. In at least one regard we suspect his use of “symbol” is much broader than 
Schutz’s understanding (see Schutz, 1962i). Further, Byrne also makes use of “methodological 
agnosticism” which seems to have been drawn out of the work of Smart (1973) who belongs to the 
phenomenology-of-religion. Nevertheless, recent work by James Spickard (2011) and Jason Blum (2012) 
suggests an attempt to reconfigure phenomenology-of-religion along lines closer to our proper 
phenomenology.  
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But does this “religiously” indicate a particular style of interpretation or is it rather a synonym for 
Christian/Hindu/etc.? Framed in another we way can say that Advaita Vedanta is a province of meaning 
which in turn, as one of the six orthodox schools of philosophy, forms one of the polythetic constituents 
of the province of meaning Hinduism, i.e. Hinduism sits at a higher level of meaning-context to Advaita 
Vedanta.
7
 But is Hinduism then a polythetic constituent (alongside Christian, Islam, etc.) of a province of 
meaning called “Religion”?8 If we were to map the hierarchy of provinces of meaning of a particular 
person, the question arises whether we would get the chain Swincan→Religion→Hinduism→Advaita or 
Swincan→Hinduism→Advaita. If the latter is found then “Religion” is, as J.Z. Smith suggested, ‘not an 
empirical category. It is a second order abstraction’ (1988:233). We may therefore call it an ideal type – 
not itself a province of meaning but a means of classifying certain provinces according to some common 
characteristics. There is thus no religious way of experiencing but ways of experiencing that share certain 
commonalities that scholars bring under a particular rubric. The issue we wish to emphasise is that, just 
as “religion” may be an ideal type, so too may “social science”. That is, there is no one province of 
meaning that we can call Social Science but rather provinces of meaning that share certain commonalities 
that we bring under this rubric.
9
  
 Secondly, as ideal type, “social science” designates a particular type of cognitive style which 
can give greater clarity to our understanding of the crisis of social science: There is a crisis of social 
science in that there is a lack of agreement as to this cognitive style’s constitution. It is our contention 
here that just as a person can only properly function while utilising only one province of meaning at a 
given moment, so too can a province of meaning only function properly if it has a single cognitive style.
10
 
                                                 
7
 We are aware that this is a gross oversimplification but one necessary for the speed of exposition. One 
particular point to bear in mind is that this relationship should not be regarded as one of essential 
necessity. There are cases of people who would treat the Advaita Vedanta province as equal if not higher 
to Hinduism in meaning-context.  
8
 This problem is faced by Byrne also, how does one identify a religious concept over a non-religious 
concept? While it might be quite easy to speak of Christian concepts can these same concepts also be 
called religious?  
9
 It is for this reason that we have not argued that phenomenology is the only social scientific 
methodology. 
10
 This point is partially recognised by Sturrock in his discussion of Structuralism. Within the “hard” 
sciences structuralism is seemingly obligatory, whereas in the “soft” sciences it is not and so has to fight 
as a competing methodology among others (Sturrock, 1986:viii). We will not make use of Sturrock’s 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” sciences which correspond to natural and social science 
respectively. Sturrock’s point, framed in our terms, is that Natural Science possesses a single cognitive 
style that we can call structuralism. In Social Science, however, there are numerous cognitive styles such 
that structuralism becomes Structuralism: ‘a fairly assertive intellectual movement [cognitive style] 
aiming to persuade those of other allegiances [cognitive styles] or none that its methods are the soundest 
and most inspiring on offer in the study of language, history, literature and so on’ (Sturrock, 1986:viii). In 
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As it stands Social Science, and Religious Studies as our example, is overwhelmed with cognitive styles 
all vying to operate within the province of meaning. These cognitive styles are the content brought about 
by normative philosophies of social science. That is, the dictates of how one does “social science”.  
 In the context of what we have already discussed, we can say that within the province of 
meaning of Religious Studies, phenomenology of religion and phenomenology-of-religion represent two 
such cognitive styles.
11
 We can see this if we return to their emphasis on philosophical anthropology. 
Both the “phenomenology of religion” of the Movement and phenomenology-of-religion ask the question 
“what is religious wer?”. For the Movement this question is a qualification upon “what is wer?”; either 
not all weras are religious or wer is not always religious. For the phenomenology-of-religion, however, 
the two questions are synonymous. Eliade, for example, in advocating the notion of homo religiosus, 
argued that “wer” is always religious even when he denies it (Eliade, 2006b:58). This is set in opposition 
to the Heideggerian and Sartrean understanding of wer due to their presentation of a ‘man who pretends 
that he makes himself in history’ (2006b:65). This idea of wer as homo religiosus plays out on a 
methodological level in Cox’s discussion of the difference between Religious Studies and Social Science. 
Both are placed on the same level of meaning-context in his argument. From the perspective of the 
Movement, however, we make the ideological claim that Religious Studies of essential necessity is 
subordinated to Social Science. It is a polythetic constituent no different from Sport Science, Political 
Studies, Women Studies, etc. Phenomenology-of-religion, as such, engages in essentialism: the treatment 
of a province of meaning as if it belongs to a higher level of meaning-context than to which it actually 
belongs.
12
  
  We do not intend to argue that there is only one correct cognitive style per se; allowing that 
Social Science is an ideal type, several cognitive styles can be called social scientific. Scheler goes some 
way to recognising this when he claims ‘“Science” as an abstract, unitary phenomenon does not exist. 
There are only sciences in the plural’ (Scheler, 1989a:88). The issue with regard to the crisis of social 
                                                                                                                                               
comparison to these other cognitive styles Structuralism is a scientific style. In this relation to social 
science, Seebohm, speaking of phenomenology as hermeneutics, has suggested that rather than a rival, 
structuralism is a refinement of the hermeneutic project (2004:164-166). 
11
 A subsidiary issue raised by this point pertains to the level of the provinces. That is, if it is not accepted 
that Religious Studies is a branch of Social Science, as seems to be the case with phenomenology-of-
religion, then the former does not inhabit a lower level of meaning-context to the latter but is assumed to 
be equal.  
12
 It should be noted that this applies only insofar as Religious Studies is thought of as scientific, i.e. 
either subordinate to Social Science. This argument does not pertain to those who claim Religious Studies 
is not scientific. 
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science is why, if various cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one 
another? It is the exploration of this lack of coherence which will bring us to the root of the crisis of 
social science. From the perspective of the Phenomenological Movement this task first requires an 
investigation into the essence of social science.  
 
 
ii. The postulates of social science 
 
In “On Multiple Realities” Schutz begins by stating the following: ‘Scientific theorising – and in the 
following the terms theory, theorizing, etc., shall be exclusively used in this restricted sense – does not 
serve any practical purpose. Its aim is not to master the world but to observe and possibly to understand 
it’ (1962d:245). Though the person may decide to “leap” into the scientific situation13 for eminently 
practical and interest driven reasons, once there these are forgotten. In order to do this the scientist must 
adopt a particular attention à la vie toward life. It must be recalled that, following Scheler, a province of 
meaning gives a “content” to be realised by anyone. A province of meaning is taken up by the person 
when the purpose of that province fulfils (or is presumed to fulfil) their current interest. Conversely, in 
order to enact the purpose of the province, certain interests must be adopted by that person. Thus to be a 
social scientist the person may have to subordinate an original interest in order to be social scientific. 
While there is quite obviously going to be a tension in this regard, we can only adequately address this 
once we have captured what it means to be social scientific – i.e. discern the essence of social science.  
 
a. The postulate of nonpractical knowledge 
 
 In the case of science this purpose involves becoming a disinterested observer which ‘consists in 
the abandoning of the system of relevances which prevails within the practical sphere of the natural 
attitude’ (Schutz, 1962d:246).14 Schutz describes this further as freedom from hopes and fears; unlike the 
practical wer the interest lies not in whether their anticipations will prove useful to the solving of some 
                                                 
13
 The idea of the scientific situation is found in Felix Kaufmann’s Methodology of the Social Sciences 
(1944) whom Schutz has drawn from in part in his own understanding of science.   
14
 “Disinterestedness” has alternatively been expressed as: “detached observation” (Lowe, 1963:153); 
“non-evaluative precepts” (Barnes et al., 1996:viii); leaving behind everyday convictions (Seiwert, 2012); 
“unbiased explanation” (Kundt, 2012:41); “value-indifferent science” (Bubík, 2012:44). There is a strong 
connection here with the terms of “objectivity” and “neutrality” (see Ch.6.iv). 
102 
 
practical problem but in whether their anticipations will be verified. This later focus on the disinterested 
observer replaces the earlier postulate of relevancy found in “The Problem of Rationality in the Social 
World” and “The Social World and the Theory of Social Action” (Schutz, 1943[1964b]:81, 
1960[1964k]:18). As Schutz defines the postulate: ‘The formation of ideal types must comply with the 
principle of relevance, which means that the problem chosen by the social scientist creates a scheme of 
reference and constitutes the limits of the scope within which relevant ideal types might be formed’ 
(1964k:18). These ideal types refer to the theorising of the scientist as Schutz discusses it in “On Multiple 
Realities”, i.e. the constructs he uses to build a “model” of the world. The postulate dictates that the 
purpose of the scientist is driven by a particular set of relevances that are constituted by being a 
disinterested observer. We suspect the shift from the postulate of relevancy to the disinterested observer 
is due to a slight vagary in the former. That is, technically all provinces of meaning have their relevances 
and so by speaking of disinterestedness Schutz intended to better reflect the particular relevancies of the 
scientist. 
 Based on the distinction between interest and purpose, however, we must further scrutinise this 
“disinterestedness”. If we take this to mean that the scientist has no interests when doing science then 
many critics rightly say this is impossible. There are a plethora of potential reasons why a scientist may 
have an interest in doing science, from financial gain, prestige, pressure from society to simple curiosity. 
To say the scientist is “disinterested” therefore seems a misnomer more likely to cause confusion than aid 
our understanding. Based on what Schutz says about the postulate, however, we can surmise that by 
“disinterestedness” he was appealing to something akin to what Husserl claims emerged in Greece as the 
“theoretical attitude” or the desire for “knowledge for its own sake” (Husserl, 1965b:164). That is, 
“disinterestedness” and “for its own sake” are synonymous. But we suggest that “for its own sake” is far 
better translated as “nonpractical” - i.e. “does not serve any practical purpose”. We will therefore adapt 
Schutz to speak instead of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge to better capture what is meant by 
disinterested observer. The loss of “interest” allows that the scientist does indeed pursue some sort of 
interest in doing science. The introduction of “nonpractical” indicates that the knowledge acquired is of 
no use to the person.  
 A similar point can be found in Scheler when he speaks of natural science: ‘there can be no 
doubt that the science of inanimate nature has the task of seeking and furnishing truth and nothing other 
than truth (Scheler, 1973c:198). “Truth” as it is used in this context is a synonym for “knowledge for its 
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own sake” as made evident in the following statement: ‘A researcher whose research is guided by 
something other than the investigation of truth, one who aims at useful or technically applicable results, 
lacks the primary ethos of the research and does not deserve that honourable name’ (1973c:198). Such a 
comment, however, points to a tension between the purpose of science, as it has been understood here, 
and the potential interests of the person claiming to do science. On one level it is clear that we must 
conclude that not everyone who claims to do science is in fact doing science. However, on another level 
this tension may well mean that no one does science.
15
  
 Yet it is significant at this juncture that the scientist has entered the province of meaning that is 
Science and not Social Science. This is made clear in “On Multiple Realities”, for just as with any other 
province of meaning,  
the scientist enters a preconstituted world of scientific contemplation 
handed down to him by the historical tradition of his science. Henceforth, 
he will participate in a universe of discourse embracing results obtained 
by others, problems stated by others, solutions suggested by others, 
methods worked out by others. This theoretical universe of the special 
science is itself a finite province of meaning, having its peculiar cognitive 
style with peculiar implications of problems and horizons to be explicated. 
The regulative principle of constitution of such a province of meaning, 
called a special branch of science, can be formulated as follows: Any 
problem emerging within the scientific field has to partake of the 
universal style of this field and has to be compatible with the 
preconstituted problems and their solutions either by accepting or refuting 
them. (1962d:250) 
 
What we take Schutz to mean here is the following: We begin with the monothetic province of meaning 
that we call Science, instigated by the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. Within this monothetic unity 
exist polythetic constituents which Schutz calls the “special sciences”. On the first level of meaning-
context division we have Social Science and Natural Science.
16
 These too may be considered as 
monothetic unities with further polythetic divisions so that Natural Science is constituted by Chemistry, 
Physics and Biology. These all form special branches of Science. This entails that within all these special 
branches are certain shared science postulates alongside specialisation postulates.   
 
b. The postulate of subjective interpretation 
 
                                                 
15
 See Ch.6. 
16
 By placing Natural and Social Science on the same level of meaning-context this necessarily entails 
that they are incompatible with one another. I.e. neither can be reduced to the other. This however leads 
to a problem which we will return to in Chaper 7. 
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 We now need a postulate which qualifies science as social science. The postulate of subjective 
interpretation which fulfils this requirement is first briefly stated in “The Problem of Rationality in the 
Social World”: ‘The scientist has to ask what type of individual mind can be constructed and what typical 
thoughts must be attributed to it to explain the fact in question as the result of its activity within an 
understandable relation’ (1964b:85). A more detailed explanation of the postulate is provided in 
“Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation” where Schutz explains that social scientists do not 
proceed in the same manner as natural scientists because they have different interests. The interest of 
social science is ‘human conduct and its common-sense interpretation in the social reality’ (1962g:34).17 
By consequence it necessarily refers to subjective points of view – the interpretation of actions and their 
contexts by the actors themselves. Drawing on Max Weber’s phrase “subjective interpretation of 
meaning” Schutz defines the postulate here as: ‘we always can – and for certain purposes must – refer to 
the activities of the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by the actors in terms of 
systems of projects, available means, motives, relevances and so on’ (1962g:35).18  
 In speaking of the postulate of subjective interpretation we are not referring to the interpreting of 
the social scientist but the object of his interpetings. To be clear, “interpreting” here refers to an act 
whereas “interpretation” refers to an action. Take the following from Weber: ‘In “action” is included all 
human behaviour when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it’ (Weber, 
1947:80). As the individual acts they “attach subjective meaning”, that is, they interpret. The “subjective 
interpretation” therefore does not refer to the process of the scientist but the object of his inquiry. As 
Knudsen has ably described this, ‘the reality upon which the social sciences build their ideal types and 
models has already been experienced and interpreted by the “objects” themselves, i.e. the individuals of 
the scientific analysis’ (Knudsen, 2004:49).  
 However, clarity is required in this area, as Husserl demands: ‘we must grasp the contrast 
between objectivity and the subjectivity of the life-world as a contrast which determines the fundamental 
sense of objective-scientific discipline itself, and we must secure this contrast against the great 
temptations to misconstrue it’ (Husserl, 1970c:127). For example, Galdur may be observing Kerwalh and 
                                                 
17
 It cannot be ignored that despite our comments regarding the human prejudice (Ch.2.iii.c) that Schutz 
quite regularly speaks in terms of “humans” and “human being” – an issue to which we will return later 
(see Ch.7.iv). 
18
 The appearance of Weber in this context should not be taken to mean he should be considered a 
member of the Phenomenological Movement. Our consideration of Weber in these pages is only in 
relation to the ways in which he has influenced certain phenomenologists such as Scheler and Schutz.  
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Reinakh spar with each other. As an observer he is not involved in their action such that ‘he is “tuned in” 
upon them but not they upon him’ (Schutz, 1962g:26). In saying this, Schutz suggests that Galdur is 
thereby “disinterested” – i.e. fulfilling the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. However, in a later 
discussion on common-sense understandings of “equality” by groups in “Equality and the Meaning 
Structure of the Social World” (1957[1964i]) Schutz tacitly reveals a problem with this assumption. 
Although Galdur is not participating in the sparring, he nevertheless participates within the in-group of 
Kerwalh and Reinakh by sharing their relevances, by observing in order to offer advice to Reinakh. 
Subjective interpreting is therefore meaning constituted as meaning for “Me” or “Us” (1964i:251-254). 
By contrast, objective interpreting is really interpretations about an out-group and is therefore meaning 
constituted in terms of meaning for “Him/Her” and “Them” (1964i:254-257). The problem in relation to 
“disinterestedness” is that these objective interpretations are framed in reference to the observer’s own in-
group. That is, the observer’s objective interpreting is nevertheless subjective. As such these would be, 
following Schutz’s terminology, subjective objective interpretations.19 “They” only makes sense in 
relation to “Us” even if this “Us” is conceived negatively as “Not Them”. Such an observer is therefore 
not “disinterested” in the sense Schutz wishes to capture because by his own admission these objective 
interpretations can be imposed upon the out-group by the observer (1964i:255-256).  
 In order to avoid an unnecessary amount of confusion that can stem from such phrases as 
“subjective objective interpretations” and the possible combinations in which “subjective” and 
“objective” may then be placed, we will alter Schutz’s terminology. To do this we will co-opt certain 
terminology from Ninian Smart’s “Interpretation and Mystical Experience” even though his argument is 
largely untenable from our position. Specifically we need to extract the ideas of auto-interpretation and 
                                                 
19
 Elements of this can be found in another of Schutz’s essays, “The Stranger”:  
For the approaching stranger, however, the pattern of the approached 
group does not guarantee an objective chance for success but rather a pure 
subjective likelihood which has to be checked step by step, that is, he has 
to make sure that the solutions suggested by the new scheme will also 
produce the desired effect for him in his special position as outsider and 
new-comer who has not brought within his grasp the whole system of the 
cultural pattern but who is rather puzzled by its inconsistency, 
incoherence, and lack of clarity. (Schutz, 1944[1964c]:103)  
Continuing the above example we may say of a second observer, Ardith, that she is not a member of 
Galdur, Kerwalh and Reinakh’s in-group. As an out-group member she must make sense of their 
province of meaning in its relation to her as their queen. Indeed, as the queen she not only lacks the 
monothetic unifying province “to aid the queen”, she cannot even possess it herself because she is the 
very object which that province is aimed at. As such in order to bring the province of “Huscarl” as a 
specific instantiation of “to aid the queen” to consistency, coherency and clarity Ardith must orientate 
this province which she herself cannot inhabit to her own province of meaning “Queen”.  
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hetero-interpretation from his general argument. According to Smart, when it comes to describing 
“religious experiences”20:  
There is the description given by the man himself, in terms of his own 
tradition. There is the description which others of his own tradition may 
give. Also, men of another tradition may describe his experience in terms 
of their tradition or standpoint … We crucially, then, should distinguish 
between a mystic’s interpretation of his own experience and the 
interpretation which may be placed upon it from a different point of view. 
(Smart, 2009:80) 
 
To the mystic’s interpretation of his experience is applied “auto-interpretation” and to the interpretation 
of the experience by another is applied “hetero-interpretation”. Smart’s discussion is framed in terms of 
comparing two interpreters with one another; we do not need to go that far to make use of these two 
phrases. When, for example, Gharys speaks of “Me” and “Us” he is engaging in auto-interpreting, and 
when he uses such language as “Him/Her” or “Them” he is engaging in hetero-interpreting. Both auto-
interpreting and hetero-interpreting are forms of subjective interpretation because they are framed in 
terms of the “Here and Now” which Gharys occupies.21 In the case of group level distinctions such as 
“Us” and “Them”, his “Here and Now” is expanded to include certain other persons. 
 However, it must be recognised that, in hetero-interpreting “Them”, Gharys is fulfilling certain 
practical interests that are dominating: ‘This world as experienced through my natural attitude is the 
scene and also the object of my actions. I have to dominate it and change it in order to carry out my 
purposes’ (Schutz, 1962i:306). The “Us/Them” distinction has an inherent bias to suggest “We” are 
better. But if such is the case then the scientist is failing at the postulate of nonpractical knowledge 
because he is automatically placing himself in a dominating position through hetero-interpreting 
“Them”.22 Such a line of argument has exactly been that of Edward Said (1978) who argued that the 
scholar will always hold power over his subjects, an argument also found in feminist and postmodernist 
thinking.
23
  
 We must be clear that objective interpreting and hetero-interpreting are not the same. All 
subjective interpreting involves holding a position, a “Here”, which entails practical concerns. But in 
taking up the postulate of nonpractical knowledge the social scientist abandons their “Here”. As Schutz 
says in “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation”:  
                                                 
20
 Here meant ‘in a special sense, meaning something like a vision or an intuition’ (Smart, 2009:42).  
21
 See Ch.3.i. 
22
 We have sketched some preliminary comments on the application of auto- and hetero- interpreting in 
relation to the topic of “myth” (Tuckett, 2013).  
23
 E.g. Baum (1990), Sprague (2005), Fricker (2006[2011]), Wylie (2007[2011]), Neitz (2011).  
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The social scientist has no “Here” within the social world or, more 
precisely, he considers his position within it and the system of relevances 
attached therefore as irrelevant for his scientific undertaking. His stock of 
knowledge at hand is the corpus of his science, and he has to take it for 
granted – which means, in this context as scientifically ascertained – 
unless he makes explicit why he cannot do so. (1962g:39)
24
 
 
By having no “Here” the social scientist engages in objective interpreting, there is no in-group whose 
interests are being served.
25
 Based on our comments about nonpractical knowledge, however, one may 
argue that it is impossible not to occupy a “Here” as this is tantamount to having no interest whatsoever. 
All interpreting, in order to be interpreting, involves taking a position. In subjective interpreting this 
involves taking a position against an object. Accepting this point, by objective interpreting what is 
properly meant is that the interpretation involves taking up the position of the object. In the case of social 
science the objects under study are subjective interpretations. What the postulate of subjective 
interpretation properly entails is that the social scientist occupies the “Here” of the out-group.26 But 
because of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge this occupation is only ever virtual: the social 
scientist does not then take up the practical interests of that individual/group.  
 The postulate of subjective interpretation therefore qualifies the postulate of nonpractical 
knowledge – all that is relevant to the scientist is the group’s subjective interpretations – refining the 
purpose from science to social science: nonpractical knowledge of the world as it is for wer. This 
qualification serves to distinguish social science from natural science. According to Schutz natural 
science develops constructs of the first degree and social science develops constructs of the second 
degree (1962h:59). By this Schutz means that the constructs of social science are the constructs of 
constructs whereas natural science just has constructs. The objects of natural science are “dead” in the 
sense that they are neither experiencing or interpreting – i.e. they are not taking a position against another 
                                                 
24
 This last qualification distances Schutz from a monolithic conception of science as a cumulative 
process. So long as the scientist can make explicit why, science is open to revision.  
25
 Technically we should regard the scientific community as an in-group. Indeed, we must for the purpose 
of certain other postulates below. Rather, the point here is that in terms of approaching his topic of study 
the scientist has no in-group in the sense that neither the people under study or some other group benefit 
from his research in terms of their ability to further practical interests.  
26
 Scheler is getting at exactly this when we he claims in his discussion of the variations in practical 
morality: 
Practical morality pertains to the value of the factual comportment of men, 
that is, comportment on the basis of norms which belong to the relations 
of value-ranks recognised by these men, and which correspond to their 
own structures of preferring. The value of such practical comportment is 
completely relative to its “ethos” and can never be measured by an ethos 
of another epoch or that of another people. Only after we take possession 
of an ethos of a certain age can we judge the actions and types of 
comportment of the people of that age. (Scheler, 1973b:300)  
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object.
27
 In the case of both sciences, by objective interpreting we take up the position of the object in 
question. In the case of social science, however, this object is itself a position taken against another 
object.  
 
c. The postulate of adequacy 
 
 In order to ensure that the scientist is objectively interpreting subjective interpretations further 
postulates are required. To this end we have the most consistent postulate which appears in all Schutz’s 
essays, the postulate of adequacy: ‘each term used in a scientific system referring to human action must 
be so constructed that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way 
indicated by the typical construction would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself as 
well as for his fellow-man’ (1962g:44; 1962h:64; 1964k:19; 1964b:85). The only variation occurs in “On 
Multiple Realities” where this definition is subsumed under the postulate of consistency and 
compatibility, and where “compatibility” takes the place of “adequacy” (1962d:251).  
 “Problem of the Rationality of the Social World” reveals this postulate is derived from Weber, 
who states that:  
A motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor 
himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question. 
We apply the term “adequacy on the level of meaning” to the subjective 
interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and in so far as, 
according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component 
parts taken in their mutual recognition are recognised to constitute a 
“typical” complex of meaning. (Weber, 1947:89-90) 
  
As it is used by Weber here, “adequacy” refers to the way in which the acting person construes their 
action as fitting into a “typical” way of acting in the situation that they find themselves. That is, they have 
a yardstick of “what people do” against which to judge their own action. For example, if Akelot rebels, he 
“views” his rebellion as “adequate” insofar as he thinks the conditions which caused him to rebel are 
                                                 
27
 While this certainly holds true in such branches of Natural Science as Physics, such branches as 
Zoography and Ethology whose attention is the behaviour and habits of animals might be considered to 
be dealing with experience and interpretation. For example, how can we describe the mating dances of 
birds as “mating dances” if the opposite sex does not interpret the associated behaviours as such? Husserl 
himself mentions briefly “animal spirituality” (ferhđcundhad) (Husserl, 1965b:152). Gordon has 
mentioned that if social science is construed as the study of societies then there are various animals that 
also form these (Gordon, 1991:2-15). Though there is no space to pursue such inquiries here, these points 
raise necessary challenges and issues that we suspect are so far under-considered particularly if we attend 
to philosophical anthropology.  
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“typical” conditions for rebelling. It is in this sense that Schutz uses the term typification28: ‘We typify, in 
daily life, human activities which interest us only as appropriate means for bringing about intended 
effects, but not as emanations of the personality of our fellow-men’ (Schutz, 1964b:81). Typifications 
therefore provide the relevant conditions for bringing about a particular end.  
 Following the postulate of subjective interpretation, social science’s object of study is the world 
as it is for wer; the social scientist thus constructs ideal types as interpretations of weres interpreting. 
That is, ideal types are second degree constructs of the typifications – first degree constructs – which 
guide the person’s acting. Continuing with the example of Akelot, the social scientist constructs an ideal 
type which posits the relevant conditions necessary for Akelot to rebel – i.e. how the situation must be 
giefan to Akelot for him to respond in a particular fashion. This ideal type can then be “correct” on two 
grounds. First, it is correct if the proposed relevant conditions are observed and Akelot does rebel. If the 
relevant conditions are observed but Akelot does not rebel then it is incorrect. Second, as our concern is 
the world as it is for Akelot, this ideal type as a second degree construct must make sense to Akelot if it 
were “rewritten” as a first degree construct. That is, the ideal type must not contain a relevant condition 
to which Akelot could not attest to as a possible relevant condition. Thus, as another example, if Odagen 
witnesses the god Lugus, the relevant conditions within our ideal type used to objectively interpret this 
encounter cannot contain Barrett’s Hyperactive Agency Detection Device29 if Odagen does not himself 
recognise it as belonging to his various typifications. The postulate of adequacy thus stipulates that 
second degree constructs of the social scientist correspond to the first degree constructs used by wer in 
order to be correct. Gordon expresses this point quite usefully: ‘no discipline that studies phenomena can 
be satisfactory unless contact is made between the theory and the real world’ (Gordon, 1991:40). We 
must not lose sight that our interpretations are of an interpretation.  
 
d. The postulates of rationality 
 
 It is important to recognise here that there is a subtle distinction in the way “adequate” is used 
by Weber and Schutz in terms of who is “correct”. For Weber it is Akelot who is “correct” or not. For 
Schutz it is the social scientist who is “correct” or not. However, we must be clear on what is meant by 
“correct” in both cases. As recognised by Schutz, Akelot’s appeal to typifications has to do with what 
                                                 
28
 See Ch.3.ii.c. 
29
 See Ch.1.i. 
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Weber called “rationalisation” in terms of “disenchantment of the world”. Schutz interprets this to mean 
‘the transformation of an uncontrollable and unintelligible world into an organisation which we can 
understand and therefore master, and in the framework of which prediction becomes possible’ (Schutz, 
1964b:71). Thus to be “correct” is to be rational. But in saying this, we must now determine what it 
means to be rational. In following Weber’s formulation Schutz understands rationality to refer to 
“problem” solving. That is, to “master” something is to solve the problem which it presents to the person. 
However, this requires careful clarification because there is an assumption that what we are going to 
designate as the postulates of rationality belongs to science alone. A careful consideration of Schutz’s 
comments on this point reveals that actually these postulates are common to all provinces of meaning. 
That is, every province is within itself rational.  
 In “Problem of Rationality of the Social World” Schutz speaks of the postulate of rationality. 
This states that: ‘The ideal type of social action must be constructed in such a way that the actor in the 
living world would perform the typified action if he had a clear and distinct scientific knowledge of all 
the elements relevant to his choice and the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate means for 
the realisation of the most appropriate end’ (Schutz, 1964b:86). This point is worth emphasising for it is 
Schutz’s contention that science is rational and can only deal with rational constructs. Schutz’s 
understanding of rationality primarily responds to Parsons’ understanding of rational action:  
Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the 
conditions of the situation, and by the means which, among those 
available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for those 
reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science. 
(Parsons, 1937:58) 
 
But what ends are these? Schutz states that these ends are the problem of the social scientist. That is, all 
the ideal types are constructed around a problem which is his central interest. Each special branch of 
science then becomes concerned with one (or a type of) problem (1962d:249-250). He gives the example 
of economics: ‘Build all your ideal types as if all actors had oriented their life-plan and, therefore, all 
their activities to the chief end of realising the greatest utility with the minimum of costs; human activity 
which is oriented in such a way (and only this kind of activity) is the subject matter of your science’ 
(Schutz, 1964b:87). The economist then constructs ideal types of people who would work according to 
this problem as it has been laid out by the economist.
30
 Rational deliberation involves three requirements 
                                                 
30
 While framed in this way, “problem” is an acceptable way to describe the scientist’s work. Certainly it 
is consistent with what Thomas Kuhn call “normal science” (Kuhn, 2012:25-34). However, in certain 
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(1964b:86) which are explicated in greater detail in “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation” as 
clear and distinct knowledge of: 
a) the particular state of affairs within which his projected action has to start. This involves a 
sufficiently precise definition of his biographical situation in the physical and socio-cultural 
environment; 
b) the state of affairs to be brought about by his projected action, that is, its end. Yet since there is 
no such thing as an isolated project or end… I have, therefore, to have clear and distinct 
knowledge of the place of my project within the hierarchical order of my plans (or the 
interrelationship of the end to be achieved with other ends), the compatibility of one with the 
other, and the possible repercussions of one upon another; 
c) the various means necessary for attaining the established end, of the possibility of bringing them 
within my reach, of the degree of expediency of their application, of the possible employment of 
these same means for the attainment of other potential ends, and of the compatibility of the 
selected means with other means needed for the materialisation of other projects. (1962g:30-31) 
 
We suggest that these requirements are expressed in other essays as separate postulates which 
collectively constitute the postulates of rationality: 
 (a) finds expression as the postulate of logical consistency: ‘The system of ideal types must 
remain in full compatibility with the principles of formal logic’ (1964k:19). According to this postulate 
the constructs of a given case must form a consistent whole and be non-contradictory. By “formal logic” 
is designated those rules by which constructs may be consistently connected.
31
 No problem exists in 
isolation and can only be made sense of in relation to other problems. 
 (b) occurs in “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation” as part of the postulate of logical 
consistency. In “On Multiple Realities”, however, Schutz speaks of ‘the postulate of highest possible 
clarity and distinctness of all terms and notions used, especially requiring the transformation of confused 
prescientific thought into distinctness by explicating its hidden implications’ (1962d:251). Dennis 
describes this usefully as the postulate of clarity: ‘Scientists, then, must maximise, and be seen to 
maximise, the clarity and consistency of their terms of reference as an end in itself’ (Dennis, 2004).  
                                                                                                                                               
situations the use of “problem” may incline us to think of some practical interest that needs resolving. 
Take the following comment from Kalleberg: ‘When we define something as a “problem”, we not only 
assume a given state of affairs, but also that the situation is not as it ought to be’ (Kalleberg, 2010:189).  
In this respect it may be less confusing to speak of “question” instead.  
31
 McLain has pointed out that while the postulate of subjective interpretation is what divides natural and 
social science, the postulate of logical consistency is what holds them together (McLain, 1981:106). 
Contained within this is the assumption that the rules of “formal logic” are the same for both natural and 
social sciences. A similar point can be found in Elster (1983). Elster argues that different sciences rely on 
different types of explanation, Physics, Biology and Social Science all share causal explanations in 
common but differ in also utilising mechanistic, functional, and intentional explanations respectively.  
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 (c) appears alternatively as the postulate of compatibility (1964k:19) and the postulate of tested 
observation (1962d).
32
 The latter provides the fullest descriptions: ‘all scientific thought has to be 
derived, directly or indirectly, from tested observation, that is, from originary immediate experiences of 
facts within the world’ (1962d:251). Though the postulate is not named, a similar comment is then made 
in “Concept and Theory Formation”: ‘each step involved in the construction and use of the scientific 
model can be verified by empirical observation, provided that we do not restrict this term to sensory 
perceptions of objects and events in the outer world but include the experiential forms, by which 
common-sense thinking in everyday life understands human actions and their outcome in terms of their 
underlying motives and goals’ (1962h:65). As this latter comment may seem problematic it must be 
contextualised as a response to Nagel’s (1952[1963]) and Carl Hempel’s (1941 [2011], 1952[1963]) 
views on social science. In particular Schutz criticises their postulate of sensory observation which 
involves a restriction such that observation only “counts” in face-to-face relationships, yet he observes 
that much of what goes on in the common life-world exists outside this kind of relation. In this respect 
the postulate of sensory observation is too strong and actually removes from the interests of the social 
scientist much of the social world (1962h:54-55). To avoid possible confusion with Nagel and Hempel’s 
postulate we will speak of the postulate of verifiability: the social scientist’s constructs are verified if 
another social scientist performing the same study would produce similar constructs. In order to be 
verifiable it is therefore necessary to exist within a community of scientists who can perform this 
verification. 
 The problem of this presentation is highlighted by Dennis (2004) who argues that Lynch (1993) 
– following Schutz – sees scientific rationality as superior to common-sense rationality. Though Lynch 
(2004) repudiates the claim, had he made this argument he would not entirely be incorrect. Take the 
following comment from Schutz: ‘Only on the level of models of interaction patterns constructed by the 
social scientist in accordance with certain requirements defined by the methods of his science does the 
concept of rationality obtain its full significance’ (Schutz, 1962g:33). This can be seen particularly with 
the postulate of clarity. Dennis has argued that clarity is for science an end in itself and so it will always 
obtain to a higher degree than that found in common-sense thinking. Yet this relies upon a misconstrual 
                                                 
32
 E.g. Gordon speaks of the principle of empirical testability. As he sees it, something is scientific if it 
can be tested by observation or experiment (Gordon, 1991:26).  
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by Dennis based, we suspect, upon the under-emphasis given to the question of relevancy by Schutz.
33
 
More accurately, Dennis’ claim that clarity is an end in itself is nothing more than a re-statement of the 
postulate of nonpractical knowledge that as such has nothing to do with rationality but rather gives 
rationality its relevance. Unlike Parsons who held that only science is rational, Schutz held a much 
broader view.   
 In “Problem of Rationality in the Social World” Schutz makes a distinction between rationality 
of knowledge and the rationality of choice itself (Schutz, 1964b:79). What he stipulates, though, is that 
although we may lack clear and distinct knowledge in the everyday situation this does not mean that we 
are not acting rationally: ‘it would be sufficient to interpret the terms clearness and distinctness in a 
modified and restricted meaning, namely, as clearness and distinctness adequate to the requirements of 
the actor’s practical interest’ (1964b:79).34 All rational deliberation is based upon a “problem at hand” 
but this very problem is determined by our biographical situation. As each person has a different 
biographical situation this then assumes that in-groups share,  
a system of relevances sufficiently homogenous in structure and content 
for the practical purposes involved. If this is not the case, then a course of 
action which is perfectly rational from the point of view of the actor may 
appear as non-rational to the partner or observer and vice versa. Both 
attempts, to induce rain by performing the rain-dance or by seeding clouds 
with silver iodine, are subjectively seen, rational actions from the point of 
view of the Hopi Indian or the modern meteorologist respectively. 
(1962g:29) 
  
Rationality, it is heavily implied, is determined by a system of relevances that are in turn determined by 
the stock of knowledge of the person’s biographical situation. But this is to say no more than the 
postulate of relevancy. Indeed, this is the very reason we have abandoned it. A person’s interests are 
determined by a problem which determines what the relevant conditions are regardless of whether that 
problem be religious, artistic, or scientific.  
 Let us say that my “problem at hand” is to catch a train. This requires a degree of clarity because 
I need the relevant knowledge of where I am and where the train is. But the level of clarity needed for me 
to solve the problem does not require knowledge of the exact GPS co-ordinates of my home, only that my 
home is seven streets away from the train station. Let us say further that the train leaves in fifteen 
minutes. I must then determine a route that will get me to the station within that time which requires 
                                                 
33
 Much of Schutz’s work on the question of relevancy was never completed in his life time and most has 
appeared as posthumous publications (e.g. 1970[2011a]; 2004[2011d]). 
34
 As the use of “adequate” may cause confusion with postulate of adequacy we may instead use of 
Garfinkel’s phrase “sufficient for present purposes” (Garfinkel, 1967:268).  
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knowledge of which routes I have taken in the past, or others have taken, which cover the distance in the 
requisite time – i.e. a verified route. In this I may come to the conclusion that there are two routes 
available that take eight and ten minutes respectively. If I choose to take the ten minute route I am acting 
no less rationally than if I took the faster route because both meet the relevant conditions of catching the 
train within fifteen minutes. Indeed, I may have factored into my choice of route the fact that the slower 
route is more aesthetically pleasing. This then brings us to the logical consistency of the act of catching 
the train, for as Schutz noted it must sit within a system of actions. Catching the train at that time is 
necessary for getting to work which is necessary for earning money which is necessary for others things 
and so on. That I have chosen the slower route factors into this logical consistency because walking a 
pleasing route improves my mood which improves my frame of mind for working, thereby having a 
knock-on effect.  
 It must be emphasised that the clear and distinct knowledge required is dependent upon the 
“problem at hand”. In the case of each of these postulates it is possible for me to have “clearer and more 
distinct” knowledge of them but this extra knowledge is irrelevant to solving the problem. In “common-
sense” rationalities, clear and distinct knowledge solves the problem. Where scientific rationality differs 
is that clear and distinct knowledge is the problem to be solved. Schutz himself concludes ‘that “rational 
action” on the common-sense level is always within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of 
constructs of typicalities of the setting, motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and 
personalities involved and taken for granted’ (1962g:33). By virtue of this typicality, however,  
the more standardised the prevailing action pattern is, the more 
anonymous it is, the greater is the subjective chance of conformity and, 
therewith, of the success of intersubjective behaviour. Yet – and this is the 
paradox of rationality on the common-sense level – the more standardised 
the pattern is, the less the underlying elements become analysable for 
common-sense thought in terms of rational insight. (1962g:33) 
 
That is, the more rationalised this action becomes, the more it is repeated, the less the person needs to 
have clear and distinct knowledge into the typifications that guide it.
35
 A person may correctly solve a 
problem without knowing how they did it per se. By contrast, as the objects of social science are these 
“underlying elements” – these typifications – the social scientist cannot correctly solve a problem without 
knowing how they did it.  
                                                 
35
 Though it goes beyond the scope of our main argument, it is possible to introduce notions of 
“unconscious” or “sub-conscious” here.   
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 The point to be emphasised is this: rationality is always determined by the province of meaning 
the person is currently operating within. As Husserl argued in Crisis, it was the error of positivistic 
sciences to distort rationality and construe it in a one-sided manner (Husserl, 1970c:7-10). In the case of 
scientific rationality, the system of relevances of the province is provided by the postulate of nonpractical 
knowledge and in the case of social scientific rationality by the addition of the postulates of subjective 
interpretation and adequacy. Rationality in all its guises is determined by the postulates of clarity, logical 
consistency and verifiability, but without the addition of further postulates it is empty.
36
 This point is not 
made clear by Schutz’s own discussion because the postulates of rationality in “Problem of Rationality in 
the Social World” have already been giefan relevance by the postulates of science. That is, they are 
framed in terms of scientific rationality rather than rationality in general. It is therefore more accurate to 
speak of multiple rationalities that are giefan their distinctive identities as Christian, Azande, Scientific, 
or Sporting rationality which differ according to what they deem the relevant conditions for solving 
“problems at hand”.37 To reiterate this does not entail that the scientist’s rationality is “higher” as the 
possibility for his rationality is dependent upon a different set of relevances.
38
 
 
 Thus we have the following postulates as constituting the essence of social science: postulate of 
nonpractical knowledge which is the necessary criterion of all science; the postulate of subjective 
interpretation is necessary to make that science social; the postulate of adequacy ensures that science is 
objective; the postulate of logical consistency, postulate of verifiability, and postulate of clarity ensure 
science is rational. Further based on our discussion of rationality above we can also stipulate that these 
postulates are eidetic, they are of essential necessity for social science to be social science.  
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 It is worth noting that the postulates that are necessary to “fill” rationality are always those postulates 
which would determine the purpose of a province of meaning.  
37
 Scheler also comes to a similar conclusion about science: ‘All of its theses, inferences, deductions, and 
inductions must be correct and therefore subject to a normative legislation based on pure logic. Leaving 
aside the basic articles of its constitution, which have no validity in philosophy, science naturally shares 
these standards of cognition with every form of cognition [rationality], including cognition exercised in 
our daily affairs from the perspective of the natural attitude’ (Scheler, 1973c:198).  
38
 This understanding of rationality is echoed by Toulmin: ‘The idea of rationality, I shall be arguing, is 
concerned far more directly with matters of function and adaptations – with the substantive needs and 
demands of the problem-situations that men’s collective conceptions and methods of thought are 
designed to handle – than it is with formal considerations’ (Toulmin, 1972:vii).  
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iii. Proper phenomenology as social science 
 
What we have called the postulates of social science parallel what Merton referred to as the norms or 
ethos of science developed in “Science and the Social Order” (1938[1973a]) and “The Normative 
Structure of Science”. Merton observes, however, that ‘the ethos of science has not been codified, it can 
be inferred from the moral consensus of scientists as expressed in use and wont, in countless writings on 
the scientific spirit and in moral indignation directed toward contraventions of that ethos’ (Merton, 
1973b:269). That is, the norms he identified were not written down in a “lore book of science” but rather 
discerned from what scientists did when they went about doing something called “science”. As Kalleberg 
notes, the norms are ‘taken for granted in well-functioning scholarly communities’ (Kalleberg, 
2007:150). With regard to our postulates of social science, then, we have been following Sartre in 
rendering explicit an implicit essence. Yet at the same time, the main way in which these norms are made 
apparent for Merton is the way in which scientists have reacted to their violation. Thus it is important to 
bear in mind that the scientist will not always satisfy the postulates in their day-to-day activities. 
Agreeing with Garfinkel, our postulates of social science are ‘a way of stating the ways in which a person 
would act were he conceived to be acting as an ideal scientist’ (Garfinkel, 1967:280). These postulates, 
insofar as they capture the essence of social science, are ideal in the sense that we do not expect that 
social scientists will consistently meet them. What we regard as important is the attempt by scientists to 
meet with this ideal, no matter how difficult, and the fact that they recognise when it has not been 
achieved. We do not shy from this entailing overt normative claims about what scientists ought to do.  
 What should also be drawn from Merton’s comments if applied to the postulates of social 
science is that if they lack formalisation they are not constituents of a cognitive style as such. Rather, 
these postulates are criteria by which we determine if a particular cognitive style can be called social 
scientific. This point also feeds into our recognition that there is a crisis in social science. Simply put, 
why, if these cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one another? Before 
we can answer this question however, we need to make the further point that phenomenology has a 
warrant to comment upon this situation because it is itself a social scientific cognitive style. This is not 
only based on Husserl’s own claim that phenomenology is a rigorous science or Embree’s discussion of 
the emergence of Cultural Phenomenology, but that the strictures of phenomenology accord with the 
postulates of social science:  
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 In the first instance, the stricture of philosophical anthropology can be seen to be an expression 
of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge and postulate of subjective interpretation. In the case of the 
former this is made apparent by the fact that any philosophical anthropology has as its concern the 
question “What is wer?” Phenomenology is a descriptive task as made clear by Spiegelberg’s statement 
of the “phenomenological task”: ‘the descriptive investigation of the phenomena, both objective and 
subjective, in their fullest breadth and depth’ (Spiegelberg, 1971a:2). Precisely because we are only 
describing, in Husserl’s sense of giving conceptual expression to the perceived, we are engaged in a 
nonpractical interest.
39
 To see this we can contrast “descriptive investigation” with “evaluative 
investigation” which implies a practical interest. In the process of evaluation I have set the object in 
question against some standard which I find it to either satisfy or fail to satisfy. This very establishment 
of a standard of evaluation requires a practical interest to which alters the relevant conditions. Let us 
return to the example of rebellion in the previous section: For Akelot to rebel, relevant conditions must 
pertain to cause him to rebel. A descriptive investigation – which is guided by the postulate of subjective 
interpretation – determines what these relevant conditions are for Akelot. If we observe that Akelot is not 
rebelling, we may predict what relevant conditions need pertain to cause him to rebel, but these 
predictions are no more than descriptive investigations in need of verification. If the proposed conditions 
pertain and Akelot does not rebel, then clearly the observer is wrong in their prediction. By contrast, the 
evaluative investigation determines what these relevant conditions should be. Rather than Akelot 
determining the relevant conditions, it is the observer. Thus, if the proposed conditions do pertain and 
Akelot does not rebel then it is not the observer who is wrong, but Akelot. An evaluative investigation 
therefore generates “ought” claims about how the observed should behave.  
 It should be noted that this use of “evaluation” does not contradict our understanding of an 
evaluative philosophy of social science. It is precisely the task of an evaluative philosophy of social 
science to stand in judgement over the findings of social science – i.e. to sort proper science from pseudo-
science. In the current context of our argument this is to say that we are making a “third degree” 
evaluative investigation into the second degree constructs of social scientists, accepting those that are 
descriptive investgations and rejecting those that are evaluative investigations. We do not deny that there 
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 This recognition of the phenomenological use of “description” has perhaps been somewhat understated 
particularly in its relation to “explanation”.  
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is a practical interest involved in this. However, clarification will need to be given as to the extent and 
limits of such an interest.
40
  
 While this places a certain onus on the postulate of nonpractical knowledge, so far it is only by 
virtue of the example of Akelot that the postulate of subjective interpretation has been introduced at all. 
However, phenomenology’s descriptive investigation focuses on phenomena which we saw in our 
definition of phenomenology simpliciter are necessarily giefan in social relations. As Embree so lucidly 
described it, phenomenology focuses on “encountering”, where encountering is a social engagement. In a 
further aspect we can draw the contrast with Natural Science, which lacks this postulate, by pointing to 
Glendinning’s fourth thesis of no view from the sideways perspective: ‘the phenomena of interest to 
phenomenology are simply objects and properties “for us” or even “for me”’ (Glendinning, 2004:36). 
The objects of natural science, by contrast, are not “for us” or “for me” in that it can have a view from 
“nowhere”.  
 Though we will have reason to disagree with Glendinning on this thesis it will not be for the 
obvious reason that the “for us” or “for me” implies a subjective aspect.41 The concern this may cause can 
first be mitigated by the context of his argument. Glendinning’s main contention is that, contra 
naturalism, phenomenology involves the ‘attempt to rid us of the idea that “a view of phenomena from 
sideways on” makes sense’ (2004:37). That is, a phenomenon by definition is always “for me”, “for us”, 
“for him”, “for her”, etc. A phenomenon never just is. We must recall that in the principle of principles 
we lock ourselves to studying that which is giefan, and as pointed out earlier this entails that it is giefan 
to someone. And on these grounds the principle of principles is the phenomenological formulation of the 
postulate of adequacy.  
 Nevertheless, it would seem that if the phenomenon in question is “for me” this would make it 
almost too easy to meet the postulate. Certainly if I am Akelot I can decide what the relevant conditions 
are for me to rebel. To an extent this cannot be denied but at the same time it is also a fairly bland 
investigation. It must be remembered that phenomenology has as its purpose the stricture of philosophical 
anthropology. As such, the consideration of Akelot’s desire to rebel as a case of “wer in situation” is only 
of interest insofar as it tells us something of wer in general. In this we should return to Sartre and STE: 
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 See Ch.6.iii. 
41
 See Ch.6.iv. 
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our study is always aimed at “we ourselves”.42 For Sartre the phenomenological analysis of my joy 
should inform our understanding of joy in general in turn conceived as a particular activity of wer in 
general. Here too, our consideration of Akelot’s desire to rebel is of interest insofar as it tells us 
something of rebellion in general. This in turn is of interest if we recognise that rebellion is one among 
many activities that inform us about wer in general. So even if I am Akelot this presents no impediment if 
this “for me” tells us something about “for us”.  
 That the study of Akelot’s desire to rebel should tell us something of rebellion in general brings 
us to a consideration of the rationality of phenomenology. To begin with, the postulate of logical 
consistency is expressed by the principle of presuppositionlessness. As Husserl states in LI: ‘meanings 
inspired only by remote, confused, or inauthentic intuitions – if by any intuitions at all – are not enough’ 
(1970a:252). In the phenomenological sense logical consistency cannot be achieved by simply accepting 
“tradition”; if what “tradition” tells us is remote or accepted on bad faith, then what “tradition” provides 
is unclarified and unverified.
43
 It is, in Heidegger’s words, only the destruction of “tradition” in the sense 
that, tied to the postulate of adequacy, the concepts we draw on are consistent with what is giefan by the 
phenomena. As such this relates back to the principle of principles; as Carr recognised, ‘being true to 
Husserl is less important than being true to the “Sachen selbst”’ (Carr, 2004:360). In the case of Akelot 
this would mean that our analysis of his rebellion should not be coloured by our pre-knowledge of 
rebellion. Again we can see Sartre’s claim that “existence precedes essence” as a social scientific stricture 
in the sense that each new study has the potential to overthrow all that has gone before. In regard to the 
use of “unclarified” and “unverified”, this also relates the principle to the postulate of clarity and the 
postulate of verifiability. We may also say that the postulate of clarity is expressed by the stricture of 
insight into essences. It is only by achieving the greatest possible clarity and distinctness that we can say 
that we have discerned the full essence of a thing in terms of its type and eidos. 
 Looking more specifically at the postulate of verifiability, we can see how this protects the 
postulate of adequacy from vapid subjective claims. While the principle of principles demands that all 
verification is done against the things themselves, we must also be clear upon who is doing the 
verification. Drawing on our comments on the postulate and its communal aspect, we may thus relate this 
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 See Ch.2.iv.g. 
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 According to Sartre acting in bad faith entails one who ‘constitutes itself in its own flesh as the 
nihilation of a possibility which another [realité humaine] projects as its possibility’ (Sartre, 2003:70). It 
is important to bear in mind that this notion of bad faith, much like Heidegger’s authenticity and 
inauthenticity, does not indicate a moral valuation.  
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to the stricture of conscious adherence. That is, verifiability is achieved only if another phenomenologist 
would come to the same conclusions if studying the same phenomenon. In the case of Akelot this would 
mean that not only would another phenomenologist affirm what we have concluded about Akelot’s 
rebellion but also what can be said of rebellion in general based on this. This then requires knowledge of 
who can, or is suitable, to do such verification. Perhaps an interesting example of this is the Crisis. 
According to Moran, Husserl thought of himself as a scientist engaged in “co-philosophising” with his 
various assistants including Edith Stein, Heidegger, Ludwig Landgrebe, and Eugen Fink. Crisis was 
written with Fink’s assistance and it seems he had some input into its composition such that: ‘The final 
text of the Crisis, then, in part is a Fink-Husserl cooperative effort and their individual contributions may 
never be properly identified and disentangled’ (Moran, 2012:13-14).44 In short, in any collaborative work 
the work itself cannot be said to properly belong to one or the other as they must share the conclusion 
reached.  
 Taking the above altogether, the table below shows the relation of phenomenological strictures, 
postulates of social science, and requirements of a province of meaning: 
Phenomenological Strictures Postulates of social science 
Requirements of a Province of 
Meaning 
Philosophical Anthropology 
Nonpractical Knowledge 
Purpose 
Subjective Interpretation 
Principle of Principles Adequacy 
Methodology Principle of 
Presuppositionlessness 
Logical Consistency 
Verifiability 
Conscious Adherence Identifier 
Insight into Essences Clarity Outcome 
 
One may well object at this juncture that our analysis so far has been too convenient. Particularly in our 
heavy use of Schutz, it may be charged that the requirements of a province of meaning, the strictures of 
phenomenology, and the postulates of social science cohere all too neatly. And there is a certain element 
of truth in this. To use our terminology of above we are engaged in an auto-interpretative activity in 
which we declare who “We” are and at the same time a hetero-interpretative task that determines whether 
“They” belong with “Us”.  We will make no attempt to deny that this argument is in its way ideological 
when it comes to social science. Wiebe called such discussions “political”; we view it as our imperial 
argument. Nor do we see a problem in this per se because it is a problem faced by everyone engaged in a 
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 Lauer’s translation (1971) does however indicate a number of sections that are clearly Fink’s additions.  
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normative philosophy of social science. Yet in proclaiming this we do not view Schutz’s postulates to be 
completely clarified. In the course of our exposition certain problematic features have arisen; grounds 
upon which we will need to criticise Schutz. Having now concluded our normative philosophy of social 
science, it is the task of Part II to turn to an evaluative philosophy of social science in which these 
challenges will be met. Only by doing this will we be able to fully clarify the essence of social science 
and address the crisis which it suffers. 
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Part II 
 
In Part I we have established what is meant by proper phenomenology, and in so doing we have come to 
an understanding of the essence of the social science. As we have suggested, Alfred Schutz’s postulates 
of social science present the eidetic structures of this essence. In the course of doing so we have already 
clarified certain aspects of this essence. This has been our normative philosophy of social science and in 
this Part we turn now to an evaluative philosophy of social science. Principly this takes the shape of an 
imperial argument: sorting proper science from pseudo-science. Only once this delineation has been 
achieved will we be in a position to get at the core of the crisis of social science. As such we must deal 
first with the challenges to proper science, some of which we have already begun to identify in the 
previous chapter.  
 The first challenge to be recognised is the abstracted nature of the essence of social science that 
we have presented. By this we mean no mention has been made of the concrete situation of doing 
science. Having delineated the eidetic structure of social science, the necessary question is what 
circumstances must pertain in order for the postulates to be met: under what conditions is it possible for 
science to proceed? Based on the comments of Martin and Wiebe regarding the emergence of 
Wissenschaft in Germany, one might be inclined to suggest that the conditions on which science proceeds 
are established in universities. They would not be alone in the argument that universities are the 
guardians of science and this fits in with a broader framework in which democracy is also necessary for 
science. However, such arguments rely too heavily upon the unwritten assumption that Science as an 
institution covers all of science. To the contrary we find it necessary to argue that there is nothing in the 
nature, or structure, of universities and democracy that would protect science. Quite the opposite in fact. 
Simply put, democracies - or indeed any State - and universities have a proclivity toward pseudo-science. 
 A second more fundamental challenge lies in what we call the “humanist challenge”: as we have 
eminently practical interests (surviving and thriving) that cannot be escaped, all “nonpractical interests” 
in fact contain implicit practical interests. While this challenge has been formulated in numerous ways, 
including by postmodern and feminist critiques that we have mentioned already, the root argument is that 
science, despite its claim to seek “knowledge for its own sake”, cannot avoid being value-laden1 – i.e. 
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 E.g. Rudner (1953), Strauss (1953), Jonas (1959[1963]), Myrdal (1970), Longino (1990), Anderson 
(1993), Root (1994), Hacking (1995[2011]), and Hausman and McPherson (2006). 
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there is no proper science, only pseudo-science as we have understood it. In order to maintain that proper 
science does not reduce itself to pseudo-science, we must further investigate the epistemic status of 
science through a consideration of objectivity. Particularly under the auspices of naturalism, a reification 
of science’s objectivity through an orthodoxy of rationality has led to epistemic arrogance which 
engenders pseudo-science.  
 Investigating these problems of the possibility and epistemic status of science will place us in a 
position to address the crisis of social science. Having cut away pseudo-science we will nevertheless be 
left with the problem raised by our own recognition that multiple cognitive styles may be proper science. 
That is, numerous cognitive styles may meet the postulates of social science as we have established them. 
The problem to be tackled, then, is why, if these cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle 
to cohere with one another? A consideration of this problem can only be achieved if we focus on the 
“social” of social science. By this we mean it is necessary to engage into an investigation into 
intersubjectivity and how it is Others are recognised as Other. In so doing we shall return to the human 
prejudice as a major source of pseudo-science in social science. 
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5. The Possibility of science 
 
The first challenge to be addressed is under what conditions is it possible for science to proceed? As has 
been noted in the Introduction and the previous Part, a significant number of scholars maintain science is 
dependent in some fashion on universities. Such arguments have their emphasis in the institutional setting 
of science. It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate that, based on our understanding of science, 
these arguments have taken issues regarding the practical possibility of science as matters of the essential 
possibility of science. By “practical possibility”1 we mean the amount of time that can be giefan over to 
the doing of science, and by “essential possibility” the condition upon which this giefende can take place. 
Such an argument is predicated on the following point by Husserl: 
The sense of our whole meditation implies that sciences, as these facts of 
Objective culture, and sciences “in the true and genuine sense” need not 
be identical and that the former, over and above being cultural facts, 
involve a claim, which ought to be established as one they already satisfy. 
Science as an idea – as the idea, genuine sciences – “lies”, still 
undisclosed, precisely in this claim. (Husserl, 1999:9) 
 
Quite simply, just because a university department calls itself “Social Science” or claims to be doing 
social science does not mean that it actually is. In particular we need to recognise that while such 
departments provide more opportunity in which to do science, science is itself not dependent upon these 
departments in order to be done.  
 
 
i. The practical possibility of science 
 
In the past a number of scholars have maintained that the possibility of science is founded upon a 
democratic society: Hook (1944) argued for the relevance of naturalism to democracy; McLung Lee 
(1973) helped inspire Students for a Democratic Society (Morton et al. 2012:11); Lloyd advocates a 
methodology that he calls historical structurism which is ‘radically egalitarian and democratic’ (Lloyd, 
1989:488); Merton (1973a) argues that under totalitarian rule science is undermined; Kalleberg (2010) 
argues that Merton’s norm of universalism is fundamental to both democracy and science; and Burawoy 
(2011a) equates public sociology with deliberative democracy. Indeed, there is a whole host of literature 
(mostly American) that implies that higher education has always been in the service of promoting 
                                                 
1
 This phrase is derived from Husserl (1970c:18).  
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democracy, John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) and Ernest Boyer’s “The Scholarship of 
Engagement” (1996) being two notable examples. Expanding upon Scheler’s scepticism on the matter 
(Scheler, 1980b:93-94), we argue that the relation between democracy and science is one of practical 
possibility and not essential possibility.  
 In order to show this we will return to the work of Merton as one of the strongest advocates of 
the relation of science to democracy. Take the following passage from his essay “Science and the Social 
Order”:  
[In totalitarian structures] incompatible sentiments must be insulated from 
one another or integrated with each other if there is to be social stability. 
But such insulation becomes virtually impossible when there exists 
centralised control under the aegis of any one sector of social life which 
imposes, and attempts to reinforce, the obligation of adherence to its 
values and sentiments as a condition of continued existence. In liberal 
structures the absence of such centralisation permits the necessary degree 
of insulation by guaranteeing to each sphere restricted rights of autonomy 
and thus enables the gradual integration of temporarily inconsistent 
elements. (1973a:266) 
 
The relation between democracy and science is also strengthened in “The Normative Structure of 
Science”, in which Merton lays out the norms of science, where he claims scientists now ‘recognise their 
dependence on particular types of social structure’ (1973b:267). We mean to deny this claim by looking 
at two of Merton’s norms in relation to democracy. 
 Universalism demands that all truth-claims be consistent with observation and previously 
confirmed knowledge. As Merton goes on to explain: ‘The circumstance that scientifically verified 
formulations refer in that specific sense to objective sequences and correlations militates against all 
efforts to impose particularistic criteria of validity’ (1973b:270). By this Merton means that science does 
not distinguish its results on the grounds of gender, race, religion, nationality, etc. Acceptance or 
rejection of scientific data is dependent upon its verification either by already established knowledge or 
further observation. This then also agrees with our postulate of verifiability. 
 Disinterestedness – so dependent is science upon verification by fellow scientists that they in 
effect police one another, promoting a disinterested attitude in one’s work (1973b:276). Merton sees 
priority in scientific discovery as one of the criteria of achievement but because this requires validation 
by a community of peers who themselves seek priority there is less room for cheating. In order to express 
this Merton speaks of “compeers” instead of peers which Gieryn suggests is to deliberately capture the 
notion that the people assessing one’s work are the very people one is competing with (Gieryn, 
2007:124). Thus in the interests of getting ahead the scientist needs to play by the rules of the game. 
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Merton suggests this is more of an institutional point rather than a personal one; the scientist is made 
disinterested by the institution he works in as this is the only means to advance within that institution. 
While this disinterestedness equates with the postulate of nonpractical knowledge, we may note, that 
because of his focus on compeers, this is not the purpose of science for Merton, per se. And more than 
Schutz, Merton also recognised the frailty of the norm: ‘To the extent the scientist-layman relation does 
become paramount, there develop incentives for evading the mores of science. The abuse of expert 
authority and the creation of pseudo-sciences are called into play when the structure of control exercised 
by the qualified compeers is rendered ineffectual’ (Merton, 1973b:277). On this we both concur that the 
Scientific province of meaning pivots around the maintenance of disinterestedness and when this is 
abandoned Science collapses.
2
 
 As recognised by Epstein (2007), the norm of universalism is particularly important because 
Merton argues that it is also to be found in democracy: ‘impersonal criteria of accomplishment and not 
fixation of status characterise the open democratic society’ (1973b:273). As noted by Kalleberg, this is 
the closest Merton comes to ever defining the norms of democracy which he notes is typical of 
contemporary sociology in failing to provide definitions of the concept (Kalleberg, 2010:195). But at the 
least it can, according to Kalleberg, be said that there is an “internal relationship” between the 
universalism of democracy and the universalism of science (2007:155). However, it is impossible to 
ignore the context in which Merton writes with the rise of Nazism. As Kalleberg admits earlier, Merton is 
politically ‘left of the centre, being antifascist and prodemocracy’ (2010:183). Throughout, the paper is 
an attack upon the state of science under Nazi totalitarianism, concluding that science cannot function 
under any form of totalitarian rule. However, as Kalleberg comments indicate, aside from the norm of 
universalism Merton gives no clear definition of “democracy” and even less consideration to 
“totalitarianism”. The definition of the latter has come under particular scrutiny and many would question 
if Nazism comes under this definition.
3
 We do not mean to put into question Merton’s analysis that 
Nazism undermined science, but rather draw attention to the leap that is made from this analysis to the 
argument that all totalitarian States undermine science whereas democracy protects it. 
 We charge that Merton is dealing with a reified understanding of democracy whereby he 
assumes universalism is a necessary feature. Universalism entails a non-racist and egalitarian State. But if 
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 A similar sort of argument is presented by Wiebe (2012).  
3
 According to Kershaw “Nazism” has come under the rubric of “fascism”, “totalitarianism” and “sui 
generis phenomenon” at various points in time (Kershaw, 1985:18-19).  
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we look at the earliest known democratic State, Athens, we see this clearly isn’t the case. Around the 4th 
century BCE when Athenian democracy was at its height the population of Athens was around 300,000 
and the number of citizens entitled to vote was somewhere between 30,000-60,000 and a significant 
portion of those not allowed to vote were women and slaves. In Merton’s context sexism and slavery are 
considered to be antithetical to democracy, yet the Athenians had no such problem reconciling them. As 
such democracy means something very different to two collections of people of different milieux. In 
order to understand Merton’s use of “democracy” in this context it is worth drawing on Kershaw’s 
observation about the term “totalitarianism” as ‘an ideological instrument of negative political 
categorisation’ (Kershaw, 1985:30). In Merton’s case we see the converse, the use of “democracy” as “an 
ideological instrument of positive political categorisation”.4  
 We will not seek to define either “democracy” or “totalitarianism” in this case. What we need to 
focus on is Merton’s use of “liberal” in “Science and Social Order” as synonymous with “democracy” in 
“The Normative Structure of Science”. Following Scheler we accept that “liberal democracy” may be 
beneficial to science but not that all democracy is “liberal” (Scheler, 1980b:94). By contrast, Merton has 
erroneously conflated “liberal” and “democratic”. By “liberal” Merton means the insulation of a 
particular group by the State such that it can operate autonomously. Following Scheler we define “State” 
in the following manner: ‘The state, as seen by itself, is simply the highest centre of the [ferhđcund] 
collective will, i.e., the will of control over a natural life-community (people) or a plurality of such 
communities’ (1973b:545). A State, therefore, is any group which auto-interprets itself (“as seen by 
itself”) as a monothetic unity that cannot be made the polythetic constituent to a higher level of group 
(“highest centre”). This “controlling will” is then directed to, among other things, ‘the preservation and 
furtherance of the well-being of the whole of the community, both within and without (administration, 
“defense” of the community against attacks)’ (emphasis added, 1973b:546). To avoid confusion with 
“liberalism”, we understand Merton’s use of “liberal” to mean “abstentive control” in contradistinction to 
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 This “positive” formulation of democracy has also occurred in phenomenology. E.g. Klaus Held has 
spoken of the Greek invention of democracy as ‘the novel and unique world-historical form of 
community which does justice to this authentic phenomenology of the political’ (Held, 1993:299). This 
use of “authentic”, meant to be derived from Heidegger, however contains a positive valuation that 
Heidegger did not originally ascribe to it (Heidegger, 2010:42-43). Held goes on to suggest that it is 
because of Heidegger’s one-sided focus on the notion of anguish to the exclusion of awe that he was not 
able to see the benefit of democracy against national socialism. He claims that: ‘Heidegger could not see 
the uniqueness still distinguishing liberal democracy of “rights of man” rooted in the Greek beginning’ 
(Held, 1993:300). A claim (much like Merton’s) that neatly obscures that the current “rights of man” 
condemns slavery, which the Greeks found perfectly acceptable.  
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“active control” by the State. That is, the State necessarily controls the various groups that constitute it by 
either determining what those groups should do (active control) or letting those group determine for 
themselves what they should do (abstentive control). Therefore when Merton claims that 
‘Democratisation is tantamount to the progressive elimination of restraints upon the exercise and 
development of socially valued capacities’ we can see the assumption that democracy enforces abstentive 
control (1973b:273). This abstentive control by democracy therefore insulates science. But turning to our 
very own democracy (Britain) we can see that in this empirical case the government does not observe 
abstentive control in relation to science. Instead it takes active control through the recently enforced 
Research Excellence Framework (REF) that determines the apportionment of funding to universities in 
Britain. We will explore this case in detail to show that democracy is not only unnnecessary for science 
(essential possibility), but it can in fact hinder it.  
 Under REF, universities present research accomplishments to acquire funding which are 
assessed according to an overall quality profile which determines the submitted work’s “originality”, 
“significance” and “rigour”. However, no definition as such is given to these terms, but for each profile 
there are three sub-profiles: “Outputs”, “Impact” and “Environment”. Within the sub-profile “Outputs”, 
definitions to the above three assessment terms are provided. Of interest to us is “significance”. In the 
Social Science division “significance” means: ‘the development of the intellectual agenda of the field and 
may be theoretical, methodological and/or substantive’ (REF, 2012:67). But this definition is ambiguous 
as to the locus of this significance: Is it meant to be significant to academia or is it meant to be significant 
to society at large?   
 In order to answer this question we must look instead in more detail at the “Impact” sub-profile. 
The generic description of “Impact” states the following: ‘The sub-panels will assess the “reach and 
significance” of impacts on the economy, society and/or culture that were underpinned by excellent 
research conducted in the submitted unit’ (REF, 2012:6). This is then further interpreted by the various 
divisions according to their intentions. In the case of Social Science, REF ‘wishes to encourage the 
submission of a wide range of types of impact outside academia’ within the spheres of ‘creativity, culture 
and society; the economy, commerce or organisations; the environment; health and welfare; practitioners 
and professional services; public policy, law and services’ such that the ‘beneficiaries of impact may 
include (but are not restricted to) community/ies, the environment, individuals and organisations’ 
(emphasis added, REF, 2012:68). According to REF, then, the purpose of Social Science is the postulate 
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of public benefit: scientific research should be beneficial to society as a whole. It is not concerned with 
work that is significant to academia alone: ‘HEIs [Higher Education Institutes] are reminded that impacts 
on research or the advancement of academic knowledge within the higher education sector (whether in 
the UK or internationally) are excluded’ (REF, 2012:68). This concern with society beyond academia is 
again emphasised later: ‘The main panel particularly acknowledges that there may be impacts arising 
from research within Main Panel C disciplines which take forms such as holding public or private bodies 
to account or subjecting proposed changes in society, public policy, business practices, and so on to 
public scrutiny’ (REF, 2012:86). This is finally summarised in the definitions for “reach” and 
“significance” of impact:  
a. Reach will be understood in terms of the extent and diversity of communities, 
environments, individuals, organisations or any other beneficiaries that have benefitted 
or been affected. 
b. Significance will be understood in terms of the degree to which the impact has 
enriched, influenced, informed or changed policies, opportunities, perspectives or 
practices of communities, individuals or organisations. (REF, 2012:74) 
 
We may regard “reach” and “significance” as expressions of the outcome that REF would impose on 
Social Science. While “Impact” may only account for 20% of the overall assessment our charge here is 
that the REF – as a medium of governmental control – enforces a postulate of public benefit which 
fundamentally affects the purpose of Social Science and overrides the postulate of nonpractical 
knowledge. 
 John Ziman (2002) and Philip Moriarty (2011) both raise concerns about this focus and changes 
to Research Councils UK (RCUK) and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
which is in charge of REF. Significantly, both appeal to Merton’s norms of science and both recognise 
these government structures as undermining them. Ziman sees disinterested science as academic research 
which is opposed to instrumental research, which is effectively what is entailed by “impact”. He criticises 
that: ‘Being normally funded by contracts rather than by patronage, instrumental science is so captive to 
material interests and commercial agendas that it is partisan rather than objective in its judgements’ 
(Ziman, 2002:399). Indeed, this ethical practice (as Ziman refers to it) is incompatible with the ethical 
practice that underpins academic research founded on the mutual trust that everyone pursuing this kind of 
research is being “disinterested”. In this regard the notion of “disinterested” is further unpacked by 
Ziman’s list of basic ethical principles of academic research: personal integrity, transparency, intellectual 
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sincerity, honesty, authenticity, collegiality, benevolence, and autonomy (2002:399).
5
 Normally, the 
corruption of these principles is attributable to instances of weres frailty, but Ziman warns, if we accept 
instrumental knowledge then the corruption of these principles will become habitual.  In short, the 
community of scientists falls apart.  
 Moriarty sees just this in the case of RCUK and REF which focus on short-term economic gains 
that are actively causing the demise of the scientist as disinterested. Disinterestedness is defined by 
Moriarty as the drive by curiosity: ‘[scientists] carry out their work not to “engage with users” nor to 
“generate impact” but to address a question, or series of questions, about how nature behaves’ (Moriarty, 
2011:60).
6
 To serve a client is to bear the potential applicability of one’s findings very much so in mind. 
It is to be constrained by the practical interests of that client. He further sees this as the loss of Mertonian 
norms in science and the death of academia in the face of an emergent post-academia (Ziman’s phrase). 
He goes on to discuss the Warry Report, Increasing the Economic Impact of the Research Councils 
(2006), which advocates that universities steer research in ways that will produce economic growth 
(Moriarty, 2011:66). This includes the contamination of the peer review process in which the main 
criterion becomes economic relevance. Further, he warns of the subtle shift in language that occurs in the 
report from “peer” review to “user” review. He also goes on to detail how the baffled responses by a 
number of universities over just how economic impact was to be measured/defined was summarily 
ignored by the research councils (2011:67-68). Worse still, in the case of “Impact” in REF, a petition was 
signed by 17,500 academics in 2009 to have the category removed from the assessment criteria, but was 
ignored by HEFCE. The full demise of academic research for Moriarty is made clear by RCUK’s tips for 
completing “impact statements”, which place an emphasis on putting outcomes, users and beneficiaries of 
research first and designing the project around them (2011:68).  
 The postulate of public benefit entails cohortativism: the purpose of “science” becomes to “fulfil 
the client’s interest”. In particular this has a significant impact on scientific rationality and the postulate 
of verifiability. As observed by Tittle: ‘the extent to which [the clients] want sociologists’ help, they want 
us to find evidence that supports their interests. But can this form the basis of scientific validation? I 
doubt it, unless scientific validity is no more than the ability to appease one’s clients’ (Tittle, 2004:1643). 
As Tittle further observes, this kind of validation ‘leaves the door open to two competing analyses 
                                                 
5
 In various ways these correspond to Schutz’s postulates of social science.  
6
 Moriarty is a professor of physics at Nottingham University, hence the use of “nature”. In this case the 
word can be substituted for the object of study of whichever branch of science we are speaking of.  
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coming to contradictory results being equally valid to one another. Publics rarely want to find the “truth” 
in the sense that looking at the full array of positive and negative evidence’ (2004:1643). Different clients 
will have different interests which then require different standards of verification.
7
   
 REF instils this mercenary approach in Science. Moreover Desmond King indicates that to a 
certain degree REF not only engenders cohortativism but also operates as the “client” too.  Studying 
previous iterations of “applied research” (fulfilling practical interests), King observes that as far back as 
1965 such research ‘might be politically unpalatable for the prevailing government’ (King, 2011:75). 
This brought about the creation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), a branch of RCUK, to 
oversee funding applications that in 1981-82 came under fire from the Rothschild Inquiry which 
questioned the “scientific” nature of the SSRC. King notes that Rothschild validated the quality of 
research of the SSRC and its research questions, as well as confirming its scientific status (2011:83). But 
at the same time Rothschild accepted a very broad notion of “client” for applied research. King goes on 
further to argue that since then “applied” has taken on narrower meanings and it is out of this restrictive 
understanding of “clients” that REF’s “Impact” was inspired (2011:85-86). As such REF approved 
research must also be “politically palatable”.   
 As Ziman, Moriarty and King’s arguments make clear, REF undermines the very scientific 
norms that Merton espoused. Contrary to his assumption democracies do not necessarily provide the 
abstentive control that would insulate science. REF itself is an instrument of active control that engenders 
cohortativism which through a postulate of public benefit replaces the postulate of nonpractical 
knowledge. Regardless of whether we are considering a “totalitarian” or “democratic” State, the 
insulation of science is dependent upon instruments of abstentive control.  However, we must not then 
fall into a confusion that the essential possibility of science is dependent upon abstentive control by 
States. The “insulation” of which Merton has spoken of refers to “institutional” science, e.g. science done 
by university departments. As Wiebe has put it more recently: science ‘could not exist without strong 
institutional support for the sustained critical reflective thought it requires’ (Wiebe, 2012:183). What is 
not considered by either Merton or Wiebe is non-institutional science. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Ch.6.iv. 
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ii. Science and institutions 
 
In pursuing an understanding of “non-institutional science” we mean to show that universities only 
provide practical possibility towards the pursuit of science. To do this we must first secure what is meant 
by “institution” in order to know what is “non-institutional”. For this task we need to consider groups as 
groups for which Schutz may not be ideal. Some have regarded Schutz’s phenomenology as being 
methodological individualism, a view perhaps stemming from the influence of Weber. For example, this 
can be seen in the way that the postulate of subjective interpretation is formulated in terms of 
understanding the “individual mind” (Schutz, 1962g:43, 1964k:18). In this respect Merton’s norms could 
be regarded as more holistic; his norm of disinterestedness arises out of the collective need for “fair 
play”. In another respect Schutz gave significant prominence to the role of consociate relations, face-to-
face encounters, throughout his work, leading to a focus on individuals interacting with individuals rather 
than individuals with groups, or groups with groups.  
 Embree has also pointed to this seeming deficit in Schutz’s thinking. However, based on 
Schutz’s conclusions in “Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility” (1958[1964j]), he 
suggests that there is an implicit but fundamental perspective in which groups can be regarded as 
individuals (Embree, 2011b:2). He raises three points in this regard. First, there are comments like the 
following in PSW: 
we frequently use sentences in which ideal types like “the state,” “the 
press,” “the economy,” “the nation,” “the people,”  or perhaps “the 
working class”… appear as grammatical subjects. In doing this, we 
naturally tend to personify these abstractions, treating them as if they were 
real persons known in indirect social experience. But we are indulging in 
an anthropomorphism. Actually the ideal types are absolutely anonymous. 
(1967:198-199) 
 
Second, we can suggest that holding a province of meaning involves being a member of a group. In his 
discussion of the stock of knowledge Schutz recognises that much of this is not directly gained by the 
individual but rather giefan by his fellows. As Embree suggests, this entails that ‘we always already are 
members of groups’ (Embree, 2011b:5). Third, though not always recognised, Schutz held that ‘the 
individual is the abstractum abstracted from intersubjectivity or collective life and, it would follow, the 
structure of the social world as a structure of individuals rests on an abstraction and is thus abstract, while 
intersubjectivity is concrete’ (2011b:5). Take, as one example, this statement from “Common-sense and 
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Scientific Interpretation”: ‘we preceded as if the world were my private world and as if we were entitled 
to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world’ (Schutz, 1962g:10).8  
 While Embree’s argument does suggest that Schutz did not commit himself to methodological 
individualism, he admits that his own subsequent suggestion that groups can be treated as individuals 
themselves goes beyond the letter of Schutz’s own writing. We can, however, develop an alternate 
argument to Embree’s by relating Schutz’s work to that of Scheler on groups. We have noted previously 
that Schutz accepted Scheler’s sociology of knowledge largely without qualification.9 
 Scheler’s discussion of groups is intimately bound up with his analysis of the Person: 
not only does everyone discover himself against a background of, and at 
the same time as a “member” of, a totality of interconnections of 
experience which have somehow become concentrated, and which are 
called in their temporal extension history, in their simultaneous extension 
social unity; but as a moral subject in this whole, everyone is also given as 
a “person acting with others,” as a “man with others,” and as 
“coresponsible” for everything morally relevant in this totality. (Scheler, 
1973b:520) 
 
This totality of “living with one another” has its centre which Scheler calls the collective person which 
can be contrasted with the individual person. Scheler describes the mode of experience of the individual 
person as experiencing-for-oneself and the collective person as experiencing-with-one-another. As Schutz 
himself suggests: ‘The subjective meaning the group has for its members consists in their knowledge of a 
common situation, and with it a common system of typifications and relevances… The system of 
typifications and relevances shared with other members of the group defines the social roles, positions 
and statuses of each’ (emphasis added, Schutz, 1964i:251). We may therefore qualify our idea of auto-
interpretation
10
 into “meaning for me” which belongs to the individual person and “meaning for us” 
which belongs to the collective person. In this respect the collective person is constituted by the co-
experiencing of individual persons and therefore possesses its own “consciousness-of” (Scheler, 
1973b:522-523). As the totality of persons experiencing with one another ‘the collective person with its 
world is not fully experienced in any of its member-persons; it is given as something going beyond the 
member-persons in terms of duration, content, and range of effectiveness’ (1973b:523).11 Thus, to call 
groups collective persons is to say that they constitute a “Here” that is not identical with the “Here” of 
                                                 
8
 See also 1962b:167, 1962h:53, 1962i:306, 1964a:22, 1964i:253, and 2011a:135, 169. 
9
 See Ch.3.i. 
10
 See Ch.3.ii.b. 
11
 In his consideration of intersubjectivity in CM, Husserl largely repeats Scheler’s thought when he 
speaks of ‘personalities of a higher order’ (Husserl, 1988:131-136). 
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any single member (individual persons) but rather is an external “Here” which they must occupy in order 
to be members.  
 Scheler points to a community of collective persons. We may usefully put this in Schutz’s terms 
of meaning-context. That is, a collective person as constituted by a particular province of meaning can 
find itself as a polythetic constituent to a province of meaning of a higher level. In such a case collective 
persons become individual persons in relation to a collective person of a higher level. As Scheler himself 
explains: ‘the collective person (apart from the concepts of it, such as state, nation, church) is as much a 
[ferhđcund] individual as the individual person’ (1973b:525). An example of such stratification can be 
found in the structure of Taekwondo: 
 Practitioner  
 Tuesday class  
 Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club   
 Central Taekwondo Academy 
 United Taekwondo Association 
 British Taekwondo Control Board 
 European Taekwondo Union  
 World Taekwondo Federation  
 Taekwondo  
 
Each level of organisation is the controlling force over an ever increasing number of practitioners 
creating levels of collective person in which the “we” becomes ever expanded. But running this in reverse 
this does not mean that someone operating at the meaning-context of Central Taekwondo Academy 
speaks of practitioners alone. Referring to a lower level of meaning-context they, as Schutz above points 
out, treat the Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club as a “grammatical subject”. In this respect they do 
not refer to a single practitioner or practitioners in the plural, but treat the whole club as an individual 
person.
12
  
                                                 
12
 The above example of Taekwondo also highlights other useful points that do not, however, further the 
current argument:  
 First, it is worth noting the abstractions involved. The list is taken from my own personal 
affiliation to Taekwondo and it is worth pointing out that not only am I practitioner at the Tuesday Class 
but also the Wednesday Class within the Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club. However, this may 
pose a problem if we remember that provinces of meaning on the same level of meaning-context are 
contradictory. While this is technically true it is only so in the sense that a person cannot occupy them at 
the same time. As both classes happen at different times I am able to attend both. But, if another club has 
a Tuesday class I would not be able to attend both. On this point too, so long as class times do not 
conflict a single practitioner may therefore also be a member of various clubs, academies, associations, 
etc. without problem. 
 Second, though not contradictory provinces on the same level of meaning-context are 
nevertheless conflictory. By this we mean that the physical strains induced, or injuries incurred, during 
the Tuesday Class render it harder to attend the Wednesday Class. Thus a practitioner may forgo the 
Tuesday Class in order to be able to attend the Wednesday Class. On a different level this conflict of 
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 Among those groups considered by Scheler as collective persons, he regards the State to be one 
particular type (1973b:545). And to understand the State as “controlling will” is significant if related to 
Schutz’s own comments regarding the individual person. According to Schutz our world is one of 
domination in that ‘we have an eminently practical interest in it, caused by the necessity of complying 
with the basic requirements of life’ (Schutz, 1962d:227). That is, all swincan is geared towards surviving 
and thriving.
13
 Both State and individual as persons share the same concern of surviving and thriving. 
 States, just like other collective persons, contain within them subgroups that are themselves 
individual persons, many of which are referred to as “institutions” in social science. But as Patricia 
Martin (2004) has pointed out, the prolific application of “institution” to a wide range of cases does not 
exactly make the notion clear. In the case of Schutz there are numerous references to “institutions” but 
rarely if ever do these comments give a suggestion as to what is meant.
14
 This would seem to be a missed 
opportunity as Martin lays the majority of confusion over “institution” at the feet of Parsons (2004:1253), 
whom Schutz butted heads with frequently.
15
 One may be inclined to therefore accept Martin’s twelve 
point definition of “institution” (2004:1256-1259). However, as detailed as this definition is, there is an 
inherent flaw to the entire scheme. If we were to replace every mention of “institution” with “group” we 
would find that no part of the definition would become problematic. That is, if institutions are a kind of 
group, it is not clear what feature on this list cannot be found in non-institutional groups or, considering 
its extensiveness, what feature could be added to go beyond an institution. This is made clearest with the 
third criterion, which happens to be the strongest: ‘Institutions entail distinct social practices that recur, 
recycle, or are repeated by group members’ (2004:1256). Based on this we can ask why Great Britain 
isn’t an institution? The State as an institution seems to run counter to the generally accepted assumption 
                                                                                                                                               
provinces can be more “ideological”. For example, alongside the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) 
there is at the same level of meaning-context the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF). Both 
Federations have differing rules and styles of Taekwondo, ones each regards as proper while treating the 
other’s as improper. Thus senior members will occasionally exhort members not to associate with the 
other Federation.  
 Third, following on from this point we can observe in Taekwondo a far more complex relation 
of provinces of meaning than the above list indicates. In particular we can note that the Edinburgh 
University Taekwondo Club offers both WTF and ITF classes. Thus the club is the polythetic constituent 
to two monothetic unities simultaneously.  
13
 See Ch.3.i. 
14
 E.g. 1962:10, 55; 1964b:70-71; 1964c:92; 1964d:108; 1964e:121, 134; 1964h:137, 157; 1964k:10; and 
2011a:177.  
15
 See Schutz 1979[2011c]. 
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that States contain institutions.
16
 One may counter that Great Britain can’t be an institution because the 
social practices of now are not those of the Tudor period. But Martin’s own definition denies this rebuttal 
with the ninth and tenth criteria: ‘Institutions are inconsistent, contradictory, and rife with conflict’ and 
‘Institutions continuously change’ (2004:1257). That an institution differs from how it was some years 
ago does not stand against it. And again it is unclear how this differs from non-institutional groups.  
 Working with our comments regarding States above, we could draw on Albrecht’s definition of 
institutions: ‘the principle structures through which human activities are organised and established to 
serve basic human needs’ (Albrecht, 1968:383). And at one point Schutz would seem to endorse this: 
‘There are, on the one hand, institutions of various kinds, tools, machines, etc.; on the other hand, habits, 
traditions, rules, and experiences, both actual and vicarious’ (Schutz, 1964b:70). But this functional 
differentiation is then countermanded later: 
Following the customary terminology, we use the term “cultural pattern of 
group life” for designating all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and 
systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, 
habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of 
sociologists of our time characterise – if not constitute – any social group 
at a given moment in its history. (1964c:92) 
 
In this case institutions appear to include those very things they were differentiated from in the previous 
quote.
17
 Even if we set this aside, the notion that institutions are necessarily functional is fairly suspect. 
Albrecht argues that Art is an institution and tries to justify this on the basis of “basic human needs”. But 
while Art may be very important to an individual person’s needs can we then broaden this to the whole 
group as a person? If we consider the collective person’s need to survive and thrive there are three areas 
that need to be attended to: production, new members must be created to replace lost members; 
regulation, some level of discipline must be maintained among members; protection, members must be 
defended from external threats.
18
 An institution would presumably fulfil one of these needs. How Art 
does this is less than clear.  
 Take another example, Sport, which is also widely regarded as an institution(s).
19
 Sport cannot, 
in this functional sense, be an institution as it neither produces new members for the State or protects 
                                                 
16
 This point is made by Berger and Luckmann who argue that States are made up of the interconnection 
of various institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:55).  
17
 The two sources are only a year apart.  
18
 This list is derived from the introductory comments of “Equality and the Social Meaning Structure” 
(Schutz, 1964i:229-230).  
19
 E.g. Kenyon (1968), Sheehan (1968), Gerber (1972), Alderman (1974), Ingham (1975), Edwards 
(1976), Gruneau (1976), Snyder and Spreitzer (1976), Messner (1992), and Anderson and Taylor (2000). 
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them from external threats. One may counter that it is a source of regulation, keeping people happy and 
so forth, but this is to ignore the rampant tribalism that occurs between fans of different teams such as in 
Football.
20
 Another counter would be that the amount of money Football earns contributes to production. 
However, not all Sports are so financially successful and such an argument does not consider the 
possibility that Football’s financial success is the result of it being an institution rather than vice versa. 
That this is likely the case can be seen if we draw a comparison with another major institution – 
marriage.
21
 On a purely functional level what is gained by marriage? It is not required for production as 
offspring can be produced in other ways. We may suggest that its serves a regulatory function through 
rearing these offspring. However, not only are there societies without marriage, but in other cases 
marriage is undergoing de-institutionalisation.
22
 Further, in societies that already have marriage as an 
institution we witness cases of single parent families raising successful members in that these offspring 
do not present a threat to the State’s surviving and thriving.  
 All this indicates that institutions cannot be defined functionally. Nonetheless, though Schutz 
never gives an explicit definition, an understanding of “institution” can be drawn out of certain other 
comments. One idea we need to draw on is Schutz’s sociology of knowledge as it occurs in “The Well-
Informed Citizen” (1946[1964e]). In many other places Schutz talks of “socially derived knowledge” but 
in this essay he also introduces “socially approved knowledge”: what I know is given additional “weight” 
if others I trust also affirm this knowledge. Further, if I giefe authority, be it to my mother or government, 
then the knowledge they possess also carries more “weight”. This leads to the following statement: 
The power of socially approved knowledge is so extended that what the 
whole in-group approves – ways of thinking and acting, such as mores, 
folkways, habits – is simply taken for granted; it becomes an element of a 
relatively natural concept of the world, although the source of such 
knowledge remains entirely hidden in its anonymity. (1964e:133) 
 
What we wish to emphasise from this statement is the idea of a “natural concept of the world”, a concept 
that is drawn directly from Scheler’s “natural view of the world” (Scheler, 1980b).23 As Scheler argued, 
there is ‘no universal and constant view of the world such as the “state of nature,” “idealism,” or 
“materialism.” There are only relatively “natural” views of the world integrally united with particular 
                                                                                                                                               
Meier (1981) is somewhat unique in pointing out that institutionalisation is not an essential feature of 
sport.  
20
 E.g. Taylor (1971), Harrison (1974), Dunning et al. (1986, 2002), Perryman (2001), and Moorhouse 
(2006). 
21
 E.g. Bell (1997), Waite and Lehrer (2003), Trost (2010) and Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2011). 
22
 E.g. Trost, (1978), de Boer (1981), Seltzer (2000), Cherlin (2004) and Shih (2010).  
23
 E.g. 1964c:95-96, 1964e:121, 1964f:206, 1964i:228.  
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social groupings’ (Becker and Dahlke, 1942:315). Thus, “natural” means what is “given” or “accepted 
without question” by a group (Scheler, 1980b:74).24 We can apply this to our discussion by suggesting 
that an institution is any group deemed natural by the State. That is, the group is “accepted without 
question” and even defended when put into question: institutions are protected groups. Even groups that 
do not fulfil the needs of the State (producing, regulating, or protecting) are institutions if the State 
actively tries to protect them.
25
 We will utilise the Old English “rihtgesetnes”26 to signify this 
phenomenological use of “institution”. 
 By consequence the ascription of “rihtgesetnes” to any particular group is entirely subjective on 
the part of the State.
27
 Conversely, the case of Don Quixote indicates the ascription of “rihtgesetnes” is 
not merely the prerogative of States. In his study of Don Quixote, Schutz points out that for the hero of 
the story ‘the institution of knights errant… is universally acknowledge and authenticated’ (Schutz, 
1964h:137). The rihtgesetnes of knights errant has its own historical basis, is a way of life with a 
particular goal, possesses its own legal and economic system and even its own cosmogony. But as is 
made clear from the story, though the other characters humour Don Quixote they treat it as nothing more 
than phantasy; that in their “common-sense world” there is no such rihtgesetnes of knights errant and all 
that is associated with it.  
 The problem this presents for our consideration is that no formal criteria can be laid out by 
which we can determine if a particular group is a rihtgesetnes or not.
28
 Nevertheless, groups can be 
marked out as rihtgesetnessa or not based on the way the State treats them through such mediums as law. 
That is, rihtgesetnessa are protected by laws laid down by the State and un-rihtgesetnessa are either not 
covered by particular laws or are subject to laws that repress them. In short, if we wish to identify un-
rihtgesetnisc science an easy way of doing this is to identify illegal science.  
                                                 
24
 “Given” is not therefore being used in our sense of “giefan”.  
25
 It is important to recognise the difference between protection and insulation in this regard. All insulated 
groups are institutions, but not all institutions are insulated.  
26
 Literally translated as “right office” or “right institution”. Derived from the conjunction of “riht” 
(“right” or “proper”) and “gesetnes” (“position”, “foundation”, “tradition” or “institution”). While 
“gesetnes” would be a more direct translation, the conjunctive “riht” better captures our intended 
meaning.  
27
 This point concurs with Klaus Meier’s (1981) work on the definition of Sport in sociology. He 
provides an extended argument as to why “institutionalisation” is inadequate as an essential feature of 
Sport. Based on our comments the understanding of rihtgesetnes can be applied to what he classifies as 
Sports but this is not a necessary connection.   
28
 Byrne has criticised those who would claim that all religions are a priori “masking institutions” and 
instead states ‘the notion that religions are masking institutions is to be proved, if at all possible, on a 
case-by-case basis’ (Bryne, 1999:257). We would make the much stronger claim that whether religions 
are rihtgesetnes at all needs to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis.  
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 For such an example of illegal science we need only turn to the Scientific Revolution and the 
debate over heliocentrism. Although Galileo was not initially censored for discussing the hypothesis that 
the earth moved and the sun was stationary, his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems 
(1632) had him brought before the Vatican Inquisition which found him “vehemently suspect of heresy”. 
According to Finocchiaro this phrase does not have the same connotation it does in current parlance but 
rather is the official categorisation of a crime: ‘there were three types of religious crime, in descending 
order of seriousness: formal heresy, vehement suspicion of heresy, and slight suspicion of heresy’ 
(Finocchiaro, 1989:15). Galileo was therefore convicted of having committed the second most serious 
crime the Inquisition could accuse someone of. As a consequence he was placed under house arrest for 
the rest of his life (a lenient sentence) and the Dialogue was placed on the list of illegal books. During his 
lifelong arrest Galileo wrote Two New Sciences (1638), and Finocchiaro notes ironically that ‘though the 
forbidden topic of the earth’s motion was not so much as mentioned, the conceptual framework and laws 
of motion he elaborated therein could be used later to provide a more effective proof of the phenomenon 
than any he had been able to formulate before’ (1989:39). Quite simply, Galileo’s science was illegal and 
yet he did it anyway. Just because the State or ruling body suppresses science does not mean that science 
does not get done “behind closed doors”.29  
 The point to be made of this is that science is not always rihtgesetnisc. Rihtgesetnessa of 
Science (i.e. university departments) only increase the practical possibility in which science can be done. 
Contra Wiebe, science could ‘exist without strong institutional support for the sustained critical reflective 
thought it requires’ (Wiebe, 2012:183). As such, in relation to the crisis of social science it is important to 
emphasise that this crisis is not a rihtgesetnisc matter. Our concern is not the protection of Social Science 
as a rihtgesetnes. The question then, is, insofar as science is rihtgesetnisc what condition is being met 
(essential possibility) so that time can be giefan to doing science.  
 
 
iii. The essential possibility of science 
 
                                                 
29
 Of course the problem is that because such science is done secretly, awareness of it is limited. Much of 
Galileo’s work was held in the Vatican Secret Archives and virtually unknown until access was granted 
in the 1870s (Finochiaro, 1989:42). 
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In order to discern the essential possibility of science let us focus further on Galileo. As Finocchiaro 
points out, being under house arrest provided Galileo with the very time he needed in order to write Two 
Sciences that would justify heliocentrism (1989:39). If we attend to what it means to be under house 
arrest we can note that it involves a lot of spare time. “Spare time” is defined here as any time in the life 
of the person that does not need to be spent surviving and thriving. As Schutz notes, we have eminently 
practical interests (swincan) in the life-world founded upon the necessities of life. Conjoined, this is to 
say that all practical interests are aimed at the surviving and thriving of the person. If the person fails in 
their practical interest then they risk their surviving and thriving.
30
 Hence the possibility of a person 
having nonpractical interests is dependent upon all practical interests being currently satisfied. If satisfied 
this leaves time in the person’s life for the pursuit of interests extra to their surviving and thriving.  
 This division between what we are now calling “swincan time” and “spare time” was partially 
recognised by Sartre in BN as the division between the “serious attitude” and “play”: ‘The serious attitude 
involves starting from the world and attributing more reality to the world than to oneself; at the very least 
the serious man confers reality on himself to the degree to which he belongs to the world’; and ‘The first 
principle of play is man himself; through it he escapes his natural nature; he himself sets the value and 
rules for his acts and consents to play only according to the rules which he himself has established and 
defined’ (Sartre, 2003:601). To play, then, is to ignore the eminently practical interests of surviving and 
thriving and establish a new approach to the world. Science, we argue, as the pursuit of nonpractical 
knowledge (a nonpractical interest) is a form of play predicated upon spare time. As Husserl himself 
recognised:  
The theoretical interest that comes on the scene as that thaumazein 
[science], is clearly a modification of curiosity that has its original place 
in natural life as an interruption in the course of “earnest living,” as a 
working out of originally effected vital interests, or as a playful looking 
about when the specific needs of actual life have been satisfied or working 
hours are past. (Husserl, 1965a:172-173) 
 
This theoretical attitude requires a turning away from practical “earnest living”. This point is made no 
less clear than by phenomenology when Husserl recognised in LI that the intuitions of phenomenological 
analysis run in an ‘unnatural direction’ from the natural attitude (1970a:254). This is precisely because 
                                                 
30
 It is the very point of Heidegger’s anxiety that the individual will always act in the interest of 
continuing their interests but must face that inevitably they will not be able to do this (Heidegger, 
2010:178-184). 
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we put into question those things taken for granted, things which allow us to pursue our practical interest, 
and un-invest ourselves in the world.  
 In practice too, Schutz pays dividends to the idea that science is predicated on spare time. After 
participating in World War I Schutz was granted the right to university level education as a veteran and 
went on to study law and economics. Afterwards he then went to work in banks as a legal advisor which 
he continued to do after moving to America in 1939 until the last two years of his life. As Wagner has 
pointed out: ‘When we discuss aspects of his scholarly work, we hardly think about the fact that almost 
everything he wrote was done in his spare time’ (Wagner, 1984:111). This includes the only major work 
published in his life time – PSW.31 By consequence of this it is necessary to recognise that science, and 
by extension phenomenology, is play understood as the fulfilment of a nonpractical interest. Nonpractical 
knowledge is a derivative form of nonpractical interest and as such we view science as no different from 
sport.
32
 Meier’s (1981) definition of Sport, for example, is predicated on a definition of Games. Building 
on the work of Suits (1972), Meier suggests that a game differs from “technical” activities (synonymous 
with “practical interest”) by instantiated rules that favour inefficient means to achieve the set goal 
(1981:93-94). This pursuit of inefficient means is, as Sartre suggested, to set the rules for ourselves.  
 However, three objections can be raised to the notion that the essential possibility of science is 
spare time. First, it is not clear how spare time is not a matter of practical possibility like State insulation 
and rihtgesetnessa above? Second, the claim that science is play seems to contradict the fact that people 
are employed to do science. Third, engaging in play is tantamount to satisfying “idle curiosity”, but it 
could be argued playing does in fact contain practical interests. We regard this third objection as the more 
fundamental criticism for it gets at not just the possibility of science but the very possibility of having any 
sort of nonpractical interest.   
 The first objection can be restated as follows: practical possibility can be understood as that 
which determines how much time is made available for a particular activity to be pursued. In suggesting 
that science is predicated on spare time are we not just speaking about another variable like the existence 
of rihtgesetnessa? It must be conceded that quite obviously the more spare time is available the more 
time can be spent doing science. But the difference between this and the above cases can be seen if we 
consider the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. As we see it, States and rihtgesetnessa – insofar as they 
                                                 
31
 That only the one book got published and the vast majority of his work was done as articles also 
testifies to the fact that much of his work was restricted to his spare time.  
32
 Husserl was working toward a similar point with science and art (see Moran, 2004b:180).  
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enforce insulation – are potential sources for the creation of the spare time necessary for science to occur. 
As we saw in the case of Galilieo though, these are not the only sources which have the capacity to create 
spare time. Thus if States or rihtgestenssa do not create spare time this does not undermine the postulate 
of nonpractical knowledge. However, science is logically dependent upon spare time because of this very 
postulate. Any “time” which is not spare time is quite obviously “swincan time” – i.e. time spent 
pursuing practical interests. But if science is attempted during this swincan time this would involve either 
a contradiction of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge or the redefinition of the purpose of science.
33
  
 This point leads to the second objection. The imposition is that Science rihtgesetnessa, e.g. 
university departments, have as their function the creation of spare time. Not only does the case of REF 
above clearly indicate otherwise but even without this, scientists who work at universities are earning 
money and therefore pursuing practical interests. This is in fact completely true, but we must be clear as 
to how it is true. Returning to the constituents of a province of meaning we need to understand Science’s 
relation to Swincan. As a province of meaning Swincan has as its purpose “the surviving and thriving of 
the person”. This then requires a methodology in order to carry out this purpose. What then is the 
methodology of Swincan? Considering the basic requirements for continued surviving such as food and 
shelter (Schutz, 1964i:230), the primary means in which these are achieved in many societies is by the 
accruing of money with which to buy them. Money, we can say following Heidegger, has the being-
useful-for surviving and is a methodology of Swincan.
34
 How then is money accrued? Again looking at 
the societies about us, the most common method is having a job. Jobs have the being-useful-for earning 
money. Science has the being-useful-for earning money which has the being-useful-for surviving insofar 
as it is treated as a job.  
 However, we must distinguish between the reasons for gaining such knowledge (interest) and 
the sort of knowledge produced (purpose). That is, science produces a particular kind of product, 
nonpractical knowledge, but any kind of production requires a producer with the incentive to produce. 
But to speak of “product” in this sense is to necessarily speak of “demand” which is to draw us from the 
individual level to that of the group. In the context of science being a job this depends on “paymasters” 
being willing to pay for the production of nonpractical knowledge. But the group as a collective person 
                                                 
33
 It should be recognised that as the sources of creation of spare time are dependent upon the situation, 
the “swincan time”/“spare time” distinction we have drawn is a formal division not always clear to the 
person in everyday living. 
34
 Just as Social Science does not necessarily have social science as its methodology so should we not be 
mistaken into thinking that earning money is the only methodology of Swincan.  
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also has eminently practical interests which will not necessarily be served by such a product. The only 
way in which paymasters would ask for such a product is if the surviving and thriving of the group is so 
secured as to allow time to be giefan over to such production – i.e. there must be spare time on a group 
level. 
 However, this is a tenuous transition, for as Seiwart notes: ‘it is unnatural to cultivate a 
discipline that demands leaving behind one’s everyday convictions’ (Seiwart, 2012:36). To pursue 
nonpractical interests is to go against ourselves, and though Seiwart’s comment is meant at the level of 
the individual person, it pertains to the collective person also. Thus if, subjectively, the collective person 
perceives itself to be “threatened” in any way then this tenuous situation in which an “unnatural” activity 
was possible will be lost and it will re-organise its constituents to respond to this threat.
35
 This is achieved 
by controlling the activity of its members so they contribute to the surviving and thriving of the collective 
person. The most effective means for doing so is through the control of the individual person’s own 
means of surviving and thriving. In States such as ours in which the surviving and thriving of individual 
persons is achieved through jobs and the earning of money, this is achieved by the control of funding. 
That is, through the instrument of paymasters (of which REF is one) the collective person puts funding 
into those jobs or areas of work that are most likely to contribute to its own surviving and thriving.    
 In order to further elucidate this point, we can turn to Sartre’s analysis of anguish and re-apply 
this on the level of the collective person. Anguish, according to Sartre, ‘is the mode of being of freedom 
as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself’ (Sartre, 
2003:53). The notion is drawn from both Kierkegaard and Heidegger (2010:179-180).
36
 Kierkegaard, 
Sartre observes, is correct in differentiating anguish from fear which comes from without whilst anguish 
comes from within. In many normal situations the two can oscillate between each other, but Sartre also 
maintains that there are ‘situations where anguish appears pure; that is, without ever being preceded or 
followed by fear’ (2003:54). According to Sartre fear entails ‘the apprehension of myself as a destructible 
transcendent in the midst of transcendents, as an object which does not contain in itself the origin of its 
future disappearance’ (2003:54). When I am afraid I apprehend the possibility of my own disappearance 
as the object I currently am as coming from an outside source. Wars, for example, recreate this on the 
                                                 
35
 We call this a subjective perception because it is a situation pertaining to “Us” – “We are in trouble”. 
That an out-group may say of the situation that “They are not in trouble” is irrelevant.  
36
 It should be noted that Sartre’s notion of anguish has a much more practical concern than Heidegger’s 
concept of anxiety (Spiegelberg, 1982:507).  
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level of collective persons: one collective person is pursuing the disappearance of another collective 
person either by destruction or assimilation. Therefore each collective person involved in the conflict 
faces fear, including the aggressor who runs the risk of losing. 
 Thus in the state of war which causes fear, the collective person reorganises itself in order to 
ensure its surviving and thriving against this external threat. Fearful of its own disappearance, the 
collective person loses spare time. Historically we can see a number of examples in which threats to the 
collective person have denied the possibility of science.  Merton goes some way to recognising this 
argument when discussing the universalism of science, he notes the following situation:  
Particularly in times of international conflict, when the dominant 
definition of the situation is such as to emphasise national loyalties, the 
man of science is subjected to the conflicting imperatives of scientific 
universalism and of ethnocentric particularism. The structure of the 
situation in which he finds himself determines the social role that is called 
into play. The man of science may be converted into a man of war – and 
act accordingly. (Merton, 1973b:271) 
 
The “structure of the situation”, the state of war, threatens the collective person and so takes away the 
possibility of spare time directing all constituents towards the surviving of the group. Merton cites the 
1914 manifesto of ninety three German scientists as such a moment when the wer of science becomes a 
wer of war, turning their science into a form of cohortativism. More famously we can think of both 
Weber and Durkheim who wrote strong polemics for their respective sides of the war, both claiming 
“objectivity” (Derman, 2012:26-30; Tiryakian, 1995:123). In this situation science is thereby for-
rihtgesetnesian (de-institutionalised). Even Wiebe recognises that ‘in periods of cultural crisis, it is not 
impossible that the sciences could be seriously curtailed or lost altogether’ (Wiebe, 2012:184). That is, 
university departments re-organise themselves to contribute to the war effort and cease to do science in 
the sense we have defined it.   
 Anguish differs from fear in that it originates not from an external source but internally. Anguish 
is the realisation that ‘any conduct on my part is only possible, and this means that while constituting a 
totality of motives for pushing away that situation, I at the same moment apprehend these motives as not 
sufficiently effective’ (Sartre, 2003:55). I realise in the moment of anguish that all that might cause me to 
take one course cannot in fact cause me to take that course. There is always the possibility that I may do 
something else. Specifically this takes two forms as either “anguish in the face of the future” or “anguish 
in the face of the past” (2003:56). Whereas anguish in the face of the future entails that I am faced with 
possibilities to which I have no determinant that forces me to take one or the other, in the case of anguish 
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in the face of the past I realise ‘the total inefficacy of the past resolution’ (2003:57). We may frame this 
in Schutz’s terms of provinces of meaning to say that in anguish there is a discord of the purpose of a 
province of meaning and my prevailing interest. In anguish in the face of the future I am faced with 
multiple provinces of meaning and realise that no one province is more being-useful-for than any other 
and in anguish in the face of the past I realise that some previously inhabited province of meaning no 
longer has the being-useful-for fulfilling my interest. With regard to collective persons, we may say that 
Democracy, Monarchy, etc. are provinces of meaning which can be inhabited by those collective persons 
that we have brought under the type State. In the cases of these States (e.g. Britain) we can see moments 
of anguish exhibited in historical instances of governmental upheaval.
37
 This takes the form of anguish in 
the face of the past in which the currently inhabited province of meaning to which the collective person 
ascribes no longer fulfils the prevailing interest. Any civil war may therefore be described as a moment of 
anguish of the collective person.
38
 With regards to the surviving and thriving of the collective person the 
opportunity for spare time is dissolved due to the inherent confusion caused by anguish. That is, without 
a province of meaning standing out as being-useful-for fulfilling the collective person’s prevailing 
interest over and above other provinces of meaning, time cannot be suitably organised.  
 Based on this distinction we may be inclined to suggest that the current economic crisis is a 
moment of anguish for the State. Certainly, it has no relation to fear as it is not a threat from without per 
se.
39
 However, this would not be entirely accurate. As we saw above, earning money is the methodology 
of Swincan which has the purpose of surviving and thriving. If the economic crisis were to do with the 
anguish of the collective person this would entail one of two outcomes: Either, through anguish in the 
face of the past the purpose of Swincan no longer corresponds to the prevailing interest of the collective 
person; or, through anguish in the face of the future a number of provinces all have as their purpose 
                                                 
37
 One can relate this point about anguish to a consideration of rihtgesetnessa also. That is, for-
rihtgesetnesian can either be the cause or the result of anguish. For-rihtgesetnesian as a result of anguish 
is in certain respects similar to the situation brought about by war. For example the Pilgrimage of Grace 
in 1536 was provoked as a response to the dissolution of Catholic monasteries in Yorkshire. In this 
situation the for-rihtgesetnesian of the Catholic Church in England brought about the moment of anguish.  
38
 In point of fact, Democracy as a province of meaning, particularly British Democracy, involves the 
rihtgesetnesian of the moment of anguish. Each election calls for the purpose of government to be called 
into question by making the populace vote for different political factions each with their own interests in 
mind. Such a point requires further elucidation beyond the space available here. It should however be 
recognised that no value judgement is implied by this. Anguish, as Sartre saw it, is a part of the essential 
structure of consciousness of freedom (2003:57-58). As Spiegelberg recognised: ‘Sartre’s anguish has 
nothing to do with cowardly timidity in the face of real or imaginary dangers’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:507). 
39
 The qualification is necessary because it can become a moment of fear insofar as “bankers” are made 
responsible for the crisis and removed from the in-group. 
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“surviving and thriving” and none commends itself as more being-useful-for. However, as the purpose of 
Swincan is surviving and thriving this corresponds directly to the eminently practical interest of the 
collective person; it is in fact the only province where there is a direct correlation between interest and 
purpose. In other cases the purposes of provinces may not correspond directly with the prevailing interest, 
thereby opening up more provinces as suitably being-useful-for. Quite simply, the being-useful-for of 
Swincan can never be put into question.  
 However, while we may not be able to put the purpose of Swincan into question, we can put its 
methodology into question. If earning money is the prevailing methodology of Swincan for our collective 
person then the economic crisis is predicated on this: As the value of money devalues it loses its being-
useful-for surviving. Similarly to anguish in the face of the past, we may say that the methodology of the 
province of meaning no longer fulfils the purpose of that province and thereby no longer fulfils the 
prevailing interest. However, as this pertains to methodology and not purpose we cannot say this is a 
moment of anguish. Instead we shall define this as malaise: there is a disjunction of the being-useful-for 
of a methodology and my prevailing interest.
40
 The economic crisis, therefore, is a moment of malaise for 
the collective person in which the methodology, earning money, has been put into question, thereby 
frustrating the possibility of fulfilling the prevailing interest. As in this case, the prevailing interest is the 
eminent interest of surviving and thriving and this entails that spare time is lost as time is redirected to 
alleviating this malaise either by fixing the methodology or discerning a new one. REF, as the paymaster 
in this situation, does precisely this by reorganising academia toward economic gain.  
 As such we may conclude the following: science as a job does not constitute a contradiction of 
the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. However, science as a job is a matter of practical possibility 
dependent upon the group’s surviving and thriving being so secured as to generate the requisite spare 
time in which such a job can exist. This does not mean, though, that departments of Science are thus 
closed down the moment the collective person’s spare time is lost. The title “Science” which a 
department may hold stands for nothing in our consideration. In this respect they are full of pseudo-
science but this need not just take the form of cohortativism.  
                                                 
40
 Properly speaking what has been discussed here is “malaise in the face of the past” and we may posit 
the corresponding “malaise in the face of the future” in which many methodologies presents themselves 
as equally being-useful-for the prevailing interest.  
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6. The Epistemic Status of science 
 
The previous chapter suggested that the essential possibility of science is predicated on spare time. 
However, we have yet to address the third objection – which is also our second challenge – that science, 
and play more generally, nevertheless involve practical interests. Previously we have pointed to a tension 
between the interests of the person and the purposes of provinces of meaning.
1
 A province only ever finds 
itself utilised if it can fulfil the prevailing interest of the person. Conversely, to utilise a province one 
must adopt certain interests. In the case of science this presents an especial problem because of the 
postulate of nonpractical knowledge. Schutz, having given primacy to the province of Swincan, suggests 
that we are driven by practical interests. But science, in claiming to be nonpractical, clearly goes against 
this. This leaves room for a doubt that finds expression in Husserl’s CM:   
Naturally we get the general idea of science from the sciences that are 
factually given. If they have become for us, in our radical critical attitude, 
merely alleged sciences, then, according to what has already been said, 
their general final idea has become in a like sense, a mere supposition. 
Thus we do not yet know whether that idea is at all capable of becoming 
actualised. (1988:8) 
 
Placed in our current context, Husserl’s doubt amounts to what we call the “humanist challenge”: As we 
have eminently practical interests that cannot be escaped, all “nonpractical interests” in fact contain 
implicit practical interests. As such science understood as knowledge for its own sake has never been, 
nor can ever be, achieved even in situations where abstentive control is exercised and Science does not 
promote practical interests. Ruggerone, for example, has criticised the fact that Schutz’s ‘notion of 
science remains an idealised vision which ultimately ignores its debt to worldly rationality, and hence its 
dependence on the life-world’ (Ruggerone, 2013:191). As such this essence of social science has no 
empirical validity. In order to counter this challenge and justify the possibility of nonpractical knowledge, 
we turn to a clarification of objectivity. Previously we understood objectivity to involve taking up the 
position of the object. Properly speaking, this is objective interpreting and it is necessary now to delineate 
a second sense of “objectivity” in the form of objective knowledge which pertains to our understanding 
of rationality. It is only by a reification of the latter in “science” that the humanist challenge holds sway.   
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 See Ch.4.ii.a. 
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i. The humanist challenge 
 
Returning to our comments in the Introduction on Martin and Wiebe’s solution to the failure of Religious 
Studies, one objection that we can raise is that they fail to give due credit to the tension between 
Wissenschaft and Bildung. The latter – as self cultivation – is closely related to the notion of “humanism” 
particularly as it emerged out of Sartre’s post-phenomenological phase. In the 1945 lecture 
“Existentialism and Humanism” (1973) Sartre claims that there are two senses in which “humanism” can 
be used. First: ‘One may understand by humanism a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as 
the supreme value’ (1973:54). This view is associated with Auguste Comte, and a similar criticism is 
found in Scheler who argues Comte has a concept of wer in which ‘it is never anything more than himself 
that he is adoring’ (Scheler, 1954:156). This form of humanism is thus closely associated with both the 
human prejudice and anthropologism. Sartre advocates, however, a second form: ‘Man is all the time 
outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, 
on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist’ (Sartre, 1973:55). 
Such an understanding is related to Bildung in that through humanism ‘man can realise himself as truly 
human’ (1973:56). 
 In other terms this has been expressed by Lowe (1959[1963])
2
 as the opposition between 
scientists and humanists. According to Lowe, each approaches theory formation and the question of 
reality in a different fashion. For the “scientist”:  
the only subject of study is everyday experience – not that mysterious 
substratum of such experience which ancient and mediaeval philosophers 
proclaimed as “true” or “essential” reality. And for the scientists there is 
only one method appropriate to the study of man, as to that of nature: 
detached observation, in order that the “facts” can speak for themselves – 
and all the more clearly the better the observer succeeds in cutting himself 
loose from the observed object. (emphasis added, 1963:153) 
 
Whereas the “humanist” responds: 
everyday social reality is subject to the flux of history, amenable at best to 
description but not to theory, that is, to meaningful generalisation. To 
arrive at such generalisations we must ascend from the kaleidoscope of 
experience to the realm of norms. It is with the “good society” that social 
theory is concerned. Hence it must not sever its ties with that domain 
where criteria are established, namely philosophy. And since the student, 
in studying society, studies the likes of himself, it is through his 
participation rather than his aloofness that laws of the social process are 
discovered. (emphasis added, 1963:153) 
 
                                                 
2
 Lowe’s comments are a response to Jonas’ “The Practical Uses of Theory” (1959[1963]). 
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While much can be drawn from these brief comments our primary concern is how Lowe portrays the 
scientist as concerned with the way society is and the humanist as concerned with the way society ought 
to be. Framed in philosophical anthropological terms each side poses a different question: the social 
scientist asks “What is the world for wer?”; and the humanist asks “how can I make wer better?”. Based 
on the way we have defined social science and phenomenology, humanism as “the betterment of wer” is 
antithetical to their nonpractical interests.  
 The cohortativism we mentioned in the previous chapter is one kind of humanism and concerns 
how the better wer is achieved. This corresponds to what Hearn has called the ‘blue-ribbon policy 
experts’, juxtaposed against the ‘red-ribboned vanguard party members’ (Hearn, 1982:407). This latter 
constitutes another form of humanism which we call imperativism that seeks to define what the better wer 
is. In contrast to cohortativist who works out how to achieve a particular goal, the role of the imperativist 
is to decide upon the goal to be achieved. The “existentialism” proposed by Sartre in “Existentialism and 
Humanism” may be regarded as imperativistic through its use of ‘existence comes before essence’ 
(Sartre, 1973:27-30). That is, by suggesting wer defines their own essence, this is to suggest wer decides 
upon the goal they wish to achieve.
3
 Of course, as Schutz suggests, with any type, the division between 
imperativist and cohortativist is a construct based on the current considerations and in reality we may find 
that they are one and the same person (Schutz, 1964e:123).  
 The divisions we are now drawing between “science”, “cohortativism”, and “imperativism” 
have recently been rendered in Sociology by Michael Burawoy’s presidential address to the American 
Sociological Association “For Public Sociology” (2004[2005a]).4 During the paper he made a fourfold 
division of labour of Sociology into professional, critical, public and policy sociologies.
5
 Professional 
sociology supplies ‘true and tested methods, accumulated bodies of knowledge, orienting questions, and 
                                                 
3
 It is for the reason that Sartre’s existentialism post-BN is humanistic that we have avoided drawing upon 
this later period. While certain of aspects of his thought are phenomenologically acceptable it is beyond 
our scope to justify this here.  
4
 The address turned out to be so important it was published in several journals: American Sociological 
Review (2005a), Sociale Welt (2005b) and The British Journal of Sociology (2005c). Social Problems, 
Social Forces, Critical Sociology, The American Sociologist and The British Journal of Sociology then 
dedicated special issues to it. Since then Burawoy claims that there are well over a hundred essays from a 
large range of countries contributing to what he calls the “public sociology wars” (2009:450).  
5
 We have not provided a parallel here for critical sociology. This is in part because of some ambiguity 
and criticism over the divisions particularly from British Sociology (Scott, 2005:405). Despite this a 
number have favoured the ethos of Public Sociology and produced work along that line. E.g. Beck 
(2005), Braithwaite (2005, 2008), Calhoun (2005, 2008), Ericson (2005), Etzioni (2005), Hall (2005), 
Kalleberg (2005, 2010, 2012), Sassen (2005), and Vaughan (2005, 2011). Most of Burawoy’s ardent 
critics have come from America in the form of the Strong Professional Program in Sociology. E.g. Boyns 
and Fletcher (2005), Brint (2005), Turner (2005), Smith-Lovin (2007) and Stinchcombe (2007). 
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conceptual frameworks’ and is in fact the sine qua non of the other three (2005a:10). In Burawoy’s 
opinion, as the dominant branch of Sociology it is characterised with being the “disinterested observer” 
and is thus equivalent to our “scientist”. Public sociology is the successor to the utopian aspirations of 
“first-wave speculative sociology” prevalent between 1850-1920 from which positivism and naturalism 
also stem (Burawoy, 2005e:158-159). As Buroway explains elsewhere, public sociology involves 
‘conveying sociology to a wide lay audience through sociological interventions that set a new agenda for 
the discussion of public issues’ (Burawoy, 2005d:71). That is, it is an imperativist discourse about which 
values should be promoted.
6
  By contrast, policy sociology ‘is sociology in the service of a goal defined 
by a client. Policy sociology’s raison d’etre is to provide solutions to problems that are presented to us, 
or legitimate solutions that have already been reached’ (2005a:9). Such an understanding corresponds to 
the cohortativism discussed in the previous chapter.   
 Also, like Schutz, Burawoy recognises a dialectic between public sociology (imperativism) and 
policy sociology (cohortativism). He gives the example of Diane Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger 
disaster of 1986 which was an imperativist argument accusing ‘the organisational culture of NASA as 
“normalising deviance”’ which allowed the disaster to happen (2005d:73). These conclusions then 
become cohortative when she became part of the government body investigating the cause of the 
Columbia disaster of 2003. Burawoy therefore notes: ‘The distinction between public and policy 
sociology is analytical – the one a conversation about values and goals and the second concerned with the 
means to solve well-defined problems – in practice the two are often closely connected’ (2005d:73).  
 The cohortativist, as so ably described through the medium of policy sociology, is hired ‘to 
solve a problem or justify an already given solution’ (2005d:73). Similarly to what we saw in the 
previous chapter, Burawoy warns: ‘policy sociology is all too easily captured by clients who impose strict 
contractual obligations on their funding, distortions that can reverberate back into professional sociology’ 
(2005a:17). Insofar as “science” is a job, it is at risk of becoming cohortativist in order that the “scientist” 
can insure that they get paid. But this means professional sociology (science) is undermined by the 
trappings of policy sociology (cohortativism). Another example is provided by Turner, an ardent critic of 
Burawoy, in the form of “social engineering”:  
                                                 
6
 Among the reasons we have not considered Sartre’s work beyond BN is that his work possessed a 
“utopian” (re. imperativistic) goal ‘to bring about a classless society’ which is necessarily 
unphenomenological (McBride, 2013:176).  
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I would not be so arrogant as to tell a client or the public what they should 
do to be morally or ethically pure (I certainly have opinions but this is 
different than giving advice or demanding that my opinions be the centre 
of public debate). My proposal is more modest: use sociological 
knowledge to solve problems that clients bring to us. (2005:40) 
 
This “modesty”, though, hardly defends science as Turner thinks it does. If the client has a problem to be 
solved there is no guarantee that this problem is one of nonpractical interest. Indeed, it seems highly 
unlikely that a client would pay out money for the resolution of something other than a practical problem. 
But this then means that the “social engineer” does not accord with the postulate of nonpractical 
knowledge. Indeed, there can arise a situation whereby the methods that satisfy one client would produce 
results totally unsatisfactory to the next.
7
  
 However, the humanist challenge runs deeper than the risk that clients may undermine science. 
As this challenge is understood by Natanson, there is a conflict over the question of “value” in science 
between those who advocate “commitment” (the humanist) and “nihilism” (the scientist) (Natanson, 
1963:19-26). Natanson asks whether social scientists can reach “objectively true conclusions” about 
matters of value and “the good” and if so whether this should be a part of scientific research (1963:352). 
As we have defined science, the response to this question is similar to the position of Weber: ‘it can never 
be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for 
immediate practical activity can be derived’ (1963:358). However, Natanson’s question presumes that the 
social scientist can pull back from reaching these conclusions. The humanist challenge, however, forces 
us to rephrase the question: can the social scientist reach conclusions about things themselves without 
making judgements about what is good? It is our charge that this is possible but this requires a 
consideration of the epistemic status of scientific knowledge. To demonstrate this we will continue our 
imperial argument by charging that the epistemic status naturalism confers on scientific knowledge 
necessarily makes it humanistic and therefore pseudo-science.  
  
 
ii. The epistemic superiority of naturalism 
 
                                                 
7
 An extension of this is that appeasing certain clients will render the mercenary scientist unpalatable to 
others. A point partially recognised by Wiebe who comments that getting funding from one source in 
Religious Studies can close down other potential sources (2012:189). 
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In charging that naturalism is inherently humanistic we are, however, faced with the challenge, as pointed 
out by de Caro and MacArthur, that due to naturalism’s “pre-eminent status” ‘little energy is spent in 
explicitly defining or explaining what is meant by scientific naturalism’ (de Caro and MacArthur, 
2004:2). A case in point is McCutcheon’s Critics Not Caretakers (CnC) (2001), in which the section 
headed “Naturalism” says nothing on what he takes naturalism to be. Indeed, as suggested by numerous 
scholars, “naturalism” is a term that can be used in several ways.8 According to de Caro and MacArthur’s 
the first naturalist movement began with the positivism of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, Herbert 
Spencer and Ernst Mach in the nineteenth century (de Caro & MacArthur, 2004:8). But “positivism” is 
equally difficult to define.  Whether an explicit definition can be given to either “naturalism” or 
“positivism” is dubious, but just as with “phenomenology” it is in our interests to be as precise as 
possible and highlight the shared constitutive claims of “naturalisms/positivisms” such as they are.  
 From Husserl’s perspective, naturalism has its roots in Galileo and the mathematisation of 
nature which prompted what de Caro and MacArthur call the “Great Success of Modern Science 
Argument” (2004:4).9 This position that only science gives us the true picture of reality finds its earliest 
expression among the positivists. Saint-Simon held the view that the study of human phenomena had to 
proceed along the lines of natural science, and suggested in Travail sur la gravitation universelle (1813) 
that all phenomena operate under a single principle which he identified with Newton’s law of gravitation. 
According to Gordon, descriptions of society in terms of “social physics” and “social physiology” in 
early positivist writings are influenced by Saint-Simon’s ideas (Gordon, 1991:280). Comte, as a seven 
year assistant of Saint-Simon, further developed his ideas and in Course in Positive Philosophy (1830-
1842) he coined the term “positivism” to mean ‘the laws of intellectual evolution which govern the 
development of the human mind’ (1991:272). Contained within this “positive philosophy” was the means 
to banish disorder from human civilisation, but as Gordon notes this was not conceived as either an 
ethical or political philosophy but as “scientific” philosophy. Rather, this new “science” – sociology – 
would determine the laws that underpin social phenomena.
10
  
                                                 
8
 E.g. Strawson (1985), McDowell (1994), Hornsby (1997), Benton (2000), Sklar (2001), Goldwag 
(2007), de Caro and Voltolini (2010), Smith and Sullivan (2011) and Scott Smith (2012). 
9
 See Ch.1.i. 
10
 Saint-Simon and Comte hold a difficult place in modern sociology even though it is from the latter that 
we get the word “sociology”. Instead many sociologists trace the founding of their discipline to the 
figures of Spencer, Durkheim and Weber. However, this raises more questions because of the above 
comments and there is a debate on the degree to which Durkheim, in particular, was influenced by Comte 
(see Gouldner (in Durkheim, 1959) and Giddens (1978) for two every different opinions). Gordon 
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 However, there is a friction between this Comtean understanding of science and ours, especially 
when, as Gordon notes, ‘from the beginning of his work, [Comte] intended that the new science he would 
build should be a practical one, having the same relation to politics as physiology to medicine’ 
(1991:292). This friction was felt particularly in Britain where positivism was to have its biggest 
audience. Among the many that started to draw on positivism was the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart 
Mill. This did not mean that there was a total merger of utilitarianism and positivism. Within the British 
audience, a divide was made between Comte’s positivism as a philosophy of science and a social 
philosophy. A critique emerged which led to the rise of neo-positivism, which was antagonistic towards 
this older version. In their definition of positivism, Delanty and Strydom provide six positivist tenets 
which any “positivism” may or may not adhere to. The divide between the two positivisms stems from 
one tenet in particular – instrumentalism: ‘an orientation towards the manipulation of the world rather 
than understanding it and, closely related, an instrumental view of theory as consisting of nothing but 
observations and nothing more than a tool of prediction’ (Delanty & Strydom 2003:14). Mill’s critique of 
Comte is rooted in his instrumentalist bent toward the construction of a positivist society. This 
instrumentalism is what we are now calling humanism. As such, in Britain Comte’s positivism failed to 
establish itself as a social philosophy.  
 Neo-positivism came to prominence through the Vienna Circle, including Moritz Schlick (1882-
1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), and Otto Neurath (1882-1945), during the 1920s onward. It has been 
alternatively called logical positivism or logical empiricism which is associated with such names as 
Hempel (1905-1997), Nagel (1901-1985), Anthony Flew (1923-2010) and A.J. Ayer (1910-1989). The 
positive or the empirical was no longer viewed as total, and the logical was introduced, marking a shift 
from inductive reasoning to deductive logic. Wittgenstein played an important role in this shift from the 
older positivism. He moved away from the older thing-event-fact model, to a thing-event-fact-language 
model (2003:15-16). This meant that logical positivism concerned itself less with things, events and facts, 
but with the language in which these are expressed. The focus became the logic of language, particularly 
the language of science which was supposed to be an ideal language that would map onto reality directly. 
As summarised by Carnap: ‘All statements belonging to Metaphysics, regulative Ethics, and 
                                                                                                                                               
suggests that Durkheim wanted to show his colleagues that Comte had been correct in two respects: 
‘society could be studied scientifically; and such a study, properly conducted could provide knowledge of 
great practical value’ (Gordon, 1991:441). As such he continued Comte’s positivism and is included 
within the “older positivism” by Delanty and Strydom (2003:18). 
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(metaphysical) Epistemology have this defect, are in fact unverifiable and, therefore, unscientific. In the 
Viennese Circle, we are accustomed to describe such statements as nonsense’ (Carnap, 1934:26).11  
 How, then, does naturalism fit into this? Another of Delanty and Strydom’s tenets is 
physicalism: there is only physical stuff and all mental and psychic properties can be reduced, in effect, to 
brain processes and chemicals. Significantly they also suggest that physicalism can also be called 
naturalism (Delanty and Strydom, 2003:14).
12
 In this case naturalism is an aspect of a broader positivism. 
Naturalism, as a movement in philosophy, however, seems to extend far beyond this single tenet. 
According to Delanty and Strydom, positivism was the orthodox methodology of the social sciences in 
the first half of the twentieth century with its strongest footholds in Britain and America (2003:13). 
Naturalism seems to have arisen with the demise of neo-positivism, beginning with certain key defections 
by Ayer (1940) and Wittgenstein (1953[1968]) leading to a virtual collapse in the 1950s. According to 
Kincaid, naturalism as a movement arose out of this demise (Kincaid, 1996:19). 
 Steel and Guala suggest there are two dominant “naturalisms” which stress the centrality of 
science to philosophy and the thesis that social science should endorse the methods and standards of 
natural science (Steel and Guala, 2011:3). De Caro and MacArthur, however, regard both to be a part of 
what they call “scientific naturalism” and call them the ontological and methodological doctrines 
respectively: 
Ontological doctrine: the world consists of nothing but the entities to 
which successful [natural] scientific explanations commit us. 
Methodological doctrine: [natural] scientific inquiry is, in principle, our 
only genuine source of knowledge or understanding. All other alleged 
forms of knowledge (e.g. a priori knowledge) or understanding are either 
illegitimate or are reducible in principle to [natural] scientific knowledge 
or understanding. (de Caro, and MacArthur, 2010:4)
13
 
 
The positivist tenet of physicalism is seemingly expressed through the ontological doctrine in that it is 
natural science which studies and uncovers this “physical stuff”. Writing separately, however, MacArthur 
                                                 
11
 There is an interesting parallel in Carnap’s claim in The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) that 
philosophy is the “logic of science” and Husserl’s claim in Formal and Transcendental Logic that 
philosophy is the “science of science”. 
12
 However, by their own account this may not be entirely accurate; later they then seem to suggest that 
naturalism has arisen out of the demise of physicalism (2003:368). 
13
 In an earlier version they call these “themes” rather than “doctrines” and also make the claim that both 
entail that ‘philosophical inquiry is conceived continuous with science’ (de Caro and MacArthur, 
2004:3). Quine has expressed this view: ‘it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that 
reality is to be identified and described’ (Quine, 1981:21). And more recently, Moser and Trouts: 
‘philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences’ (Moser and Trouts, 1995:9). On the broadest scale, 
then, not only should social science be dependent upon natural science but so too should all philosophy.  
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has suggested that physicalism is a component of extreme scientific naturalism (MacArthur, 2010:130). 
This “family” of scientific naturalism argues that not only should all sciences should be reduced to 
natural science but that natural science ultimately reduces itself to physics. By contrast, narrow scientific 
naturalism accepts that not all natural sciences can be reduced to one particular science and broad 
scientific naturalism accepts the same of certain human sciences also (2010:126). Based on their 
conceptions of science the older positivism can be characterised as extreme scientific naturalism and neo-
positivism as moving toward narrow scientific naturalism. Certainly the latter seems to be the more 
orthodox position in philosophy and social science. A quick survey of naturalism as it occurs within 
Religious Studies, for example, and its emphasis on evolutionary explanation would suggest that narrow 
scientific naturalism predominates.
14
  
 Broad scientific naturalism, however, points to an emerging critique among philosophers of 
scientific naturalism which has led to its counterpart - liberal naturalism. While there is no clear 
definition as yet, it would seem that liberal naturalism involves the rejection of the ontological doctrine 
and/or the methodological doctrine of scientific naturalism (de Caro & MacArthur, 2010:9). Within 
Religious Studies, for example, McCutcheon advocates methodological reduction in the study of religion 
while denying metaphysical reduction which corresponds to the ontological doctrine (McCutcheon, 
2001:x). And Martin and Wiebe, under criticism by Seiwert (2012), have also renounced “ontological 
naturalism” in favour of “methodological naturalism” (Martin and Wiebe, 2012b:67-68). However, as 
liberal naturalism can reject either doctrine the question arises as to what holds it and scientific 
naturalism together as “naturalism”. According to de Caro and MacArthur:  
What makes Scientific Naturalism and Liberal Naturalism both versions 
of naturalism is that neither countenances the supernatural, whether in the 
form of entities (such as God, spirits, entelechies, or Cartesian minds), 
events (such as miracles or magic), or epistemic faculties (such as 
mystical insight or spiritual intuition). (2010:3)  
 
Or, as Kincaid put it: ‘Naturalism is thus the belief that social phenomena are part of the natural world 
and accordingly amenable to the methods of the natural sciences’ (Kincaid, 1996:xv).  
 There is not the space here to give an exact history of the many divergences that occur between 
naturalism and positivism. Indeed, as made clear by one of Embree’s identifiers,15 the Phenomenological 
                                                 
14
 E.g. Sperber (1975, 1996), Guthrie, (1980, 1993), Wiebe (1999), Barrett (2006), Wildman (2009), 
Flanagan (2011).  
15
 See Ch.3.iii.a. 
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Movement has understood itself as a response to naturalism and positivism, with the seeming assumption 
there is little difference between the two. As we see it this constitutive claim of naturalism is synonymous 
with positivism’s tenet of unified science:  
Based on a series of assumptions – i.e. that the universe is a causally 
ordered, homogenous, one-layer world, that there is a basic unity to 
human experience and that we are therefore able to gain knowledge of 
reality and indeed construct a knowledge system about it. It is claimed 
that it is possible to produce a unified scientific language for all scientific 
disciplines, which effectively means that all the different scientific 
disciplines, including the social sciences, can be reduced to physics – a 
claim that in its extreme form takes on the character of an ideology, 
named scientism. (Delanty and Strydom, 2003:13-14)  
 
As we saw above in the older positivism of Saint-Simon and Comte, this notion was prevalent in their 
conviction that society could be explained according to the same laws as those found in physics. Neurath, 
speaking for neo-positivism, states that: 
The aim of scientific effort is to the reach the goal, unified science, by 
applying logical analysis to the empirical material. Since the meaning of 
every statement of science must be statable by reduction to a statement 
about the given, likewise the meaning of any concept, whatever branch of 
science it may belong to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to other 
concepts, down to the concepts of the lowest level which refer directly to 
the given. (Neurath, 1929[2003]:33) 
 
Similar statements can be found from other members of the Vienna Circle such as Carnap (1936[2003]), 
and prominent logical positivists Hempel (1942[2011]) and Nagel (1961[2003]). Thelma Lavine, who 
was critical of Nagel
16
 and may be seen as a proto-liberal naturalist, likewise claimed: 
The naturalistic principle may be stated as the resolution to pursue inquiry 
into any set of phenomena by means of methods which administer checks 
of intelligent experimental verification in accordance with the 
contemporary criteria of objectivity. The significance of this principle 
does not lie in the advocacy of empirical method, but in the conception of 
the regions where that method is to be employed. That scientific analysis 
must not be restricted in any quarter, that its extension to any field, to any 
special set of phenomena, must not be curtailed – this is the nerve of the 
naturalistic principle. (Lavine, 1944:184-185) 
 
And more recently Daniel Dennett has argued that ‘the central biological concept of function and the 
central philosophical concept of meaning can be explained and united’ (Dennett, 1995:185). Entailing 
that ‘all the achievements of human culture – language, art, religion, ethics, science itself – are 
themselves artifacts… of the same fundamental process’ (1995:144).  
 The full consequences of unified science can be seen if we turn to Wiebe and his comments 
about science in The Politics of Religious Studies (PRS) (1999). Wiebe’s argument is framed around a 
                                                 
16
 See Lavine, 1953a[1963a], 1953b[193b]. 
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political conflict within the academic study of religion in the form of ideological commitments that will 
fundamentally alter the way in which Religious Studies departments proceed. He proposes a “scientific” 
study of religion by which he means ‘the attempt only to understand and explain that activity rather than 
to be involved in it’ (1999:ix). This is in contrast to the encroaching threat of “theology” by which is not 
meant ‘a particular intellectual activity or discipline, but more generally it denotes any kind of 
confessional or religious orientation’ (1999:x). What Wiebe calls a “theologian” is a more specific 
understanding of a “humanist”. As Wiebe explains: ‘The discourse that establishes a science is not a 
scientific discourse, but that does not imply that it must be political in the narrow sense of the word; it is 
a discourse about methods for the attainment of a particular kind of conversation rather than a substantive 
discourse on behalf of a particular set of values’ (1999:xi). In many respects this argument is similar to 
our own but it is worth noting that for Wiebe this is a rihtgesetnisc problem – i.e. whether rihtgesetnessa 
of Religious Studies are populated by scientists or humanists. This is made clear when he summarises the 
argument of his book: 
If the academic study of religion wishes to be taken seriously as a 
contributor to knowledge about our world, it will have to concede the 
boundaries set by the ideal of scientific knowledge that characterises 
universities. It will have to recognise the limitations of explanation and 
theory and be content to explain the subject-matter – and nothing more – 
rather than show itself a form of political or religious behaviour (or an 
injunction to such action). (1999:xii) 
 
We have mentioned already that this theme has been continued with Luther Martin, as a “failure of 
nerve” of university departments to be truly scientific (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a, 2012b). Again, it is 
debatable as to how far universities actually promote the “ideal of scientific knowledge”. Rather, our 
focus here is on the idea of the “ideal of scientific knowledge” as Wiebe’s expression of the tenet of 
unified science.
17
  
 In Wiebe’s understanding: science ‘attempts to obtain reliable beliefs about the world; it 
attempts to understand the world as it is and to represent it as accurately as possible’ (emphasis added, 
1999:133). He thus associates himself with Weber who had the following to say on the position of the 
academic: 
One can only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity 
to see that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or 
logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is 
another thing to answer questions of the value of culture and its individual 
                                                 
17
 More recently this has been cast in terms of “scientific purity” (Wiebe, 2012:181).  
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contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community 
and in political aspirations. (Weber, 1946:146) 
 
Wiebe sees himself as making a similar contention regarding the position of the scientist in society. He 
proclaims that: ‘Those who see science as but another ideological structure have not understood its 
nature; they fail to see that what is special about science is that it concerns restrictions’ (Wiebe, 
1999:133). In this respect everything Wiebe has thus far suggested accords with the postulate of 
nonpractical knowledge.  
 However, as we see it, this appeal to unified science necessarily leads to humanism, particularly 
if we recognise a subtle distinction between the position of Weber and Wiebe. According to Weber it is 
the role of the academic to ‘determine… the internal structure of cultural values’ (Weber, 1946:146). We 
suggest in the case of Weber the attempt to discern the internal structure of cultural values is to 
understand the world as it is for wer.
18
 Indeed, it is from Weber’s original formulation that we have 
formalised the postulate of subjective interpretation. Weber’s concern is not necessarily whether these 
cultural values are “true”. He explicitly denies this when he says the academic is not to ‘answer questions 
of the value of culture and its individual contents’ (1946:146). Rather, he is more interested in the internal 
logic that holds a collection of cultural values together as those values for that group. Wiebe’s 
formulation of “understanding the world as it is” differs in lacking the crucial clause “for wer”, thereby 
proclaiming the world to be in certain a way and only in that way; a statement not made or endorsed by 
Weber. Because of this focus on the world as it is brought about by this ideal of scientific knowledge, 
science is a ‘different, and epistemically superior, method for understanding and explaining the world’ 
(Martin and Wiebe 2012b, 69). Or as Sellars puts it: ‘science is the measure of all things, of what is that it 
is, and of what is not that it is not’ (Sellars, 1956:173). And de Caro and MacArthur claim that ‘according 
to the most common form of naturalism, the image of the world provided by the natural sciences is all the 
world there is’ (de Caro and MacArthur, 2010:2). It is these claims to “epistemic superiority” that give 
warrant to Husserl’s criticism of earlier naturalism that it leads to a one-sided conception of rationality 
(Husserl, 1970c:7-10); they reveal that naturalism/positivism has ceased to be scientific.  
 
 
iii. From “is” to “ought” 
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 See Ch.4.ii.b. 
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Schutz calls the general view that expresses unified science the “monopolistic imperialism” of natural 
sciences (Schutz, 1973:49). Some recognition of this is found in MacArthur who points out that: 
‘Scientific Naturalism is itself a normative doctrine. Consequently, it is really a claim about how 
philosophy should be conducted, or what it should admit, from the rational point of view given the great 
success of modern science and its implications’ (MacArthur, 2010:136). But we cannot criticise 
naturalism for being a monopolistic imperialism in this regard; our arguments regarding phenomenology 
are no less imperialistic.
19
 Our issue is that naturalism goes beyond imperial arguments to colonial ones – 
i.e. extending beyond the province of Science. We propose that the epistemic status granted by unified 
science entails an orthodoxy of rationality: there is only one correct form of rationality and all other 
forms of rationality must either be made derivative of this form or rendered false. This orthodoxy, 
though, is not limited to the sciences but pertains to the entire life-world. Scheler had begun to identify 
this when he spoke of ‘the peculiar positivist idea of judging the development of all [werisc] knowledge 
on the basis of a small curve segment that shows only the development of the modern West’ (Scheler, 
1980b:148). That is, an orthodoxy of rationality determines what sorts of knowledge are valid for all 
provinces of meaning. This colonialism is thus imperativistic in that by knowing the world as it is one is 
by consequence determining how well people have appropriated this “as it is”. We charge that any “social 
science” founded upon an orthodoxy of rationality therefore engages in evaluative investigations rather 
than descriptive investigations
20
 and is therefore pseudo-science. Nevertheless, Wiebe would deny this 
humanistic element in naturalism and has supported nonpractical knowledge. Recently, he has decried 
McCutcheon’s call that the scholar of religion should be a “public intellectual” (Wiebe 2012, 187-188).21 
However, contra Wiebe, our charge is that humanism is the unavoidable consequence of naturalism’s 
orthodoxy of rationality.  
 To see this we need look no further than the source of Wiebe’s phrase “a failure of nerve”. 
Gilbert Murray coined the phrase in Four Stages of Greek Religion (1912) to indicate ‘a rise of 
asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of 
faith in normal human efforts; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference 
                                                 
19
 Though our phenomenological position may be more tenable on the grounds that it is not 
“monopolistic”; as we understand the term, this indicates that there can only be one social scientific 
methodology.  
20
 See Ch.4.iii. 
21
 Together with Martin, they also accuse the naturalistic work of Mark Johnston (2009, 2010), Wesley 
Wildman (2009) and Owen Flanagen (2011) of introducing extra-scientific agendas more appropriate to 
what they elsewhere referred to as Bildung (Martin and Wiebe, 2012c:619). 
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to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the soul to God’ in Greece brought about by the emergence of 
Christianity (Murray, 1912:103). The phrase was then taken up by Sidney Hook in “Naturalism and 
Democracy”: ‘A survey of the cultural tendencies of our time shows many signs pointing to a failure of 
nerve in Western civilisation’ (Hook, 1944:40). This failure ‘exhibits itself as a loss of confidence in 
scientific method and in varied quests for a “knowledge” and “truth” which are uniquely different from 
those won by the processes of scientific inquiry’ (1944:40). Hook decries that this failure of nerve has led 
to ‘intellectual and moral irresponsibility’ (1944:41). Speaking of the deplorable state of the world due to 
the Second World War he continues that ‘a scientific analysis of modern history – and I am assuming that 
history is an empirical discipline – reveals that the chief causes of our maladjustments and suicidal 
conflicts are to be found precisely in those areas of social life in which the rationale of scientific method 
has not been persistently employed’ (1944:44). Naturalism, therefore, is ‘the only way of reaching truths 
about the world of nature, society, and man’ (Hook, 1944:45). McCutcheon, taking up the phrase from 
Wiebe, then echoes Hook in CnC when he claims that: ‘One of the implications of this failure of critical 
nerve is that scholars of religion find themselves all but speechless when it comes to debating the so-
called religious contributions to be made to making decisions of relevance to the public concern’ 
(McCutcheon 2001:130). What we mean to show here is that McCutcheon’s argument supports Scheler’s 
own argument that rather than being epistemically superior to theology, naturalism shares a ‘unity of 
style’ (Scheler, 1980b:88). 
 The key difference between the “naturalism” of Wiebe and McCutcheon is that where the 
former is strongly embedded in scientific naturalism the latter has more in common with liberal 
naturalism. As mentioned earlier, McCutcheon vocally rejects any metaphysical reduction and favours 
instead only methodological reduction; a rejection that later allows him to claim that rather than being 
antagonistic, naturalism and postmodernism form a dialectic (McCutcheon, 2001:61). McCutcheon thus 
disassociates himself from scientific naturalism as something modernist and we could call his version of 
liberal naturalism “postmodern naturalism”. However, liberal naturalism’s rejection of scientific 
naturalism seems to be centred on a denial of unified science.
22
 What these criticisms fail to appreciate is 
that unified science is the logical consequence of what de Caro and Voltolini call the “constitutive claim 
of naturalism”: ‘no entity or explanation should be accepted whose existence or truth would contradict 
                                                 
22
 E.g. Strawson (1985), McDowell (1994), Hornsby (1997), Dupré (2004), Putnam (2004), Kincaid 
(2006) and MacArthur (2010). 
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the laws of nature, insofar as we know them’ (de Caro and Voltolini, 2010:75) – i.e. de Caro and 
MacArthur’s ontological doctrine. Because of this, Ram Neta (2007) has pointed out there is a dilemma 
in liberal naturalism in which it either reduces itself to scientific naturalism or ceases to be naturalism. 
The inherent problem of de Caro and Voltolini’s statement above is how do we know the laws of nature? 
Quite simply, these laws are those that have been furnished through natural science. Natural science, and 
by consequence scientific naturalism, set the limits within which these seeming non-natural entities 
operate: only entities which do not ‘imply any violation of the causal closure of the natural world’ are 
permissable (de Caro and Voltolini, 2010:78).
23
 By consequence we charge that the ontological doctrine 
(or “metaphysical reduction”) necessarily leads to humanism and, conversely, McCutcheon’s “public 
intellectual” could not make sense without it.  
 In CnC, as elsewhere, McCutcheon argues that the sui generis treatment of religion as a topic 
has resulted in a compartmentalisation that has isolated it from the rest of academia. By consequence it 
now struggles to define its position in those rihtgesetnessa. This lack of identity has resulted in a situation 
where it is impossible to know whether the scholar down the hall is a colleague or an object of data 
(2001:xiv). We have no strict disagreement with this contention. His point here is effectively the same as 
the one made earlier in regard to essentialism: it is a mistake of scholars to treat Religious Studies and 
Social Science as being on the same level of meaning-context. When this step is made, religion is 
separated off from the world and its mundanity is denied.
24
 This forms what Paul Griffiths calls 
McCutcheon’s imperialistic argument: ‘he thinks that when scholars think and write about religion and 
religions, they ought reduce what they study to “minds, economies, societies, classes, genders” (452) – 
these terms are, it seems, central to McCutcheon’s final vocabulary, a final that vocabulary he thinks all 
scholars of religion ought share’ (Griffiths, 1998:893). That is, there is a way scholars of religion should 
be doing things and McCutcheon is proclaiming what that way is. Again, we cannot criticise 
McCutcheon’s imperial argument, this is exactly what we are doing. 
                                                 
23
 De Caro and Voltolini erroneously label the second horn of the dilemma as leading to supernaturalism 
(2010:70). Neta’s criticism is quite simply why call it “naturalism” at all (2007:661)?  If there is no 
formal connection with scientific naturalism which she notes various other authors equate with 
naturalism in general why is the title retained? We suggest it is retained so as to grant legitimacy, the 
need for which in part stems from the fear that once one leaves the bosom of “naturalism” one falls into 
the clutches of “phenomenology” (here only meant in that vague sense of everything that isn’t 
naturalism). 
24
 See Ch.4.i. 
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 However, in taking up this “failure of nerve”, McCutcheon goes beyond this imperial argument 
in advocating that scholars should be “public intellectuals”. In particular he laments that the current trend 
of scholarship in Religious Studies (here he refers to America) is mostly just “translation” or “colour 
commenting”. As such: ‘When it comes to deciding whether and to what extent religious positions that 
claim ahistorical authority, wisdom, and direction are useful in charting the course of a public school 
curriculum, a welfare agency, or even a policy for war, translators have no voice and little, if anything to 
add’ (McCutcheon, 2001:131). The role of the public intellectual, for McCutcheon, is to assess how 
appropriate it is for religion to engage in debates on developing the “good society”25 - i.e. he advocates a 
postulate of public benefit.
26
 But in forwarding this postulate he has ceased to be imperial and started to 
be colonial. As partly recognised by Griffiths: ‘Along with McCutcheon’s views about what scholars of 
religion ought and ought not do goes a set of views, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, about the 
way things are’ (Griffiths, 1998:894).  
 McCutcheon goes on to say that: ‘Where they could be involved in studying the mechanisms 
that make cultures possible, thereby uncloaking the ahistoric rhetoric that makes its appearance in all 
debates, scholars of religion qua translators have instead opted for the highly conservative practice of 
entrenching ideologies and rhetorics’ (McCutcheon, 2001:133). He argues that instead of being 
translators we should be critical rhetors. However, it is at this juncture that he becomes somewhat 
guarded, shying away from the explicitly normative position expressed in the work of Chomsky (1987) 
and Said (1994) and referred to as “moralist intellectuals” by Karabel (1996). As McCutcheon describes 
the role, a critical rhetor ‘exposes the mechanism, whereby these very truths and norms are constructed in 
the first place, demonstrating the contingency of seemingly necessary conditions and the historical 
character of ahistorical claims’ (2001:134), a role that would incline us to think as full-force humanism. 
However, McCutcheon denies this: 
the scholar of religion as critical rhetor comes not to inform the world of 
how it ought to work, but explains how and why it happens to work as it 
does, making such critical scholarship a convenient resource to avoid 
when making pronouncements on the future of human meaning, the 
nation, or the world – claims that are either politically conservative or 
liberal, in support of dominant or oppositional regimes. (2001:135) 
 
                                                 
25
 Gary Lease asks a somewhat similar question: ‘is “religion” in any traditional sense still viable? Can it 
represent an adequate response on the part of humanity to the world in which it now finds itself’ (Lease, 
1994:471)? 
26
 See Ch.5.i. 
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As McCutcheon sees it, this critical rhetor is no good for humanism because they do not provide anything 
constructive. But surely in exposing these contingent mechanisms and historical “ahistorical claims” 
McCutcheon is engaged in a task no different from Chomsky’s demand that scholars should ‘speak the 
truth and to expose lies’ to those under study (Chomsky, 1987:60)? That McCutcheon is not deviating 
from Chomsky’s humanism is made clear in the following: ‘When compared to the moralist intellectual, 
however, the scholar of religion as public intellectual – and as publicly accountable intellectual – is more 
timid about making pronouncements on what these conditions really should be’ (2001:135). Even though 
McCutcheon may be “timid” in making his pronouncements there is still, nonetheless, the expectation 
that the public intellectual should be making such pronouncements. But this makes his position no less 
imperativistic than that of Chomsky or Said.
27
  
 It is once this imperativistic emphasis is engaged that McCutcheon begins to depend on the 
ontological doctrine he denied earlier. He rules out of hand certain entities as valid causes of events. As 
Griffiths also notes: ‘This presumably means, inter alia, that God does not exist; that what is claimed by 
the Nicene Creed is (by and large) false; and that what the Buddha represented as having said in the Lotus 
Sūtra is a tissue of mistakes’ (Griffiths, 1998:894). Or, in Hook’s words: ‘The existence of God, 
immortality, disembodied spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have been customarily interpreted 
by the great institutional religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they deny 
the existence of fairies, elves, and leprechauns’ (Hook, 1944:45). In endorsing this sort of statement 
McCutcheon thus makes judgements about how the world ought to work. This is clearest in his criticism 
of William Dean’s The Religious Critic in American Culture (1994) where he takes issue with Dean for 
studying Zbigniew Brezezinski’s comments on the fall of America as a world leader.  
 We should caution that McCutcheon gives no explanation as to who Dean is or why he has been 
singled out. This is significant because McCutcheon chooses not to mention that Dean at the time of 
publishing was emeritus professor of constructive theology at Iliff School of Theology. In this he 
commits the same “sleight of hand” that Ivan Strenski has noted of David Chidester’s work on Africa:  
In speaking of such a “particular science” Chidester would then seem 
deliberately to exclude observers like travellers or individuals with 
                                                 
27
 Said characterises the intellectual as an “outsider”: ‘It is the spirit in opposition, rather than in 
accommodation, that grips me because the romance, the interest, the challenge of the intellectual life is to 
be found in dissent against the status quo’ and ‘there is no dodging the inescapable reality that such 
representations by intellectuals will neither make them friends in high places nor win them official 
honours’ (Said, 1994:xv). By his own admission this view of the intellectual may in fact be due to his 
inability to ever secure himself a position ‘inside that charmed circle’ (1994:80).  
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religious or political ambitions – theologians, missionaries, or colonial 
administrators. But in reading Chidester more closely we discover the 
curious fact that he applies the description “study of religion” and 
“comparative study of religion” to just those sorts of persons pursuing 
deliberate religious or political agendas! Kolb and Mentzal were, as a 
matter of fact, then serving in the colonial administration, not in some 
early research institute or university. (Strenski, 1998:363) 
 
McCutcheon, like Chidester, provides no information on the proper identity of Dean and instead goes 
straight into highlighting how Dean suggests that a cause for America’s impending fall is (in our terms) 
“gāstcund illness”. McCutcheon opines that gāstcund illness is hardly a ‘useful explanatory category,’ a 
causal agent in this decline (McCutcheon, 2001:137). Why? Because such an explanation obscures the 
real political and economic causes. He quite literally corrects the cause. Rather than asking the question 
of why Dean, who is quite overtly a theologian
28
 and therefore someone McCutcheon should consider as 
a datum of study were he still being imperial, has made this argument, McCutcheon engages Dean at his 
own level. Even if Dean has appropriated from “academic theory” McCutcheon fails, like Chidester, to 
recognise that ‘with “metropolitan theory” having been “colonised” by missionaries and thus put to use 
by them for purposes of domination, we are back to theology and churches, and no longer in the realm of 
academic Religious Studies or comparative “study” of religion in the recognisable sense’ (Strenski, 
1998:364).  
 Our point here is that McCutcheon engages in a colonial argument of his own by criticising 
Dean’s conclusions at the same epistemic level. Having denied “metaphysical reduction” which leads to 
claims that ‘religion is nothing but … ’ (McCutcheon, 2001:x), McCutcheon’s criticism of Dean does 
exactly this by saying ‘religion is nothing but [politics and economics]’. This then begs the question of 
how McCutcheon is no less theological than Dean? We can find no grounds on which to determine which 
is epistemically superior to the other. There is a dreadful irony in the fact that McCutcheon proclaims that 
‘to uncover – and thereby challenge – the often occluded and disguised mechanisms that carry out these 
universalisations is nothing other than the consistent analysis of ideologies: the means by which slippage 
from is to ought routinely take place’ (2001:140). But the presupposition to know the “is” is itself an 
ideological commitment to ontological naturalism. As Griffiths rightly sees it: ‘the program of 
historicization and transgression that McCutcheon recommends (indeed, requires) of scholars of religion 
is not (and in principle cannot be) free from deep axiological and metaphysical commitments that give it 
sense, purchase, and power’ (Griffiths, 1998:894). McCutcheon’s response to Griffiths’ admittedly 
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 Scare quotes are not required.  
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scathing comments proves the point: ‘despite all of us having all sorts of pretheoretical commitments, 
aims, and motives, the truth of which can neither be verified or falsified, they do not all have something 
to do with intentional, invisible agents (whether personal or not) controlling the course of cosmic history’ 
(McCutcheon, 2001:146). Despite claiming that he does not wish to “lower” himself to the level of 
metaphysical discussion this is exactly what he does by calling these agents “invisible”.29 How does he 
know they are invisible? 
 McCutcheon’s position reveals that methodological naturalism cannot proceed without 
presupposing ontological naturalism, as Neta saw. But this ontological naturalism which makes claims as 
to what is necessarily makes ought claims. “Is”, as McCutcheon rightly notes, leads to “ought”. Wiebe, 
therefore, in also proclaiming to know the world as it is cannot escape this charge either despite his 
advocation of nonpractical knowledge. As we see it, this is a consequence of the presumed epistemic 
superiority of naturalism brought about by its orthodoxy of rationality. A point reiterated by Slingerland, 
who agreeing with Martin and Wiebe (2012a), decries the ‘cultural parochialism’ (colonialism) of the 
older Comparative Religion only to commit it when he claims that ‘the science of religion is certainly 
making inroads in more civilised parts of the world’ (Slingerland, 2012:615). This assumption of “more 
civilised” parts of the world falls into Scheler’s criticism of the peculiar positivist trend of judging all 
knowledge according to the “modern West”. All naturalistic “science” is little more than an evaluative 
investigation into how well (the “ought”) groups have addressed reality (the “is”) it assumes there to be 
based on its orthodoxy of rationality.  
 The problem that must now be addressed is whether this slip from is to ought is a problem 
peculiar to naturalism or something that pervades all science. That is, does all science slip into 
humanism? In order to address this we must return to the root distinction between Weber and Wiebe. As 
we pointed out, the difference between the two is that Weber proposed to understand the world as it is for 
wer whereas Wiebe sought the world as it is. Recognising this distinction between the two entails a 
difference in understanding objectivity. So far we have spoken of “objectivity” as objective interpreting: 
                                                 
29
 McCutcheon commits the same failure with Griffiths as he does with Dean. He does not account for the 
fact that Griffiths, as professor of Catholic Theology at Duke Divinity School, is a theologian in the 
proper sense of the term. (This does not, however, detract from his accurate assessment of McCutcheon’s 
position). Thus, when he criticises Griffith’s Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of 
Religion (1999), he is not attacking a scholar of religion qua “theologian” or even a theologian attempting 
to be a scholar of religion as he would have the reader believe. Indeed, that he does not give the full title 
of Griffith’s book where the word “practice” would instantly indicate an explicit theological project is 
somewhat telling that he may have been setting up a straw man.  
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understanding reality from the perspective of the object.
30
 But, and this must be emphasised, this 
understanding of objectivity is not unique to social science. What we suggest is that all sciences, properly 
understood, entail understanding the world as it is for X. What this X is depends on the particular branch 
of science being dealt with. In the case of social science this X is determined by the postulate of 
subjective interpretation. The fault of naturalism/positivism is to fail to recognise that any use of “as it 
is”, even in natural science, is really an abbreviation of “as it is for X”. Physics, for example, does not 
give us the world as it is but the world as it is for atoms or as it is for planets. Naturalism engages in an 
essentialism whereby the province of meaning of Science is raised to the highest level of meaning-
context – i.e. subordinating all other provinces of meaning. Contra this we need to recognise that science, 
predicated on the postulate of nonpractical knowledge, necessarily holds a low, if not the lowest, level of 
meaning-context thereby becoming epistemically inferior. As such no non-scientific provinces of 
meaning are derivative upon it.  
 
 
iv. Objectivity and neutrality 
 
In order to escape the epistemic arrogance brought about by an orthodoxy of rationality we must now 
clarify a second sense in which “objectivity” is used. According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann31 
in this second sense “objectivity” is taken to mean “possessing a reality of its own” (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966:76). Or, “true independent of the subject” (sic.). We designate this understanding 
objective knowledge. Naturalism appeals exactly to this sense as the possibility to “view the world from 
nowhere”. To understand the world as it is one must lose one’s position in it but at the same time not take 
up another position either. Contra to this, Glendinning has noted how phenomenology rejects a “view 
from the sideways perspective” (Glendinning, 2004:36). However, he applies this only with regard to 
social phenomena and admits that natural science can achieve this. We regard his argument as not going 
far enough and deny that even natural science can achieve the “view from the sideways perspective”. 
Developing their phenomenological positions we must qualify “true independent of the subject” and in 
doing so we can recognise the epistemically low status of science to escape the humanist challenge.  
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 See Ch.4.ii.b. 
31
 Both were students of Schutz.  
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 As we see it, “nowhere” and “true independent of the subject” are alternative ways of saying 
“true for everyone”. By “everyone” we mean anyone signified by any “us/them” distinctions we make.32 
“Everyone” therefore includes any hypothetical “thou” regardless of whether we respond to them 
protagonistically or antagonistically.  We say hypothetical because the “thou” does not have to come into 
existence to nevertheless be a part of “everyone”. As Schutz identified, all successor relations are geared 
towards hypothetical “thou’s” that we assume will come into being though, by historical accident, they 
may not (Schutz, 1962i:318). As such because this “thou” is hypothetical it is anonymous – possessing 
only the bare minimum required to be a “thou”.  
 This understanding of objectivity is heavily bound up with an understanding of “neutrality”.33 In 
order to be objective in this sense, one must also be neutral with regard to what one is talking about or 
else it will not be accepted by “everyone”. In a simpliciter sense Peter Donovan has defined neutrality as 
follows: ‘To be neutral is to stand in relation to two or more parties which are themselves in tension, in 
such a way that the respective interests of those parties are not thereby materially affected’ (Donovan, 
1999:235). This definition of neutrality, however, reveals it to be a relational concept, the “would-be 
neutral” is always what Sartre called the “Third” (Sartre, 2003:437). Donovan identifies three modes of 
neutrality based on this relational criterion (Donovan, 1999:235-239). However, “neutrality” as it is used 
above and in one of his own modes does not depend on this relational criterion and we see that there are 
four different forms of neutrality in Donovan’s scheme. Of these, only two concern us here: 
 Neutrality as “designated role”. Of this role-neutrality Donovan suggests that ‘would-be neutrals 
have a defined contribution to make, a role to play’ (1999:238). Examples of this kind are referees in 
sport contests. The referee is a part of the situation who enforces the pre-agreed conditions of the 
opposing parties that ensure “fair play”. The key aspect of this is that the conditions of “fair play” have 
been agreed upon by opponents.  
 Neutrality as “disinterestedness”. This form of neutrality is our addition to Donovan’s 
classifications based on two criticisms he provides of observer-neutrality
34
: observer-bias, the observer is 
limited by both their location and frame of mind; and observer-incomprehension, the observer may miss 
                                                 
32
 “Everyone” is here taken from Schutz (1970d:53, 57). This use originally stems from Husserl’s in CM 
(1988:92-99). In Crisis Husserl also uses “all of us” (1970c:182-183). 
33
 E.g. Wach (1958), Nagel (1961[2011]), Smart (1973), Wiebe (1999), McCutcheon (2001), Jensen 
(2011), and Neitz (2011).  
34
 We would prefer to call this form of neutrality abstentive-neutrality and we have already partially 
covered this in our discussion of States and “abstentive control” (see Ch.5.ii).  
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the most significant aspect of the event. But bias and incomprehension are not just problems of observers 
and any activity can be affected by them. Rather, they have everything to do with the interpretive 
framework used by the person. In the case of observations, the observed may never be privy to these 
interpretations. Thus, we call this addition reflexive-neutrality: a reflexive activity that attempts to 
mitigate interpretative bias and incomprehension in any form of acting.  
 Objectivity as objective knowledge is underpinned by reflexive-neutrality. That is, “true for 
everyone” (objectivity) is assumed to also mean “acceptable by everyone” (neutrality). Despite 
Donovan’s claims, it is non-relational in the sense that because it applies to “everyone” it is therefore 
context invariant. If a particular claim is shown to suffer from bias and/or incomprehension this entails 
that it is not “true for everyone” as the claim would not be accepted by those who do not share the 
bias/incomprehension. In this understanding objectivity and neutrality are synonymous. This differs from 
the understanding of objectivity as objective interpreting which requires reflexive-neutrality but is not 
synonymous with it. One can be reflexive-neutral without understanding the world as it is for X.  
 We can demonstrate this point by noting that role-neutrality requires reflexive-neutrality. If I am 
the referee in a Taekwondo match I am expected to enforce certain rules to ensure a “fair” match. This is 
clearly role-neutrality because I act as a Third in the contestation of two other parties. But being a referee 
requires a level of reflexive-neutrality in a number of ways: 
1. Article 14.5.1 of the rule book states that ‘Lifting the knee to avoid attack or impede the 
progress of an attack’ will result in a kyongo penalty (half point deduction) (WTF, 2012:26). I 
may regard lifting the knee a valid defence – this is their bias – but if I wish to continue as a 
referee they must enforce this rule or it may be perceived that I am not fulfilling this role. Added 
to this, the player may have lifted their knee for any number of reasons – their knee may have 
locked mid-kick – but these are irrelevant to the application of the rule. 
2. Similarly, according to article 3.4 a coach is not allowed to leave their designated seat. Leaving 
their seat is covered by articles 14.5.1 that ‘Uttering undesirable remarks or any misconduct on 
the part of a contestant or coach’ will result in a kyongo and 14.5.2 ‘A coach or a contestant 
interrupting the progress of the match’ will result in a gam-jeom (full point deduction) (WTF, 
2012:26). Depending on the manner in which they leave their seat it is at my discretion to apply 
a kyongo or a gam-jeom. This, as was pointed out during training, is irrelevant to the intentions 
of the coach. The coach may be trying to get my attention because they have missed a foul 
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against their player. This is a legitimate reason to call for attention but this is not reason to leave 
their seat. But here I must avoid incomprehension by either failing to enforce a penalty where a 
penalty is due (they allow themselve to be swayed by the coach’s legitimate concern) or I am too 
harsh applying a gam-jeom when only a kyongo was appropriate (they left their seat but did not 
step into the ring).  
In both cases my being “objective/neutral” does not require me to understand the situation as it is for 
player/coach. In fact, in this case of being a referee, trying to understand the situation as it is for the 
player/coach would not only slow proceedings down but would undermine my ability to referee.  
 Following Berger and Luckmann, this understanding of “objectivity” is produced and 
constructed by werisc activity. They call this objectivation: ‘the process by which the externalised 
products of human activity attain the character of objectivity’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:78). They 
are, however, quick to point out that this objectivity ‘does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart 
from the human activity that produces it’ (1966:78). This is the naturalist claim. Rather, this 
understanding of objectivity can be summarised by the phrase “this is how things are done”. Based on 
their phrasing it would be more accurate to say that objective knowledge is the product of meeting a 
rational standard determined by the postulate of verifiability in terms of what a particular in-group 
deems as rational, that is, the appropriate means for fulfilling a given end. In other words, objective 
knowledge is brought about by complying with the rules of verification within a particular mode of 
rationality that group members are expected to meet. Indeed, this equivocation is found in an early draft 
of Schutz’s “Concept and Theory Formation”: ‘the social sciences too have to be objective in this sense, 
if by objectivity it is understood that all scientific propositions are subject to verification or recitification 
by fellow scientists’ (Schutz, 2004:124). 
 Based on our previous discussion about objective and subjective interpretations, it is important 
to highlight how the word “objective” can be maintained in this regard.35 Previously, we noted that the 
postulate of verifiability in reference to scientific rationality is what points to the communal aspect of 
science. The postulate can only be met if it is assumed that there is some Other – belonging to the in-
group of scientists – to do the verification. We must emphasise that “I” do not decide that my work is 
verified but “they” do. For example, it is common practice that any submission to a journal undergoes 
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 See Ch.4.ii.b. 
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blind peer review by at least two reviewers.
36
 The fact that these reviews are “blind” is useful for 
highlighting the point we wish to make.
37
 The reviewers belong to an in-group, broadly speaking the 
scientific community, to which the author of the work, because of their anonymity, becomes an outsider. 
The reviewers in question have no way of knowing whether the author is a completely new scholar or 
someone who has previously been accepted into the in-group already. In this respect the author through 
their submitted work is a candidate, a particular kind of out-group which seeks to join the in-group. On 
this point it is worth emphasising that the reviewer is not a case of role-neutrality, in this situation there 
are only two parties involved. Thus, the task of the reviewer is as follows: ‘By the operation of his system 
of typifications and relevances he subsumes individuals showing certain particular characteristics and 
traits under a social category that is homogenous merely from his, the [insider’s], point of view’ (Schutz, 
1964i:255). The reviewer must decide whether the candidate meets the rational standard which 
determines membership to his in-group. This requires reflexive-neutrality on the part of the reviewer in 
both a forced and enforced sense. It is forced because the reviewer must know how to apply the rational 
standard avoiding incomprehension, and it is enforced because they are unaware of the identity of the 
candidate avoiding bias. Whenever this standard is appealed to, therefore, a process occurs whereby the 
verifee’s membership in the in-group is temporarily put into question during the verification process.  
 We call this rational standard “objective” because the verifee must occupy the group’s position. 
Thus, as noted earlier, the group as a collective person is a single grammatical subject and has its own 
“Here” to be occupied by members.38 Whenever a person wishes to be a part of a group they must apply 
themselves to that group’s rational standard. This requires reflexive-neutrality because bias and 
incomprehension threaten group membership. But as the above example of the taekwondo referee 
indicates, neither the rational standard nor reflexive-neutrality are the exclusive rights of science.  
 In this sense “objective” and “neutral” become bywords for complying with group norms – i.e. 
professionalism. To say a scientist has produced objective knowledge is to say no more than that they 
have met the agreed upon rational standard that makes the scientist a scientist. That is, being objective 
involves complying with a set of rules laid down by the rest of the group. The referee, insofar as their 
role-neutrality requires reflexive-neutrality, is a case in point. They do not create the rules which they 
                                                 
36
 We are dealing here with an abstracted “ideal” case.  
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 Of course in certain situations it is impossible to have “blind” reviews, e.g. when Taekwondo referees 
assess another referee.  
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 See Ch.5.ii. 
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enforce during a match. Instead, how well they enforce the rules determines how professional they are. 
Recognising this point allows us to return to the humanist challenge. In the case of naturalism, because of 
the orthodoxy of rationality the rational standard that applies to science is essentialised so that it becomes 
the rational standard for all provinces of meaning. Though we said objective knowledge entailed the 
claim “true for everyone” where “everyone” includes any hypothetical “thou”, this is only the case if we 
accept the objective knowledge produced by objective interpreting is presumed to be the only form of 
objective knowledge. What must be recognised is that objectivity in the sense of objective interpreting 
pertains to the postulate of nonpractical knowledge and as such is part of what makes science “science”. 
By contrast, objectivity understood as meeting a rational standard pertains to the postulate of verifiability 
and therefore is part of the rationality of any province of meaning not just Science. The epistemic 
arrogance of naturalism consists in treating the objective knowledge produced by science as objective 
knowledge for all provinces of meaning. By doing this it cannot avoid making “ought” claims 
(humanism) as the categories, or ideal types, of science are imposed upon other provinces of meaning.   
 Phenomenology in recognising science to be a form of play, however, recognises that as a 
nonpractical interest science is easily abandoned when practical interests arise. Provinces of meaning are 
arranged by the groups that utilise them in order of superiority and inferiority (Schtuz, 1964i:241). This 
hierarchy of meaning-context is determined by what the group constitute surviving and thriving to be. A 
consequence of this, not fully explicated by Schutz, is that the valuations of a superior province can 
override the valuations of an inferior province. This is so because the knowledge of superior provinces is 
more “taken for granted” due to their importance for the group’s surviving and thriving. As a form of 
play, science is epistemically inferior in that other superior provinces must be safeguarded before it can 
be pursued. Further, as the postulate of nonpractical interest can make other forms of play an object of 
study, science will always remove itself to a lower level of meaning-context. It thus avoids “ought” 
claims because there are no provinces below Science to which its objective knowledge can then be 
applied. Only by this recognition can the humanist challenge be avoided. However, three concessions 
must be made.  
 First, the humanist challenge is not, in fact, totally defeated and nor can it be. By this we mean 
that any discussion of how science is to go about its business is a normative discussion that is filled with 
“ought” claims. Both von Stuckrad and Wiebe have pointed out that the discussion that establishes 
science is not necessarily scientific (von Stuckrad, 2012:36; Wiebe, 2012:184-186). This is imperialism 
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in that these “ought” claims only have validity within the sphere of science. Here it is useful to draw on 
Schutz’s discussion of the notion of equality: ‘Equality and inequality in this sense refer to various 
degrees of excellence in performance, achievement, and status – but only of homogenous elements, that 
is, only elements belonging to the same domain of relevances are comparable in this respect’ (Schutz, 
1964i:239-240). The equality of objects, according to Schutz, can only be properly determined if those 
objects are within the same domain of relevance (province of meaning). Thus the scientist can only 
justifiably evaluate those objects that belong to the province of Science. This is exactly what we are 
doing with our phenomenological analysis. Thus, as Schutz goes on to say, ‘that which is comparable in 
terms of the system of one domain is not comparable in terms of other systems’ (1964i:240). While the 
normative claims of our phenomenological position apply within the province of Social Science, these 
“ought” claims should not translate into other provinces.  
 Second, the use of “should” above highlights another need for clarification. Contra Hook, it is 
not the purpose of science to remedy “intellectual and moral irresponsibility”. Indeed, due to its inferior 
epistemic status it cannot speak of the “irresponsibility” of other provinces. However, we must, as 
recognised by Strenski, admit a risk of colonialism. By this we mean that purely scientific categories 
(ideal types) can be taken up and forced upon the object of study such that the object adopts them for its 
own. Schutz recognises something similar when he discusses the difference between in-group and out-
group interpretations. He notes that based on the way a particular out-group views it (hetero-interpreting), 
the in-group may begin to adopt those views as their own (auto-interpreting) (1964i:247). In the case of 
science this colonialism can occur simply by making the findings/results of analysis publicly accessible 
and without any volitional act on the part of the scientist themselves. As Strenski noted in the case of 
Chidester, the findings and theories of science can be co-opted by other groups. Such is the risk of 
science: the products of science, nonpractical knowledge, are useable in that they can have the being-
useful-for fulfilling practical interests.  
 Simply, once scientific knowledge is produced it becomes part of our (both the individual 
person and the collective person so far as this knowledge is shared) overall stock of knowledge and 
therefore available for use by other provinces of meaning. In this respect, the findings of science are 
naturalised in that they become taken for granted not only by scientists themselves but non-scientists also. 
Again, we can turn to Galileo and heliocentrism as a case in point. That the earth revolves around the sun 
is now taken for granted by “Europeans”.  
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 Third, while the knowledge produced by science is useable, any scientist who construes their 
knowledge as useful is actively engaging in colonialism and ceases to be scientific. They become a 
humanist. A survey of “scientific” literature to sift out useful from useable knowledge would likely reveal 
that much of this literature is not scientific in the sense we have defined it. As such, the sphere of 
scientific research is greatly reduced and much that goes by the name is not proper science. One may note 
that insofar as rihtgesetnessa promote the production of useful knowledge, not only are they not scientific 
but science becomes an un-rihtgesetnisc activity. In such cases the continued use of the word “science” is 
a means of legitimating and conferring authority. Think, for example, of the numerous adverts that 
present “scientifically proven” products. In fact, much science that finds itself in “common” discourse is 
colonial.   
 To a certain extent one may conclude that the crisis of social science stems from the necessarily 
ideological struggle of separating proper science from pseudo-science. While this may have some merit, 
we regard this as the problem of the possibility of science and risk of science. That is, establishing the 
time to do science and protecting it from pseudo-science involves dealing with external threats to science. 
In lamenting the current state of Religious Studies, for example, both Wiebe and McCutcheon are 
combatting sources of fear – the “theologians” – which would determine how religious studies should be 
done. Our consideration is not focused on defending science from its various foes, however. By “crisis” 
we have indicated something internal to social science. Nevertheless, this consideration of external 
threats has led to an understanding of objectivity as meeting a rational standard that can now be related to 
our earlier comments on sociology of knowledge. It is important to recognise that the production of 
objective knowledge insofar as it is based on the postulate of verifiability relies upon approval by the in-
group. That is, objective knowledge is nothing more than socially approved knowledge.
39
 And if 
objectivity in this sense is a matter of social approval, this entails that all knowledge is intersubjectively 
constituted. By thus considering the matter of objectivity, in both senses, we are now in a position to 
understand the crisis of social science. That is, if we want to get to the core of the crisis we must now turn 
to a consideration of intersubjectivity for which we will gain the precise advantage of our proper 
phenomenology.  
                                                 
39
 See Ch.5.ii. 
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7. The Crisis of social science 
 
In previous chapters our imperial argument has focused on delineating proper science from pseudo-
science. In this concluding chapter we must establish a delineation between proper social science and 
pseudo-social science. As we have argued, science properly understood is the attempt to understand the 
world as it is for X. What sort of science we are engaged in therefore depends on what this X is. Co-
opting Sartre, we have suggested social science is the study of “wer in situation”; this is to say that the X 
of social science is wer and we are concerned with the world as it is for wer. The issue to be addressed 
now is that multiple cognitive styles do this – meeting the postulates of social science – which begs the 
question why, if these cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one 
another? This lack of coherence, we propose, stems from a failure to consider the philosophical 
anthropological question “What is wer?” Each methodology operates as if the question has been 
answered and it is in this presumption that we will find the core of the crisis through a consideration of 
intersubjectivity; a consideration for which phenomenology is precisely suited. 
 
 
i. “Knowledge about” and “knowledge of” 
 
As we see it, the rational standard explicated in the previous chapter is predicated upon intersubjectivity. 
By this we mean that in order to engage in the process of constructing “socially approved knowledge” it 
must first be assumed that the person involved in doing this has the “right” to do so. In the previous 
chapters our postulates of social science have referred to the achievement of the rational standard of 
social science. But to question this “right” is not to determine how objective knowledge (whether 
scientific or otherwise) is constructed, rather it is to ask who is involved in its construction.
1
 This is in an 
                                                 
1
 Contained within this point is a further criticism of Merton’s norms of science, particularly the norm of 
universalism that science does not adjucate on the basis of gender, race, etc. (see Ch.5.i). As discussed by 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry, in its earliest days the Royal Society was more inclined to trust the word of a 
“gentleman” than a “commoner”. Thus, for example, although Robert Hooke’s (1635-1703) discoveries 
have withstood the test of time in comparison to Robert Boyle (1627-1691), among their contemporaries 
it is the latter who is credited with being a better scientist as he was a gentleman and Hooke his paid 
servant (Barnes et al., 1996:146). Since then the authority of the gentlemen has transferred from virtuoso, 
to philosopher, to scientist (1996:149). These transitions represent within science alterations in the 
rational standard by which work is verified and who is involved in such verification. Such a point is not 
problematic to our phenomenological understanding of social science because it only refers to who is 
involved. The later example of Robert Chambers shows how specialisation became a mark of authority 
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important clarification. Since its introduction to English speaking social/behavioural sciences in the 
1960s, “intersubjectivity” has come to mean “shared” or “mutual understanding”. For example, Bruner 
defines intersubjectivity as ‘how people come to know what others have in mind and how they adjust 
accordingly’ (Bruner, 1996:161), and Cox – representative of phenomenology-of-religion – portrays 
intersubjectivity as a means of obtaining objective knowledge (2010:1).
2
 As Alessandro Duranti explains 
it, the term was introduced through English translations of certain works that were drawing from Husserl, 
of which two notable books are Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945[1962]) and 
Schutz’ PSW (1932[1967]) (2010:4). However, within a couple of generations this connection to Husserl 
was forgotten, and crucially what Husserl meant by “intersubjectivity” differs from this more modern 
rendering as “mutual understanding”.3  
 According to Duranti the main issue is how we read various German compound words (usually 
featuring the component “Wechsel”)4 Husserl used when discussing the topic. As early as Royce 
Gibson’s translation of Ideas I (1931), there is a tendency to translate these words as “mutual 
understanding”.5 Similarly in Schutz’s essay “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in 
Husserl” (1957[1970d]) when discussing Ideas I he asks: ‘How in the frame of the natural attitude, is 
mutual understanding (Einverständnis) in principle possible?’ (Schutz, 1970d:51). Duranti notes that the 
inclusion of the original German suggests the translators’ (Kersten with the aid of Gurwitsch and 
Luckmann) awareness that the phrase is not entirely accurate (2010:5-6). In turning to Ideas II, however, 
Duranti suggests that these “Wechsel” compounds mean something akin to “trading places”. For example 
we get the following passage:  
The things posited by others are also mine: in empathy I participate in the 
other’s positing. E.g., I identify the thing I have over and against me in the 
mode of appearance α with the thing posited by the other in the mode of 
appearance β. To this belongs the possibility of substitution by means of 
trading places [Platzwechsel]. (Husserl, 1989:177) 
 
Intersubjectivity is not to be understood as the achievement of “mutual understanding”. Rather, as 
“trading places” intersubjectivity is the existential condition upon which “mutual understanding” 
becomes possible (Duranti, 2010:6-7).  
                                                                                                                                               
and that scholars were even denounced for commenting on other specialisations (1996:156-162). This 
emphasis on specialisation parallels our comments on disciplinarity (see Ch.1.iv). 
2
 See also Rommetveit (1974), Trevarthern (1977), Newson (1978), Rogoff (1990), Prus (1997), Sawyer 
(2003), Schegloff (2006), and Tomasello (2007).  
3
 A similar point can be found in Kerry and Armour’s evaluation of Sport Studies (see Ch.2.ii.b). 
4
 E.g. Wechselverständnis, Einverständnis, Wechselverständigung. 
5
 “Mutual understanding” is also found in Findlay’s translation of LI (Husserl, 1970a:278). 
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 However, we would argue that this shift has more to do with Schutz’s treatment of Husserl than 
a translation issue. In responding to Ideas II, Schutz actually refers to “trading places” as “transferring”, 
as part of Husserl’s considerations of “transcendental intersubjectivity” (Schutz, 1970d:69-73). But 
Schutz concludes of the whole project: 
We must conclude that Husserl’s attempt to account for the constitution of 
transcendental intersubjectivity in terms of operations of the 
consciousness of the transcendental ego has not succeeded. It is to be 
surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can 
be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum 
(Gegebenheit) of the life-world. It is the fundamental ontological category 
of human existence in the world and therefore all philosophical 
anthropology. (1970d:82) 
 
Duranti’s own quotation crucially misses this rejection of transcendental intersubjectivity in which this 
question of possibility is meant to occur (Duranti, 2010:9). Further, Duranti does not assume that PSW is 
prone to the above translation issue because the phrase “mutual understanding” does not occur (2010:5). 
However, this is to brazenly ignore that Schutz’s consideration of intersubjectivity is titled “Foundations 
of a Theory of Intersubjective Understanding” and that he is concerned with how “genuine 
understanding” (i.e. mutual understanding) is achieved (Schutz, 1967:111).6 As we see it, the shift away 
from considerations of intersubjectivity as possibility has more to do with Schutz’s outright rejection of 
the issues of transcendental phenomenology (1967:97). That is, he refuses to ask how the Other is 
constituted for the subject but instead claims that: ‘The object we shall be studying, therefore, is the 
human being who is looking at the world from within the natural attitude’ (1967:98). The problem this 
creates is that rather than rejecting this “transcendental problem” Schutz actually presupposes a solution 
to it and that solution takes the form of the human prejudice. To understand this we must clarify the 
problems of intersubjectivity. 
 Scheler, much like Schutz, recognises the connection of intersubjectivity to philosophical 
anthropology. In The Nature of Sympathy (NS) (1913, 1923[1954])
7
 he suggests that the fundamental 
consideration from which empirical social sciences and other branches of philosophy can proceed is 
                                                 
6
 One may object that the following treatment of PSW as well as our assessment of “The Problem of 
Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” is dogged by translation issues similar to those faced by 
Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger. However, the significant difference in the case of Schutz is that his later 
writings were in English. As George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert note of their translation of PSW they 
have followed the terminology established by these later English writings (in Schutz, 1967:ix). 
7
 NS was initially published concurrently with Formalism as Zur Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühle 
und von Liebe und Hass (1913). The second edition was then published as Wesen und Formen der 
Sympathie (1923). The translation used here is of the fifth edition (1948[1973a]) which contains 
corrections by Maria Scheler of mistakes by the printer found in the second through fourth editions.  
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intersubjectivity (1954:213-215). Scheler begins his discussion by arguing that the problem of 
intersubjectivity is not in fact a single problem but rather six problems which need to be properly 
distinguished. For our purposes only the first four concern us, of which we may note there is an order of 
precedence:  
the common basis for the epistemological as well as for the metaphysical 
enquiry must consist, [1], in an ideal scrutiny, without reference to actual 
existence, of the essential relationships between self and community in 
general; and [2], in an exact determination of the situation within the field 
of natural experience. This is succeeded at once by [3] the epistemological 
question as the origin of our knowledge of other minds, and this in turn by 
[4] a critical justification of this knowledge in respect of empirical 
evidence. (1954:227) 
 
Scheler then reduces this order to two separate questions: 
Knowledge of the nature of the community, and of the existence of others 
in general; and knowledge of the contingent existence of a member of a 
community or of some particular historical community. (1954:234) 
 
In “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego” (1942[1962b]), Schutz 
usefully re-renders this distinction as ‘[general] empty knowledge about the existence of some alter ego 
and some community as such and the [contingent] knowledge of one or more concrete fellow-men and 
social groups’ (1962b:158).  
 Empty “knowledge about Others’ existence” refers to (1) and (2) and Scheler deals with this by 
his consideration of an “absolute Robinson Crusoe” (originally found in Formalism) to whom the 
question is posed that if he has never perceived entities of his own kind would he nevertheless know of 
the existence of conscious subjects like himself? In Formalism, Scheler answers that Crusoe would know 
that there was such a community of subjects but he would not know where they are (Scheler, 1973b:521). 
This is on the basis that Crusoe would have a ‘specific and well-defined consciousness of emptiness or 
absence (as compared with the presence of some genuine entity already there), in respect of emotional 
acts as represented, for instance, by the authentic types of love for other people’ (1954:235). Crusoe, in 
effect, would experience the existence of other subjects in general by being lonely.
8
 He would have an 
                                                 
8
 We differ slightly from Scheler on this point who claimed that Crusoe would never think “I am alone in 
the world” (1954:234). Loneliness as it is used here means the feeling of need for the presence of another. 
In the state of loneliness I believe there is someone “out there” but cannot find them. The feeling of 
loneliness we are suggesting of Crusoe is quite a broad one, one in which he thinks of a community rather 
than a particular Other. More often, the experience of loneliness is felt as the need for the presence of 
another who is not among those who are present. Much more space needs to be given over to the study of 
loneliness than can be given here. What we will emphasise is that though we have disagreed with Scheler 
on the feeling of loneliness we nevertheless affirm the conclusion he draws about knowledge about other 
subjects in general.  
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abundance of acts to perform but no appropriate target; this “firing blanks” leads to the idea of a “Thou” 
with whom he is currently unacquainted. What is significant about this “general Thou” is that it ‘must 
necessarily be given as a whole beforehand, as a “background” to the positing of the reality of any 
possible object within it; hence it does not simply comprise the sum of all contingent facts with it’ 
(1954:236). What can be drawn from this is that although Crusoe has a general idea that out there are 
“Thou’s” whose lack of presence he experiences, this does not necessarily mean that he knows what they 
will “look” like.  
 For Scheler the case of the absolute Crusoe shows that “knowledge about Others’ existence” is 
never problematic and therefore focuses on “knowledge of an Other”: (3) and (4). Following the order of 
precedence we begin with the presence of the Other (3) when ‘in the order of dependence among 
cognitive intentions (or the corresponding spiritual acts of the person), at which social and other-
consciousness commences, i.e. what kind of cognitive acts must already have been accomplished before 
awareness of others can appear’ (1954:217). We may qualify this as “knowledge of an Other’s presence”. 
This is an issue of “transcendental psychology” and concerns when we recognise a subject as subject. 
Once recognised, this is followed by (4) ‘the emergence and development of knowledge on the part of 
actual men concerning the minds of those about them’ (1954:221). That is, “knowledge of an Other’s 
thoughts”.  
 Scheler observes that there are two approaches to this question of contingent Others: 
The theory of analogical inference, whereby, on perceiving expressive 
movements similar to those which we experience in ourselves in 
consequence of our own individual self-activity, we infer as a similar self-
activity in others; and the theory of empathy especially associated with 
Theodor Lipps, whereby this assumption involves a belief in the existence 
of mind in others, based upon a process of empathic projection of the self 
into the physical manifestations evinced by the other. (1954:238) 
 
A modern example of this sort of reasoning is found in phenomenology-of-religion through Cox’s notion 
of “interpolation”9: ‘To interpolate means to insert what is apprehended from another religion or culture, 
which to the outsider often appears strange or unusual, into one’s own experience by translating it into 
terms one can understand’ (Cox, 2010:52). This modern version is still just as prone to Scheler’s criticism 
of the original:  
we are indeed conscious of our expressive movements, but apart from 
mirrors and suchlike, such consciousness takes the form, merely of 
intentions to move, and of the consequences which follow from sensations 
                                                 
9
 Developed from van der Leeuw (1963:674-675). 
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of movement or state; while in the case of others, the primary data are 
presented by the visual images of such movements, which have no sort of 
immediate resemblance or similarity to the data encountered in our own 
case. (Scheler, 1954:240) 
 
How I experience my ferhđloca performing a gesture is not the same as how I experience the other 
person performing the same gesture. Not only this, we can analogise other minds in animals whose 
gestures are quite unlike our own. Most damning is that while potentially helpful in explaining the degree 
to which we understand other subjects, the analogical argument already presupposes them to be subjects. 
Further, even when we do make such inference all we have done is place my self into another location 
rather than recognise another self. Empathy, which is presented in the same way as Husserl in Ideas II 
(1989:170-180), fares little better. It can only provide a hypothesis as to how the assumption that there is 
an Other before me arises, but ‘it would be blind chance that the process of empathy should coincide with 
the actual presence of mind in the bodies so perceived’ (Scheler, 1954:241). It could not, he goes on to 
say, distinguish between empathetic feelings toward a genuine Other or a painting or the character 
Hamlet. Further, like the analogical argument, to see expressive movements as “expressive” is to have 
already presupposed subjectivity.  
 As theories of presence, Scheler argues analogy and empathy are unable to pick out the Other as 
Other. We can see this in the case of Husserl’s notion of “trading places”. In order to “trade places” with 
someone, that “someone” is already presupposed to be a subject worth “trading places” with. Conversely, 
that I can “trade places” with an object does not guarantee that object to be a subject. “Trading places” is 
therefore no different to “mutual understanding”. That is, analogy and empathy pertain to thoughts but as 
they are utilised by Lipps, Riehl, and Husserl, among others, they also try to explain how we know the 
Other is present (1954:240). But this is to violate the order of precedence. That I can know what the 
Other is thinking through “trading places” cannot be the proof that the Other is an Other because the 
Other has already been presupposed in the premise.  
 Both the analogy and empathy rest on what are, for Scheler, two unphenomenological 
presuppositions: ‘(1) that it is always our own self, merely, that is primarily [giefan] to us; (2) that which 
is primarily [giefan] in the case of others is merely the appearance of the body’ (1954:244). Scheler’s 
main argument as to why these are presuppositions is that it is not always clear who an experience 
“belongs” to. Indeed, we have a tendency, he suggests, to ‘live more in others’ than ourselves 
(1954:247). In this respect he charges analogy and empathy with underestimating the difficulty of self-
knowledge and over-estimating the difficulty of Other-knowledge. Much of what we think belongs to our 
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Self – based on the findings of child psychology – is in fact “socially derived”.10 That most of my 
knowledge is socially derived clearly indicates that who “I am” depends in large measure on “who” is 
around me. Embree has also pointed out that Schutz too thought the “individual” to be an abstraction.11 
Schutz nonetheless criticises this argument on the basis that ‘there is no such thing as an experience 
“given” to me that would not indicate which individual stream of consciousness it belongs to’ (Schutz, 
1962b:170). This is pursued further to argue that even though an experience may refer to the thoughts of 
another person this does not destroy their character of belonging to me; there are only ever “other 
people’s thoughts thought by me” (1962b:171). On one level Schutz’s criticism is valid: the hatred of 
ducks has to belong to someone in the sense that the hatred must occur in a particular ferhđloca. “Me” 
and “you” are designations of different locations of ferhđ in which this hatred occurs. The hatred is 
“mine” insofar as it occurs in this ferhđloca.12 But Scheler does not deny this: when the thought “hate-
ducks” occurs, we can say which ferhđloca had this particular thought. Rather, he is putting into question 
the origin of this hatred. I hate ducks, but whether I hate ducks because you hated ducks first or because I 
hated ducks first is the matter of obscurity.  
 Drawing on this point Scheler moves to his perceptual theory of the alter ego. The obscurity of 
whom the hatred of ducks originated with allows Scheler to suggest that internal perception is not only 
perception of oneself (Scheler, 1954:248). By this he means that just as I can have an external perception 
of myself – when I touch my arm for example – and also an external perception of the Other so too then 
my internal perception of my self indicates the possibility of an internal perception of the Other. In all 
cases the internal and external are intrinsically connected to one another. Such internal perception is 
conditioned by external perception in that the Other’s body must influence my body in order to give rise 
to this internal perception. But the only restriction this enforces is that the external perception affects the 
specific content of the Other’s thought. Indeed, the only thing which cannot be understood in this way is 
the Other’s experience of their own bodily states (1954:255). And it is exactly because of this that I am 
separated from the Other, and it is from this level of the experience of one’s own body that analogy and 
                                                 
10
 Zahavi’s (2004) study of intersubjectivity indicates that Husserl may have also been making the same 
sort of argument in the posthumous nachlass volumes of Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität (1973a, 
1973b, 1973c). 
11
 A significant point to be drawn from this is that Scheler’s argument to a large extent entails that 
subjectivity is intersubjectively constituted. Subjectivity, that is, in the sense of being an “individual self” 
different from others. Schutz, despite his disparagement of Scheler in “Scheler’s Theory of 
Intersubjectivity”, nonetheless agrees with this position (see Ch.5.ii). 
12
 See Ch.2.iii.c. 
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empathy may come into play. Scheler claims the Other is giefan as an “integral whole” and that internal 
perceptions give aspects of their self and external perceptions aspects of the body (1954:261-264). That 
is, the form of perception determines what limited content I draw from this whole.   
 Schutz agrees with Scheler’s criticism of analogy and empathy in trying to present solutions to 
“empirical problems” (4) as solutions to “transcendental problems” (3) (Schutz, 1962b:159, 164). He also 
agrees that Husserl is just as subject to Scheler’s criticisms. But Schutz’s analysis of Husserl comes to a 
very different conclusion:  
it is in no way established whether the existence of Others is a problem of 
the transcendental sphere at all, i.e., whether the problem of 
intersubjectivity does exist between transcendental egos (Husserl) or 
Persons (Scheler); or whether intersubjectivity and therefore sociality does 
not rather belong exclusively to the mundane sphere of our life-world. 
(1962b:167) 
 
Not only does he ignore the transcendental problem as he does in PSW, but now denies that it is a 
problem altogether. Like Scheler he concurs that our “knowledge about Others” is never problematic 
(1962b:168), but now makes the significantly bolder claim that our knowledge regarding presence isn’t 
problematic either. As such he goes on to claim that ‘we will set aside transcendental problems and turn 
to the mundane sphere of our life-world’ (1962b:167). Part of the basis for this rejection of transcendental 
problems is Scheler’s claim in his perceptual theory that the Person is unobjectifiable (1962b:171). But it 
would seem that the Self recognised in internal perception is the objectified Person. On this point Schutz 
seems to be comparing Scheler’s comments on the Self in NS with those found in Formalism and HPC 
which seem largely inconsistent. This inconsistency, however, mainly stems from Scheler’s refutation of 
analogy and empathy. Here it is difficult not to notice the rapid speed with which he changes from 
“subject” to “mind” to “self” giving all the terms a certain degree of equivalency. This equivalency, 
however, stems from his amalgamating the thinking of Lipps, Riehl, Wolfgang Köhler, Lévy-Brühl and 
others – who all use these terms in their discussions of analogy and empathy – under a single umbrella. 
Rather, it would seem in his own thinking the Self is only a given portion of the integral whole that is the 
Person. But this begs the question of how I know a person when I meet one? Though Schutz does not put 
it in such terms, Scheler falls back into analogy: as a person I can bring to consciousness my self, the 
qualities of this self can be observed in other entities, and so they too must be persons. But the very 
unobjectifiability of the Person, like empathy, also means that it is blind chance that this perceived self 
belongs to a genuine person. 
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 Schutz proposes to get out of this problem via his general thesis of the alter ego. He effectively 
argues that the Self is the objectified Person on the basis of introducing a time structure lacking in 
Scheler’s consideration of external and internal perception. Accordingly we must recognise two attitudes: 
‘one of living in our acts, being directed towards the objects of our acts; and the other, the reflective 
attitude, by which we turn to our acts, grasping them by other acts’ (Schutz, 1962b:172). According to 
Schutz we never grasp our Selves in the acting attitude
13
, only the reflective attitude. The Self as it is 
acting in the vivid present is inaccessible to the reflective attitude because it is precisely the Self of the 
vivid present performing the reflection. Thus, when I do reflect, ‘what we grasp by the reflective act is 
never the present of our stream of thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past’ 
(1962b:172-173). However, while I cannot grasp my self in the vivid present I can grasp the self of the 
Other in their vivid present. He draws the following point: 
In listening to a lecturer, for instance, we seem to participate immediately 
in the development of his stream of thought. But – and this point is 
obviously a decisive one – our attitude in doing so is quite different from 
that we adopt in turning to our own stream of thought by reflection. We 
catch the Other’s thought in its vivid presence and not modo praeterito; 
that is, we catch it as a “Now” and not as a “Just Now”. (1962b:173) 
 
 Schutz calls this vivid simultaneity. He thus defines the alter ego as ‘that subjective stream of thought 
which can be experienced in its vivid present’ (1962b:174). And in further explicating this general thesis 
he admits this to be an analogical argument: 
It implies that this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same 
fundamental structure as my own consciousness. This means that the 
Other is like me, capable of acting and thinking; that his stream of thought 
shows the same through and through connectedness as mine; that 
analogous to my own life of consciousness his shows the same time-
structure (emphasis added, 1962b:174) 
 
However, we may note that this does not involve overestimating self-knowledge, as Scheler feared above, 
because I crucially perceive the Other (in their vivid present) in a way that I cannot perceive my self.  
 Insofar as Schutz is treating a problem of thoughts, of achieving genuine understanding, then 
this general thesis is adequate for social science:  
The general thesis of the alter ego, as outlined above, is a sufficient frame 
of reference for the foundation of empirical psychology and the social 
sciences. For all our knowledge of the social world, even of its more 
anonymous and remote phenomena and of the most diverse types of social 
communities is based upon the possibility of experiencing an alter ego in 
vivid presence. (1962b:175) 
 
                                                 
13
 Our interpolation – Schutz uses no particular term or phrase.  
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However, he goes on to conclude that ‘we have in a similar way as Scheler to distinguish between our 
experience of the existence of Others, that is, the general thesis of the alter ego, and our knowledge of or 
about the Other’s specific thoughts’ (1962b:176). But this means Schutz is using the general thesis as a 
solution to the problem of presence - now rendered “existence”. But as the example of the lecturer makes 
clear, the general thesis clearly is concerned with thoughts. Insofar as Schutz thinks the general thesis 
also solves the problem of presence, he has failed to ask a crucial question: why should he listen to this 
object that is making noise in the first place? If we contrast the lecturer with a monkey solving a puzzle it 
is not difficult, via this general thesis, to build up the thought processes of the monkey as it tries to solve 
the puzzle in its vivid present.   
 Based on comments by Barber, Schutz would necessarily exclude the monkey, however, 
because he criticised Husserl for being too lax in recognising consciousness in the non-human (Barber, 
2013:321-322). But this presupposition that the lecturer is a subject and the monkey not has nothing to do 
with the general thesis. Rather, it has to do with comments such as the following: ‘As long as human 
beings are not concocted like homunculi in retorts but are born and brought up by mothers, the sphere of 
the “We” will be naively presupposed’; ‘I just live along amidst other human beings which I group under 
the relations of we and you’; and ‘any production and any tool … is the frozen result of human activities’ 
(emphasis added, 1962b:168, 177). And as he puts it in “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences” 
(1940[1962a]): ‘Of special importance for our topic is the constitution of the specifically human, and that 
means cultural, worlds in their peculiar manner of objectivity’ (1962a:126). Where Husserl spoke of 
Transcendental Egos and Scheler of Persons, Schutz speaks of Human Beings. Elsewhere Schutz openly 
admits that his approach to social science is anthropomorphic (Schutz, 2004:131). This entails, though, 
that the question of presence is actually answered by the human prejudice: to find the “human” is to find 
the Other.  
 
 
ii. “Knowledge that” and “knowledge how” 
 
While we accept this distinction between “knowledge about Others” and “knowledge of an Other”, the 
problem as we see it with Husserl, Scheler and Schutz’s accounts is in subsuming the problems of 
presence and thoughts under a single question, as this entails the assumption that both require the same 
solution. Instead, we suggest the consideration of “knowledge of an Other” concerns itself solely with 
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thoughts; it is a matter of intersubjectivity understood as achievement – i.e. “mutual understanding”. The 
problem of presence requires a different sort of “knowledge”, the sort that produces the human prejudice. 
Dan Zahavi has gone some way to indicate this when he discusses different kinds of empathy; taking 
anger as an example, it is possible to distinguish between “that someone is angry” and “why someone is 
angry” (2012:81). The question of “why” pertains to “knowledge of an Other’s thoughts” which 
presupposes the subject. And this must be distinguished from “knowledge that an Other is present” which 
informs this presupposition.  
 At this juncture it may be asked in what respect the human prejudice, as a form of “knowledge 
that”, constitutes an actual problem for social science. The issue stems from the vast swathes of 
anthropological and religious studies literature that indicate groups for which this human prejudice is not 
accepted. To give two examples in both directions: in his study of the Ojibwa people, Irving Hallowell 
observed: ‘While in all cultures “persons” comprise one of the major classes of objects to which the self 
must become oriented, this category of being is by no means limited to human beings’ (Hallowell, 
1960:20). One does not need to be a human being in order to be a “person” (i.e. subject).14 Conversely, 
Claude Levi-Strauss noted that: ‘a very great number of primitive tribes simple refer to themselves by the 
term for “men” in their language, showing that in their eyes an essential characteristic of man disappears 
outside the limits of the group’ (Levi-Strauss, 1969:46). In this case not all human beings are “men” (i.e. 
subjects). We have called the human prejudice a “prejudice” precisely because it has less than universal 
acceptance in the mundane sphere. That is, to turn Schutz against himself: ‘the results of an analysis of 
the mundane sphere, if true, cannot be impugned by any basic assumption (metaphysical or ontological) 
which might be made in order to explain our belief in the existence of Others’ (Schutz, 1962b:175). In 
other words, our understanding of wer cannot violate the postulate of adequacy.
15
 The assumption of the 
human prejudice (whether metaphysical or ontological) simply cannot be accepted as there are groups for 
which subjectivity is recognised in the non-human or not in all humans.
16
 
                                                 
14
 If there is a connection to Scheler’s concept of Person in this use we have not yet identified it.  
15
 See Ch.4.ii.c. 
16
 A critic may at this point wish to leap upon Schutz’s use of “true”. As we take him to mean “true” in 
this context, it refers to whether the likes of Hallowell and Levi-Strauss have accurately represented the 
people they are talking about thus meeting the postulate of adequacy. The alternative reading of “true” is 
to suggest that in recognising subjectivity in the non-human these groups are being untrue somehow. But 
to make this claim violates the principle of principles. That is, groups that recognise subjectivity in the 
non-human or not all humans would be accused of being deviant. Such analysis ceases to be social 
scientific because it carries with it statements regarding how these groups “ought” to understand the 
world – i.e. it becomes colonial (see Ch.6.iv). 
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 More importantly, to accept the human prejudice is to enforce a European orthodoxy of 
rationality
17
 – one we charge is prevalent within Social Science. According to Hallowell it is common 
practice within Social Science to assume that “subject” and “human” are synonymous.18 Within Religious 
Studies, Ioannides and Robertson have recently commented that ‘it is noteworthy that the study of 
religion, fundamentally concerned with the consideration of one of the most enduring products of “the 
human”, only sporadically and reluctantly embraces a deconstructive (re)thinking of this seemingly 
commonsensical, yet discursively and materially volatile category’ (2013:230).19 This taking for granted 
of “the human” is played out in naturalist literature, for example, when entities regarded as subjects by 
various groups are labelled as: “superhuman beings” (Spiro, 1966; Lawson and McCauley, 1990); 
“humanlike but nonhuman beings” (Guthrie, 1980, 1993); “non-natural entities” (Barrett and Keil, 1996); 
and “counter intuitive agents” (Boyer, 2001; Pyysiäinen, 2003). Each indicates an anthropomorphic 
cognitive default whereby the person identifies the human in the non-human. This is particularly clear in 
the case of Pyysiäinen
20
 who, eager to deny a value judgement is not involved, nonetheless states that 
“counter-intuitive” ‘only means something that contradicts panhuman intuitive expectations of how 
entities behave’ (2003:157). Similarly, in the antagonistic phenomenology-of-religion, we find van der 
Leeuw claiming that humans are everywhere, everytime the same (1963:675). Cox too has spoken of 
‘postulated non-falsifiable alternate realities’ (2010:48).21  
 Pyysiäinen’s “counter-intuitive” and Cox’s “non-falsifiable” serve the same function in 
implying that there is a particular way the world “is” that is then violated by what we have dubbed 
“religions”. We charge that both these concepts fail at the postulate of adequacy. That is, the Buddhists of 
Pyysiäinen’s study do not think of the Buddha as “counter-intuitive” and the indigenous tribes of Cox’s 
studies (2007) do not think of their ancestors as belonging to a reality which is non-falsifiable. Indeed, 
that these groups do not view such entities in these terms was made clear back in the 1970s by Evans-
                                                 
17
 See Ch.6.iii. 
18
 Within this thesis a number of scholars utilised have peretrated the human prejudice (e.g. Albrecht 
(1968), Byrne (1999), Delanty and Strydom (2003), and Steel and Guala (2011)). This even extends to 
those who have responded to or interpreted the very phenomenologists we have suggested were trying to 
avoid it (e.g. Spiegelberg (1971a) Dunlop (1991), Glendinning (1998), Gorner (2007) and Kelly (2011)).  
19
 Part of the problem with their account, however, is the continued use of the word “human”.  
20
 We have favoured Pyysiäinen’s account over Boyer’s because he rejects the latter’s “cognitive 
optimum” whereby the human mind can only handle so many counter-intuitive breaks by a single entity. 
Pyysiäinen clearly demonstrates that insofar as we grant these ideas as counter-intuitive it is possible to 
have radically counter-intuitive ideas through the introduction of writing which allows them to be 
remembered (2003:161-162).  
21
 See Ch.2.i.  
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Pritchard’s study of the Azande and witchcraft. He recognised that for the Azande witchcraft was 
falsifiable because they were perfectly capable of determining whether or not it had taken place. As 
Evans-Pritchard observed, the occurrence of witchcraft is not miraculous (1976:19). The best known 
example of this is the case of collapsing granaries – the Azande are quite clear whether witchcraft has 
caused the collapse or not (Evans-Pritchard, 1976:22-23). In our terms, the presence or non-presence of 
witchcraft is covered by the postulate of verifiability within the Azande conception of rationality. To call 
these realities “counter intuitive” or “non-falsifiable” is at best to proclaim that the postulate of 
verifiability employed by the Azande differs from our own. But the “our own postulate of verifiability” 
referred to here is not that of the social scientist. This we noted in Chapter 4, as a postulate determining 
rationality is dependent on other postulates to give it context.
22
 In the social scientific case this context is 
provided by the postulates of nonpractical knowledge, subjective interpretation, and adequacy, all of 
which would refer us back to the Azande. But the use of “counter intuitive” or “non-falsifiable” actually 
indicates the implicit adoption of some other rationality that has obstinated the study. Pyysiäinen’s case 
makes this very clear:  
Our knowledge, for example, partly consists of panhuman preferences 
and inclinations encoded in our minds in evolution. It is, however, 
cognitively easier for us to consider our moral intuitions as someone’s 
viewpoint; this someone is a god. Ascribing moral ideas to a divine mind 
both explains these ideas (their existence and their binding nature) and 
makes it easier for us to process moral knowledge in the mind. (2003:162)  
 
The findings of evolution set the rational standard for all rationality against which the rationality of the 
Buddhists, etc., are being judged. The issue with the approach of both Pyysiäinen and Cox is that the use 
of “counter-intuitive” and “non-falsifiable” comes with a tacit “to us” hidden in the usage. But the “us” 
represented here is not the “us” of social scientists. This “us” more accurately belongs to a European 
stock of knowledge.
23
  Schutz in accepting the human prejudice falls to the same rebuttal.  
 Schutz’s acceptance of the human prejudice actually deviates from earlier phenomenology in 
two important respects: first, he re-institutes the “man-animal” which earlier phenomenology was trying 
to remove from the consideration; second, insofar as phenomenology rejected this, the question of 
recognising a subject as subject is not a matter of “knowledge that”. As we saw in the case of Heidegger, 
                                                 
22
 See Ch.4.ii.d. 
23
 “European” is used in Husserl’s sense (see Ch.1.i). One may object that it is out of this European ferhđ 
that the idea of social science emerged. And while this might be true, such an objection hides a cultural 
parochialism - à la Slingerland (See Ch.6.iii) – in which it is assumed only Europe can be properly 
scientific.  
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phenomenology recognised that this is the wrong question: the study of Dasein is not a study of entities 
(“that”) but a study of being (“how”).24 The question “What is wer?” is not answered by determining a 
kind of entity but a style of being. As such a phenomenological approach analyses “knowledge how an 
Other is present”. As argued in Chapter 2, Husserl’s Transcendental Ego, Scheler’s Person and 
Heidegger’s Dasein all signify the being which I have (not am) and to call other entities weras marks 
them as having this same being. The question, then, is if they are all aiming at “knowledge how”, why 
did they consistently fail to achieve their goal? The answer to this can be found in Sartre’s approach to 
intersubjectivity, which affects a fundamental shift in our understanding of “subject” and “object”. As 
Sartre himself proclaims at the end of Saint Genet, his aim is to ‘reconcile, with one final effort, the 
object and the subject’ (1952[1963]:599). Schutz has criticised this approach in “Sartre’s Theory of the 
Alter Ego” (1948[1962e]) but this criticism is flawed because it is trapped by the approach of 
“knowledge that”. Once we have recognised this shift we will finally be in a position to understand the 
crisis of social science.  
 Sartre’s primary consideration of intersubjectivity is found in BN where he rejects both realist 
and idealist solutions to the problem (Sartre, 2003:247-254). The realist can only be certain of bodies, 
and so posits the mind of the Other as a certainty, thus endorsing an idealistic thesis without warrant. For 
the idealist the Other is just my representation but if it is my representation how can it refer to a system of 
representations that are not mine? In this he effectively repeats Scheler’s criticisms of the analogical 
argument and theory of empathy. Both fall into the trap that the Other is just a replication of my self, but 
Sartre points out the fundamental presupposition that we operate under is that ‘the Other is the one who is 
not me and the one who I am not’ (2003:254). The Other is constituted by an absence of my 
representations. But the crucial question, what we have called “knowledge how”, is how this absence is 
recognised as such. Realist and idealist accounts must either give into solipsism or posit a “Third”,25 a 
being who is simultaneously “Here and There” to confirm that my representation (“Here”) of the Other 
(“There”) is accurate. The challenge, then, is to provide a positive theory of the Other’s presence that 
                                                 
24
 See Ch.2.iii.d. 
25
 See Ch.6.iv. 
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does not fall into solipsism or require God (2003:256). As Sartre sees it, Husserl, Hegel
26
 and Heidegger 
have attempted exactly this.  
 Husserl’s solution, according to Sartre, comes from CM and FTL in which he argues that 
reference to the Other is indispensable for the constitution of the world. On a level not pursued by Sartre, 
we can say that such an argument really concerns “knowledge of”. According to Lewis and Staehler, in 
CM Husserl did not intend to prove the Other’s existence but to ‘to show that it is possible to make sense, 
phenomenologically speaking, of the Other in his or her otherness’ (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:50). 
Husserl recognises that: ‘The character of the existent “other” has its basis in this kind of verifiable 
accessibility of what is not originally accessible’ (Husserl, 1988:114) – a point that Sartre will take up 
himself. But as Staehler’s analysis of CM reveals, Husserl is still faced with the challenge ‘that the Other 
is accessible in the mode of inaccessibility appears to be a rather paradoxical response to the question of 
the Other’s givenness’ (Staehler, 2008a:113-114). Problematically Husserl does not question this 
giefannis. Indeed, Staehler’s discussion of my accessibility and the Other’s innaccessibility indicates that 
Husserl is still operating via an analogy similar to Schutz’s general thesis above (2008:114-116). Sartre 
himself sees the argument as little different from Kant’s own idealistic position. The “Other” becomes 
little more than a regulatory concept: 
If someone replies from the start that the transcendental subject refers to 
other subjects for the constitution of the noematic whole, it is easy to 
reply that it refers to them as to meanings. The Other here would be a kind 
of supplementary category which would allow a world to be constituted, 
not a real being existing beyond this world. (Sartre, 2003:258) 
 
 Heidegger, building upon the work of previous thought, recognised two necessities: ‘(1) the 
relation between “human-realities” must be a relation of being, (2) this relation must cause “human-
realities” to depend on one another in their essential being’ (2003:268). Thus Heidegger argued that 
Dasein is being-with (Mit-sein) and more specifically “being-with-Others”. Sartre’s criticism focuses on 
this “with”: ‘“with” does not intend the reciprocal relation of recognition and of conflict which would 
result from the appearance of a [réalité-humaine] other than mine in the midst of the world. It expresses 
rather a sort of ontological solidarity for the exploitation of this world’ (2003:269); Heidegger fails to 
account for the phenomenon of resistance identified by Scheler.
27
 This can be seen in his analysis of tools 
                                                 
26
 Hegel’s position is not examined even though his inclusion here by Sartre prompted French 
phenomenologists to regard him as part of the Phenomenological Movement. A claim largely contended 
by other members (Spiegelberg, 1982:440-442). 
27
 See Ch.2.iii.e. 
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as a way of revealing the Other. First, the Other may not be present at the time of use so that this gives us 
“knowledge about” rather than “knowledge how” (Heidegger, 2010:11-122). Second, Zahavi has pointed 
out that Husserl claims that to recognise a tool as a tool (if not created by ourselves) stems from Others’ 
teaching us (Zahavi, 2004:183-185).
28
 But this entails that to recognise an Other in a tool is to presuppose 
another Other who taught us this recognition – i.e. “knowledge that”. The problem with Heidegger’s 
approach is that it makes our original relation to the Other one of interdependence and solidarity rather 
than confrontation (2004:186). This focus on similarity, however, risks descending into monism because 
the Other is no more than an identical Self projected onto another body. Thus Heidegger’s focus on 
“being-with” falls into the pits of analogy and empathy.  
 From this analysis Sartre draws four necessary and sufficient conditions for any theory of the 
Other’s presence to be valid: (α) Such a theory should not provide a new proof for the existence of 
Others. Solipsism on this level is impossible. In effect the ability to doubt the existence of the Other is 
predicated on the already accepted affirmation of his existence. (β) It is only by a Cartesian cogito that 
we can proceed ‘by disclosing to me the concrete, indubitable presence of a particular, concrete Other, 
just as it has already revealed to me my own incomparable, contingent but necessary, and concrete 
existence’ (Sartre, 2003:275). That is, only by delving into my own “inmost depths” will I determine the 
how of the Other’s being-not-me. (γ) As such this cogito cannot reveal the Other as “object”. That is, 
insofar as the Other is “for me” they are not a constitutive part of the world but one who “interests” our 
being (2003:276). By this Sartre means that ‘my relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation 
of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge’ (2003:268). We raise this point to highlight that 
“knowledge” as it used here is both Schutzian terminology and construed in the broadest sense possible. 
(δ) Grasping the Other as being-not-me cannot be an external spatial negation but an internal one.  
 This requires some unpacking both in relation to Schutz’s criticisms and Scheler’s order of 
precedence. In particular we have the main criticism from Schutz: 
Sartre’s criticism of the solipsistic argument can be applied to his own 
theory. For even if we were prepared to admit with him that our belief in 
the Other’s existence needs no proof since it is rooted in a pre-ontological 
understanding, we should have to show how we can arrive at an 
understanding of the concrete Other’s concrete behaviour without falling 
back upon the solipsistic argument. (Schutz, 1962e:199) 
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 Staehler offers a different view that ‘an alien tool is still recognised by us as a kind of tool that 
supposedly fulfils a certain function’ (Staehler, 2008b:18). The major issue is how we conceive “alien”. 
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Sartre is, in this context, a victim of his own style for not indicating the influence of Scheler on this 
particular list. We may note that in his own presentation Schutz renders (α) as ‘Such a theory need not 
prove the Other’s existence, the affirmation of which is rooted in a “pre-ontological” understanding’ 
(1962e:187-188). However, what Sartre actually writes is: ‘Such a theory can not offer a new proof of the 
existence of others, or an argument better than any other against solipsism’ (emphasis added, Sartre, 
2003:274). The key difference here is that Sartre opens by speaking in the plural and is ruling out, like 
Scheler, “knowledge about” as problematic – I can never doubt that there are Others somewhere. Moving 
onto (β), this entails that Sartre concerns himself with the cogito which discloses ‘to me the concrete, 
indubitable presence of a particular, concrete Other’ (emphasis added, 2003:275). This statement 
parallels Scheler’s consideration of Crusoe when he mentioned ‘the presence of some genuine entity’ 
who is absent (emphasis added, Scheler, 1954:235). The issue with Schutz’s criticism is that “presence” 
has been rendered as “existence” but how he and Sartre use the latter term differs. As such, we must be 
clear that Sartre’s “existence/presence” distinction does not correspond to Schutz’s “existence/thoughts” 
distinction. And while existence may not require proof, presence does. 
 This does not, however, mean that (γ) and (δ) then refer to thoughts or the metaphysical and 
value considerations found in Scheler’s order of precedence. To the contrary, nowhere in his 
consideration of “The Existence of Others” does Sartre show himself to be considering “concrete 
behaviour” in the sense of “knowledge of”. In fact, (γ) and (δ) rule out any consideration of thoughts. 
This is made clear by the following claim found in (γ): 
If [the Other] is for us, this can be neither as a constitutive factor of our 
knowledge of the world nor as a constitutive factor of our knowledge of 
the self, but as one who “interests” our being, and that not as he 
contributes a priori to constitute our being but as he interests it concretely 
and “ontically” in the empirical circumstances of our facticity. (Sartre, 
2003:276) 
 
Quite simply, the error of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Schutz was to consider our relation to the 
Other as “knowledge to knowledge” (2003:268). This is quite overt in Scheler when the problems of 
presence and thoughts are subsumed under a single question: ‘the epistemological question as to the 
origin of our knowledge of other minds, and this in turn by a critical justification of this knowledge in 
respect of empirical evidence’ (Scheler, 1954:227). All recognise that the Other is constituted by the 
absence of my representations; it is this that underpins their claims that the Transcendental Ego, Dasein, 
191 
 
and Person are unobjectifiable.
29
 But treating this unobjectifiability as an epistemological issue leads to 
insurmountable problems.  
 If we are to understand how the Other is present this must be in terms of “being to being” – i.e. 
an ontological consideration. In making this a matter of being, (δ) renders the recognition that the Other’s 
not-being-me must engender an internal negation in the sense that they must have some effect on me for 
the recognition to occur. Returning to our comments on the stricture of philosophical anthropology, 
Scheler understood phenomena in terms of milieu-things by which was meant that phenomena are things 
whose variation effects weres experiencing.
30
 However, in Formalism Scheler does not go into much 
detail on what forms these effective experiences might take, thus placing the effective experience of a 
storm and the love of parents alongside each other (Scheler, 1973b:140). This is in part because milieu-
things are treated epistemologically (1973b:148-149). Sartre’s comments, however, suggest that it is in 
how they are experienced effectively that we are able to recognise the presence of the Other. But this is 
occluded if we treat the matter epistemologically instead of ontologically. Sartre, therefore, effectively 
makes Scheler’s order of precedence stricter by suggesting that not only must each problem be separated 
out, but no solution to any problem can then be used as a solution to another.  
 
 
iii. Wer without end 
 
Sartre proposes to meet all these requirements via the regard
31
. The primary problem of the above 
attempts to establish the Other's presence is that they first approached the Other in their object-ness 
(epistemologically). Sartre instead begins with the concrete fact that in everyday life I can have an 
original relation with an Other, and it is this “ordinary appearance” which must be questioned. By this he 
means that my experience of shame, for example, is always shame before somebody (2003:245). 
 Sartre begins by discussing seeing a man in the park. Insofar as this man is treated as an object 
he is no more than one among many objects in this park which are arranged around me from ‘my point of 
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 See Ch.2.iii.f. 
30
 See Ch.3.iii.b. 
31
 In the translation of BN by Hazel Barnes “regard” is translated as “look”. We have maintained the 
original French for clarity.  
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view into instrumental complexes’ (2003:278). That is, objects are primarily giefan as instrumentalities.32 
Here we may helpfully introduce Schutz’s own discussion of the null-point.33 So far as this man is treated 
as an object he may be subtracted from the totality of objects without the remainder being perceptibly 
changed. The bench he is sitting on does not disappear too. But: ‘Perceiving him as a man, on the other 
hand, is not to apprehend an additive relation between the chair and him; it is to register an organisation 
without distance of the things in my universe about that privileged object’ (2003:278).34 Rather than the 
objects of view being oriented around me as the null-point they “flee” this orientation. I see these objects 
of the park as they are oriented around this man.  
 But even accounting for this decentralisation we may still be caught in the analogical argument – 
I am imagining the world as it would be if I made that “There” this particular object (the man) is 
occupying my “Here”. This decentralisation is “virtual” because that man is still a “full object” for me to 
grasp (2003:280). Yet in the recognition of this object as null-point a revelation can occur: 
If the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as the object 
which sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-
subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of 
being seen by the Other. It is in and through the revelation of my being-
as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his 
being-as-subject. For just as the Other is a probable object for me-as-
subject, so I can discover myself in the process of become a probable 
object for only a certain subject. (2003:280) 
 
Sartre calls this “being-seen-by-another” in which “I the subject” finds myself “I the object”. The 
decentralisation of my world ceases to be virtual and becomes actual. This regard which objectifies me, 
however, should not be confused with the faculty of sight alone: ‘the [regard] will be given just as well 
on occasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the 
slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain’ (2003:281). The regard is not, therefore, the 
particular faculty which regards me. This faculty, we are told, is bracketed out in the experience of 
“being regarded”.35 
                                                 
32
 More formally we may, following Heidegger, say that a particular entity is either giefan as instrument 
when it is ready-to-hand or as object when it is present-to-hand (see Ch.2.iii.d). 
33
 See Ch.3.i. 
34
 It is important that Sartre has italicised “man” is this regard to emphasis the shift to “mankind” rather 
than an individual male.  
35
 Thus Spiegelberg’s interpretation of the regard as “gaze” is in fact too restrictive particularly as he 
associates it with the “human gaze” (1982:523-524). 
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 It is this self-reference of the regard that is key. In Sartre’s definition of the situation I am 
surrounded by a world which determines both my facticity and my freedom.
36
 The world as a collection 
of “instrumental complexes” gives me certain possibilities for acting. We suggest Sartre’s understanding 
of the “world” is no different from the concept of the life-world introduced by Husserl:  
the life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, 
existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical 
or extratheoretical. The world is pre-given to us, the waking, always 
somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and 
necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as 
horizon … Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the 
life-world), are “given” as being valid for us in each case (in some mode 
or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that we are 
conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon … The 
world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but 
exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied 
to it. (Husserl, 1970c:142-143) 
 
The life-world, like wer, is not entity but being. The possibilities I have available thus depend on the 
particular complex of the situation. My freedom is then the possibilities which I can enact in this 
situation. Then I am regarded. I become aware of my self, but this awareness is not that of the reflective 
attitude but an unreflective consciousness of the self (Sartre, 2003:284). Such awareness of the self 
presents it not with possibilities but with probabilities. The self perceived is the self that the Other 
regards. It is, Sartre continues, a self which I cannot escape and it is exactly this self that is giefan in 
moments of pride and shame. In this my possibilities become instrumentalities for the Other. That is, I am 
no more than an object for this Other to manipulate. Indeed, the experience of shame is this manipulation. 
As instrumentality my possibility is therefore probability (2003:288).  
 It is this distinction between possibility and probability that gets to the core of Sartre’s 
understanding of subject and object. Schutz’s criticism of Sartre fails to account for this distinction. He 
agrees with Sartre’s criticism of Husserl’s resolution of the intersubjective problem (Schutz, 1970a:36-
39), but then takes issue when Sartre admits there is an oscillation between subject and object such that 
two persons are never subjects to one another at the same time. Sartre speaks first of being enslaved by 
the Other (2003:291), and then later of regaining our subjectivity by making an object of the Other 
(2003:304). Schutz’s contends that if we accept this oscillation of subject/object how can we determine 
the Other has open possibilities? Just as my possibilities die under the regard so too ‘the objectified 
Other has no freedom of action within open possibilities, or better: his possibilities are dead possibilities, 
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 See Ch.2.iv.g. 
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referring to other objective aspects (I have) of the Other’ (Schutz, 1962e:200). Reintegrating Sartre’s 
terminology, this is to say that I can only ever know the Other’s probabilities, not her possibilities. And 
while this is true it is the problem of “knowledge of”. But the presence of the Other is not determined by 
knowing what her possibilities actually are; it is in realising myself as among her possibilities. 
 Schutz, we argue, misconstrues the dynamics of objectification and subjectification. To render 
this clear we are better off using “subject” and “object” as verbs (being) as opposed to nouns (entities). 
Only if we do this will we be considering being. Thus: as subject I subject the life-world to my acts and 
objects (as instrumentalities) object to this subjection. To avoid confusion we will refer to these verb uses 
by gehīersumian (subjection)37 and forstandan (objection)38. This allows us to re-integrate Scheler’s 
understanding of resistance (one translation of forstandan) (Scheler, 1980b:141-143). Entities 
forstandeen my gehīersumende and they are successful in this insofar as I lack appropriate “knowledge 
of” them.39 However, certain entities not only forstandee, they defy my gehīersumende. In this Sartre 
improves on Scheler to recognise the moment in which I find myself gehīersumed by some entity to 
which I can only forstandee.
40
 As such, to experience myself as gehīersumed is to recognise the Other’s 
presence.  
 As part of the dialectic accepted by Sartre this forstandeende may become gehīersumende. The 
problem for Schutz, still reading “subject” and “object” as designating entities, is that the subjecthood of 
the Other is lost the moment I reassert my gehīersumende over them. But this he denies because: 
Peter addresses Paul because he anticipates that Paul will understand him, 
and this implies that Paul will be able and willing to co-perform by his 
listening and interpreting activity the single steps in which Peter builds 
up, while speaking, the meaning of his message. (Schutz, 1962e:202) 
 
But what is not clear is how this differs from Peter addressing his computer. When Peter operates a 
particular program he inputs certain commands that he anticipates that his computer will understand and 
so interpreting them will gain the meaning of the message and carry out the operation desired. On this 
point we maintain that “knowledge of” the Other is no more difficult than “knowledge of” any object. 
But this is not to say that how Paul and the computer feature within Peter’s possibilities is not different. 
Because of the subjective experience of being gehīersumed by Paul, Peter’s “knowledge how” this entity 
                                                 
37
 Literally translated as “reduce”, “conquer”, “subject” and/or “make obedient”.  
38
 Literally translated as “hinder”, “oppose”, “resist” and/or “withstand”.  
39
 Strictly speaking we should say that objects which successfully do this geforstandan. The introduction 
of “ge-” changes this from a weak verb to a strong verb in Old English.  
40
 Sartre never explicitly refers to Scheler in this regard but there are uses of “resistance” that clearly echo 
Scheler’s and a near indentical criticism of Husserl and Heidegger (Sartre, 2003:347-355). 
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stands out from other entities determines its subsequent treatment within his possibilities.
41
 As Sartre 
explains, the experience of being regarded (gehīersumed) ‘pushes me into a new dimension of existence’ 
(Sartre, 2003:292). As suggested by Overgaard, this ‘attempt to “fight back” by objectifying the other is 
of no use, as it only allows me to conquer an object’ (Overgaard, 2013:116). Paul is unobjectifiable in the 
sense that Peter cannot orient himself toward Paul in the same way he can toward his computer because 
having been gehīersumed by Paul he “knows” Paul can do it again. In effect after the initial 
gehīersumende experience all subsequent interaction must factor Paul’s subjecthood. This is not 
epistemological knowledge in the sense that I can point to some feature of Paul as his subjecthood, but 
rather “knowledge how” is conditioning in that it sets limits for my interaction with Paul.42 As Sartre 
goes on to explain, even though the life-world may forstandee me it is only the Other that can limit me. 
By not- being-me the Other presents a limit to my own subjecthood, a limit that could not otherwise be 
known:  
It would perhaps not be impossible to conceive of a For-itself [subject] 
which would be wholly free from all For-others [other subjects] and 
which would exist without even suspecting the possibility of being an 
object. But this For-itself simply would not be “man”. (2003:306) 
 
Intersubjectivity as possibility, therefore, is brought about by the interplay of entities that gehīersume one 
another.
43
 
 We have called this experience of being gehīersumed “subjective” on the grounds that no 
rational standard can be provided to determine the occurrence of being gehīersumed (2003:291-292). 
There are two reasons for this. First, Sartre recognised being regarded is not dependent upon the entity 
possessing a particular set of constituents. Eyes may be the most common source of the regard but they 
are not the only one. Second, the experience is self-referential. It is I who feels shame or pride in the face 
                                                 
41
 Used in this context we can draw a parallel between beings differentiated by “knowledge how” and 
Sartre’s notion of the négatités. 
42
 It must be remembered that the regard is not about the actual constituents of Paul. If the regard is 
brought about by his looking at me this is bracketed in the actual experience of being regarded. It may be 
countered that in reflection I can bring to mind the fact that Paul looked at me and recognise this as the 
source of his regard. And we do not deny this, but his subjectivity, once established, is not then bound to 
his eyes. To say so would be to argue that to strike out his eyes would be to destroy his subjectivity.  
43
 Many criticisms of Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity stem from the result that this constant interplay 
of gehīersumian means that subjects are never equal. As Fretz summarises it, there is ‘no room for social 
intercourse in which equal subjects respect the ambiguity of human existence (facticity and freedom), 
with regard to themselves as well as to one another’ (Fretz, 1992:88). However, we regard this criticism 
on the basis of equality as somewhat vapid. Such arguments presume the equality of subjects but rarely 
consider what is meant by “equality”. Natanson, for instance, suggests that most of these criticisms 
charge that BN is not true to experience (Natanson, 1981:332-333). Ironically, Schutz is among those 
who appeal to this sort of argument and yet also argued at the same time that equality is a relative notion 
(see Ch.6.iii).  
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of the Other. These feelings are mine and do not entail that the Other is ashamed or proud of me. 
Combined, this entails that given two entities of the same kind we cannot exclude the possibility that I 
will only experience one as gehīersumende me. Or, given two entities of different kinds we cannot 
exclude the possibility that I will experience both as gehīersumende me. Contra Glendinning, there is not 
an ‘a priori assumption that non-human animals, along with stones and plants, are, in some way, 
absolutely deprived of the kind of “sight [gehīersumende]”, and hence also of the kind of “world”, that 
belongs to Dasein [wer]’ (1998:64). Rather, the recognition of Other as Other is no different from the 
recognition of certain groups as rihtgesetnessa.
44
 It is this point drawn from Sartre’s analysis of 
intersubjectivity that brings us to the very core of the crisis of social science. Contrary to Derrida (1969), 
we cannot speak of an “end of wer” but must rather accept “wer without end”. By this we mean that no 
essential possibility
45
 for which sorts of entities may be wer can ever be determined. 
 By consequence, if an entity does gehīersume me this only raises the practical possibility that 
entities of a similar kind can also gehīersume me. Were it a matter of essential possibility this would 
dictate that all entities of the same kind after this initial experience are wer. Further, this determination of 
practical possibility is not just a matter of which entities gehīersumen me, but the form that 
gehīersumende takes. By this we mean something akin to Scheler’s case of the ducks above. Let us say I 
have been gehīersumed by Maerin, during which she has imparted upon me that “Farholt is wer”. By 
consequence I may now treat Farholt as wer even though I have never had an originary experience of 
being gehīersumed by him.46 This indicates the need for a sociology of knowledge conspicuously absent 
in Sartre’s considerations of intersubjectivity.47 According to Berger and Luckmann, for Scheler, the 
sociology of knowledge is ‘concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality’ (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966:15). More exactly, it is to understand wer in terms of her “world openness”48 brought 
about by “socially approved” and “socially derived” knowledge such that each group develops its own 
“knowledge that” which presents limitations in terms of the practical possibility of which entities may or 
may not gehīersume a member.  
                                                 
44
 See Ch.5.ii. 
45
 See Ch.5. 
46
 Here we differ from Sartre slightly who took it that I cannot know – conceptual knowledge in the form 
of propositions – that a particular entity is an Other without this subjective experience (Sartre, 2003:292). 
47
 This lack was later recognised in his post-phenomenological period.  
48
 See Ch.2.iii.e. 
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 As such “knowledge that” involves the establishment of a rational standard regarding who can 
or cannot be wer. Thus if I know Morholt as wer, and Maerin is an entity of the same kind, this raises the 
likelihood that she too can be wer. Morholt, however, may deny that Maerin can be wer. To him she is an 
orc
49
: an entity who is perceived to be incapable of possessing the being that entities of the same kind 
have been perceived to possess. We are here extending Fitzgerald’s argument in Discourse on Civility 
and Barbarity in which the civil/barbarian dichotomy ‘is about who is and who is not properly human’ 
(Fitzgerald, 2007:111). A notion that can be traced back (at least) as far as the Greeks of Homer to 
Aristotle who made a distinction between oikumene (Greek-born) and barbaroi (non-Greeks). Husserl, 
too, spoke of the difference between “men” and “brutes” among humans (1988:126). However, we need 
to escape the use of “human” in this regard, as the Greeks were aware that there was only one species of 
human and as such the difference between oikumene (wer) and barbaroi (orc)
50
 is a social, rather than 
biological, valuation (Padgen, 1982:16-17).
51
 The difference between wer and orc is one of social 
valuation, entailing that Farholt can take up Morholt’s denial as his own. That is, Farholt may never 
experience being gehīersumed by Maerin precisely because Morholt has informed him that she cannot.  
 Yet this rational standard can never undermine the essential possibility that any entity can 
gehīersume me. Thus, even though the human prejudice may be a part of my European rational standard 
this does not preclude me from being gehīersumed by my dog. Indeed, when Manque poos she looks at 
me, a look which I interpret as some sort of embarrassment on her part and which inclines me to turn my 
back to her. By turning my back I am becoming an object in the life-world as it is orientated around 
Manque - submitting to her gehīersumende.52 
 Wer as a socially constructed concept will thus vary from group to group and from member to 
member within a particular group.
53
 To keep with Sartre’s terminology this is to say that wer is itself a 
                                                 
49
 From the Old English meaning “foreigner” or “demon”.  
50
 Both can in fact be translated as “foreigner”. They are also potentially linguistically related if not 
cognate. Padgen mentions the work of Ker (1958) in which the Normans were referred to as “barbarians” 
(1982:202). However, it is not clear who called them this and we have been unable to find an edition of 
The Dark Ages (1904, 1955) that matches this pagination and thus failed to find the reference Padgen has 
alluded to.  
51
 Scheler also produces a similar case to this (see 1973b:312).  
52
 A similar example can be found in Glendinning (1998:141-143). 
53
 Contrary to Glendinning it is possible to maintain Heidegger’s “sharp” distinction between Dasein 
(wer) and animals (not-wer) because as social this divide is subjective not ontological (Glendinning, 
1998:65-70). However, we are called to a more detailed analysis of being not-wer of which orc is only 
one type.   
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negation and that the various ways this negation is affected produce négatités wer.
54
 The crisis of social 
science lies in the very interest of studying wer when no unifying concept of wer can be given. This is the 
full significance of what we mean by “wer without end”. The proliferation of methodologies (normative 
philosophies of social science) stem from this crisis as each presumes a négatités wer in order to proceed. 
Phenomenology-of-religion, for example, proceeds with the négatités wer of homo religious.
55
 The lack 
of agreement that is encountered results from each négatités wer covering a restricted region of the 
province of wer (which is without end) and only partially overlapping with the négatités weras presumed 
by other methodologies. As such we charge that all such methodologies are inherently limited on the 
grounds that each works with a négatités wer that does not allow them, as philosophies of social science, 
to study the full extent of “wer without end”. It is on this basis that they are unable to cohere with one 
another.  
 In contrast to this, a phenomenological position must conclude – following Sartre – that an 
entity has the being of wer insofar as it is experienced by us as gehīersumende. We refuse on principle – 
namely the principle of principles
56
 – to determine whether the entities which do this are real or not; our 
interest is that these entities are giefan to us as being wer.
57
 Only by doing this can we understand how 
the presence of Others is recognised in such a way as to accommodate the empirical findings of scholars 
such as Hallowell and Levi-Strauss and keep to the postulate of adequacy that our social science 
demands.  
 
 
iv. Ferhđcund science 
 
While there are likely numerous négatités wer, in these closing comments we must deal with the human 
prejudice of the European négatités wer which is presupposed by many philosophies of social science. As 
we see it, the human prejudice is one among many ‘implicit premises which permeate the explicit 
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 A similar line of thought can be found in Foucault’s The Order of Things. More accurately Foucault 
argues that “man” did not exist until the end of the eighteenth century (2002a:336). As we understand it, 
Foucault’s discussion rather than covering wer without end really highlights the emergence of a particular 
négatités wer. Further study is required to explore the similarities and differences in Foucault’s projects 
and our own. An initial question would be the relation of this négatités wer to Husserl’s discussion of the 
European ferhđ. 
55
 See Ch.2.iv. 
56
 See Ch.3.iii.d. 
57
 We should also not think that wer is the only being these entities can possess.  
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propositions of [social] science in a hidden way, as a tacit dimension in the way [the scientist] as a 
scientist speaks and acts and practices his science’ (Kiesel, 2004:45). But in presupposing the human 
prejudice, social science becomes obstinate. By obstinate we mean that in presupposing the human 
prejudice we cannot escape this European orthodoxy of rationality. We cannot avoid pseudo-scientific 
colonialism of some sort because we will always assume that the people under study should accept the 
human prejudice also.
58
 
 But in saying this must we conclude that Schutz, whom we have heavily accused of human 
prejudice, also engaged in colonialism, and if so does this not then undermine the entire idea of social 
science that we have promoted through our normative philosophy of social science? Take the claim that: 
‘Of special importance for our topic [social science] is the constitution of specifically human, and that 
means cultural, worlds in their peculiar manner of objectivity’ (Schutz, 1962a:126). This has then 
impacted on those drawing from his phenomenology. Berger and Luckmann echo this claim: ‘As soon as 
one observes phenomena that are specifically human, one enters the realm of the social. Man’s specific 
humanity and his sociality are inextricably intertwined. Homo sapiens is always, and in the same 
measure, homo socius’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:69).59 Natanson claimed that ‘the reality of 
everyday existence presupposes the possibility of mutual interaction for all human beings of whatever 
epoch or culture’ (Natanson, 1981:333). And as we saw above, Duranti restricted intersubjectivity to 
humans alone, denying the possibility of non-human intersubjectvity (Duranti, 2010:12).
60
 Even in Sartre 
we cannot ignore that réalité humaine is translated as “human reality” and that he regularly referred to 
“human beings”. However, unlike those above we can reconfigure Sartre’s use of “human” with little 
damage to his thinking primarily because this use refers to a style of being rather than a kind of entity. 
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 This becomes doubly obstinate in the way that humans then become privileged in terms of “knowledge 
of”. E.g. there are claims like that van der Leeuw’s above – prototypical of phenomenology-of-religion – 
that wer is everywhere and everytime the same. Luther Martin has contented similiarly on the basis that 
evolutionary psychologists have found that the morphology of the human brain has remained relatively 
consistent for the past 100,000 years (Martin, 2012:63). The danger here is the slip into the “horse 
fallacy” identified by Evans-Pritchard whereby we assume that the humans of some past epoch think 
exactly like we do but really only construct a “world” that we (with all our prejudices) would conceive 
(Evans-Pritchard, 1977:108) We regard knowledge of humans from a past epoch as no more or less 
difficult than our knowledge of ducks. That we may happen to be human also offers no special privilege, 
or advantage we should say, in garnering this “knowledge of”. 
59
 They perpetrate the human prejudice in a number of places from an over-emphasis on language, to 
citing humans’ geographical spread and reproductive tendencies (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:65-70).  
60
 See Depraz’s study (2004) of intersubjectivity which draws on Husserl’s posthumous nachlass 
Analysen zur passive Synthesis (1966). 
200 
 
 In order to combat this we must remove ourselves to a lower epistemic level.
61
 To do this we 
will see how presupposing the human prejudice has a consequence for Schutz’s application of social 
science. Echoing Husserl,
62
 Schutz makes the point that the life-world in which I live in is one shared 
with fellow weras:  
My experience of the world justifies and corrects itself by the experience 
of the others with whom I am interrelated by common knowledge, 
common work, and common suffering. The world interpreted as the 
possible field of action for us all: that is the first and most primitive 
principle of organisation of my knowledge of the exterior world in 
general. (Schutz, 1964k:9) 
 
The life-world, we must remember, is the totality of all that is organised about me as its null-point 
(Schutz), as various instrumental complexes (Sartre). However, Schutz, presupposing the human 
prejudice, then makes a distinction between “natural” and “social”: ‘I discriminate between natural 
things, which may be defined as things essentially given to me and you and everyone, such as they are, 
independent of any human interference, and on the other hand, social things, which are understandable 
only as products of human activity, my own and others’’ (1964k:9). But in so presuming this he falls into 
exactly the same sorts of problems as we have identified above. Namely, the “natural world” is taken to 
be some sort of invariant core in the same way that “panhuman” indicates such. Indeed, this “natural 
world” gives us the “man-animal” from which spread various “social worlds” as derivations and 
deviations from this “core”, and can only be discussed as such. Berger and Luckmann, following Schutz, 
put it thus: ‘these biological facts serve as a necessary presupposition for the production of social order’ 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966:70).
63
 This point can also be seen in Spiegelberg’s description of the life-
world: ‘Now this world in the sense of an all-inclusive horizon was clearly not the world in the sense of 
objective science or cosmology. It was the world as experienced by a living subject in his particular 
perspective, however distorted, hence clearly a subjective and relative affair’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:146). 
More recently, Staehler, speaking on Klaus Held’s treatment of Husserl, has spoken of ‘the relation 
between the “one world” of humanity and the many cultural worlds’ (Staehler, 2007a:325). One can only 
understand the life-world as various “social worlds” presenting different perspectives on the one “natural 
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 See Ch.6.iv. 
62
 See Ch.2.iii.f. 
63
 We are sceptical of how much of Berger and Luckmann’s work is still consistent with Schutz’s 
phenomenology beyond this point. They make hefty use of Marx, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, 
Durkheim, and George Herbert Mead (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:29). It is not overtly clear, however, 
how reconcilable these thinkers are with Schutz’s phenomenology.  
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world”. But the failure of Schutz, Spiegelberg and Held in this regard is to not recognise that the very 
discrimination between a “natural world” and “social world” is itself social. 
 By saying this discrimination is itself social we mean that it is brought about by a group of 
concurring weras.
64
 Based on our understanding, “life-world” is the correlate of the questioner. 
Regardless of whether I do so scientifically or not, the life-world into which I enquire is inescapably my 
world. As Wciórka puts it: ‘Each person possesses its own world proper only for it … World is always 
world in reference to the person only’ (Wciórka, 1989:620). Through the processes of intersubjectivity 
my world is always recognised as a perspective on our world (1989:621). I recognise that my “Here” 
gives me a different perspective to the one you have at your “There”. Following Husserl in Ideas II: 
‘Each person has, ideally speaking, within his communicative surrounding world his egoistic one insofar 
as he can “abstract” from all relations of mutual understanding and from the apperception founded 
therein, or rather, insofar as he can think them as separated’ (Husserl, 1989:203). But this difference of 
perspectives is founded on the similarity we share as both being weras. That is, in order to participate in 
this “our” you too must be wer. We suggest in this regard that each négatités wer is the progenitive 
rihtgesetnes from which a life-world as “our world” can exist at all. But the wer who does not concur 
with us about this rihtgesetnes does not share our life-world; they have their life-world.  
 Husserl was beginning to make a similar distinction in the form of home-world and alien-world 
(Lewis and Staehler, 2010:57-58).
65
 However, we need to stipulate that Husserl’s notion of home-world 
and alien-worlds is a negation within a single life-world (Waldenfels, 2004:282). As Staehler notes of 
Husserl’s distinction: ‘alienworlds make us aware of our home context in a significantly different way 
from how we experience it in everyday life, and at the same time, this homeworld is put into question by 
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 While it is possible to call any group of concurring weras a collective person (see Ch.5.ii), it would 
potentially be more accurate to say that concurring weras actually involve a community of collective 
persons.   
65
 A key passage for the development of the idea of “alien-worlds” comes from “Crisis of European 
Man”. Speaking of European and Indian civilisations Husserl writes: ‘Dies tritt sofort hervor, sowie wir 
uns z.B. in die indische Geschichtlichkeit mit ihren vielen Völkern und Kulturgebilden einfühlen. In 
diesem Kreis besteht wieder Einheit einer familienhaften Verwandtschaft, aber einer uns fremden’ 
(Husserl, 1954:320). The key word “fremden” is translated by Lauer as “strange” (Husserl, 1965b:157) 
and by Carr as “alien” (Husserl, 1970c:275). Although Carr’s seems to be the predominant translation, 
Lauer’s could be used to create a connection with Schutz’s work, particularly his essay “The Stranger” 
(1964c). A third possible translation of “fremden” is “foreign”. While we have reservations about Carr’s 
translation we have maintained it for ease of exposition.  
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the existence of alien homeworlds’ (Staehler, 2008b:19). Home-world and alien-world represent possible 
“views” within our life-world which makes this “questioning” a matter of anguish.66 
 However, to speak of “views” does not mean that we are now endorsing world view analysis. 
Stemming from Robert Redfield’s work, a 
“world view” refers to the way the world looks to that people looking out. 
Of all that is connoted by “culture,” “world view” attends especially to the 
way a man, in a particular society, sees himself in relation to all else. It is 
the properties of existence as distinguished from and related to the self. It 
is, in short, a man’s idea of the universe. (1952:30) 
 
This understanding has in turn influenced the work of Hallowell, Saler (1977) and the phenomenology-
of-religion of Smart (1996). And while much of Redfield’s understanding is similar to what we have 
termed “life-world”, the phrase “world view” nonetheless indicates one and the same world shared by all 
for which there can be various perspectives. In the case of Redfield this is brought about by the human 
prejudice and presumes that humans share the world (our life-world). He admits that ‘to use the concept 
is to assume certain human universals’, one of which is that ‘every man separates other human beings 
from one another … and looks upon other human beings as significantly different from all else that is not 
human’ (1952:30).67 To speak of their life-world, however, is to speak of an orc-world: a life-world in 
which the négatités wer is constituted differently. Insofar as these orc-worlds engender “questions” for 
the home-world, as they are without our rihtgesetnes of wer they are sources of fear.  
 Any disagreement on wer indicates the multiplicity of life-worlds each constituted by its own 
négatités wer. It is therefore inappropriate to speak of the life-world for this implies the singular.
68
 Or 
rather, the problem lies in the full phrase “the world as it is for X” which we maintained in previous 
chapters, as this falls into the same problem as “world view” above by implying only a particular 
perspective on one and the same life-world which we must now deny. That is, the world as it is for atoms 
and as it is for planets is the study of two perspectives on the European life-world. Both “atoms” and 
“planets” belong to our life-world in that they are ways of organising the totality that surrounds us. 
Husserl also identifies this:  
The differences in “World pictures,” i.e., in empirically intuited worlds of 
things, which come to the fore within intersubjective consensus and 
which, despite their discrepancies as to content, nevertheless manifest 
themselves in intersubjective understanding as experiences of the world, 
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 See Ch.5.iii. 
67
 Redfield makes some rather hefty, and difficult to substantiate, claims about what these “human 
universals” are. 
68
 E.g. Wild (2004:127), Carr (2004:367-368), Lewis and Staehler (2010:59-60). 
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of the one and the same world, together with the impossibility, which 
results, of arriving on the basis of actual experience at unconditionally 
valid judgements about this world, necessitate theoretical research in the 
form of natural science. (Husserl, 1989:218) 
 
Atoms and planets are négatités, and Schutz’s distinction between a “social world” and a “natural world” 
another. They form part of what Scheler called the “relative natural view of the world” as that which is 
taken without question.
69
 Indeed, the very idea of an “absolute natural view of the world” is an idol of 
cognitional theory. To speak of “the world” is to mask an “our” and in such a fashion as to be normative. 
Hobbes’ “bellum omnium contra omnes”, for example, is no more than a ‘political foil and background 
for the future interests that all these typical “ideologies” seek to justify’ (Scheler, 1980b:74). To speak of 
“the world” to someone carries with it the tacit attempt to convince them to share this “natural view of the 
world”. Again this is recognised by Husserl: ‘Natural science brings to cognition “Objective” nature, 
which henceforth belongs for its part to the surrounding world of the communal spirit’ (Husserl, 
1989:219).
70
 Or, as Scheler put it in a potentially problematic statement: ‘[natural views of the world] 
belong at the bottom of the automatically functioning “group-soul” – and certainly not to the “group-
mind”’ (Scheler, 1980b:75). 
 Strictly speaking we should translate “Gruppenseele” and “Gruppengeist” as “group-gāst” and 
“group-ferhđ” (Scheler, 1980a:54). However, Scheler intends no gāstcund claims by the former: ‘These 
are not for us metaphysical entities that would substantially precede all living and experience with one 
another; rather, they are only the subject of psychic and mental contents which always produce 
themselves ever anew in experiences with others’ (1980b:69). Rather, he goes on to explain that to 
“group-soul” belong folk traditions, customs and mores and to “group-mind” belong philosophy, art, and 
science. He contrasts the two as bottom-up and top-down approaches. Thus, claiming that the natural 
view of the world is rooted in the “group-soul” is to say that it is not itself an “artificial” concept such as 
those produced by the “group-mind” but rather the conditioning which determines what sort of concepts 
can be thought of – it determines the sort of negations that can take place. The “group-mind” in effect 
formalises as négatités those negations already found in the “group-soul”. We do not need to maintain 
this distinction, however, to carry our point. Indeed, we should not. Not only do the terms confuse with 
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 It is also possible to find in Ideas II discussion of “näturlicher Weltbegriff” which translates as “natural 
world-concept”. According to Carr the phrase seems to have come from Richard Avenarius (Carr, 
2004:372). The phrase can also be found in Heidegger’s BT. We suggest that both likely developed the 
notion from Scheler.  
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our accepted terminology, but there is, we suspect, a lack of dialectic between the two in Scheler’s 
analysis.
71
 More important is how the relative natural view of the world conditions negations.  
 The scientific study of wer is not the study of the organisation brought about by such 
negations;
72
 it is the study of the organiser(s) – the one(s) doing the negation. To recognise wer as 
present is to recognise an entity capable of organising the life-world. As Scheler put it in NS: ‘our 
conviction of the existence of other [selves]
73
 is earlier and deeper than our belief in the existence of 
Nature’ (1954:259). Any disagreement as to who are and are not wer amounts not to a difference in 
“Here” and “There” but a disagreement over who does the organising and thereby the organisation that 
subsequently arises. For every group of concurring weras – a négatités wer – there arises a life-world.74 
No proper social science can proceed without the recognition that there is not one life-world but life-
worlds.
75
 Only by recognising this fundamental point which stems from “wer without end” will we avoid 
the consistent error of understanding their life-world by the conditionings of our life-world.  
 On this final point we must scrutinise our own use of “social”. Above we have said of Schutz 
that the division into a “social world” and “natural world” is a social one. Yet “social” is being used in 
two different fashions in this context. The problem is that when we speak of the “social” there is a 
tendency to set it in contradistinction to the “natural”. But to then say this contradistinction, this negation, 
is itself social seems to lead either to contradictions at worst or confusions at best. Carr, for example, in 
analysing Husserl’s presentation of “life-world” in Crisis erroneously places what he calls the “scientific 
world” and “cultural world” (sometimes used as a synonym for life-world by Husserl)76 on the same level 
                                                 
71
 As Husserl’s analysis of Galileo’s mathematisation of nature shows, the European life-world came into 
being by creating new conditions as to what sort of negations can take place. But in this respect what was 
at the time of Galileo part of the “group-mind” has since become part of the “group-soul” of Europe. We 
may usefully apply Thomas Kuhn’s (2012) notion of “paradigm shift” in this case with certain 
qualifications.  
72
 It is therefore the task of natural science to study these organisations, though whether the word 
“natural” of the title can still be maintained on the basis of this discussion is a point we will not explore.  
73
 Up until this sentence the phrase “fremden Ich” (Scheler, 1973a:253) is consistently translated as 
“other selves” and no explanation is provided for the sudden switch to “mind” which we have replaced. 
74
 Husserl may have been rendering a similar point when he spoke of the “harmony” of monads 
(1988:108). 
75
 This does not exclude “world view” completely. As suggested above worldviews apply to variations 
within the home-world brought about by different locations and epochs. Within the European life-world, 
for example, there have been ‘changes from the early Western organismic world-view, which extended to 
the thirteenth century, to the mechanistic world-view’ (Scheler, 1980b:43).  
76
 See Ch.2.iii.f. 
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(Carr, 2004:369-371). The error here being that he fails to realise that this “scientific world” is not equal 
to but derivative of the “cultural world”.77 
 Based on what we have said about “knowledge about” it must be recognised that wer always 
acts on the basis that there are other weras even when alone. If we return to Scheler’s absolute Robinson 
Crusoe, in our sense all of Crusoe’s actions are social even though the Others “known about” are not 
present.
78
 Indeed, his actions are oriented around their very not-being-here. How Crusoe acts upon or 
thinks about a rock is irrevocably social in that the Others’ not-being-here factors into his acting/thinking. 
In this we differ markedly from Weber who argued that social actions only occurred with animate objects 
and not inanimate objects: ‘Not every kind of action, even overt action, is “social” in the sense of the 
present discussion. Overt action is non-social if it is orientated solely to be the behaviour of inanimate 
objects’ (Weber, 1947:102). A similar division is found in Berger and Luckmann, following Schutz, 
between social and non-social activity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:71). The issue with this conception 
of “social” is that it is really a synonym for “public”. Or more exactly, only actions directed at “animate 
objects” can be classed as social. Not only is it unclear how the division between animate and inanimate 
is to be made but it is also far from obvious that actions directed to inanimate objects are non-social. 
What is not considered then is the notion that even an action committed in complete privacy is still social. 
Even Crusoe’s simple act of classification, of sifting one sort of rock from another is social in our regard 
because he always carries with him the possibility that an Other, were they present, might organise the 
rocks differently. But the inevitable conclusion our understanding leads to is that all Crusoe’s world is 
social in the sense that Others “haunt” him at every turn. And once recognised we are forced to ask what 
difference is there between “social world” and “world”? What does “social” add in such a consideration?  
 The answer can only be supplied if we in turn add, whether explicitly or not, the “natural world” 
to counterpoise it. But this “social world” we now speak of is not the “social” of our social science. 
Properly understood social science has as its object life-worlds as products of concurring weras. The 
negation of life-worlds into “social” and “natural” are not presuppositions of this science, which is how 
Schutz proceeds, but a part of this object to be studied. To act on the basis that atoms, planets, etc., are 
not themselves social ideas or constructs is to operate with a Europeanised understanding of our science: 
                                                 
77
 Carr also speaks of a third “perceived world”. However, the notion is deeply problematic because 
alongside the “cultural world” it is “pre-given”. But if both are “pre-given” it is question begging as to 
how the to two can be distinguished from one another.  
78
 A similar argument can be found in Glendinning (1998:123-125). 
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it presupposes the European life-world as the “absolute natural view of the world”. The human prejudice 
which we have tried to combat here is the highest expression of this Europeanisation. To co-opt a 
comment from Ioannides and Robertson, the human prejudice ‘seek[s] to re-inscribe [wer] within a 
biopolitical paradigm that brings about the centrality of the human, and particularly of certain humans’ 
(Ioannies and Robertson, 2013:230). So long as social science is treated as the contradistinction of natural 
science then we will continue to perpetuate this Europeanisation - this crisis of social science. We do not 
hesitate, therefore, to claim that any who accept this contradistinction are engaging in pseudo-social 
science. This is not to say they are not doing a science of a sort (meeting the postulate of nonpractical 
knowledge), but they are not doing a social science which is aware of its proper object.   
 We must, therefore, remove ourselves to an inferior epistemic level by abandoning “social 
science”. There are two social sciences, that which accepts the contradistinction with natural science and 
that – at a lower epistemic level – for which the former is a negation to be studied. It is a science for 
which all sciences (including itself) can be an object of study. To avoid confusion between the two we 
return to Husserl’s original title – “Geisteswissenschaft”. To reiterate our comments in the Introduction, 
we agree with Seebohm that “Geisteswissenschaft” should be translated as “spiritual science” or, in our 
terms, “ferhđcund science”. Indeed, we must now admit that the science whose essence we have been 
trying to clarify is the science of ferhđ. Ferhđ, as we have understood it, is the ability to address a life-
world in its “whatness”.79 In Sartre’s terms it is the capacity to create negations within a life-world. In a 
more significant sense, to be gehīersumed is to be the object of ferhđcund activity. Indeed, what Schutz 
called “socially approved knowledge” and “socially derived knowledge” properly entails the taking up of 
previous ferhđcund acts, i.e. negations, as one’s own.  
 To relate this to our emphasis on philosophical anthropology, we can say that the organisation of 
a life-world involves ferhđcund activity. Thus the negating of a life-world into “social” and “natural” is 
itself a ferhđcund act. And those participating in this process of organisation are recognised as wer. 
Indeed, the recognition of wer as wer as brought about by gehīersumian also entails our being brought 
within that very organisation being constructed. Gehīersumian places us within our life-world. Thus, 
insofar as our science is “social” this is to recognise only that no study of wer, as the source of ferhđcund 
activity as established in Chapter 2, can proceed without recognising that wer is only wer among weras. 
Scheler’s consideration of Crusoe and “knowledge about” is no more than the establishment of the 
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presupposition of our science at this level of meaning-context: there are weras like me as the source of 
ferhđcund activity and this can never be doubted. The crisis of ferhđcund science, then, predominantly 
brought about by the human prejudice, is the assumption that there is one life-world to which there are 
numerous derivative world views. We thus conclude that: 
Ferhđcund science is the pursuit of nonpractical knowledge into wer as a 
being who not only exists as part of the organisation of the life-world but 
acts as one among many organisers of a life-world. 
 
Furthermore we may add that on the basis of our conclusions in Chapter 5 that ferhđcund science as a 
nonpractical pursuit is a form of play and as such is not bound to universities. While rihtgestnesian may 
aid its practical possibility, it is not of essential possibility. Further, following our conclusions in Chapter 
6, as a form of play, ferhđcund science holds an inferior epistemic status and is easily abandoned when 
more practical concerns demand.  
 This essence of ferhđcund science is not, however, the end. While enough clarity has been 
achieved to explicate the problem at hand – the crisis of social science – it must be remembered that 
essences are the ideal of phenomenology. It is for this reason that the stricture of conscious adherence and 
the principle of presuppositionlessness exist as expressions of the postulate of verifiability.
80
 The errors 
and prejudices of one phenomenologist can be recognised and accounted for by his fellows. As such our 
argument does not invalidate the postulates of social science in Chapter 4 that Schutz discerned, even if 
after discerning them he continued to presuppose the human prejudice of the European life-world. Rather, 
through an imperial argument this clarification of the essence of social science, via the strictures of 
proper phenomenology established in Chapter 3, has pushed through to a lower level of meaning-context 
so that we have in fact been clarifying the essence of ferhđcund science. To carry the metaphor of that 
chapter, we have not provided a map of the terrain of the phenomenological continent. Rather, we have 
affected the necessary shift to enter the continent in such a way that understands the crisis of social 
science and from which constructive headway can now be made. Following the stricture of insight into 
essences, we are in no doubt that now that this shift has been affected that there are other problems in 
need of clarification.    
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Glossary 
 
Ferhđ – “spirit” understood in a “sociological” sense to mean the capacity to “halt” the world and address 
it in its “whatness”. Ferhđcund – “spiritual”.  
Ferhđloca – “body”. The sources from which an entity with ferhđ is able to act upon its world. 
Forstandan – “objection”. An object is an object in sofar as it objects to being subjected by a subject. 
Therefore an object is a particular localisation of resistence against the subject in their world. When this 
resistence is successful, i.e. the domination fails, this objection becomes geforstandan.  
Old English Modern English translation 
Forstandan Objection 
Forstandee Object 
Forstandeen Objects 
Forstandeende Objecting 
Forstanden Objected 
 
Gāst – “soul”: “spirit” when understood in a metaphysical sense. 
Gehīersumian – “subjection”. The mark of a subject is its ability to dominate the world about it. I.e. the 
subject subjects (or subjugates) its world according to its needs.  
Old English Modern English translation 
Gehīersumian Subjection 
Gehīersume Subject 
Gehīersumen Subjects 
Gehīersumende Subjecting 
Gehīersumed Subjected 
 
Giefan – “given”. Verb sense of “to give”. Not to be read as “accepted without question”.  
Rihtgesetnes
sg.
/Rihtgesetnessa
pl.
 – “institution” defined as a protected group. The presence of the group is 
accepted without question by the individual/group. If threatened it is actively defended. Rihtgesetnisc – 
“institutional”. Rihtgesetnesian – “institutionalisation”.  
Swincan – “Work” meant in the sense of any activity aimed towards the surviving and thriving of the 
person. Not meant in the sense of having a job.  
Wer
sg.
/Weras
pl.
 – “man”: the beings which we are. A valuation of another entity that it has the same sort 
of being as myself.  
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